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GAUDAPĀDA-KĀRIKĀ



with a complete translation into English,

Notes, Introduction and Appendices

By

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राजकीया प्राच्यविद्यालयभूतपूर्वप्राचार्येण
अनुक्रमाङ्कः “ ब ” ९

गैडपादकारिका

सरपरशुरामभाऊमहाविद्यालयभूतपूर्वप्राचार्येण
भाण्डारकरप्राच्यविद्यासंशोधनमन्दिरस्थसंशोधन—
विभागाधिपतिना करमरकरकुलावतंसेन दामोदरस्तुना
रघुनाथशर्मणा विरचितैराङ्गभाषानुवाद-
टिप्पण्यादिभिः समेता



पुण्यपत्तनस्थ—

भाण्डारकरप्राच्यविद्यासंशोधनमन्दिराधिकृतैः
स्वकीये मुद्रणालये
मुद्रयित्वा प्राकाश्यं नीता
शाके १८७५ वत्सरे १९५३ म्हिस्ताब्दे

मूल्यं पञ्च रुप्यकाः

Dedicated to
The Sacred Memory of
The Late Mahāmahopādhyāya
VASUDEVA SHASTRI ABHYANKAR

[1862-1942]

who did his utmost throughout his life to expound and
popularise the Philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya

P R E F A C E

Prof. Vidhuśekhara Bhattacharya published his edition of Gauḍapādakārikās (or Āgamaśastra) some years ago. A close perusal of that edition clearly showed that Prof. Bhattacharya had allowed himself to be carried a little too far by his leanings towards Buddhism, and hence some of his interpretations appeared clearly to be biassed and forced. While teaching Gauḍapādakārikā to the M. A. students, I had occasion to criticise Prof. Bhattacharya's interpretations, and I felt that it would be better to present my views in a book-form, before a larger circle of readers so that a balanced view of Gauḍapāda's philosophy could be taken. The present edition has been brought forth with such a back-ground.

Fortunately as regards the text of the Kārikās, there is no difference of opinion. Prof. Bhattacharya has collated a large number of MSS, but his text does not materially differ from that published in the Ānandāśrama series more than fifty years ago. I also looked into two MSS. specially lent by the Prajñapāṭhaśālā, Wai.

(1) Ms. No. $\frac{172}{44}$ — (माण्डूक्यकारिका)

This is not a very old Ms. It contains four Prakaraṇas, and the colophon at the end of the fourth Prakaraṇa is इति गौडपादभगवतः कृतौ आगमग्रन्थे उपदेशग्रन्थे वेदान्तसूले चतुर्थं प्रकरणम् ।

No. $\frac{167}{9}$ — (माण्डूक्योपनिषत्कारिकाभाष्य)

This also is not a very old Ms. It contains the first Prakaraṇa only, and the commentary of Ānandagīti. The colophon reads

इति श्रीमत्परमहंसपरिव्राजकाचार्यस्य शङ्करभगवतः कृतौ आगमशास्त्रविवरणे माण्डूक्योपनिषद्ग्रन्थे प्रश्रमं प्रकरणं संपूर्णम् ।

In the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute Collection, there is a Ms. called उपदेशग्रन्थ which contains only the 3rd and the 2nd Prakaraṇa of the Gauḍapādakārikās. None of these MSS. show any marked variations of readings. It may therefore be taken for granted that the text of the Kārikās is more or less fixed.

I have in effect stated above that the present edition is intended to show how Prof. Bhattacharya's Buddhistic interpretations of the Kārikās are not acceptable. I am aware that I might be charged with having taken a partisan view myself. In the Introduction, I have discussed several important topics in this connection, and have tried to show that Gauḍapāda was a traditional Vedāntist and that he took particular care to show now and then that his philosophy differed from that of the Buddhists.

I have to thank the authorities of the Bhandarkar O. R. Institute for having undertaken to publish this work in their Government Oriental Series. I must also thank Prof. Dr. Miss Sulochana Nachane, of the M. S. University of Baroda, for helping me in various ways.

In the end, I hope this edition would meet the needs of students of Indian philosophy, who wish to understand and appreciate Gauḍapāda's Ajativāda.

Poona,
28 August 1953 }

R. D. Karmarkar

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[The usual Abbreviations are used in this edition. The Bhāṣya on the Kārikās, attributed to Śaṅkarācārya is referred to as K.bhāṣya or Śaṅkara-bhāṣya.]	

INTRODUCTION

I Gauḍapāda : His Date, Life, Works etc.

In the traditional salutation formula repeated daily by the followers of Śaṅkarācārya, Gauḍapāda stands as the grand preceptor (*paramaguru*) of Śaṅkarācārya. गौडपाद comes after शुक, then गोविन्दयोगीन्द्र whose pupil Śaṅkara was ; thus—

- (1) नारायण
- |
- (2) ब्रह्मदेव, the lotus-born one
- |
- (3) वासिष्ठ
- |
- (4) शक्ति
- |
- (5) पराशर
- |
- (6) व्यास
- |
- (7) शुक
- |
- (8) गौडपद the great
- |
- (9) गोविन्द
- |
- (10) शङ्कर
- |
- (11-14) पश्चपाद, हस्तामलक, ब्रोटक,
 and वार्जिककार (सुरेश्वर).

From Nārāyaṇa up to Śuka, there is the पितृ-पुत्र succession ; from Śuka onwards there is the गुरु-शिष्य succession. The traditional date of Śuka would be about 3000 B. C., as he was the son of Vyāsa who lived at the time of the Mahābhārata war. Even if the latest date for the Mahābhārata war, viz. 1000 B. C. is accepted, and if Gauḍapāda was a direct pupil of Śuka as tradition asserts, the date of Gauḍapāda would be not earlier than 1000 B. C., and then Śaṅkarācārya who was the pupil of the pupil of Gauḍapāda, would have to be taken as having lived sometime between 2900 B. C. and

900 B.C. Tradition¹ again tries to avoid such a conclusion by assigning a long life of thousands of years to Śuka, as well as to Gauḍapāda. A more rational way to explain the position would be to believe that only the chief names, and not all the names, have been preserved by tradition as lying between Śuka and Śaṅkarācārya. Luckily some fresh evidence² has recently come to light in respect of the relation between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. A work called ‘Śri Vidyārṇava’ dealing with the Śākta doctrines by Vidyāranya (circa 1100 A.D.) says गौडादिशङ्करान्तात्र सप्तसंख्या समीरिताः ।, that is, there are five names of Ācāryas between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. The same work says that Śaṅkarācārya’s direct pupils were fourteen (शङ्कराचार्यशिष्यात्र चतुर्दश दृढव्रताः । दिव्यात्मानो दृढात्मानो निग्रहात्मकमाः ॥). Of these the names of the four pupils पद्मपाद, सुरेश्वर, हस्तामलक and ब्रोटक have become more well-known (only पद्मपाद’s name is given in the श्रीविद्यार्णव). The account seems plausible enough, but the writer who lived about 1100 A.D. speaks of himself as living in the fourth generation from Śaṅkarācārya, which is not in conformity with the generally accepted date 788 A.D. for Śaṅkara.

Anandagiri³ in his commentary on the Gauḍapāda-Kārikā-bhāṣya (that goes under the name of Śaṅkara) mentions that Gauḍapāda practised penance at Badarikāśrama, and Nārāyaṇa revealed to him the Kārikās on the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad.

Śaṅkara in his bhāṣya on the Śvetāśvataraopaniṣad says तथा च शुक्लशिष्यो गौडपादाचार्यः. It is true that here Gauḍapāda is referred to in the singular, but so is Vyāsa himself in the Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.

1 The Yogavāsiṣṭha describes Śuka as the greatest of Yogins who enjoyed the Samādhi state for more than ten thousand years !

जगाम शिखरं मेरोः समाध्यर्थमनिन्दितम् ॥

तत्र वर्षसहस्राणि निर्विकल्पसमाधिना ।

दश स्थित्वा शशामासावत्मन्यस्नेहदीपवन् ॥

(II. 1-43-44).

2 See the article ‘A Survey of the Śākta School’ (in Marathi) by Prof. H. B. Bhide, in Bhārata Itihāsa Saṁśodhaka Maṇḍala Quarterly Vol. XXXIII Nos. 1 & 2, 1953.

3 आचार्यो हि पुरा बद्रिकाश्रमे नरनारायणाधिष्ठिने नारायणं भगवन्तमभिव्रेत्यतपो महदत्यत ततो भगवानतिप्रसन्नस्तस्मै विद्या प्रादादिति प्रसिद्धं परमगुरुत्वं परमेश्वरस्येति भावः । on IV. 1.

The gods, likewise, are often mentioned in the singular, so the rule about the plural being used honorifically is not without its exceptions.

Bālakṛṣṇānanda (circa 17th century) in his शारीरकमीमांसाभाष्य-शार्त्तिक, describes Gauḍapāda as गौडजातिश्रेष्ठ and as one being in Samādhi right up from the Dvāpara yuga.

There is no reason to doubt the historicity of Gauḍapāda, on the strength of the above traditional account which could not have possibly invented him.

The Kārikās have been quoted by well-known writers, both Vedāntists and Buddhists :—

Śāntirakṣita and Bhāvaviveka⁴ quote some Kārikās as coming from some Vedāntasāstra. As both the above Buddhist writers were concerned with the doctrines and not the name of the author, the non-mention of Gauḍapāda need not appear surprising. In fact, Sanskrit writers normally quote passages from other works, without specifying the names of the authors. Śaṅkarācārya quotes the Kārikā अनादिमायया ... in his sūtrabhāṣya (II. 1. 9), with the remark अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तसंप्रदायविद्विराचार्यैः, and Kārikā III. 15 in the bhāṣya (I. IV. 14), with the remark तथा च संप्रदायविदो बद्धिति. (The plural used in both the cases is obviously intended to show respect and refers to only one Ācārya and not to many).

Sureśvara in his Naiṣkarmyasyaiddhi,⁵ quotes two G. Kārikās (I. 11 and 15), and one from Upadeśasāhasrī of Śaṅkara, with the remark एवं गौडैर्द्वाविद्वैनः पूज्येरयमर्थः प्रभाषितः। As द्वाविद्वैः here refers to Śaṅkara, गौडैः must refer to only one individual viz. गौडपाद. Dr. Walleser misunderstands गौडैः and द्वाविद्वैः to mean ‘representatives of the Gauḍa and Drāviḍa tradition’. The commentator ज्ञानोक्तम calls the G. Kārikās quoted in the नैष्कर्म्यसिद्धि, गौडपादीयवाक्य.

Vidyāraṇya in his पञ्चदशी refers to Gauḍapāda's teaching which is characterised as आचार्यसमति by his commentator.

The Vedāntasāra of Sadānanda quotes two G. Kārikās (III. 44, 45) as being too well-known, with the remark तदुक्ततम्.

4 About the 5th and 8th centuries A. D.

5 IV. 41, 42,

All this shows that Gaudapāda's work at any rate was fairly known to authors and commentators and he was referred to in terms of respect (though not by name).

Gauḍapāda seems to be a nickname and not a proper name, गौड being used to show respect ; and Gauḍa apparently refers to the Gauḍa territory where the Kārikās were written and where their author became famous.

Bhāvaviveka (500 A. D.), in his commentary तर्कज्ञाला on his own work मध्यमकहृदयकारिका, quotes four passages which closely resemble G. Kārikās. Śāntirakṣita (700 A. D.) in his मध्यमकालङ्घारकारिका quotes about ten G. Kārikās in connection with the औपनिषद् views, which are called उपनिषदशास्त्र by Kamalaśila, disciple of Śāntirakṣita. Gaudapāda in all probability cannot thus be later than 500 A. D.

The Kārikās of Gaudapāda show more than a similarity of thought and expression with the Mūlamadhyamakārikās of Nāgārjuna (whose date is accepted as circa third century A. D.) and with Catuhśataka of Āryadeva who was the disciple of Nāgārjuna.

The Kārikās of Gaudapāda are indebted a lot to the Bhagavadgitā, and if we believe in the genuine nature of the bhāṣya by Gaudapāda on the Sāṅkyakārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa (circa 2nd century), it is clear that the date of Gaudapāda must be somewhere between 300 to 500 A. D.

Alberuni (11th century A. D.) (pp. 131-2, Alberuni's India) says- ' ... the Hindus have books about the jurisprudence of their religion, on theosophy, on ascetics, on the process of becoming god and seeking liberation from the world as, e. g. the book composed by Gauḍa the anchorite, which goes by his name ... ' Further on, Alberuni refers to the book Sāṃkhya, composed by Kapila, the book of Patañjali, the book *Nyāyabhaṣa* composed by Kapila, ... the book *Mimāṃsa*, composed by Jaimini, ... the book *Lokayata*, the book *Agastyamata* composed by Agastya, ... and the book *Vishnu-dharma*. It is clear that Alberuni mentions Gauḍa the anchorite as representing the Vedāntic doctrine first, because the Vedāntic philosophy was held in high estimation. Though we do not know even now anything about *Nyāyabhaṣa* of Kapila or *Agastyamata* by Agastya, we think there is no reason to doubt the existence of some

work by Gauḍa as sufficiently well-known in Alberuni's time. Anyway Gauḍa the anchorite, mentioned by Alberuni, can reasonably be identified with Gauḍapāda, the author of the Gauḍapāda-kārikā. The tradition of Gauḍapāda as being a great Yogin is also corroborated by Alberuni.

One Sadāśivabrahmendra in his जगद्गुरत्तमालास्त्र, refers to Gauḍapāda as having expounded the bhāṣya of Patañjali, and as having been the preceptor of Apolony. The commentator Ātmabodhendra says Gauḍapāda came into contact with Āpalūnya (equated with Apollonius, the Pythagorean philosopher who lived in 100 A. D.). Even if this tradition is held to be correct, it would only show that *some* Indian philosopher had met the Greek philosopher, not necessarily Gauḍapāda. Again, it is now held that the Greek accounts in this connection are not at all trustworthy.

Works of Gaudapāda

Besides the Kārikās, the following works are known traditionally to have come from Gauḍapāda. No definite evidence is available on this point, but it would not be wrong generally to believe in tradition unless there is evidence to the contrary :—

(i) Bhāṣya on the Sāṅkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa

Some scholars are of opinion that the bhāṣya on the Sāṅkhyakārikās is of a very poor quality and betrays no flashes of deep thought, and hence it could not have been written by Gauḍapāda. These same critics, curiously enough, have no hesitation in thinking highly of the Māṭharavṛtti (bhāṣya by Māṭhara on the Sāṅkhyakārikās, which is certainly not better in any way than Gaudapāda's bhāṣya and has so many passages in common with it) which is supposed to have the honour of being translated into Chinese about the middle of the sixth century. According to some both Māṭhara and Gauḍapāda have drawn upon a common source which was known to the Chinese in translation⁶.

The bhāṣya is a matter-of-fact tame work, but Gauḍapāda had really not much scope to show his brilliance here, as he was required to follow the Sāṅkhyakārikās. Perhaps it was his first work when

6 Could it be that Māṭhara and Gaudapāda are identical and that the Māṭharavṛtti and Gaudapādabhāṣya are but two editions of the same work?

he was attracted to the tenets of the Saṅkhyā philosophy. Anyway we are not prepared to regard this work as not genuine. At the end of the 69th Kārikā-bhāṣya, we read

सांख्यं कपिलमुनिना प्रोक्तं संसारविमुक्तिकारणं हि ।
यत्रैताः सप्ततिरार्थं भाव्यं चात्र गौडपादकृतम् ॥

The bhāṣya designates the Kārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa as आर्याः. It contains the following quotation,

(*Karika 1*) सनकश्च सनन्दश्च तृतीयश्च सनातनः ।
 आसुरिः कपिलश्चैव बोद्धः पञ्चाशेषस्तथा ॥
 इत्येते ब्रह्मणः एताः सप्त प्रोक्ता ब्रह्मणः ॥

where some of the Saṅkhyā philosophers are described as sons of Brahmadeva.

पञ्चाशेषतितत्त्वज्ञो यत्र तत्राश्च मे वसेत् ।
जटी मुण्डी शिखी चापि मुच्येत नात्र संशयः ॥

This quotation from पञ्चाशेष is given twice in the bhāṣya (also under Kārikā 22). We give below the passages quoted from other works in the bhāṣya to give the reader a general idea about the work.

(*Karika 1*) अपाम सोममसृता असूमागन्म ज्योतिरविदाम देवान् ।
 किं नूनमस्मान् कृणवदरातिः किंसु धूर्तिरसृतमार्यस्य ॥

(This is from अर्थवृशिरस्त्र, Rgveda VIII. 48. 3)

तथा चोक्तम्

(*Karika 2*) षट् शतानि वियुज्यन्ते पशूनां मध्यमेऽहनि ।
 अश्वमेधस्य वचनादूनानि पशुभिन्निभिः ॥

(Mahidhara quotes this in his bhāṣya on Yajurvēda-Samhitā XXIV).

बहुनीन्द्रसहस्राणि देवानां च मुगे मुगे ।
कालेन समतीतानि कालो हि दूरतिक्रमः ॥

अपि चोक्तम्-

(*Karika 4*) आगमो ह्याप्तवचनमात्रं दोषक्षयाद्विद्धुः ।
 क्षीणदोषोऽन्तरं वाक्यं न ब्रूयादेवसंवात् ॥
 स्वकर्मण्यभियुक्तो यः सङ्क्षेपविष्वर्जितः ।
 पूजितरतद्वैघैर्नित्यमात्रो ज्ञेयः स तादृशः ॥

प्रतिभा यथा-

दक्षिणेन च विन्ध्यस्य सहस्रं च यदुतरम् ।
द्वायिव्यामाससुद्रायां स प्रदेशो मनोरमः ॥

उक्तं च-

- (*Karika 12*) रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः ।
उभयो तत्त्वसत्त्वसोमिथुनं तम उच्यते ॥
- (This is usually taken to come from देवीभागवत)
युणा गुणेषु वर्तन्ते (*Gītā III. 28*) इति वचनात् ।
- (*Karika 23*) तत्र यमाश्च नियमाश्च पातञ्जलेऽभिहिताः ।
अहिंसासत्यासतेयज्ञद्वचर्यापिश्रिया यमाः ।
शोऽसत्त्वोपतःस्वाध्यायेऽब्रप्रणिधानानि नियमाः ॥
(योगसूत्र 30, 32)
- (*Karika 61*) अज्ञो जन्तुरनीशोऽयमात्मनः सुखदुःखयोः ।
ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत्स्वर्गं नरकमेव वा ॥
(महाभारत III. 30-88)
- केन शुद्धीकृता हंसा मयूराः केन चिविताः ॥

उक्तं च-

कालः पचति भूतानि कालः संहरते जगत् ।
कालः सुमेषु जागर्ति कालो हि दुरतिक्रमः ॥

Thus the bhāṣya quotes from the Mahābhārata, Bhagavadgītā, Purāṇa, Yogasūtras etc. A study of the Sāṅkhya philosophy which preached that भूतप्रकृति was अविकृति led Gaudapāda to declare that there cannot be अन्यथाभाव of the प्रकृति, and the doctrine of the Puruṣa being a mere looker on, coupled with the statement of the Bhagavadgītā that the qualities, सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस् are responsible for the Samsāra (युणा गुणेषु वर्तन्ते) was utilised by him to enunciate ultimately his doctrine of Ajātivāda in course of time.

There is a strong probability that Gaudapāda wrote a commentary on the Sāṅkhya-kārikā and called his own independent work कारिका as well.

(2) उत्तरगीता— Gaudapāda's commentary on this work is known from the colophons as गौडपादीयव्याख्या on the उत्तरगीता, and commences with अखण्डं संविदानन्दमधाद्भूमनसगोच्चरम् । आत्मानमस्तिलाधार-माश्रयेऽभिट्ठिसिद्धये ॥ इह खण्ड, अर्जुनः 'अशोच्यानन्वशोच्चस्वम्' इत्यारभ्य भगवद्बृषदिष्ट-मात्मतत्त्वोपदेशं विषयभोगप्राबल्येन विस्मृत्युं उन्नत्तदात्मतत्त्वं भगवन्तं पृष्ठति-, and

ends with आत्मयोगमवोचयो भक्तियोगशिरोमणिः । तं वन्दे परमानन्दं नन्दनन्दन-
मीश्वरम् ॥

A good edition of this work is still a desideratum. The Vanivilas Press at Sri Rangam and the Gujarati Printing Press, Bombay have published this small work, but the text cannot be said to have been properly edited. Strangely enough, the Vanivilas editor says that several translations of this work have been published in English and other languages. We were unable to find even one after a search for the same all over India. The one English translation by Mr. Lahari, published by the Theosophical Society of Madras has been long out of print and we were unable to see it. We consulted eight MSS. of this work at the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona, and the following observations about them would show why a reliable edition of this work should be undertaken as early as possible :

Ms. No. 162 gives a total of 241 verses distributed in six chapters (I-39; II-30; III-42; IV-37; V-37; VI-56) and the colophon reads

इति श्रीमहाभारते भीष्मपर्वणि उत्तरगीतायां योगशास्त्रे ब्रह्मविद्यायां
श्रीकृष्णाञ्जुनसंवादे etc.

Ms. No. 163 gives a total of 137 verses only, distributed in three chapters (I-54; II-56; III-27) and the colophon reads

इति श्रीमद्भागवते उत्तरगीतासूपनिषत्सु ब्रह्मविद्यायां योगशास्त्रे श्रीकृष्णा-
ञ्जुनसंवादे etc.

Ms. No. 164 gives a total of 160 verses, distributed in three chapters (I-65; II-59; III-35) and the colophon reads

इति श्रीउत्तरगीतासूपनिषत्सु अश्वमेधपर्वणि etc.

Mss. 165-189 contain the commentary which is called गौडपादीय-
दीपिका or उत्तरगीतावाच्य (गौडपादाचार्यविरचिता) or गौडपादीयव्याख्या. The text is distributed in three chapters, but the number of verses varies (as 110, 116, 112, 123).

The name of the commentator however is the same viz. Gauḍapāda throughout. The unreliability of the colophons to the *Uttaragītā* is clearly shown from the fact that in no versions of the *Mahābhārata* is the *Uttaragītā* found either in the *Bhīṣmaparvan* or the *Āśvamedhika* parvan. Similarly it is not found in the *Bhāgavata*.

This raises the question whether the Uttaragītā was written by Gaudapāda himself, along with the commentary. It is not unlikely that Gaudapāda who seems to be indebted to the Bhagavadgītā for many ideas in his Kārikās, may have thought of emphasising the Yoga element in the Gītā, by writing a supplement to it. The Uttaragītā, besides describing the nature of Brahman, Jīvanmukti etc gives a detailed description of the Nādīs, Kundalini etc.

(3) सुभगोदयस्तुति— This is a small Tantric or Śākta work of the Stotra type, containing 52 verses. It begins thus :—

भवानि ऽनं वन्दे भवमहिषि सञ्चित्सुखवपुः
पराकारां देवीमसृतलहरीमैन्दवकलाम् ।
महाकालातीतां कलितसरणीकलिपततनुं
सुधासिन्धोरन्तर्वसतिमनिशं वासरमयीम् ॥

It refers to the two schools, समय and कौल of the Śāktas and condemns the कौल in no uncertain terms (तदेतत्कौलानां प्रतिदिनमनुष्टेयसुदितं भवत्या वामाख्यं मतमपि परित्यज्यसुभयभ । ४२ ; ... अतो बाह्या पूजा भवति भगरूपेण च ततो निषिद्धाचारोऽयं निगमविद्वाऽनिन्द्यचरिते । ४३). As can be expected, it refers to the Nādīs, पिङ्गला, इडा, चक्र, विन्दु etc. Verse 31 ककाराकाराभ्यां स्वरगणमवष्टुष्य निखिलं etc. is similar to काकीमुखकारान्त उकारश्वेतनाकृतिः । अकारस्य च लुक्षस्य कोऽर्थः संप्रतिपद्यते ॥ (Uttaragītā). On the whole, this small work reveals poetic talents of a high order.

It is argued by some that the author of this Tantric or Śākta work must be some other Gaudapāda. We do not think that there is any reasonable ground for such a supposition. As the author of the Kārikās had interested himself in the Sāṅkhya and Baudha philosophical works, he could have been equally interested in the Śākta school which attached so much importance to Yoga in its practical aspect.

(4) श्रीविद्यारण्यसूत्र is another Tantric work attributed to Gaudapāda, as also commentaries on (5) Durgāsaprāśatī, (6) Anugītā and on (7) Nr̄siṁhottarataṭapaniyopaniṣad.

The Māndūkyopaniṣad has much in common with the Nr̄siṁhotarataṭapaniyopaniṣad, and as Gaudapāda had used the Māndūkyā as a basis for his Kārikās, tradition seems to have regarded him as the author of the commentary on the Nr̄siṁha as well,

It appears to us that Gaudapāda's authorship of the Sāṅkhyakārikābhāṣya, Uttaragītā and Subhagodayastuti can be reasonably accepted to be correct. Gaudapāda appears to have been attracted by the Sāṅkhyakārikās in the beginning, from which he learnt of the Puruṣa being entirely different from the Prakṛti which alone was responsible for the evolved world. Then he was influenced by the Mūlamadhyamakārikā of Nāgārjuna, which advocated the unreality of the world, and this enabled him to advocate his Ajativāda based upon the cardinal doctrine of the Upaniṣads, the oneness of Brahman, and he wrote his own Kārikās to preach his Vedāntic doctrine, and especially to controvert the teachings of the Lāṅkāvatāra where the Buddha teaches a large number of doctrines, but fails to grasp the most important one which fact Gaudapāda proclaims by saying नैतद्वृद्धेन भाषितम् in IV-99.

II The Contents of Gaudapāda-Kārika

Prakarana I:— There is only one Paramātmā who is all-pervading, but he, in association with the various Upādhis or limiting adjuncts, functions in different ways in different states.

Thus—

(1) He resides in the body in the right eye, is known as Viśva, experiences the gross world (by means of the sense-organs and the mind) in the waking state.

(2) He is known as Taijasa, residing inside in the mind and experiences the subtle or non-gross in the dream state.

(3) He is known as Prājña, residing in the heart-Ākāśa, and experiences bliss in the state of deep sleep.

This all-pervading Paramātmā is known as Turya, the Fourth, being immutable, non-dual, where no duality which is the source of all miseries has any scope.

Viśva and Taijasa are bound down by the relation of cause and effect, perceiver and perceived, subject and object etc., under the influence of duality, Prājña only by the cause (Ajñāna) and they function accordingly ; while the Fourth is beyond all this and is but consciousness or Jñāna, and is *all-seeing* and beyond all duality. In the case of both Prājña and Turya, there is no experience of

duality, but the Prajñā remains influenced by the basic Avidyā or Ajñāna which is absent in the case of the Turya.

Some philosophers who believe in a real process of creation regard the creation as the manifestation of the Lord, or as resembling the dream or magic phenomena, or as due to the will of the Lord, or as coming from Kāla (Time) or as serving the purpose of enjoyment or sport for the Lord, or as being the nature of the Lord.

But all these theories are wrong. If the highest is known to be Āptakāma (whose desires are fulfilled), how could he be associated with creation in any capacity, without changing his own nature ?

So, the correct position in this matter is that all duality is but illusion and Advaita the only reality. When the soul, who is, so to speak, asleep under the influence of (Avidyā or) Māyā is awakened and frees himself from the clutches of Avidyā, Advaita, unoriginated, uncontaminated by the experiences in the waking, dream or deep sleep, flashes forth. If the creation were real, it would ever remain real, for none can ever change his nature. The various theories of creation have their use in gradually making the soul realise the Advaita which is extremely difficult to grasp, especially by people of ordinary intelligence.

The realisation of Advaita can be achieved by the worship of or meditation on the sacred ओङ्कार.

Corresponding to the three states (जाग्रत्, स्वप्न and सुषुप्ति) we have विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ forms of Ātman and these can be taken to resemble or as equated with अ, उ and म, the three मात्राः of ओङ्कार. For the purposes of उपासना, the symbol ओम् is very useful as it enables the साधक to get a proper idea of the Paramātman easily,

Thus—

ओङ्कार

(1) Has three मात्राः—अ,
उ, म

(2) अ is the first of the
alphabet, and

परमात्मन्

(1) Has three पाद-विश्व, तैजस
and प्राज्ञ (respectively con-
cerned with जाग्रत्, स्वप्न and
सुषुप्ति states).

(2) विश्व deals with the gross
which is first perceived and
thus resembles अ.

अ is all-pervading

विश्व can be equated with अ; as he also experiences all out-side world.

[So by meditating upon अ as resembling विश्व or as identical with विश्व, the साधक secures pre-eminence and all his desires].

(3) उ represents उत्कृष्टता and links अ with म्

(3) Similarly तैजस also is उत्कृष्ट as he is able to perceive the सूक्ष्म, and is also the link between the waking state and the state of deep sleep.

[By meditating upon उ as resembling तैजस or as equated with तैजस, the साधक secures excess and equanimity].

(4) म् represents 'measuring' and 'merging'. For, म् represents the limit of ओम् and म् merges into अ and उ to give a complete idea of ओम्.

(4) प्राज्ञ similarly lays down the limits of विश्व and तैजस, and after सुषुप्ति comes again the जाग्रत् state.

[By meditating upon म् as resembling प्राज्ञ or as equated with प्राज्ञ, the साधक secures omniscience and the idea about merging into the highest].

The meditation on the three मात्राः of ओम् as the three quarters of the परमात्मन् however does not lead to the highest knowledge which is to realise तुर्यं or the आत्मन् as without any quarters. This would correspond to the ओम् known as one unit (the नादब्रह्मात्मक ओम्).

The meditation on the Mātrā-less ओम् makes the साधक free from fear, for ओम् is nothing but the immutable Brahman which is the beginning, middle and end of all, all-pervading, and All-Controller, auspicious and non-dual. One who has known ओम् in this way is alone Muni *par excellence*; other Munis are called चुनिस by courtesy.

Prakarana II

It is admitted by all that the objects seen in dream are false, because they are seen within the limited space of the body and within a very short time. One sees mountains and rivers and goes to distant lands, even though one's body is lying motionless on the bed. Again, the सप्तयोजनता (the ability to serve a purpose) of objects in the dream is vitiated in the waking state. One who has enjoyed a full meal in the dream feels still hungry when he wakes up. Objects seen in the waking state have similarly their सप्तयोजनता vitiated in the dream state. So, there is no reason to suppose that they are in any way different from the objects in the dream. An object which is सत्य must retain its state under all circumstances and can never change its nature. Again, the truth of the dictum 'whatever is not there before and is not there in the end, must not be existing in the present as well' is self-evident. Judged in the light of this dictum, objects experienced both in the waking and the dream states are false and can be spoken of as being only imagined. This means that the Paramātman himself by his Māyā imagines himself as Jīva or individual soul who in turn creates a world of his own for himself. Nothing is really originated. The objects in the dream are real only to the dreamer ; the objects in the waking state are likewise real to the person who has experienced them. Objects in the dream are Cittakāla (lasting as long as the mind imagines them), objects in the waking state are Dvayakāla (imagined by the mind and also related to the external objects which are also imagined) ; but both are equally false. Objects in the waking state require, in addition, the use of sense-organs for being perceived, but that does not make them real. Just as, in darkness, one superimposes the snake upon the rope, people superimpose upon the Paramātman all kinds of ideas, shapes and forms. There is naturally no limit to one's imagination ; different people (as long as they have not secured the right knowledge) indulge in the pastime of describing the Paramātman in various ways. Thus the Ātman is taken to be (1) Prāna, (2) Elements, (3) Guṇas, (4) Tattvas, (5) Pāda, (6) Objects of sense, (7) Worlds, (8) Gods, (9) Vedas, (10) Sacrifices, (11) Enjoyer, (12) Object of enjoyment, (12) Subtle, (13) Gross, (14) Possessed of form, (15) Form-less, (16)

Time, (16) Quarters, (18) Topics for discussion, (19) Universe-divisions, (20) Mind, (21) Intellect, (22) Citta, (23) Merit and demerit, (24) Twenty-five principles, (25) Twenty-six principles, (26) Thirty-one principles, (27) Infinite, (28) People, (29) Āśramas, (29) Man and Woman, (29) High and Low, (30) Creation, (31) Dissolution, (32) Stability, (33) All-existing and so forth. In short, whatever one is pleased to imagine about or to superimpose upon Ātman, that becomes that Ātman for him. But people well-versed in the Vedānta know the so-called creation as nothing but a castle in the air, as false as objects in the dream or as the creation by magic. The Highest truth can thus be summarised as :— ‘There is no annihilation, no birth, no one bound down to Saṁsāra, no one trying for liberation, no one desirous of liberation, no one liberated’. For, only Advaita exists and it is unoriginated, and there is nothing distinct or non-distinct apart from Ātman.

Sages free from passion, fear and anger, well-versed in the Vedic lore, realise the Ātman as non-dual, auspicious, free from all distinction and where there is the sublation of Saṁsāra. One who has realised the Ātman in this way has no use for prayers to deities or sacrificial offerings to Pitṛs; he is beyond all Vidhi or Niṣedha rules, he stays or wanders at will and goes on with his daily avocations like an automaton. Having realised the Advaita in this way, the sage should take care to see that he does not fall down from that state, till the body comes to an end.

Prakarana III— When it is proved that there cannot be any origination or change associated with the Paramātman, all talk about the individual soul or Jīva having recourse to the Upāsanā or meditation on the Paramātman is really meaningless. For, the Jīva is Paramātman himself, and it is scant courtesy shown to Jīva if we narrow his functions and powers by calling him inferior to Paramātman. Really the Paramātman is like Ākāśa, infinite and subtle and Jīvas are like Ghaṭākāśa, Paṭākāśa etc. which are nothing but Ākāśa associated with the Upādhis, Ghaṭa, Paṭa etc. When the Upādhis vanish away, Ghaṭākāśa is merged into Ākāśa, similarly the Jīvas, with the Upādhis, body etc. gone, are merged into the Paramātman. So long as the Upādhis are there, the Jīvas retain

their individualities, names and forms and experience happiness or misery. Ākāśa is not changed or divided by Ghaṭākāśa etc.; similarly the Paramātman undergoes no change on account of the Jivas. Ghaṭākāśa is not a part or transformation of Ākāśa, so Jiva likewise is not a part or transformation of the Paramātman who has these Upādhis superimposed upon him by the ignorant.

The Taittiriyopaniṣad clearly points out how Paramātman is the inmost, unchangeable in the five sheaths of the Jiva; similarly in the Madhukāṇḍa we are told how the Ātman is one like Ākāśa in the Adhyātma and Adhidaiva pairs. The oneness of Ātman and Jīva is always acclaimed and their manifoldness decried by the Śruti. Sometimes the Śruti describes creation as something arising from the Paramātman (like sparks from fire, or jar from earth or a pair of scissors from iron), but such passages must not be taken at their face value. In this world, there are different grades of intelligent people; some are too dull-witted to understand the highest truth of Advaita all at once; it is for their sake that the Śruti, out of pity for them, speaks in a manner which can be understood by them. Passages speaking of duality are to be understood metaphorically only.

Advaita is the highest reality which can be only one; those who believe in Dvaita have ample scope for their imagination to run riot, with the result that they put forth all sorts of theories (for, who can curb their imagination?) and are always quarreling among themselves. Advaita looks on amusedly, pitying these Dvaitins; it can possibly have no quarrel with them. There cannot be any dispute about imagined things.

If then, there exists only the unoriginated Paramātman, the creation that is experienced can be explained only on the theory that it is due to Māyā and not real. A real creation is an impossibility. When a thing is produced, that means it was unproduced before, that is, its nature was 'to be unproduced'. Now nothing can ever change its nature. An unproduced thing must ever remain unproduced.

There are some Śruti passages that speak of creation from भूत, others from अभूत. We shall have to decide the question as to which passages are authoritative by strict logical reasoning, and should not

accept blindly what Śruti says. ‘There is here nothing manifold’ ‘Indra acts with his Māyā powers’ — these passages clearly point out that production or creation is due to Māyā. Some passages directly condemn production, others like ‘Who could possibly create him?’ deny the existence of ‘cause’.

The production or birth of an existent thing can only be due to Māyā, never in reality; if the production were to be real, it would be tantamount to saying that a thing already produced is being produced! A non-existent thing, it is obvious enough, cannot be produced either in reality or through Māyā; the son of a barren woman cannot be there even through Māyā! •

So, just as the mind vibrates in dream to produce false objects, it acts in the same manner in the waking state as well; the mind remains the same non-dual throughout. This duality is thus brought about by the mind-vibration; when the mind ceases its pranks, duality disappears. When the mind ceases to function, there is no perceivable, and pure, eternal, unoriginated consciousness, that is, Brahman, flashes forth. This is how the mind free from vibration, and under proper control, acts. In the state of deep sleep, the mind is still under the spell of ignorance, and has its mischief-making tendencies only lying dormant; but the properly controlled mind enjoying the Samādhi is nothing but Brahman itself, all light, and omniscient. This is a true description of such a mind, not a metaphorical one. In such a state of Samādhi, there is no desire, no anxiety, all is peace and quiet, light and fearlessness. There is self-realisation, unoriginated and unchangeable consciousness.

This state can be achieved by what may be called the ‘Free-from-touch yoga’. Ordinary yogins cannot reach it. Most of them are afraid that thereby there would be annihilation of the Ātman. The greatest self-control, and perseverance are required before one can reach this goal (some may find the task as difficult as to empty the ocean by means of taking out drops of water with a Kuśa grass blade). Desire and enjoyment would lead the साधक away from his goal now and then; even the temporary pleasure in the Samādhi may delude him, but he should strive with all his might against such temptations, set his face against Kāma (desire) and Bhoga (enjoyment), concentrating his mind upon the unoriginated Brahman alone. He should awaken the deluded mind in the

Samādhi, put it on the proper track when distracted, and see that it does not swerve from the stable path ; when he is able to do this, he has reached his goal, the mind has become Brahman, calm and eternal bliss.

The highest truth, therefore, is :—The doctrine of non-origination is the only true one, no individual soul is born, there is no cause that can produce him. Nothing is originated.

Prakarana IV :—

The individual souls are not different from the Paramātman, being all-pervading, subtle and incapable of being contaminated like Ākāśa—this is known by Jñāna which is also like Ākāśa and not different from the Paramātman. The ‘Free-from-touch Yoga’ which enables one to secure the right knowledge is beneficial to all creatures, conducive to their happiness, beyond all dispute and free from opposition.

Some disputants (the Sāṅkyas) declare that an existent is produced ; others (the Vaiśeṣikas) declare that a non-existent alone can be produced. Thus they carry on dispute with one another, and they controvert their opponents’ position, with the result that they both help in establishing the non-origination theory. The अजातिवादिन् is thankful to the सत्कार्यवादिन्S (Sāṅkyas) for showing how futile the arguments of the असत्कार्यवादिन्S (वैशेषिक) are, and to the latter for controverting the former. Both the सत्कार्यवादिन्S and असत्कार्यवादिन्S forget the basic principle that nothing can change one’s own nature. If a thing is असत्, it would ever remain असत्, it can never be changed into सत् and vice versa. It is the nature of all souls to be free from old age and death, but they imagine themselves to be subject to these ills and suffer accordingly.

According to the सत्कार्यवाद, the कारण itself (प्रधान) is transformed into कार्य (जगत्), which means that what is being produced is the कारण (प्रधान) itself ; if so, how can they assert that प्रधान (which is capable of being changed) is अज ? Further, they say कार्य is not different from कारण ; if so, then कार्य would be अज like कारण, and कारण would be subject to change and decay like the कार्य ! No illustration can be given which can prove to us that an अज thing can produce any कार्य ; and there would be the fault of endlessness if it is assumed that a जात मूलकारण produces further जात कार्य.

The view of the असत्कार्यवादिन्‌s that असत् (कारण) produces सत् (कार्य) is untenable on the face of it. An असत् could produce only असत्, never a सत्. If the घट is non-existing before its production, where can the कारकसामग्री (the potter, wheel, etc.) work upon ? If the सृतिका is worked upon, then we will have to say that सृतिका is being produced and not घट !

Some try to account for the creation of the world and कार्यकारणभाव in general on the strength of the argument of अनादित्व. Thus they argue :— धर्मधर्म is the cause of देहादिसंघात, and देहादिसंघात is in turn the cause of धर्मधर्म and this series has no beginning. But this argument cannot stand. For, according to these अनादिवादिन्‌s, both धर्मधर्म and देहादिसंघात are कार्य, and as such both must have another आदि or कारण; the whole प्रपञ्च or संसार must also have an आदि in that case.

To say that the कार्य देहादिसंघात (which is the कार्य of धर्मधर्म) produces the कारण धर्मधर्म, is as absurd as to say that a son produces the father !

To prove that there exists a कार्यकारणभाव between two objects, you ought to be able to indicate clearly what the order is in respect of कार्य and कारण:—

(1) कार्य and कारण cannot obviously come into existence simultaneously ; otherwise, we will have to admit कार्यकारणभाव between the left and right horns of a cow !

(2) कार्य cannot produce कारण, for the कारण has to be there first to produce the कार्य.

(3) The mere statement that कार्य and कारण are interdependent and mutually produce each other would not do. You must tell us which of these is the कारण (which must necessarily be पूर्व) and which is the कार्य (which must be अपर). But this you are unable to do.

Thus the कार्यकारणभाव stands unproven. Nobody can say, which comes first, कार्य or कारण ; and without the पूर्वपरभाव, कार्यकारणभाव cannot be proved, for कार्य and कारण cannot be produced simultaneously. Taking all these difficulties into consideration, the wise philosophers have decreed that non-origination is the only true doctrine !

(4) The maxim of the seed and the sprout (where mutual कार्यकारणभाव is seen) cannot help the ज्ञातिवादिन्, for unless you first prove the कार्यकारणभाव between बीज and अङ्कुर independently, you cannot make use of this illustration.

(5) The very fact that you are not able to say, which comes first, कार्य or कारण, proves the non-origination theory; for, if a thing is being produced, you ought to be able to say what is there prior to its production.

So, the upshot of this all is that nothing is produced of itself or from another. Nothing is originated, whether it is existent, non-existent or existent-non-existent. Whatever has no beginning can have no origination.

If then only Brahman (which is प्रज्ञानघन, massed consciousness) exists, how do we get the experience of the particularity of knowledge (of Ghata, Pata etc.) ? So, the existence of external objects of knowledge will have to be admitted on the strength of logical reasoning (so argue the ब्राह्मार्थवादिन्). To this the reply would be (in accordance with the views of the विज्ञानविशेष) that reasoning must give way to facts. The existence of external objects is not necessary to produce Prajñpti (or ज्ञानविशेष), for without them, we get that kind of knowledge in dreams. The Citta (or mind, Vijnāna) of its own accord, without contacting external objects or appearances (Arthābhāsa) can produce that knowledge. Arthābhāsa and Artha both are really non-existent. Citta knows no independent object at any time.

The Vijñanavādi Buddhas however believe in some kind of transformation of the Citta. Gauḍapāda lays down his proposition against them as under :— Neither Citta, nor perceptible by Citta is originated; those (like the Vijñanavādins) who admit their origination see the foot-prints of birds in the sky (that is, they make an absolutely impossible claim). To believe in the origination of the Aja Citta or Cittadṛṣya is to believe in the change of one's nature; to say that Saṁsāra is beginningless means that Saṁsāra can never end and Liberation, if it has a beginning, would never be eternal. Like objects in dream, objects in the waking state also are false. The Citta sees in dream things by means of another body (the body of the dreamer lies on the bed all the time) going to

different regions; all admit that this body of the dreamer is false. Applying the same argument to the waking state, the Citta can be proved to perceive false objects in the waking state as well (Besides, these objects are perceivable only to the particular Citta). So, we have to admit that nothing can be really originated; a non-existent thing can never come from सत्. An असत् can not come from असत्, सत् cannot come from असत्, सत् can not come from सत् and असत् cannot come from सत्. In the waking state (as in dream), one perceives things imagined by the Citta.

For those who cannot grasp this philosophical truth, the wise have enunciated as a temporary phase, the doctrine of origination and the existence of external objects on the ground that such objects are perceived and can be put to practical use. But ultimately such people come to realise that the external objects are like the magic-elephant unreal, and that Vijnāna which creates these objects or appearances is unoriginated, without any duality, unmoving and unruffled.

The Citta can be aptly compared to a fire-brand. When the fire-brand is whirled about, it produces various forms, straight, crooked etc. which are not seen when the fire-brand is at rest; these forms do not come from outside, nor do they enter the fire-brand when the brand is at rest, or go out. No कार्यकारणभाव can be seen between the fire-brand and these forms which must be declared to be unreal and inscrutable. In the same manner, the vibration of the Citta appears to give rise to various objects or Dharmas which are unreal and inscrutable.

So, these Dharmas are not originated by the Citta, nor is the Citta originated by the Dharmas (the Buddhas do believe in some kind of origination for the Dharmas) and so the wise philosophers proclaim the doctrine of 'non-origination'.

So long as the obsession about the हेतुफलभाव continues, there would be no freedom from the results of the causal relation, and from the Samsāra; when the obsession ceases, the Samsāra also comes to naught. Everything is originated by Māya and that is consequently not permanent; unoriginated सत् can have no end. The Dharmas that are spoken of as originated by some, are not really so; their production is due to Māya which has no real existence.

A magic sprout produced by a magic seed, can not be described as either eternal or non-eternal; the same is true of Dharmas. In the case of originated things, the expressions eternal or non-eternal are meaningless.

In dream we find the Citta active and producing duality on account of Māyā, though it is non-dual ; in the waking state also, the Citta acts likewise. In dream, the dreamer sees all kinds of objects which are really not different from his Citta, and are perceivable by him alone ; the same thing happens in the waking state. Both Citta and Citta-dṛśya are interdependent and are not different from each other. As the objects in dream or those created by magic or yogic power are born and perish, so also all these Dharmas are born and perish due to Māyā. The Highest truth can once more be stated as : No Jīva is originated, no origination is possible, nothing is originated—this alone is the true doctrine.

All the duality involving the relation of perceiver and perceivable is but the vibration of the Citta which is itself void of contact with objects and is unchangeable. What exists on account of Māyā does not exist in reality (other schools of philosophy may postulate to the contrary). A thing imagined as unoriginated by Māyā can not be really unoriginated. When the absence of duality is realised, there is no cause for ‘origination’. This state of the Citta, unoriginated, is always same and free from duality ; having realised this, one secures the highest place (Brahman) free from grief, desire and fear. Once it is realised that there are no independent Dṛśya things, the Citta turns back from its wrong obsession and the calm natural state of the Citta, unoriginated and non-dual is realised by the enlightened ones. The Citta flashes forth in all its eternal glory and light. But the Citta (or Brahman or Ātman) is wrongly taken to be associated with any dharma involving duality and ideas about ‘is, is not, is and is not, is not is not,’ by the ignorant and only he who realises that the Citta is unconnected with duality, can be said to be all-knowing. What more can a person want after he has secured this omniscience and the highest place aimed at by the Brāhmaṇas, non-dual, without beginning, middle or end ! This realisation is the goal of the training of the Brāhmaṇas; this is the natural self-control and calm.

The wise have described what is Jñāna, Jñeya and Vijñeya ; this should be properly grasped.

In Laukika Jñāna, there is duality where the external objects are believed to exist, along with their perception.

In Pure Laukika Jñāna, there are no external objects but their perception is admitted.

In Lokottara Jñāna, there are neither external objects, nor their perception and in course of time, the wise one would be entitled to have omniscience.

All dharmas are by nature without beginning, like Ākāśa ; there is nothing manifold about them in any way. All are enlightened from the very beginning ; all are likewise tranquil and pure from the very beginning. Every thing is thus unoriginated and same. Those who believe in manifold nature of Jivas or Dharmas are narrow-minded and dull-witted ; only those of large intellect can realise the unoriginated eternal. The unoriginated Dharmas have this Jñāna by nature ; it is not transferred to them, hence Jñāna is said to be contactless. Even if there is the slightest idea of manifoldness, the person comes to grief, for his Jñāna ceases to be 'Asaṅga'. All dharmas are thus naturally pure, enlightened from the beginning, and liberated,—so realise the wise ones.

The highest Jñāna as described above is natural and cannot be transferred. Gautama Buddha did not preach this.

The highest place (or Mokṣa) is thus unoriginated, same, pure, free from duality, very difficult to grasp and to realise.

III Was Gaudapāda a Buddhist?

Prof. Dasgupta in his 'A History of Indian Philosophy' (Vol. I, pp. 423-429) has discussed the question whether Gaudapāda was a Buddhist, in great detail and his conclusion is ".... that there is sufficient evidence in the Kārikas for thinking that he was possibly himself a Buddhist and considered that the teachings of the Upaniṣads tallied with those of Buddha ... Gaudapāda assimilated all the Buddhist Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda teachings and thought that these hold good of the ultimate truth preached by the Upaniṣads. It is immaterial whether he was a Hindu or a Buddhist, so long as

we are sure that he had the highest respect for Buddha and for his teachings which he believed to be his".

Prof. Vidhuśekhara Bhattacharya is another great champion of Buddhism and has endeavoured in his edition of *Gauḍapādakārikās*, to prove that *Gauḍapāda* was merely reproducing Buddhist philosophical ideas in his work and no more. While Prof. Dasgupta does not appear to have made a detailed study of the *Kārikās*, and so confines himself to a few salient points in his criticism, Prof. Vidhuśekhara goes all out to uphold his thesis that *Gauḍapāda* was a Buddhist. In our Notes, we have shown in detail how the interpretations put on the *Kārikās* by Prof. Vidhuśekhara, do not bring out the meaning he wants to extract from them. Here we would be discussing the problem in a more general manner.

To begin with, it must be made clear how the two Professors have chosen to ignore some basic facts in their enthusiasm for glorifying Buddhism :—

(1) The following verse is traditionally regarded as giving the Guruparamparā of Śaṅkarācārya,

नारायणं पद्मभवं वसिष्ठं शक्तिं च तपुत्रपराशरं च
च्यासं शुक्रं गौडपादं⁷ महान्तं गोविन्दयोगीन्द्रमथास्य शिष्यस् ।
श्रीशङ्कराचार्यमथास्य पद्मपादं च हस्तामलकं च शिष्यं
तं तोटकं वार्तिककारमन्यानस्मद्गुरुत्वं सन्ततमानतोऽस्मि ॥

Here *Gaudapāda* is mentioned as either the teacher's teacher (or, at any rate a predecessor) of Śaṅkarācārya. It is simply unthinkable that, if *Gaudapāda* were a Buddhist, he would have been so solemnly selected every day in the Śaṅkarāpiṭhas that undoubtedly stand for the traditional Hinduism. Traditions are often, it is true, not quite trustworthy, but traditions involving daily practice can not be ignored.

(2) Śaṅkarācārya in his *Sūtrabhāṣya*, quotes *Gauḍapādakārika*, with the remark अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसंप्रदायविज्ञिराचायैः 'अनादिमायथा श्रुते' etc. (I. 16). He thus refers to *Gaudapāda*, most respectfully as a great Ācārya who knows the traditional Vedānta teachings. Such a reference would be quite out of order, if *Gaudapāda* had been a Buddhist.

⁷ Same as गौडपाद; the use of पद् for पाद is perhaps due to the exigence of the metre.

(3) The state of Mokṣa is called ब्राह्मण पद (IV. 85) in the Kārikās. Would a genuine Buddhist refer to Mokṣa in terms of a rival philosophy ?

(4) The Kārikās have as their basis the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad (in the First Prakarana), quote Taittirīyopaniṣad by name, and are indebted to the Brhadāraṇyaka, Chāndogya, the Bhagavadgītā, etc. for its doctrines. All these are Vedāntic works. No Buddhist would have shown such reverence and preference for non-Buddhist works.

(5) After having enunciated his doctrines, Gaudapāda at the end of his work categorically says that his philosophy has *not* been taught by Buddha (नैतद्वृद्धेन भाषितम् IV. 99). It is true that attempts have been made to explain away this passage, so as not to be regarded as anti-Buddhistic, but these carry no conviction.

(6) Gaudapāda in II-25, refers to the Bauddhas (मन इति मनो-विदो लुच्छिरिति च तद्विदः) for the *purpose of combating them*. In IV. 54, he comes to the conclusion एवं न चित्तजा धर्माश्रित्यं वापि न धर्मजस्त, thus showing that he does not hold the Vijnānavāda of the Bauddhas. Similarly the Bāhyārthavādins are also shown to be wrong in their views.

In the face of the above positive pieces of evidence, it appears strange to us, how the question of Gaudapāda being a Buddhist could have been ever taken up seriously.

We shall now briefly consider the arguments put forth by Dasgupta and V. Bhattacharya.

(1) It is contended that the expression द्विपदां वरम्⁸ in IV. 1. refers to गौतमबुद्ध. We have shown in our Notes on the Kārikā in question how the Mahābhārata uses the expression a number of times and that द्विपदां वरम् was never accepted as a peculiar epithet of Buddha. There is a greater probability of the expression referring to Nārāyaṇa or Śuka.

(2) There are various terms current in Buddhistic philosophy, used in his Kārikās by Gaudapāda, such as धर्म, चातु, लोकोत्तर, तापिच, देशित, वैशारद्य, संदृति etc. This however might at the most prove that

8 See B. O. R. I. Annals Vol. XXXII pp. 166-173 Dvipadām Varam by R. D. Karmaikar.

Gaudapāda had studied Buddhistic philosophy very well, which no one denies. We have shown in the Notes, how Gaudapāda uses some of the above terms (धर्म, संदृति etc.) in a more or less Vedāntic sense. Gaudapāda did accept the Buddhistic terminology, in order to be in a better position to contradict the Buddhist tenets successfully.

(3) अस्पर्शयोग referred to so respectfully in IV. 2, is a characteristic feature in Buddhistic philosophy.

The expression अस्पर्शयोग is not actually found used in Buddhist literature. Gaudapāda owes that expression to the Bhāgavatagītā which refers to मात्रास्पर्शं as हुःखयोनि (मात्रास्पर्शस्तु कौन्तेय शीतोष्णारुद्र-हुःखदाः । ... II. 14, V. 21) and consequently अस्पर्शयोग is the panacea to end all misery.

(4) The simile of the fire-brand (अलात) is peculiarly Buddhistic.

Gaudapāda need not have gone to the Buddhists for the simile. अलात is found used in Rāmāyaṇa (Kiśkindhākāṇḍa)⁹, Mahābhārata (Karṇaparvan)¹⁰ and Yogavāsiṣṭha¹¹. The idea of whirling the fire-brand could have been easily suggested by the expression आमपन्सर्वभूतानि यन्वारुद्धानि मायया in the Gitā (XVIII-61).

(5) There is a large number of passages in Gaudapādakārikā which seem to be the echoes of the Mūlamadhyamakārikās of Nāgārjuna, such as

भूतं च जायते किञ्चिद्भूतं नैव जायते । (IV-4)

स्वतो वा परतो वापि न किञ्चिद्भूतं जायते । (IV-22).

9 आदर्शतलसंकाशा ततो वै पृथिवी मध्या ।

अलातचक्रप्रतिमा दृष्टा गोप्तद्वत्कृता ॥ Kiśkindhākāṇḍa XLVI. 13.

10 अलातचक्रवत्सैन्यं तदा वधाम तावकम् । Karṇaparvan, 86. 42.

11 यथालातपरिस्पन्दादभिचकं प्रदश्यते ।

असुदेव सदाभासं वित्तस्पन्दात्तथा जगत् ॥ V. 78. 1.

मिथ्यैव मे विवलगम्ति नीरूपा नयनाद्यः ।

अलातचक्रप्रतिमा: सर्परञ्जुर्भैर्मोर्पमाः ॥ V. 82. 23.

The major portion of the Yogavāsiṣṭha can be assigned to the period later than that of Gaudapāda, but there are undoubtedly some strata in that work, which belong to the earlier period.

There need be no hesitation in admitting that Gauḍapāda has borrowed several ideas from his predecessors, both Buddhists and Vedāntins. Various passages in the Paramārthasāra and Yogavāsiṣṭha can be shown to bear striking similarity with those in Gauḍapāda's work.

(6) The expression बुद्ध in its various forms (बुद्धैः, बुद्धानां etc.) has been used to refer to the Buddhists and Gautama Buddha is directly mentioned in IV-99.

It has been shown in the Notes, how the expression बुद्ध is in most cases used by Gauḍapāda merely in the sense of 'the wise one' and it is unfair to read too much in it.

(7) The चातुर्कोटिक idea mentioned in (IV-83, 84) is borrowed by Gauḍapāda from Saṃjaya Belattiputta, a pre-Buddhist heretic.

Even if Gauḍapāda is taken to have been a borrower as suggested above, that does not prove anything.

(8) Agrayāṇa in Kārikā IV-90 means Mahāyāna.

It may very well mean 'the Pūrvamimāñsa'.¹²

It would thus be seen that the attempt of certain scholars to prove that Gauḍapāda was a Buddhist and that he preached Buddhistic philosophy or that he incorporated Buddhistic ideas in the Upaniṣadic philosophy, can not be said to be successful in the least. There is no doubt that Gauḍapāda studied very carefully the various philosophical systems current in his own time (such as the Sāṅkhya, Buddhistic, Gītā) in addition to the Upaniṣads and evolved his famous doctrine of Ajātivāda, which is certainly far removed from the main tenets of Buddhist philosophers, viz. (1) Momentariness (kṣaṇikatva) and (2) Dependent origination (pratityasamutpāda) which all schools of Buddhistic philosophy accept. The teachings of Gauḍapāda can under no circumstances be described as identical with or approximating to those of Śūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna.

Gauḍapāda thus seems to have been neither a Buddhist nor a Buddhist in disguise, but one who had a profound respect for

¹² See notes p. 142.

Vedāntic tradition and who evolved his doctrine of non-origination, after having studied the different systems of philosophy current in his time, and having found that they could not stand the test of logical reasoning. He was, in short, a Vedāntist, both by tradition and conviction; hence it was possible for Śaṅkarācārya and other Vedāntists to take his philosophy as their firm basis to build their detailed theories upon.

IV The Title of the whole work and the several Prakaraṇas thereof

The two hundred and fifteen Kārikās comprising the four Prakaraṇas, as a whole are described in the Manuscripts variously as गौडपादीयकारिका, or गौडपादकारिका (in the plural or the singular) or आगमशास्त्र. Fortunately there is no discrepancy as regards the *number* of the Kārikās. Similarly there are no material variants or different readings worth noting as regards the text itself. Prof. Vidhuśekhara Bhāītachārya has collated a large number of MSS. but nothing very striking has been revealed in the matter of the text proper. We also looked into several more Manuscripts at the Bhandarkar Institute and two more specially obtained from Wai, but have not found any new readings worth considering. One Ms. No. 171 at the B. O. R. I. which contains the third (अद्वैताख्य) and the second (वैतर्थ्याख्य) Prakaraṇas calls the work उपदेशाघन्थ. The Buddhist writer ज्ञानितरक्षित who quotes a number of Kārikās, quotes them as from बैदालतशास्त्र. One commentator on the Pañcadaśī seems to call Gaudapāda's work माण्डूक्योपनिषद्कारिका¹³ and Gaudapāda as वार्तिककार. Prof. Vidhuśekhara apparently likes to call the work आगमशास्त्र. There is no particular reason why one title should be regarded as preferable to the other. The simpler title गौडपादकारिका appears to us most likely to be the genuine one.

As regards the titles of the four Prakaraṇas, there is no controversy about the names of Prakaraṇas II, III and IV which are respectively called वैतर्थ्यप्रकरण, अद्वैतप्रकरण and अलातशान्तिप्रकरण. According

¹³ The title माण्डूक्योपनिषद्कारिका; is also found in some colophons.

to K-bhāṣya,¹⁴ the second Prakaraṇa proves logically the वैतश्य of द्वैत (तस्य द्वैतस्य हेतुतो वैतश्यप्रतिपादनाय द्वितीयं प्रकरणम्) and hence the name वैतश्यप्रकरण. Perhaps the real reason is that the first Kārikā in the second Prakaraṇa begins with the word वैतश्य (it would be remembered that the केनोपनिषद् is so called because it begins with the expression केनेषितं). The third Prakaraṇa is called अद्वैतप्रकरण, because it likewise proves the reality of the अद्वैत (तथा द्वैतस्यापि वैतश्यप्रसङ्गपातौ शुक्लितस्तथात्वदर्शनाय दृतीयं प्रकरणम्). The fourth Prakaraṇa is obviously called अलातशान्तिप्रकरण on account of the striking simile of the अलात there (Kārikās 47-50). The first Prakaraṇa is variously described in the Manuscripts as आगम, ओङ्कारनिर्णय and ओङ्कारप्रोपासना. In favour of calling the Prakarana आगमप्रकरण, the argument is usually advanced that it is based mainly on आगम or Śruti. The K-bhāṣya remarks तत्र तावदोङ्कारनिर्णयाय पथम् प्रकरणमागमप्रधानमात्मतत्त्वप्रतिपत्त्युपायभूतम् । While it is true that the first Prakaraṇa is mainly based upon the Māndūkyopaniṣad, there is nothing specially characteristic about it so as to differentiate it from the other Prakaraṇas and to name it आगम. Besides, the word आगम is usually associated with special sectarian doctrines (cf. पात्रवाचागम, शैवागम) and not with the general Upaṇisadic tenets which are referred to in the Kārikās. This also will show how the name आगमशास्त्र does not seem to be appropriate for the Kārikās as a whole. The concluding sections of the first Prakaraṇa describe the sacred syllable ओङ् in detail and wind up with the statement that 'he is the real sage who knows the Omkāra' (ओङ्कारो विदितो येन स मुनिनेतरो जनः । I-29). The name ओङ्कारनिर्णय or ओङ्कारप्रोपासना or better still ओङ्कार as Ānandagiri would have it, would be far more appropriate for the Prakarana.¹⁵

V The Māndūkyopaniṣad and the twenty-nine

Kārikās in the first Prakarana

The Māndūkyopaniṣad contains 12 prose passages or Mantras and commentators on the first Prakaraṇa of the Kārikās apparently

14 We have described the bhāṣya on the Kārikās, attributed to Saṅkarācārya as K. bhāṣya, as we are of opinion that the bhāṣya could not have been written by the great Saṅkara. A separate paper on this topic is going to be published by us in the near future.

15 The colophons in MSS. giving the titles of sections or chapters of a work vary so much that they can be regarded as but noting the individual fancy of the copyist or the commentator. There are more than half a dozen titles found in MSS. for some of the Adbhūtās in such a well-known work as the Bhagavadgītā,

regard the Kārikās as part of the Māndūkyā and distribute the twenty-nine Kārikās as follows, with the introductory expression अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति—

(1)	Māndūkyā	1-6	followed by Kārikās	1-9
(2)	"	7	" "	10-18
(3)	"	8-11	" "	19-23
(4)	"	12	" "	24-29

K-bhāṣya seems to regard the Māndūkyopaniṣad and the four Prakaraṇas as one work (ओमित्येतदक्षरमिदं सर्वे तस्योपव्याख्यानम् । वेदान्तार्थ-सारसंग्रहभूमिदं प्रकरणचतुष्यमोमित्येतदक्षरमित्यारभ्यते ।).

According to Madhvācārya (13th century) and his followers, both the Mantras and the Kārikās were revealed by Nārāyaṇa to Varuṇa in the form of a frog (the Kārikās had been revealed earlier to Brahmadeva). Madhvā quotes passages in this connection from the Padma and Garuḍa Purāṇas and also the Harivaiśa; but these are not found in any of the editions of those works available so far; Kūraṇārāyaṇa, a follower of the Rāmānuja school, says that the Kārikās corroborate the sense of the Mantras which, being स्वप्रमाण, need no corroboration.

This raises the questions :

(1) Do the Kārikās form part of the Māndūkyā, and (2) if not, what is the purpose of the Kārikās and how do they come to be associated with the Māndūkyopaniṣad ?

The answer to the first question can only be an emphatic No., for the following convincing reasons : —

(1) In several MSS. of the Māndūkyopaniṣad, only the Mantras (the prose portion) are given and there is no indication in the MSS. that the Kārikās ever formed part of the Māndūkyā, as is clear from the Nirnayasagar edition of the Upaniṣads.

(2) It is only the commentators commenting upon the Upaniṣad and the Kārikās together, who seem to regard the two as forming one complete whole.

(3) The Upaniṣads being Śruti are supposed to be *apauruseya* (not composed by any human agency) and it would be going

against all tradition to make Gauḍapāda, who was after all a human being (even though a great Yogi), the author of a Śruti work.

(4) The Kārikās are undoubtedly Gauḍapāda's and Śaṅkarācārya rightly refers to Gauḍapāda merely as one who knows the Vedānta tradition (वेदान्तार्थसंबोधविद्).

(5) It is admitted that sometimes the Kārikās are regarded as Śruti by some writers, but that simply would prove that the word 'Śruti' is loosely used in a broad sense, and nothing more.

It is unnecessary to pursue this topic further, for nothing can upset the traditional view of the Upaniṣads' being without any known human author, and so Gauḍapāda could not be regarded as the author of the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad proper.

(6) If the Kārikās which are introduced with the words अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति are regarded as forming part of the Upaniṣad, it would mean that Gauḍapāda lived at least some centuries earlier than the time when the Māṇḍūkya was written, so as to be famous enough to have his work quoted in it ! The Māṇḍūkya is generally regarded as one of the old Upaniṣads, while according to the above theory, it would have to be assigned to the 7th or the 8th century at the earliest ! In order to obviate this difficulty attempts are made to show that Gauḍapāda may have lived in the first century B. C. or even earlier, but that would not solve the basic absurdity of a human work being quoted in an Upaniṣad !

(7) The expression अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति with which the Kārikās are distributed among the Mantras of the Māṇḍūkya, no doubt suggests that the Kārikās existed before the Upaniṣad; similar expressions occur in the other old Upaniṣads (and Brāhmaṇas) also. Thus in the Taittirīyopaniṣad, we have the expression तद॑व्येष श्लोकः used as many as eight times. In all these cases, we have a prose passage stating a particular topic and then comes the emphatic dignified तद॑व्येष श्लोकः, introducing verses corroborating what has been stated before or the श्लोक has the sense of a संग्रहश्लोक. In the Chāndogya also, we have तद॑व्येष श्लोको or तद॑व्येष श्लोको भवति used seven times in a similar context. The Chāndogya uses अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति in one place and ushers as many as fifteen verses there, but there is reason to doubt whether these are genuine or interpolations. (In later

Upaniṣads we have a similar expression अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति, ushering about 10 verses in the मैत्रायणी, or as many as 75 verses in the षष्ठिकृतकोपनिषद् etc.). Even a superficial scrutiny of the passages in the old Upaniṣads where the श्लोके are introduced, shows that the Ślokas are used by way of clinching the argument or corroborating briefly and emphatically the argument used before in longer prose passages. In fact, the expression तद्वये श्लोको भवति has an authoritative ring about it, as compared with the docile and timid expression अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति with which Gauḍapāda's Kārikās are introduced.

(10) Prof. Vidhuśekhara has rightly pointed out how Gauḍapāda's Kārikās can in no way be regarded as a commentary on the prose portion of the Māndūkya. In fact, the matter is so obvious as not to require any elaborate attempt to support it. The Kārikās refer to matters not mentioned in the Upaniṣad, fail to explain important terms therein, enumerate several views about creation which matter is not even hinted at in the Upaniṣad and so on. Thus the first group of Kārikās fails to explain the important words सप्ताङ्ग and एकोनविशतिसुख in the prose portion of the Mantra. The Kārikās use the expression वैश्वानर in place of विश्व ; जागरितस्थान, स्वप्नस्थान and द्वृपुरितस्थान in the prose portion are not found in the Kārikās and so on. Similarly the prose portion appears to explain some terms in the Kārikās. There are also differences of interpretation about the words तुर्य, मिति, आत्मि etc. But all this criticism is based upon the wrong supposition that the Kārikās are a commentary on the Mantra prose portion or vice versa. The proper view is that the Kārikās have the Mantra portion as their basis and Gauḍapāda emphasises only those points which are useful for his own purpose which is to establish the Ajātivāda. Prof. Vidhuśekhara makes use of certain Kārikās in the first Prakaraṇa to prove that the Kārikās were earlier than the Mantra portion, but in our opinion they cannot possibly bear the interpretation he seeks to put on them. (All these cases have been discussed in detail in the Notes). The Kārikās take the Māndūkyopaniṣad as their basis and are mainly concerned with pointing out the importance of the Upāsanā of the sacred syllable Om, and incidentally refer to the different views of those who believe creation to be real. Kārikā I.7, स्वप्नमायासरूपेति द्वृष्टिरन्यविकल्पिता refers to those who believe in a real creation (the Viśiṣṭādvaitins and some Buddhists) and not to the Advaita

Vedāntins as is clear from the expression अन्यैः. Similarly Kārikā I-8, देवस्यै स्वभावोऽयमातकामस्य का स्पृहा does not contain Gaudapāda's view, but has in mind the स्वभाववादिन्, according to whom creation is real and can be attributed to the Lord's nature alone.

The position as regards the Kārikās in the first Prakarana is therefore as follows :—

(i) The Kārikās do not form part of the Māndūkyopaniṣad. They are as Ānandagiri puts it, तद् (उपनिषद्) विवरणस्त्वा.

(ii) Gaudapāda could not have written the Upaniṣad which could not have under any circumstances any human author.

(iii) Gaudapāda wrote the Kārikās; they are आचार्यप्रणीत as Ānandagiri expressly says.¹⁶

(iv) The Kārikās did not exist before the Upaniṣad, but were written long after.

(v) In the case of other Upaniṣads where similar ślokas have been introduced, they are invariably shown as part of the Upaniṣads in the MSS of those Upaniṣads, whereas several MSS. of the Māndūkyopaniṣad contain only the prose portion.

If the Kārikās did not form part of the Upaniṣad, how did they come to be associated with it in such an intimate manner? Bearing in mind that this intimate association is found mostly in the commentaries on the Kārikās, the answer appears to be that the Kārikās on account of their having the Māndūkyopaniṣad as their basis, and their importance as a well-known work on Advaita, came as a rule

¹⁶ Saṅkarācārya quotes the Kārikā (I. 16) अनादिमायथा मुसो यदा जीवः प्रस्तुत्वे in his bhāṣya on Brahmaśūtra II. 1. 9, and the Kārikā III. 15 मूलाहचिरफुलिङ्गादैः सृष्टिर्या चोदितम्यथा in the bhāṣya on I. 4. 14. The Kārikās are वेदान्तार्थसंप्रदायविद्यार्थप्रणीत according to Saṅkara. Sureśvara, Saṅkara's pupil, in his Nālakarmyasyādiddhi (V. 41-44) quotes two Kārikās (I. 11 and 15) कार्यकारणबद्धो ताविष्वते विष्वतेजसां etc. and अन्यथा गृह्णतः स्वप्नो निष्ठा तस्यमजामतः etc. expressly mentioning that they are Gaudapāda's. Similarly in his Bijhadvārtika, Sureśvara quotes some of the Kārikās. In the face of this evidence it is idle to deny that the Kārikās in the first Prakarana were written by Gaudapāda.

to be studied side by side with the Upaniṣad, and the teacher while explaining the Upaniṣad introduced the Kārikās to the pupil at suitable stages and the tradition was respected by the commentators and is even now kept up in the Pāṭhaśālās. It is therefore unnecessary to read any deeper meaning in the expression अत्रैते श्रोका भवन्ति which innocent-looking expression has unnecessarily caused such a furore amongst students of Advaita Vedānta.

VI Are the four Prakaranas inter-related ?

Prof. Vidhuśekhara argues out the case that the four Prakaranas are not inter-related, but are independent treatises which were later put together and called Āgamaśāstra. He criticises the arguments of the K-bhāṣya which shows the inter-connection of different Prakaranas, and comes to the conclusion that K-bhāṣya has not succeeded in proving its thesis.

The arguments of the K-bhāṣya are to be found in its comments at the beginning of each Prakaraṇa. At the very beginning of the first Prakaraṇa it takes stock of the whole work as follows :—

(1) The first Prakaraṇa is mainly based upon the scripture for the purpose of ascertaining the Omkāra, and shows the means for understanding the nature of Ātman.

(2) The second Prakaraṇa shows logically how duality is false, as the knowledge of Advaita can only be had when the Saṁsāra projected by duality is sublated.

(3) Dvaita is false, but the Advaita is not so ; this is logically proved in the third Prakaraṇa.

(4) The fourth Prakaraṇa discusses the rival doctrines opposed to Advaita and points out how they are opposed to one another.

K-bhāṣya, in its introductory comments at the beginning of the second Prakaraṇa says that the existence of the one without a second was stated in the first Prakaraṇa on the strength mostly of the Śruti passages.

The second Prakaraṇa shows that the non-reality of duality can be proved by reasoning and by suitable analogies.

The third Prakaraṇa shows how Advaita can be known, not merely by Śruti but by reasoning also.

The fourth Prakaraṇa describes in detail how the rival theories being opposed to one another, show their own false nature and thus Advaita becomes triumphant as a matter of course.¹⁷

Prof. Vidhuśekhara objects in toto to the above exposition of the K-bhāṣya and finds nothing acceptable in it. His objections are :—

(i) The first Prakaraṇa is not आगममात्र, it contains some reasoning or तर्क as well.

¹⁷ We quote here the original Sanskrit comments in full, which clearly show how the author of K-bhāṣya had a good grasp of the Kārikās as a whole.

तत्र तावदोङ्कारनिर्णयाय प्रथमं प्रकरणमागमप्रधानमात्मतन्वप्रातिपत्त्युपायभूतम् । यस्य द्वैतप्रपञ्चस्योपशेषेऽद्वैतप्रतिपत्तौ रज्जवामिव सर्पादिविकल्पोपशमे रज्जुतत्त्वप्रतिपत्तिः ।

तस्य द्वैतस्य हेतुतो वैतश्यप्रतिपादनाय द्वितीयं प्रकरणम् । तथा द्वैतस्यापि वैतश्य-प्रसङ्गपातौ युक्तितस्तथात्वदर्शनाय तृतीयं प्रकरणम् ।

अद्वैतस्य तं तथात्वप्रतिपत्तिप्रतिपक्षभूतानि यानि वादान्तराण्यवैदिकानि तेषामन्योन्यविरोधित्वादत्थार्थत्वेन तदुपपत्तिभिरेव निराकरणाय चतुर्थं प्रकरणम् ।

ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यत इत्युक्तम् । एकमेवाद्वितीयमित्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः । आगममात्रं तत् । तत्रोपपत्त्यापि द्वैतस्य वैतश्यं शक्यतेऽप्यधारयितुमिति द्वितीयं प्रकरणमारभ्यते ।

ओङ्कारनिर्णय उक्तः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवोऽद्वैत आत्मेति प्रतिज्ञामात्रेण । ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते इति च । तत्र द्वैताभावस्तु वैतश्यप्रकरणेन स्वप्रमायागन्धर्वनगरदिघष्टन्तेहृश्यत्वाद्य-न्तवत्त्वादिद्वैतभिस्तर्केण च प्राप्निपादितः । अद्वैतं किमागममात्रेण प्रतिपत्त्यमाहोस्त्वित्तर्केणापीत्यत आह । शक्यते तर्केणापि ज्ञातुम् । तत्कथमित्यद्वैतप्रकरणमारभ्यते ।

ओङ्कारनिर्णयद्वैतरेणागमतः प्रतिज्ञातस्याद्वैतस्य बाह्यविषयभेदवैतश्याच्च सिद्धस्य पुनर्द्वैते शास्त्रयुक्तभ्यां साक्षात्क्लिधारितस्यैतदुच्चमं सन्यमित्युपसंहारः कृतः । अन्ते तस्यैतस्यागमार्थस्याद्वैतदर्शनस्य प्रतिपक्षभूता द्वैतिनो वैनशिकाश्च तेषां चान्योन्यविरोधाद्वाग्द्वैषादिक्षेशास्पदं दर्शनमिति मित्यादर्शनत्वं सूचितम् । क्लेशानासप्दत्वात्स्यदर्शनामित्यद्वैतदर्शनं स्तुयते । तदिह विस्तरेणान्योन्यविश्वद्वैतदर्शनत्वं प्रदर्श्य तत्प्रतिषेधेनाद्वैतदर्शनासिद्धिरूपसंहृत्यावीतन्यायेनेत्यलालशान्तिरारभ्यते ।

This objection simply shows that Prof. Vidhuśekhara is hyper-critical, that is all. Surely K-bhāṣya wants to say that the first Prakarāṇa dealing as it does with the औङ्कारोपासना and the चतुष्पाद Brahman by implication, takes its stand upon Śruti, not that it excludes Tarka or reasoning entirely.

(2) The Professor further asks : ‘ If the connection between Books I and II is really as it is shown by Śaṅkara (K-bhāṣya) to be, then why is it that the author of Book II himself does not say so just at its beginning though he could do so easily ? ’

The answer to this would be that if authors all over the world had been so obliging and logical, there would have been no work left for commentators or critics. But the fact is that authors do not, as a rule, say things in a clear-cut manner as one would like them to do. Take the case of the author of the Bhagavadgītā. It is no exaggeration to say that there are as many views about the Gītā as there are writers on it. And if we apply the above test put forward by Prof. Vidhuśekhara to the Gītā, as regards the inter-connection between the different Adhyāyas, the author of the Gītā would be cutting a very sorry figure indeed ! Similarly, while studying the interpretations of the Brahmasūtras by different Bhāṣyakāras, how many times in sheer annoyance has one to blurt out ‘ why does not the Sūtrakāra say so directly, if that was his intention ? ’ But we have to take things as they are. The criticism in such cases ought to be in the spirit of स्थितस्य गतिश्चिन्तनौया.

(3) Prof. Vidhuśekhara says that there was no necessity of having two separate Prakarāṇas II and III at all. There should have been only one Prakarāṇa. For, in both the Prakarāṇas, reasoning has been resorted to in order to prove the same topic ‘ non-duality ’ ultimately.

The answer is that though the topic is the same ultimately, the emphasis is different. The second Prakarāṇa deals mainly with the illusoriness of the Prapāñca ; the third Prakarāṇa deals with the non-origination so as to prove the non-duality. Thus the approach in the two Prakarāṇas to the ultimate problem is different.

(4) Prof. Vidhuśekhara would like to enunciate a general rule that a Prakarāṇa is entitled to be called an independent work if the

contents in it could be understood without any reference to the earlier Prakaraṇa.

This dictum cannot possibly be accepted by any one. In that case, the Bhagavadgītā can easily be shown to be comprising at least half a dozen independent Adhyāyas. It is no use arguing that it does not matter in the least if we have a dozen Gītās instead of one. For, this is after all a defeatist attitude in a way. There is bound to be a connecting link, in the case of a well-known work, which knits the different sections thereof and it is the commentator's duty to point this out in a sympathetic manner and to represent the intentions of the original author in a connected reasoned way.

If objections can be taken in a hyper-critical spirit, we may as well object to the fact that Gaudapāda repeats certain Kārikās now and then, makes use of four Kārikās while describing the similarity between Alāta and Vijñāna (IV-49-52) in self-same words (he could have easily said simply that Vijñāna acts in the same way as Alāta, instead of repeating the idea word for word) or writes three Kārikās in describing the Svapnamaya, Māyāmaya and Nirmitaka Jivas (IV-68-70), when he could have disposed of the topic in one Kārikā and so on. Such criticism is clearly unhelpful.

Broadly speaking therefore, it must be conceded that the first three Prakaraṇas are written in the same style, giving due importance to both Śruti and Tarka, and discussing the general topic of Advaita, though with a different emphasis and thus are closely related with one another.

The Fourth Prakaraṇa, unlike the first three Prakaraṇas, can have some claim to being regarded as a distinct piece of work, though related to the first three Prakaraṇas. Prof. Vidhuśekhara, in his criticism of K-bhāṣya's comments about the fourth Prakaraṇa, unnecessarily spoils his case by over-stating it.

(1) Prof. Vidhuśekhara does not admit that the views of the Dvaitins and the Vaināśikas are discussed in the fourth Prakaraṇa.

This is quite an untenable position. Gauḍapāda says,

भूतस्य जातिभिर्घट्टमिति वादिनः केचिदेक्षते हि ।

अभूतस्यापरे धर्मा विवदन्तः परस्परम् ॥ ३ ॥

भूतं न जायते किञ्चिद्भूतं नैव जायते ।
 विवदन्तोऽद्यथा हेवमजाति ख्यापयन्ति ते ॥ ४ ॥
 ख्याप्यमानामजाति तैरलुमोदामहे वरम् ।
 विवदामो न तैः सार्थमविवादं विवोधत ॥ ५ ॥

Here obviously the Asatkāryavāda of the Vaiśeṣikas and the Satkāryavāda of the Sāṅkyas are referred to and they are shown to destroy each other and thus to help in proclaiming the Ajātivāda. Later the whole concept of causality is attacked and the conclusion drawn एवं हि सर्वशा बुद्धेरजातिः परिदीपिता (19). When we remember that the Vaibhāṣika Bauddhas did accept the Satkāryavāda, and the Yogācāra Bauddhas the Astikāryavāda, it is idle to deny that the fourth Prakaraṇa does refer to the Vaināśika Bauddhas.

Kārikās 25-27—

प्रज्ञसः सनिमित्तव्यमिष्यते युक्तिदर्शनात् ।
 निमित्तस्यानिमित्तव्यमिष्यते भूतदर्शनात् ॥ २५ ॥
 चित्तं न संस्पृशात्यर्थं नार्थाभासं तथैव च ।
 अभूतो हि यतश्चार्थो नार्थाभासस्तः पृथक् ॥ २६ ॥
 निमित्तं न सदा चित्तं संस्पृशात्यध्वसु विषु ।
 अनिमित्तो विपर्यासः कथं तस्य भविष्यति ॥ २७ ॥

make use of the arguments of the विज्ञानवादि Bauddhas to prove the सर्वास्तित्ववादि Bauddhas wrong and Kārikā 28—

तस्माच्च जायते चित्तं चित्तहृषयं न जायते ।
 तस्य पद्यन्ति ये जाति स्वे वै पद्यन्ति ते पदम् ॥

is a hit against the विज्ञानवादिन्^s themselves. Similarly in

एवं न चित्तजा धर्माश्रितं वापि न धर्मजम् ।
 एवं हेतुफलाजाति प्रविशन्ति मनीषिणः ॥ ४४ ॥

the Vijñānavāda is refuted, and in

क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेणु तायिनः ।
 सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम् ॥ 99 ॥ ¹⁸

18 We have discussed in detail the different interpretations of this Kārikā, as also the meaning of the expression द्विपदां वरम् in (IV.1) in our paper 'Dvipadām Varam' Annals, B. O. R. I. Vol. XXXII, Pp. 166-173.

Gauḍapāda directly says that his philosophical doctrine is different from that preached by Gautama Buddha.

It is clear therefore that the position taken by the K-bhāṣya regarding the fourth Prakarāṇa is unassailable and the arguments put forward by Prof. Vidhuśekhara only prove the truth of the adage 'None are so blind as those who will not see'.

It is further contended by Prof. Vidhuśekhara and others that the fourth Prakarāṇa contains an exposition of Buddhist philosophical views and abounds in Buddhist thought and ideas. Various Kārikās are interpreted by them in this light. In the Notes, we have tried to show what should be the proper interpretation of these passages. Here we shall briefly discuss a few general objections.

(1) Gauḍapāda salutes Gautama Buddha who is referred to as द्विषदां वर at the beginning of the fourth Prakarāṇa, and the अस्पर्शयोग taught by Buddha, at the end.

Gauḍapāda seems to have deliberately put in a Maṅgalaśloka both at the beginning and at the end in imitation of certain Buddhistic works. He presumably wanted to meet the Buddhists on their own ground and to pay them in their own coin. Nāgārjuna, while paying his obeisance to Buddha calls him बदतां वर; Gauḍapāda goes one better and calls his Master द्विषदां वर (the best of all human beings). We have already shown elsewhere that द्विषदां वर cannot be regarded as a peculiarly Buddhist expression ; it is found in the Mahābhārata, and it probably refers to Śuka, son of Vyāsa, who is traditionally regarded as Gauḍapāda's teacher, or to Nārāyaṇa himself from whom the Vedāntāśrastra has come forth.

Similarly अस्पर्शयोग is not directly referred to in Buddhist literature and Gauḍapāda is undoubtedly indebted to the Bhagavad-gītā (मात्रास्पर्शार्थं कौन्तेय हुःखयोनय एव ते II. 14 and ये हि संस्पर्शजा भोगा V. 22 सं विद्याद्वृहुःखसंयोग etc. VI. 23) for the term अस्पर्शयोग.

(2) Gauḍapāda makes use of phraseology strongly reminiscent of Buddhist schools, and has modelled some of his Kārikās on those of Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Asaṅga etc. The main doctrines taught in the fourth Prakarāṇa are the unreality of the world and

Śūnyatā respectively held by the Vijñānavādins and the Mādhyamikas. The three kinds of jñāna, the two kinds of Satya etc. are all Buddhist ideas and were borrowed by Gauḍapāda from the Buddhist writers. The use of a very large number of Buddhist terms, such as अद्वय, अध्यवृत् (time), तायिन्, धर्मधातु, नायक, निर्मितक, वैशारद्य, संश्लेष, सञ्चाप्त, संदृष्टि, the simile of the अलात and मायाहस्तिन्—all this points out how Gauḍapāda was obsessed by Buddhistic ideas which he has taught in the fourth Prakaraṇa.

We have discussed in the Notes at the proper places, the arguments involved in the above contention. Here we shall deal with their general implications. It may be freely admitted that Gauḍapāda was well-versed in Buddhistic philosophy, had studied carefully the important Buddhist writers, and had no hesitation in borrowing from them. But this does not mean that he had accepted their teachings. Gauḍapāda, so to speak, attacks the Buddhists on their own ground and using their own phraseology, wants to prove how their teachings are wrong. Gauḍapāda perhaps feels sorry that the Buddhist philosophers, having come so near the truth of Ajāti or oneness of Ātman, by preaching the Vijñānavāda or Śūnyavāda were not bold or rationalists enough to understand the Vedāntic Nirvāṇa and hence missed their bus. Thus the Mādhyamikas merely content themselves with following a middle path between eternality and annihilation, instead of accepting the Ajātivāda. Gauḍapāda had ample material in the Upaniṣads and the Bhagavadgītā to fall back upon, in order to promulgate his Vedāntic theories. The अलात simile and Mayāhaṭin illustration need not be regarded as specially Buddhistic, as they had been well-known in pre-Buddhistic literature as well. Gauḍapāda clearly points out wherein he differs from the Buddhists in Kārikā IV. 99, by his statement नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम् (Buddha has told many things, but this viz Ajātivāda, he has not told). As we have pointed out in the Notes, नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम् has a direct reference to the passages ... भाषिष्येऽहं तत्, put in the mouth of Buddha a score of times in the Laṅkāvatāra. Attempts are made by Prof. Vidhuśekhara and others to explain away the expression नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम् so as to make it conform with Buddhistic notions. Thus we are told that it is equal to अवचनं बुद्धवचनम् meaning that Buddha's silence on the nature of the highest truth implies that

can not be learnt through instruction, but intuitively by every one for himself or that the nature of existence does not depend upon the existence or otherwise of the Tathāgata. Both these explanations are, to say the least, quite unconvincing.

The Vijnānavādi Buddhas rightly admitted the illusoriness of the world, but failed to notice that illusion can not be understood unless there is a permanent real element as its resort or ālambana or adhiṣṭhāna. They later admitted the Ālayavijñāna (which is the Buddhist nearest approach to Ātman) which however, being but a continuous series of fleeting ideas, cannot play the role of an Adhiṣṭhāna. The Śūnyavādins by their categorical statement that *all* is Śūnya, made their Śūnyavāda itself Śūnya. Their attempts to make the Śūnyavāda a Madhyama way between two extremes in conformity with the supposed teachings of Buddha, satisfied no one. Saṅkarācārya attacked this weak spot in the armour of the Śūnyavādins, and showed how they are beneath contempt.

Both the Vijnānavāda and Śūnyavāda can become philosophically sound only if an unchangeable permanent reality is admitted, and Buddha failed to do this according to Gauḍapāda.

The Ajātivāda of Gauḍapāda has thus nothing in common with the Śūnyavāda of the Buddhists. Gauḍapāda believes in a permanent, unchangeable Principle which cannot be proved to be originated. That alone is the Highest truth or Reality and Advaita cannot have any quarrel with any philosophical theories preaching Dvaita, for all such theories have their ultimate basis in Advaita, being themselves mere products of imagination.

(3) The expression अश्याण (हेयज्ञेयाव्यपाक्यानि विज्ञेयान्याश्याणतः । IV. 90) refers to महायान.

Gaudapāda seems to refer to महायान as well as to the पूर्वमीमांसा here by the deliberately chosen expression अश्याण. It would be easily conceded that हेय, ज्ञेय, आव्य and पाक्य are more pointedly referred to in the पूर्वमीमांसा than in the महायान.

There are several Upaniśadic expressions found in the fourth Prakaraṇa (सोऽसृतत्वाय कल्पते, IV. 92; विद्यते न हि नानात्वम्, 91; विद्वाव्य इमं ब्रजेत् 86; ब्राह्मणं पदम् 85; सकृदिभातो 81; अमर्यं पदमस्तुते 78; असङ्गं तेन कीर्तितम्, 72 ... से वै पश्यन्ति ते पदम्, 28. etc.). Kārikās from the 2nd

and the 3rd Prakaraṇa are repeated in the fourth Prakaraṇa where the aim of Gaudapāda is obviously to show how the Buddhistic ideas fall short of the Vedāntic उत्तम सत्य. There is thus no reason to doubt that the fourth Prakaraṇa is also inter-related with the first three Prakaraṇas and all the four Prakaraṇas constitute a single and complete treatise propounding the Upaniṣadic philosophy.

VII The Sources of Gaudapāda-Karikā

Gauḍapāda, according to the present state of our knowledge must have lived about the 6th century, and could be presumed to have been acquainted with the important philosophical works that were current in his own times. It is possible to point out to similarities of thought and expression in Gauḍapāda-Kārikā and other works that undoubtedly had been written earlier. It would not perhaps be a correct statement to make that Gauḍapāda was indebted to, or drew his inspiration from, such works, but it can be said that he was influenced by such works and that he made occasional use of them in writing his Kārikās. The expression 'sources' is thus used by us in a broader sense.

We give below a list of similarities of thought and expression in the Kārikās and other works, both Vedāntic and Buddhistic (a large portion of the First Prakaraṇa is obviously based on the Māndūkyopaniṣad and so similarities between the two are not specially pointed out below).

I Aitareya Brāhmaṇa

Kārikā

- I. 25 युज्ञीत प्रणवे चेतः तेष्योऽभितसेभ्यस्वयो वर्णा etc.

II Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad

Kārikā

- | | |
|------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| I. 26 अपूर्वोऽनन्तरोऽबाहो etc. | अनन्तरोऽबाहः (IV. 4.13) |
| II. 3 अभावश्च रथादीनां श्रूयते न्यायपूर्वकम् । | स यत्र प्रस्वपिति... (IV. 3.7)
न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा
स वा एष एतस्मिन्संप्रसादे रथा
चरित्वा (IV. 3. 14-18)
तस्य वा एतस्य उरुषस्य ह्ये एव स्थाने
(IV. 3.9) |
| II. 5 स्वप्नजागरितस्थाने | |

- II. 36 जडबल्लोकमाचरेत् तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः ... बाल्येन तिष्ठासेत्
 (III. 5.1)
- III. 12 द्वयोर्द्वयोर्मधुज्ञाने परं ब्रह्म मधुविद्या or मधुज्ञानम् (II. 5)
- III. 13 जीवात्मनोरनन्यत्वमभेदेन इदं सर्वे यद्यमात्मा । (II. 4.6)
 प्रशस्यते । नानात्मं निव्यते नेह नानास्ति किंचन । (IV. 4.19)
- III. 15 सुल्लोहविस्फुलिङ्गादैः सुषिर्य यथा अग्ने: शुद्धा विस्फुलिङ्गा (II.
 1.20) स यथाद्वैधा... (IV. 5.11)
- III. 24 इन्द्रो मायाभिस्त्यपि इन्द्रो मायाभिः उरुरूप इयते
 (II. 5.19)
- III. 26 स एष नेति नेतीति व्याख्यातं अथात अद्वेशो नेति नेति (II. 3.6)
 स एष नेति नेतीति (III. 9.26 ; IV. 2.4, 22).
- III. 35 तदेव निर्भयं ब्रह्म अभयं वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि (IV. 2.4)

III Chāndogya

Kārikā

- II. 20 प्राण इति प्राणविदो प्राणे सर्वे प्रतिष्ठितम् (I. 11. 4-5)
- II. 21 पादा इति पादविदो चतुष्कलः पादो ब्रह्मणः (IV. 4-8)
- II. 22 भोज्यमिति च तद्विदः अत्रं हीदं सर्वे स्थितम् (I. 3.6)
- III. 7 नाकाशस्य शटाकाशो वाचारम्भण विकारः (VI. 1.4)
- III. 13 जीवात्मनोरनन्यत्वं etc. ऐतदाम्भ्यमिदं (VI. 8.7)
- III. 15 सुल्लोहविस्फुलिङ्गादैः etc. यथा क्षोम्यैकेन सूतपिण्डेन
 (VI. 13. 4-6).
- III. 23 सूततोऽभूततो वापि सदेव सोम्येदमश्च आसीत (VI. 2.1)
- III. 34 निश्चिह्नस्य मनसो etc. यत्रैतत्पुरुषः स्वपिति (VI. 8.1)

IV Gītā

Kārikā

- I. 3 आनन्दभूक्तथा ग्राज्ञ ... ये हि संसर्पश्च जा भोगाः (V. 22)
- I. 5 ... स भुजानो न लिप्यते सर्वभूतात्मभूतात्मा कृच्छ्रपि न
 न लिप्यते ।
- I. 6 ... चेतोश्चन्तुरुषः पृथक् लिप्यते न स पापेन ... (V. 7, 10)
- I. 19 विश्वस्यात्वविवक्षायामादि- ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः
 सनातनः । (XV. 7)
- I. 23 ज्ञाकारो नयते विश्वम् अक्षराणामकारोऽस्मि (X. 33)

यो यच्छूद्धः स एव सः (XVII. 3)

- I. 25 युक्तीत प्रणवे चेतः प्रणवो
ब्रह्म निर्भयम् ।
- I. 28 प्रणवं हीश्वरं विद्यात् सर्वस्य
हृदि संस्थितम् ।
- II. 20 सूतानीति च तद्विदः
- II. 20 युणा इति युणविदस्तत्त्वानीति
च तद्विदः ।
- II. 21 देवा इति च तद्विदः
- II. 22 यज्ञा इति च तद्विदः
- II. 22 भोक्तेति च भोक्तृविदो
- II. 23 मूर्त्ति इति मूर्तविदो
- II. 24 काल इति कालविदो
- II. 29 यं भावं दर्शयेदस्य ... ।
... तद्यहः सम्पूर्ति तम् ॥
- II. 35 वीतरागभयक्रोधैः
- III. 13 जीवात्मनोरन्यत्वम्
- III. 16 आश्रमान्त्रिविदा हीनमध्यमो-
क्ताष्टष्टयः ।
- III. 21 न भवत्यसृतं मर्त्ये
- III. 21 प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथं-
विदृभविष्यति ।
- III. 34 निश्चीतस्य मनसो
निर्विकल्पस्य धीमितः ।
- III. 38 आत्मसंसर्थं तदा ज्ञानं
- III. 39 अस्पर्शयोगो
- III. 41 मनसो निश्चहस्तद्वद्वेद-
परिसेवतः ।
- III. 42 उपायेन निश्चीयाद्विक्षिणं
कामभोगयोः ।

ॐ तत्सदिति निर्देशो ब्रह्मणन्त्रिविधः
समृद्धः । ... (XVII. 23-24)

ईश्वरः सर्वसूतानां हृदेशोऽर्जुन
तिष्ठति । (XVIII. 61)

ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं ज्ञानगम्य... (XIII. 17)

सूतानि यान्ति भूतेज्याः (IX. 25)
(Adhyāyas XVI, XVII)

यान्ति देवव्रता देवान् (IX. 25)

यज्ञशिष्टासूतसुज्ञो ... (IV. 31 ;
IV. 23-24)

अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रभुरेव
च । (IX. 24)

उपद्रष्टासुतमन्ता च ... (XIII. 22)

प्रकृतिं स्वामयिष्याय ... (IV. 6)

... संभवामि युगे युगे (IV. 8)

कालोऽस्मि लोकक्षयकृत्यवद्धो ...
(XI. 32)

सूत्युः सर्वहरश्वाहम् । (X. 34)

यो यच्छ्रद्धः स एव सः (XVII. 3)

वीतरागभयक्रोधः ... (II. 56)

वीतरागभयक्रोधाः etc. (IV. 10)

वासुदेवः सर्वमिति ... (VIII. 19)

ऊर्ध्वे गच्छन्ति सस्वस्था मध्ये
तिष्ठन्ति राजसा: etc. (XIV. 18,
XVII. 2)

जातस्य हि धूता सूत्युः (II. 27)

मिष्यैष व्यवसायस्ते प्रकृतिरस्वा
नियोक्षयति । (XVIII. 59)

ज्ञानैः शनैरुपरमेद्युद्धया धृति-
गृहीतया । (VI. 25)

आत्मसंसर्थं मनः ऊर्ध्वा... (VI. 25)

तं विद्यादद्वःस्वसंयोगविद्योगं (VI. 23)

मात्रास्पर्शास्तु कौन्तेय (II. 14)

स निश्चयेन योक्तव्यो योगोऽनिर्विण-
चेत्सा । (VI. 23)

अभ्यासेन हु. कौन्तेय वैराग्येण च
गृहते (VI. 35-36)

- III. 44 लये संबोधयेवित्तं विक्षेपं
शमयेत्तुनः । सकथायं विजानीयात्समप्राप्तं न चालयेत् ॥
- III. 46 यदा न लीयते वित्तं...
अनिङ्गनमनाभासं निष्पत्तं
ब्रह्म तत्तदा ॥
- III. 47 स्वरूपं शान्तं सनिर्बाणमकथं
सुखमुत्तमम् etc.
- IV. 10 जरामरणमिच्छन्तश्वचवन्ते
- IV. 43 अजातेष्वसतां तेषामुपलभात्
- IV. 80 निवृत्तस्याप्रवृत्तस्य निश्वला
हि तदा स्थितिः ।
- IV. 81 अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नं भ्रमातं
भवति स्वयम् ।
- IV. 85 प्राप्य सर्वज्ञतां कृतज्ञां
- IV. 86 विग्राणां विनयो हौषणं
शमः etc.
- IV. 88 ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं च विज्ञेयं
- IV. 89 सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र भवतीह
महाधियः ।
- IV. 94 भेदनिम्नाः पृथग्वादाः ।
- V Íśa

Kārikā

- III. 25 संभूतेरपवादाच्च संभवः प्रतिष्ठियते ।

अन्यं तमः प्रविशान्ति येऽसंभूते-
ष्टुपासते । (12)

VI Katha

Kārikā

- I. 26 प्रणवो ह्यपरं ब्रह्म प्रणवश्च
परः स्मृतः ।
- I. 28 प्रणवं हीन्वरं विद्यात् सर्वस्य
हृषि संस्थितम् ।
- III. 24 नेह नानेति चान्मायात्
- III. 38 उहो न तत्र नोत्सर्गः

महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्मुरुणः पंरः ।
(I. 3. 11)

अकुष्णमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा सदा
जनानां हृदये संनिविष्टः । (II. 1. 12)

नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन (II. 1. 11)

यदा पञ्चावातिष्ठन्ते (II. 3. 10)

VII Kausītakī

Kārikā

- | | | |
|------|---------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
| I. | 6 सर्वे जनयति प्राणः | अथ खलु प्राण एव प्रज्ञातमा |
| III. | १५ सुद्गोहविस्फुलिङ्गायैः | यथाद्वेष्वर्वलतो विस्फुलिङ्ग etc.
(III. 3) |

VIII Kena

Kārikā

- | | | |
|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|
| III. | I उपासनाप्रितो धर्मो जाते
ब्रह्मणि वर्तते...तेनासौ कृपणः
स्मृतः ॥ | तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदह्यपा-
सते (I. 8) |
|------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------|

IX Laṅkāvatāra

Kārikā

- | | | |
|------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| I. | 7 स्वप्नमायासरूपेति etc. | मायोपमाः सर्वधर्माः etc. (13)
मायास्वप्नोपमं दृश्यं विज्ञप्त्या त
विकल्पयेत् (17) |
| II. | 32 न निरोधो च चोत्पत्तिः | मायोपमं समाधिं च (16) |
| III. | 46 यदा न लीयते चित्तं...अनिष्ट-
नमनाभासं निष्पत्तं ब्रह्म
तत्तदा ॥ | स्वप्नविभ्रममायास्यं (66)
(also-144, 291, 561, 582, 875)
नात्र कश्चिन्महामते बध्यते न च
मुच्यते (79) |
| IV. | 83-84 अस्ति नास्यस्ति नास्त्यस्तीति
etc. कोऽन्यश्वतस्म एतास्तु etc. | तदा योगी हानाभासं प्रज्ञया पश्यते
जगत्। (94) |
| IV. | 87-88 सवस्तु सोपलभ्मं च etc. | कारणैः प्रत्यैश्वापि येषां लोकः प्रव-
र्तते etc. (III. 20, 21) also
(pages 96, 171, 188) |
| IV. | 96 अजेष्वजमनाक्रान्तं...
यतो न क्रमते ज्ञानमसङ्गं
तेन कीर्तिंतम् ॥ | लौकिकं ज्ञानं...
लोकोत्तरं ज्ञानं...
लोकोत्तरतमं ज्ञानं... (p. 157)
(pages 157-158) |

X Manusmṛti

Kārikā

- | | | |
|----|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|
| I. | 25 शुद्धजीत प्रणवे चेतः etc. | ब्रह्मणः प्रणवं कुर्यादावन्ते च
सर्वदा। (II. 74, 76-78) |
|----|------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------|

XI Mundaka

Kārikā

- I. 6 सर्वं जनयति प्राणश्चेतोऽशु-
न्तुरुषः पृथक् । यथा सुदीप्तात् पावकात् ...
तथाक्षराद्विधाः सोम्य प्रजायन्ते
(II. 1.1)
- II. 27 ...परापरमथापरे भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिः (II. 2.8)
- III. 13 जीवात्मनोरनन्यत्वम् ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम् (II. 2.11)

XII Praśna

Kārikā

- I. 26 अपूर्वोऽनन्तरोऽब्रह्मोऽनपरः एतद्वै सत्यकामं परं चापरं च ब्रह्म
प्रणवोऽन्ययः । यदोङ्गार... (V. 2)
- II. 27 परापरमथापरे एतद्वै सत्यकामं (V. 2)
- III. 24 नेह नानेति चाम्नायात् ... प्रजापतिश्चरति गर्भे... (III. 1. 7)

XIII Śvetāśvatara

Kārikā

- I. 8 कालात्प्रसूतिं भूतानां मन्यन्ते कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्थच्छा-
कालचिन्तकाः । भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्यम् ।
(I. 2)

XIV Taittirīya

Kārikā

- II. 22 वेदा इति वेदविदो प्राणो वा अन्नम् etc. (III. 7.9)
- III. 11. रसादयो हि ये कोशाः etc. Adhyāya II.
- III. 23 भूततोऽभूततो वापि सृज्यमाने असद्वा इदमश्च आसीद् (II. 7.1)
- समा श्रुतिः । etc. ... उदरमन्तरं कुरुते । अथ तस्य भयं
भवति । (II. 7. 13)

XV Yogavāsistha

Kārikā

- I. 18 उपदेशादर्थं वादो ज्ञाते द्वैतं न अविद्योधादर्थं वादो ज्ञाते द्वैतं न
विद्यते । (III. 84.25)
- II. 3 द्वैतर्थं तैन वै प्राप्तं स्वप्नं आहुः उपदेशादर्थं वादो ज्ञाते द्वैतं न
प्रकाशितम् । विद्यते । (III. 84.27)
- II. 32 ... न बद्धो न च साधकः । याकृगर्थं जगद्गूर्पं etc. (III. 19.)
- III. 31 मनसो हामनीभावे द्वैतं नैवो-
पलभ्यते । अस्तुतस्तु न बद्धोऽस्ति न मोक्षोऽस्ति
महामते । यकृद्गूरस्याद्गूर्वं etc.

We see from the above, that of the Vedic works proper, Gauḍapāda makes most use of the Māndūkya, Brhadāraṇyaka and Chāndogya Upaniṣads, and in a lesser measure of Īśa, Kaṭha, Muṇḍaka, Praśna and the Śvetāśvatara. Of the Smṛti works, Bhagavad-gītā has influenced Gauḍapāda most, giving him the idea of Asparśayoga, Māyā and so forth. It would be possible to point out scores of similarities in the Yogavāsiṣṭha, but as that work (at any rate a very large portion of it) is generally taken to be later than Gauḍapāda, we have not taken much note of it. The same can be said to be the case with Paramārthaśāra of Śesa. Of the non-Vedic works, the Laṅkāvatāra and the Mūlamadhyamakārikās have undoubtedly influenced Gauḍapāda a good deal. He seems to have thoroughly mastered the Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy, but mainly for the purpose of showing where his doctrine of non-origination differed from that of the Buddhists.

In short, Gauḍapāda, after having studied the current philosophical thoughts of his time, was willing to borrow from earlier works whatever would strengthen his Ajativāda against rival doctrines, whether Vedic or non-Vedic.

VIII Gauḍapāda's Contribution to Indian Philosophical Thought

Gauḍapāda can claim to be the first systematic exponent of the Advaita doctrine, and especially of Ajativāda. Śaṅkarācārya describes him as one who knew well the traditional Vedānta doctrines. Gauḍapāda's teachings provided the firm foundation on which Śaṅkarācārya and his successors in the Advaita field, built their edifice of detailed, analytical exposition of the Advaita theory. The late Mahāmahopādhyāya Vāsudeva Shastri Abhyankar (in the introduction to his edition of Siddhāntabindu) makes the following observations in this connection, which clearly bring out the significance and importance of the contribution of both Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkarācārya.

कारिकास्वाष्ट यद् गौडपादाचार्याणामभिप्रेतं तच्छङ्कुराचार्यैः ध्वनितम् ।

यद् गौडपादाचार्यैः ध्वनितं तच्छङ्कुराचार्यैः प्रतिपादितम् ।

यद् गौडपादाचार्यैः प्रतिपादितं तच्छङ्कुराचार्यैः साधितम् ।

यद् गौडपादाचार्यैः साधितं तच्छङ्कुराचार्यैः सिद्धान्ततया प्रतिष्ठारितम् ।

तथैव यद् गौडपादाचार्यैः तुच्छमिति धरनितं तच्छङ्कराचार्यैः प्रणिन्दितम् ।

यद् गौडपादाचार्यैः निन्दितं तच्छङ्कराचार्यैः साक्रोशमधिक्षिप्तम् ।

यद् गौडपादाचार्यैर्नभिमतमिति परित्यक्तं तच्छङ्कराचार्यैरवस्कन्दितम् ।

यद् गौडपादाचार्यैरवस्कन्दितं तच्छङ्कराचार्यैर्नैर्मूलमधितम् ।

संक्षेपत इत्यं प्रतिपादनीयं भवति—गौडपादानां परम्परया शिष्यभूताः शङ्कराचार्यां गुरुणां गुरुतमैगौडपादाचार्यैः प्रवर्तितं मायावादं न केवलं प्रतिपादयामासुः किन्तु स्वमतिविभवेन बुद्धिप्रभावेणातुलप्रतिपादनशैल्याप्रविहततर्कशक्त्या व्याख्यापयामासुः साधयामासुः प्रस्थापयामासुश्व ।

[“ Whatever Gaudapāda intended to say in his Kārikās, Śaṅkarācārya has hinted in his Bhāṣya.

Whatever Gaudapāda merely hinted, Śaṅkarācārya propounded.

Whatever Gaudapāda propounded, Śaṅkarācārya proved by reasoning.

Whatever G. proved, Š. established firmly.

Whatever G. hinted as worthless, Š. treated with contempt.

Whatever G. treated with contempt, Š. condemned outright.

Whatever G. condemned outright, Š. brushed aside unceremoniously.

Whatever G. brushed aside, Š. threw overboard mercilessly.

Whatever G. threw overboard, Š. destroyed, lock, stock and barrel.

In short, Śaṅkarācārya, the spiritual successor of Gaudapāda, not only propounded the Māyāvāda adumbrated by his ‘paramāguru’ Gaudapāda, but expounded, promulgated, framed and established the same by his acute intellectual powers, unparalleled expository skill, and relentless logical reasoning ”.]

Gaudapāda’s philosophical doctrine of Ajātivāda which he calls the ‘Uttama Satya’ is based upon the following basic ideas which he is never tired of emphasising in the Kārikās.

(1) प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कर्त्तव्यिभवति । (Nothing can ever change its nature; for, if it changed its natural characteristic even in the slightest manner, it would cease to be the original entity).

While writing his *bhāṣya* upon Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhyakārikās, Gaudapāda must have been struck by the discrepancy between the Sāṅkhyā tenets मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः and महाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्तः. How can the प्रकृति which has no विकृतिः by nature, give rise to विकारः? In the course of his *bhāṣya* on the Sāṅkhyakārikās, he quotes शुणा शुणेषु वर्तन्ते (from the Bhagavadgītā) twice, which points a way out of the difficulty, by declaring that the विकृतिः concerns only the शुणः. This would naturally lead to the acceptance of the theory of an unreal or illusory production.

(2) सर्वे सद्गवेनाजसः—All is सद् and unoriginated. From the Upaniṣadic passages, Gaudapāda concluded that every thing that exists is Brahman and as Brahman could not ever change its nature, it must be regarded as being अजं साम्यं विशारदम्.

(3) कार्यकारणभाव cannot be proved to exist.

All complex and gross can be reduced to its simplest and subtlest form. The big Nyagrodha tree can be seen to have its rise from the subtle seed. So, this vast universe can be taken to have for its cause only one entity in the ultimate analysis. Even the Naiyāyikas admit that only number 1 really exists, other numbers 2, 3 etc. are produced by अपेक्षाबुद्धि with respect to number 1. This being so, the ultimate cause can be described in the Upaniṣadic language as एकमेवाद्वितीयम्. How did the Universe come to be produced from this एक and अद्वितीय cause which is variously described as Brahman, Ātman etc.? The creation can not be described as real, because the relation of cause and effect can not be proved. Thus—कार्यकारणभाव implies that (1) कारण and कार्य are different, (2) that कारण must have existed before कार्य, that is, कार्य must have been असद् before it is produced. Both these suppositions are wrong. If कार्य and कारण are different, anything can be produced out of anything (पट can be produced from सूतिका); if कार्य is असद् before, it would always remain असद्. A कार्य must have its nature similar to that of the कारण.

Therefore (1) A सद् can not produce an असद्

(2) An असद् can not produce a सद्,

(3) सद् can not produce another सद्, for there would be विकृया in its nature during the process.

(4) A non-existent thing can obviously not be produced from a non-existent thing.

(4) कार्यकारणभाव can not be proved by resorting to the maxim of 'the seed and the sprout' wherein there is mutual interdependence leading to the establishment of the fact that the series is अनादि or beginningless. For, here also we ought to be able to know what comes first, the seed or the sprout, and in the absence of this knowledge, no relation of cause and effect could be postulated.

(5) Thus there can be no origination.

There being no relation of cause and effect, and no change or transformation of one's nature being admissible, we have to fall back upon the only possible idea that there is only one entity in this world, which must be unborn, immutable and all-pervading. All duality can be only an appearance due to Māyā which again can have no existence in reality.

(6) Whatever is in accordance with correct reasoning must alone be accepted.

The Śruti texts are entitled to respect, but not at the expense of reasoning. Once the idea of non-origination is accepted, there is no difficulty about the interpretation of conflicting passages in the Upaniṣads. Advaita is the highest reality; Dvaita can be just a part of and based on Advaita, for Advaita encompasses all and so can have no antagonism for the Dvaita ideas which are manifestly 'imagined' and are useful for a time till the realisation of the Highest Reality as unoriginated.

Gauḍapāda can legitimately claim to have placed the Advaita doctrine on a firm foundation by boldly proclaiming that the Śruti passages are to be accepted only if they do not go against the conclusions supported by reasoning¹⁹. Saṅkara also takes the same stand when he declares that even hundreds of Śruti texts could not prove that fire is not hot, or that simply because your ancestor was a fool, that does not mean that you should also act as a fool²⁰. Gauḍapāda, being more interested in the establishment of the doctrine of non-origination does not go into details as to how the

19 निश्चिनं सुकिञ्चुकं च यत्तद्वच्चति नेतरत् । III, 23

20 च हि पूर्वजो स्मृत आसीदित्यात्मनापि प्रुदेन भवितव्यमिति किञ्चिद्वित्ति प्रमाणम् ।

Bhāṣya on II, 1, 11 (Brahmasūtra)

origination is illusion or appearance. It was left for Śaṅkarācārya to make this more explicit. Śaṅkara, on his part, gives more thought to the establishment of the Avidyā or Māyā doctrine. In fact, it may be said that Ajātivāda and Māyavāda are but two sides of the same shield Advaita. Śaṅkara declared Avidyā to be सदस्ति-लक्षणा and hence अनिर्वचनीया and Śaṅkara's successors used all their ingenuity to explain the real nature of Avidyā, by resorting to one or other of the theories of Avaccheda, Pratibimba, Ābhāsa etc.

Gaudapāda was the first to make the fullest use of the doctrine of the three states, waking, dream and deep sleep, described in the Brhadāraṇyaka and the Chāndogya, for the purpose of establishing Advaita. There is surely no valid reason why the experiences in the waking state alone should be given greater attention than those in the other states, or why they should be taken as the standard by which are to be judged the other two. In the waking state, the soul perceives the gross with the help of the mind and the sense-organs ; in the dream, the sense-organs do not function and the soul perceives only the inside subtle, with the mind; in the deep-sleep state, both the mind and the sense-organs are inactive and the soul perceives nothing. Thus the soul can be said to be really free from any encumbrances only in the Suṣupti state, while in the other two states, he is dependent upon other means. The experiences in the waking state are contradicted in the dream-state and vice versa, which shows that there can not be any vital difference between the two states ; the same is the case with the experience in the deep sleep, the perception there in the form of 'I did not perceive any thing' being due to the cessation of the effort by the mind and the sense-organs and the absence of any objects of perception. Now that alone can be the highest truth which is the same everywhere, irrespective of different environments. In order to realise this we must take into account the totality of our experience. This leads Gaudapāda to declare that the highest reality can only be the 'Fourth' or Turya, beyond the three states, unoriginated, same and uncontaminated. The nature of this Turya, as the Sākṣin or Witness of all experiences in the three states, was further dilated upon by Śaṅkarācārya and his successors.

Gauḍapāda had studied the Buddhist philosophical works and he agrees with the Vijñānavādins that external objects are illusory and the Vijñāna alone matters for producing our experiences, but there he parts company with them. According to the Buddhas (the Śūnyavādins included) everything is momentary, while Gauḍapāda declares that the highest is eternal and unoriginated. The Śūnyavādins by declaring that the highest is Śūnya, lend themselves open to the charge of contradicting themselves and are unable to explain how the illusory nature or Śūnyatva of objects can be understood without any relation to some unchanging, immutable *Adhiṣṭhāna* or other.

श्रीः ।

गौडपादीयकारिकाः ।

अथ माण्डूक्योपनिषद् ।

[हरिः ॐ ।

ओमित्येदक्षरमिदं सर्वं तस्योपव्याख्यानं भूतं भवद्विष्टदिति सर्वमोङ्कारं एव । यद्बान्यत् त्रिकालातीतं तदप्योङ्कारं एव ॥ १ ॥

सर्वं ह्येतद्वाक्यमात्मा ब्रह्म सोऽयमात्मा चतुष्पात् ॥ २ ॥

जागरितस्थानो बहिष्ठंजः सप्ताङ्गं एकोनविंशतिमुखः स्थूलसुगैश्वानरः प्रथमः पादः ॥ ३ ॥

स्वमस्थानोऽन्तःप्रज्ञः सप्ताङ्गं एकोनविंशतिमुखः प्रविविक्तसुक् तैजसो द्वितीयः पादः ॥ ४ ॥

यत्र सुषो न कंचन कामं कामयते न कंचन स्वं पश्यति तत्सुषुप्तम् ॥ सुषुप्तस्थान एकीभूतः प्रज्ञानधनं एवानन्दमयो द्यानन्दसुक् चेतोमुखः प्राङ्ग-स्त्रृतीयः पादः ॥ ५ ॥

एष सर्वेश्वर एष सर्वज्ञ एषोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययौ हि भूतानाम् ॥ ६ ॥]

(अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति)

प्रथमं प्रकरणम् ।

बहिष्ठज्ञो विभुर्विश्वो हन्तःप्रज्ञस्तु तैजसः ।

घनप्रज्ञस्तथा प्राङ्ग एक एव त्रिधा स्मृतः ॥ १ ॥

(१) अन्वयः—एकः एक विभुः बहिष्ठज्ञः हि विश्वः; अन्तःप्रज्ञः तु तैजसः, तथा घनप्रज्ञः प्राङ्गः (इति) त्रिधा स्मृतः ।

Sri

Gaudapāda-Kārikā

FIRST CHAPTER

(१) One and the same All-pervading is traditionally known [lit. remembered] [as being] three-fold.—(१) Viśva, cogniser of outside, (२) Taijasa again, cogniser of inside, [and] (३) Prājña, likewise, cognition massed.

दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे विश्वो मनस्यन्तस्तु तैजसः ।

आकाशे च हृदि प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा देहे व्यवस्थितः ॥ २ ॥

(२) अन्वयः—(एकः एव विसुः) विश्वः दक्षिणाक्षिमुखे, तैजसः तु मनसि अन्तः, प्राज्ञः च हृदि आकाशे (इति) देहे त्रिधा व्यवस्थितः ।

विश्वो हि स्थूलभुद्भूतिं तैजसः प्रविविक्तभुक् ।

आनन्दभुक्तथा प्राज्ञस्त्रिधा भोगं निबोधत ॥ ३ ॥

(३) अन्वयः—नित्यं विश्वः हि स्थूलभुक्, तैजसः प्रविविक्तभुक्, तथा प्राज्ञः आनन्दभुक् (इति) त्रिधा भोगं निबोधत ।

स्थूलं तर्पयते विश्वं प्रविविक्तं तु तैजसम् ।

आनन्दश्च तथा प्राज्ञं त्रिधा तृप्तिं निबोधत ॥ ४ ॥

(४) अन्वयः—स्थूलं विश्वं तर्पयते, प्रविविक्तं तु तैजसं (तर्पयते), तथा आनन्दः प्राज्ञं (तर्पयते), (इति) त्रिधा तृप्तिं निबोधत ।

त्रिषु धामसु यद्गोचर्यं भोक्ता यश्च प्रकीर्तिः ।

वेदैतदुभयं यस्तु स भुज्ञानो न लिप्यते ॥ ५ ॥

(५) अन्वयः—त्रिषु धामसु यद् भोज्यं (प्रकीर्तिम्), यः च भोक्ता प्रकीर्तिः—यः तु एतत् उभयं वेद, भुज्ञानः (अपि सन्) सः न लिप्यते ।

(२) [One and the same All-pervading] is well set up three-fold in the body—Viśva in the front of the right eye, Taijasa again, inside in the mind, and Prajña in the Ākāśa [void, sky] in the heart.

(३) For (*hi*), always, Viśva [is] the enjoyer of the gross, Taijasa [is] the enjoyer of the rarified, Prajña likewise [is] the enjoyer of bliss—know the enjoyment [thus to be] three-fold.

(४) The gross gratifies Viśva; the rarified again, Taijasa; and bliss likewise, Prajña—know gratification [thus to be] three-fold.

(५) What enjoyable [is proclaimed] in the three abodes, and what enjoyer is proclaimed [in the three abodes]—he again, who knows this dual, [although] enjoying, is not contaminated.

प्रभवः सर्वभावानां सतामिति विनिश्चयः ।

सर्वं जनयति प्राणश्चेतोश्चूपुरुषः पृथक् ॥ ६ ॥

(६) अन्वयः—सतां सर्वभावानां प्रभवः इति विनिश्चयः; प्राणः सर्वं जनयति; पुरुषः पृथक् चेतोश्चून् (जनयति) ।

विभूतिं प्रसवं त्वन्ये मन्यन्ते सृष्टिचिन्तकाः ।

स्वप्नमायासरूपेति सृष्टिरन्यैर्विकलिपिता ॥ ७ ॥

(७) अन्वयः—अन्ये सृष्टिचिन्तकाः तु प्रसवं विभूतिं मन्यन्ते; अन्यैः सृष्टिः स्वप्नमायासरूपा इति विकलिपिता ।

इच्छामात्रं प्रभोः सृष्टिरिति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः ।

कालात्प्रसूतिं भूतानां मन्यन्ते कालचिन्तकाः ॥ ८ ॥

(८) अन्वयः—सृष्टिः प्रमोः इच्छामात्रम् इति अन्ये सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः (or, इति सृष्टौ विनिश्चिताः अन्ये मन्यन्ते); कालचिन्तकाः भूतानां कालात् प्रसूतिं मन्यन्ते ।

भोगार्थं सृष्टिरित्यन्ये क्रीडार्थमिति चापरे ।

देवस्यैष स्वभावोऽयमाप्नकामस्य का स्पृहा ॥ ९ ॥

(९) अन्वयः—सृष्टिः भोगार्थम् इति अन्ये, क्रीडार्थम् इति च अपरे (मन्यन्ते); एषः अर्यं देवस्य स्वभावः (इति अन्ये मन्यन्ते), आप्नकामस्य का स्पृहा (इति न्यायात्) ।

(6) [There must be some] origin of all entities that exist—this [is] the well-considered conclusion. Praṇa creates all, Puruṣa [creates] the rays of the mind [that is, the individual souls], separate [from one another].

(7) Other creation-theorists, on the other hand (*tu*), consider creation [to be] the manifestation [of Puruṣa]; creation is imagined by others as having the same nature as dream and illusion (*maya*).

(8) Creation [is due to] just the will of the Lord—so [think others who are] quite convinced about [there being a] creation; the Time-theorists consider the creation of beings as from Time.

(9) Creation [is] for the sake of enjoyment [of the Lord]—so [say] others; for the sake of sport—so [say] still others. This again [is] the [very] nature of God [the shining one]—[so say others, arguing] ‘What [possible] desire [can there be in the case] of [the Lord] whose cravings are [already] fulfilled ?’

[मान्तःप्रज्ञं न बहिष्प्रज्ञं नोभयतःप्रज्ञं न प्रज्ञानधनं न प्रज्ञं नाप्रज्ञम् ॥
अद्वैषमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्यमलक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपञ्चोपशमं
शान्तं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थं मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः ॥ ७ ॥]

(अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति)

निवृत्तेः सर्वदुखानामीशानः प्रभुरव्ययः ।

अद्वैतः सर्वभावानां देवस्तुयोँ विभुः स्मृतः ॥ १० ॥

(१०) अन्वयः—सर्वदुःखानां निवृत्तेः ईशानः, प्रभुः, अव्ययः,
सर्वभावानाम् अद्वैतः देवः विभुः तुर्यः स्मृतः ।

कार्यकारणबद्धौ ताविष्येते विश्वतैजसौ ।

प्राज्ञः कास्थनबद्धस्तु द्वौ तौ तुर्ये न सिध्यतः ॥ ११ ॥

(११) अन्वयः—तौ विश्वतैजसौ कार्यकारणबद्धौ इष्येते; प्राज्ञः तु
कारणबद्धः (इष्यते); तौ द्वौ तुर्ये न सिध्यतः ।

नात्मानं न परांश्वैव न सत्यं नापि चानृतम् ।

प्राज्ञः किंच न संवेत्ति तुर्यं तत्सर्वद्वक्षदा ॥ १२ ॥

(१२) अन्वयः—प्राज्ञः, आत्मानं न, परान् च एव न, सत्यं न,
अनृतं च अपि न, किंच न संवेत्ति; तत् तुर्यं सदा सर्वदृक् ।

(१०) The All-pervading is traditionally known as Turya [the Fourth]—capable of controlling the cessation of all miseries, powerful, immutable, non-dual among all entities, resplendent.

(११) Those two [well-known] Viśva and Taijasa are taken [lit. desired] to be conditioned by cause and effect; Prajña, on the other hand, [is] conditioned by cause [alone]; those two [the cause and effect] have no locus standi in [the case of] Turya.

(१२) Neither the Self, nor others again, for the matter of that; neither truth, nor again the untruth—nothing whatever does Prajña comprehend. That Turya however [is] always all-seeing.

द्वैतस्याग्रहणं तुल्यमुभयोः प्राज्ञतुर्ययोः ।

बीजनिद्रायुतः प्राज्ञः सा च तुर्ये न विद्यते ॥ १३ ॥

(१३) अन्वयः—द्वैतस्य अग्रहणम् उभयोः प्राज्ञतुर्ययोः तुल्यम्; प्राज्ञः बीजनिद्रायुतः; सा (बीजनिद्रा) च तुर्ये न विद्यते ।

स्वमनिद्रायुतावादौ प्राज्ञस्त्वस्वमनिद्रया ।

न निद्रां नैव च स्वमं तुर्ये पश्यन्ति निश्चिताः ॥ १४ ॥

(१४) अन्वयः—आद्यौ (विश्वतैजसौ) स्वमनिद्रायुतौ; प्राज्ञः तु अस्वमनिद्रया (युतः); निश्चिताः तुर्ये निद्रां न, स्वमं च न एव पश्यन्ति ।

अन्यथा गृह्णतः स्वमो निद्रा तत्त्वमजानतः ।

विपर्यासे तयोः क्षीणे तुरीयं पदमक्षुते ॥ १५ ॥

(१५) अन्वयः—तत्त्वम् अन्यथा गृह्णतः (पुरुषस्य) स्वमः, तत्त्वम् अजानतः (पुरुषस्य) निद्रा; तयोः (स्वमनिद्रयोः) विपर्यासे क्षीणे (सति पुरुषः) तुरीयं पदम् अक्षुते ।

अनादिमायया सुसो यदा जीवः प्रबुध्यते ।

अजमनिद्रमस्वमद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा ॥ १६ ॥

(१६) अन्वयः—यदा अनादिमायया सुसः जीवः प्रबुध्यते, तदा अजम् अनिद्रम् अस्वम् अद्वैतं बुध्यते ।

(१३) The non-perception of duality [is] common to both Prajña and Turya. Prajña [is] stuck up with the causal sleep, while it does not exist in Turya.

(१४) The first two [that is, Viśva and Taijasa are] stuck up with dream and sleep, Prajña, on the other hand, with dreamless sleep. The convinced ones [about Advaita] do see in Turya neither sleep, nor again dream for the matter of that.

(१५) Dream [is] for one comprehending reality otherwise ; sleep for one who does not know reality. When the wrong apprehension in those two becomes extinct, one attains to the Fourth stage.

(१६) When the individual Soul, asleep, owing to the beginning-less Māyā is awakened, he then realises the unborn, sleepless, dreamless non-duality.

प्रपञ्चो यदि विद्येत् निवर्तेत् न संशयः ।
मायामात्रमिदं द्वैतमधैतं परमार्थतः ॥ १७ ॥

(१७) अन्वयः—यदि प्रपञ्चः विद्येत् (तर्हि सः) निवर्तेत्, न संशयः; इदं द्वैतं मायामात्रम्; परमार्थतः अद्वैतम् (एव विद्यते) ।

विकल्पो विनिवर्तेत् कल्पितो यदि केनचित् ।
उपदेशादयं वादो ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते ॥ १८ ॥

(१८) अन्वयः—यदि केनचित् विकल्पः कल्पितः (तर्हि सः विकल्पः) विनिवर्तेत्; अर्यं (विकल्प—) वादः उपदेशात्; (परमार्थतत्त्वे) ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यते ।

[सोऽयमात्माध्यक्षरमोङ्गलोऽधिमात्रं पादा मात्रा मात्राश्च पादा अकार उकारो मकार इति ॥ ८ ॥]

जागरितस्थानो वैश्वानरोऽकारः प्रथमा मात्रासेरादिमत्त्वादा । आमोति ह वै सर्वान्कामानादित्थं भवति य एवं वेद ॥ ९ ॥

स्वप्रस्थानस्तैजस उकारो द्वितीया मात्रोत्कर्षादुभयत्वादा । उत्कर्षति ह वै ज्ञानसन्तां समानश्च भवति नास्याब्रह्मवित्कुले भवति य एवं वेद ॥ १० ॥

सुषुप्तस्थानः प्राज्ञो मकारतृस्तीया मात्रा मितेरपीतेर्वा । मिनोति ह वा इदं सर्वमपीतित्थं भवति य एवं वेद ॥ ११ ॥]

(अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति)

(17) If the projected creation (*prapanca*) were [really] existing, it would continue to be, no doubt. [But] this duality is just Māyā [illusion, appearance]; [there is only] non-duality in reality.

(18) If [some] illusion is imagined by some one, it is liable to [or could] be turned away. This statement [involving Vikalpa, is] on account of [its usefulness for] instruction; when [the Highest is] known, duality does not exist.

विश्वसात्वविवक्षायामादिसामान्यमुत्कटम् ।

मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ सादासिसामान्यमेव च ॥ १९ ॥

(१९) अन्वयः—विश्वस्य अत्वविवक्षायाम् आदिसामान्यम् उत्कटं स्यात्, मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ आसिसामान्यम् एव च (उत्कटं स्यात्) ।

तैजस्योत्वविज्ञान उत्कर्षे दृश्यते स्फुटम् ।

मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ सादुभयत्वं तथाविधम् ॥ २० ॥

(२०) अन्वयः—तैजसस्य उत्वविज्ञाने उत्कर्षः स्फुटं दृश्यते, मात्रा-संप्रतिपत्तौ उभयत्वं तथाविधं स्यात् ।

मकारभावे प्राङ्गस्य मानसामान्यमुत्कटम् ।

मात्रासंप्रतिपत्तौ तु लयसामान्यमेव च ॥ २१ ॥

(२१) अन्वयः—प्राङ्गस्य मकारभावे मानसामान्यम् उत्कटम्, मात्रा-संप्रतिपत्तौ तु लयसामान्यम् एव च (उत्कटम्) ।

त्रिषु धामसु यत्तुल्यं सामान्यं वेति निश्चितः ।

सं पूज्यः सर्वभूतानां वन्द्यश्चैव महामुनिः ॥ २२ ॥

(२२) अन्वयः—निश्चितः (यः) त्रिषु धामसु यत् तुल्यं सामान्यं वेति सः महामुनिः सर्वभूतानां पूज्यः वन्द्यः च एव ।

(१९) When there is the desire to state that Viśva has A-ness, the common quality [viz.] being the first [would be] prominent; and for the equating of [Viśva] with the [syllabic] portion [A in Aum], the common quality of pervading, itself [would be prominent].

(२०) As regards the knowledge of Taijasa being possessed of U-ness [the common quality] superiority [or posteriority] is distinctly seen ; for the equating of [Taijasa with] the [syllabic] portion [U in Aum] [the common quality] the nature of being both, could be of the same type [that is, is distinctly seen].

(२१) As regards Prājña possessing the state of M, the common quality, the measure [by which the remaining two are measured is] prominent ; for the equating of [Prājña with] the [syllabic] portion [M in Aum] on the other hand, the common quality, merging, itself [is prominent].

(२२) When one [or, he who has become], firm [in his realisation of the truth] knows the equal common quality in the three abodes, he, the great sage, [is] worthy of worship, and adorable by all beings.

अकारो नयते विश्वमुक्तारश्चापि तैजसम् ।

मकारश्च पुनः प्राज्ञं नामात्रे विद्यते गतिः ॥ २३ ॥

(२३) अन्वयः—अकारः विश्वं नयते, उकारः च अपि तैजसं (नयते), मकारः च पुनः प्राज्ञं (नयते); अमात्रे गतिः न विद्यते ।

[अमात्रश्चतुर्थोऽव्यवहार्यः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवोऽद्वैत एवमोङ्कार आत्मैव संविशत्यात्मनात्मानं य एवं वेद ॥ १२ ॥]

(अत्रैते श्लोका भवन्ति)

ओंकारं पादशो विद्यात्पादा मात्रा न संशयः ।

ओंकारं पादशो ज्ञात्वा न किंचिदपि चिन्तयेत् ॥ २४ ॥

(२४) अन्वयः—ओंकारं पादशः विद्यात्, पादाः मात्राः [सन्ति, अत्र] न संशयः; ओंकारं पादशः ज्ञात्वा किंचित् अपि न चिन्तयेत् ।

युज्ञीत प्रणवे चेतः प्रणवो ब्रह्म निर्भयम् ।

प्रणवे नित्ययुक्तस्य न भयं विद्यते क्वचित् ॥ २५ ॥

(२५) अन्वयः—प्रणवे चेतः युज्ञीत; प्रणवः निर्भयं ब्रह्म; प्रणवे नित्ययुक्तस्य क्वचित् भयं न विद्यते ।

(23) The syllable A leads on to Viiva and the syllable U as well, to Taijasa, and the syllable M again to Prâjña. There is no course towards what has no [syllabic] portions.

(24) One should know the letter [or, sound] Om, quarter by quarter; the quarters [are] the [syllabic] portions, no doubt. Having known the Omkâra, quarter by quarter, one should meditate upon nothing [else] whatever.

(25) One should fix the mind upon Prañava [the syllable Om]; Prañava [is] Brahman void of fear; for him ever fixed upon Prañava, there is no fear anywhere,

प्रणवो ह्यपरं ब्रह्म प्रणवश्च परः स्मृतः ।

अपूर्वोऽनन्तरोऽबाह्योऽनपरः प्रणवोऽव्ययः ॥ २६ ॥

(२६) अन्वयः—प्रणवः हि अपरं ब्रह्म, प्रणवः च परः स्मृतः; प्रणवः अपूर्वः अनन्तरः अबाह्यः अनपरः अव्ययः ।

सर्वस्य प्रणवो ह्यादिर्मध्यमन्तस्तथैव च ।

एवं हि प्रणवं ज्ञात्वा व्यक्षुते तदनन्तरम् ॥ २७ ॥

(२७) अन्वयः—प्रणवः हि सर्वस्य आदिः मध्यं तथा एव च अन्तः; एवं हि प्रणवं ज्ञात्वा अनन्तरं तत् [or, तदनन्तरं प्रणवं] व्यक्षुते ।

प्रणवं हीश्वरं विद्यात्सर्वस्य हृदि संस्थितम् ।

सर्वव्यापिनमोकारं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति ॥ २८ ॥

(२८) अन्वयः—प्रणवं हि सर्वस्य हृदि संस्थितम् ईश्वरं विद्यात्; धीरः सर्वव्यापिनम् ओंकारं मत्वा न शोचति ।

अमात्रोऽनन्तमात्रश्च द्वैतस्योपशमः शिवः ।

ओंकारो विदितो येन स मुनिर्नेतरो जनः ॥ २९ ॥

(२९) अन्वयः—येन अमात्रः, अनन्तमात्रः च, द्वैतस्य उपशमः, शिवः ओंकारः विदितः सः मुनिः, इतरः जनः न (मुनिः) ।

इति गौडपादीयकारिकायां प्रथमं प्रकरणम् ।

(२६) Praṇava indeed [is] the lower Brahman, Praṇava likewise (ca) [is] the Higher [Ātman]. Beginningless, undifferentiated, [or, without inside], without outside, unique [and] immutable [is] Praṇava.

(२७) Praṇava indeed [is] the beginning, middle and likewise the end itself of everything. Having indeed known Praṇava thus, one attains to it [Brahman] immediately [or, attains to Praṇava afterwards].

(२८) One should indeed know Praṇava as the Lord well set up in the heart of all. Having thought of the all-pervading Omkāra, the wise one does not grieve.

(२९) He, by whom has been known the Omkāra, portionless, possessed likewise of infinite portions, the [cause of] cessation of duality, [and] auspicious, [is] the sage, not any other.

Here ends the First Chapter in the Gaudapāda-kārikā

द्वितीयं प्रकरणम् ।

वैतर्थ्यं सर्वभावानां स्वम् आहुर्मनीषिणः ।

अन्तःस्थानात्तु भावानां संवृतत्वेन हेतुना ॥ १ ॥

(१) अन्वयः— मनीषिणः स्वमे तु संवृतत्वेन हेतुना भावानाम् अन्तःस्थानात् सर्वभावानां वैतर्थ्यम् आहुः ।

अदीर्घत्वाच्च कालस्य गत्वा देशान् पश्यति ।

प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वस्तस्मिन्देशे न विद्यते ॥ २ ॥

(२) अन्वयः— (पुरुषः) कालस्य अदीर्घत्वात् च देशान् गत्वा न पश्यति; सर्वः वै प्रतिबुद्धः च तस्मिन् देशे न विद्यते ।

अभावश्च रथादीनां श्रूयते न्यायपूर्वकम् ।

वैतर्थ्यं तेन वै प्राप्तं स्वम् आहुः प्रकाशितम् ॥ ३ ॥

(३) अन्वयः— रथादीनाम् अभावः च न्यायपूर्वकं श्रूयते, तेन वै प्राप्तं वैतर्थ्यं स्वमे प्रकाशितम् आहुः (ब्रह्मविदः) ।

अन्तःस्थानात्तु भेदानां तस्माज्जागरिते स्मृतम् ।

यथा तत्र तथा स्वमे संवृतत्वेन भिद्यते ॥ ४ ॥

(४) अन्वयः— तस्मात् भेदानाम् अन्तःस्थानात् तु जागरिते (वैतर्थ्यं) स्मृतम्; यथा तत्र (जागरिते भेदानाम् अन्तःस्थानं) तथा स्वमे; संवृतत्वेन (स्वमः जागरितात्) भिद्यते ।

SECOND CHAPTER

(१) The wise speak of the unreality of all entities in dream; verily, on account of the entities having [their] location within, owing to [their] being enclosed.

(२) And on account of the time being not long, [a person] does not see [things in a dream], having [actually] gone over to [different] regions, and further, [when] awakened, every one is not in that region [which he had travelled over to in the dream].

(३) The negation of chariots and others [seen in dream] is shown in the Śruti along with [the soul's] entering and going out of (*nyāya*) [the different states]; they speak of the unreality as indeed proved by that [statement], as being evident in dream.

(४) Therefore, again, [the unreality of entities] in the waking state is traditionally known, from the location within of the entities. As it [that is, the location within of entities] there [in the waking state], so in dream. [But waking state and dream are not the same; dream] differs [from the waking state owing to its being characterised] by the state of being enclosed.

स्वप्नजागरितस्थाने हेकमाहुर्मनीषिणः ।

भेदानां हि समत्वेन प्रसिद्धेनैव हेतुना ॥ ५ ॥

(५) अन्वयः— मनीषिणः हि प्रसिद्धेन एव हेतुना भेदानां हि समत्वेन, स्वप्नजागरितस्थाने एकम् आहुः ।

आदावन्ते च यन्नास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्त्वाः ।

वित्तैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवित्तथा इव लक्षिताः ॥ ६ ॥

(६) अन्वयः— यत् आदौ अन्ते च न अस्ति, वर्तमाने अपि तत् तथा (न अस्ति); वित्तैः सदृशाः सन्तः (भेदाः) अवित्तथाः इव लक्षिताः ।

सप्रयोजनता तेषां स्वप्ने विप्रतिपद्यते ।

तस्मादाद्यन्तवच्चेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृताः ॥ ७ ॥

(७) अन्वयः— तेषां (भेदानां) सप्रयोजनता स्वप्ने विप्रतिपद्यते, तस्मात् खलु ते आद्यन्तवच्चेन मिथ्याः एव स्मृताः ।

अपूर्वं स्थानिभर्मो हि यथा स्वर्गनिवासिनाम् ।

तानर्यं प्रेश्वते गत्वा यथैवेह सुशिक्षितः ॥ ८ ॥

(८) अन्वयः— यथा स्वर्गनिवासिनां (तथा) स्थानिभर्मः—(एतत्) अपूर्वम्; यथा एव इह सुशिक्षितः (तथा) अर्यं (स्थानी) गत्वा तान् (भेदान्) प्रेश्वते ।

(५) The wise speak of the dream and waking states as one, verily, on account of the common nature of entities [in the two states] on the strength of well-established reasoning.

(6) What is not at the beginning and at the end, [is] so also in the present; existing [things] [though] similar to illusions are noted as though real.

(7) Being possessed of a purpose in [the case of] the entities [in the waking state] is contradicted in the dream; therefore they indeed are traditionally known as unreal and nothing else (*eva*) on account of [their] having a beginning and an end.

(8) [It is all] wonderful ! verily, the nature of the local agent [in dream, is] as [in the case] of the dwellers in heaven. As indeed a well-trained person here, [so] this [person dreaming] sees those [various objects or regions], having gone [there].

स्वप्नवृत्तावपि त्वन्तश्चेतसा कलिपतं त्वसत् ।

बहिश्चेतोगृहीतं सद् दृष्टं वैतथ्यमेतयोः ॥ ९ ॥

(९) अन्वयः— स्वप्नवृत्तौ अपि तु चेतसा अन्तःकलिपतं तु असत्, बहिः चेतोगृहीतं सत्; एतयोः वैतथ्यं दृष्टम् ।

जाग्रद्वृत्तावपि त्वन्तश्चेतसा कलिपतं त्वसत् ।

बहिश्चेतोगृहीतं सद्युक्तं वैतथ्यमेतयोः ॥ १० ॥

(१०) अन्वयः— जाग्रद्वृत्तौ अपि तु चेतसा अन्तःकलिपतं तु असत्, बहिः चेतोगृहीतं सत्; एतयोः वैतथ्यं युक्तम् ।

उभयोरपि वैतथ्यं भेदानां स्थानयोर्यदि ।

क एतान्बुध्यते भेदान्को वै तेषां विकल्पकः ॥ ११ ॥

(११) अन्वयः— यदि भेदानाम् उभयोः स्थानयोः अपि वैतथ्यम्—, कः एतान् भेदान् बुध्यते, कः वै तेषां विकल्पकः ।

कल्पयत्यात्मनात्मानमात्मा देवः स्वमायया ।

स एव बुध्यते भेदानिति वेदान्तनिश्चयः ॥ १२ ॥

(१२) अन्वयः— देवः आत्मा स्वमायया आत्मानम् आत्मना कल्पयति, सः एव भेदान् बुध्यते इति वेदान्तनिश्चयः ।

(९) Even in the dream-state, again, what is imagined by the mind within [is] verily (*tu*) non-existing; what is apprehended by the mind outside [is] existing — [so people differentiate, but in reality] the unreality of these two [is actually] seen [or, experienced].

(१०) Even in the waking state, again, what is imagined by the mind within [is] verily (*tu*) non-existing; what is apprehended by the mind outside [is] existing—the unreality of these two [ought to be held to be likewise] reasonable.

(११) If there [is thus] unreality of entities in even both the states, who [then] cognises these entities? Who, again (*vai*); their imaginer?

(१२) The shining Ātman imagines himself by himself, through his Māyā; [it is] he alone [that] cognises the entities—this [is] the conclusion of the Vedānta [Upaniṣads].

विकरोत्परान्भावानन्तश्चित्ते व्यवस्थितान् ।

नियतांश्च बहिश्चित्ते एवं कल्पयते प्रभुः ॥ १३ ॥

(१३) अन्वयः— (आत्मा) बहिश्चित्तः (सन्) अन्तश्चित्ते व्यवस्थितान् नियतान् च अपरान् भावान् विकरोति—एवं प्रभुः कल्पयते ।

, चित्तकाला हि येऽन्तस्तु द्रुयकालाश्च ये बहिः ।

कल्पिता एव ते सर्वे विशेषो नान्यहेतुकः ॥ १४ ॥

(१४) अन्वयः— ये हि तु अन्तः चित्तकालाः, ये च बहिः द्रुयकालाः, ते सर्वे कल्पिताः एव; अन्यहेतुकः विशेषः न ।

अव्यक्ता एव येऽन्तस्तु स्फुटा एव च ये बहिः ।

कल्पिता एव ते सर्वे विशेषस्त्वन्दियान्तरे ॥ १५ ॥

(१५) अन्वयः— ये तु अन्तः अव्यक्ताः एव, ये च बहिः स्फुटाः एव, ते सर्वे कल्पिताः एव; विशेषः तु इन्द्रियान्तरे ।

जीवं कल्पयते पूर्वं ततो भावान्पृथिविधान् ।

बाह्यानाध्यात्मिकांश्चैव यथाविद्यस्तथास्मृतिः ॥ १६ ॥

(१६) अन्वयः— (प्रभुः) पूर्वं जीवं कल्पयते, ततः बाह्यान् आध्यात्मिकान् च एव पृथग्विधान् भावान् (कल्पयते); यथाविद्यः तथास्मृतिः (जीवः) ।

(१३) [The Ātman], outward-minded, diversifies other entities,— [those] differently set up, as also [those] fixed up within the mind; thus does the Lord imagine.

(१४) Those thought-timers [lasting as long as the thought lasts] within likewise, and the duality-timers [amenable to the grāhya-grahaka formula] outside—all those [are] mere products of imagination [lit. imagined]; the differentiation [between the two is] not due to any other reason.

(१५) Those again [that are] just unmanifest within, and those [that are] just manifest without—all those [are] mere products of imagination [lit. imagined]; the differentiation again [lies] in [being associated with] different organs of sense.

(१६) [The Lord] first imagines the Jīva [the individual soul], then, verily, the entities of various sorts, external [objective] and internal [subjective]; as one cognises so one remembers.

अनिश्चिता यथा रज्जुरन्धकारे विकल्पिता ।
सर्पधारादिभिर्भावैस्तद्वात्मा विकल्पितः ॥ १७ ॥

(१७) अन्वयः— यथा अन्धकारे अनिश्चिता रज्जुः सर्पधारादिभिः
भावैः विकल्पिता तद्वत् आत्मा विकल्पितः ।

निश्चितायां यथा रज्ज्वां विकल्पो विनिवर्तते ।
रज्जुरेवेति चाहैतं तद्वात्मविनिश्चयः ॥ १८ ॥

(१८) अन्वयः— यथा निश्चितायां रज्ज्वां विकल्पः विनिवर्तते,
रज्जुः एव इति अद्वैतं (निष्पद्यते), तद्वत् आत्मविनिश्चयः ।

प्राणादिभिरनन्तैश्च भावैरेतैर्विकल्पितः ।
मायैषा तस्य देवस्य यथा संमोहितः स्वयम् ॥ १९ ॥

(१९) अन्वयः— (आत्मा) प्राणादिभिः एतैः अनन्तैः भावैः च
विकल्पितः; तस्य देवस्य एषा माया यथा स्वयं संमोहितः ।

प्राण इति प्राणविदो भूतानीति च तद्विदः ।
गुणा इति गुणविदस्तत्त्वानीति च तद्विदः ॥ २० ॥

(२०) अन्वयः— (आत्मा) प्राणः इति प्राणविदः (विकल्पन्ते),
भूतानि इति च तद्विदः, गुणाः इति गुणविदः, तत्त्वानि इति च तद्विदः ।

(१७) As the rope, [with its nature] not definitely ascertained in the dark, is imagined to be [possessed of the nature of] entities like the serpent, [water-] line etc; so likewise [is] Ātman imagined [to be all sorts of things].

(१८) When the rope is definitely ascertained [as the rope], the imagined attribute turns away, and the non-duality [emerges] in the form (iii) ‘ [This is] the rope itself ’. So likewise, [takes place] the ascertainment of Ātman.

(१९) [Ātman] is imagined to be Prāṇa [life] etc. and these innumerable entities. This [is] the Māyā of that shining one [Ātman] by which [he] himself has been deluded.

(२०) As Prāṇa, the Prāṇa-knowers [imagine Ātman] ; and as Bhūtas [elements], Knowers of them [the Bhūtas]; as Guṇas, the Guṇa-knowers; and as Tattvas, the Knowers of them [the Tattvas];

पादा इति पादविदो विषया इति तद्विदः ।

लोका इति लोकविदो देवा इति च तद्विदः ॥ २१ ॥

(२१) अन्वयः— पादाः इति पादविदः, विषयाः इति तद्विदः, लोकाः इति लोकविदः, देवाः इति च तद्विदः ।

वेदा इति वेदविदो यज्ञा इति च तद्विदः ।

भोक्तेर्ति च भोक्तृविदो भोज्यमिति च तद्विदः ॥ २२ ॥

(२२) अन्वयः— वेदाः इति वेदविदः, यज्ञाः इति च तद्विदः, भोक्ता इति च भोक्तृविदः, भोज्यम् इति च तद्विदः ।

सूक्ष्म इति सूक्ष्मविदः स्थूल इति च तद्विदः ।

मूर्त इति मूर्तविदोऽमूर्त इति च तद्विदः ॥ २३ ॥

(२३) अन्वयः— सूक्ष्मः इति सूक्ष्मविदः, स्थूलः इति च तद्विदः, मूर्तः इति मूर्तविदः, अमूर्तः इति च तद्विदः ।

काल इति कालविदो दिश इति च तद्विदः ।

वादा इति वादविदो भुवनानीति तद्विदः ॥ २४ ॥

(२४) अन्वयः— कालः इति कालविदः, दिशः इति च तद्विदः, वादाः इति वादविदः, भुवनानि इति तद्विदः ।

(२१) as Pādas, the Pāda-knowers; as Objects, the Knowers of them [objects]; as the Lokas, the Loka-knowers; and as Gods, the Knowers of them [gods];

(२२) as Vedas, the Veda-knowers; and as Sacrifices, the Knowers of them [sacrifices]; as the Enjoyer, the Enjoyer-knowners; and as the Object of enjoyment, the Knowers of it [the Bhojya];

(२३) as the Subtle, the Subtle-knowners; and as Gross, the Knowers of it [Sthūla]; as the Mūrta [possessed of form], the Mūrta-knowners; and as the Form-less, the Knowers of it [Amūrta];

(२४) as Kāla [time], the Kāla-knowners; and as the Quarters, the Knowers of them [Diśaḥ]; as Vādas [discussions, theories], the Vāda-knowners; as Worlds, the Knowers of them [Bhuvanas];

मन इति मनोविदो बुद्धिरिति च तद्विदः ।

चित्तमिति चित्तविदो धर्माधर्मौ च तद्विदः ॥ २५ ॥

(२५) अन्वयः— मनः इति मनोविदः, बुद्धिः इति च तद्विदः, चित्तम् इति चित्तविदः, धर्माधर्मौ च तद्विदः ।

पञ्चविंशक इत्येके षड्विंश इति चापरे ।

एकत्रिंशक इत्याहुरनन्त इति चापरे ॥ २६ ॥

(२६) अन्वयः— पञ्चविंशकः इति एके, षड्विंशः इति च अपरे, एकत्रिंशकः इति (अपरे) आहुः, अनन्तः इति च अपरे ।

लोकाँस्त्रोकविदः प्राहुराश्रमा इति तद्विदः ।

खीपुंनपुंसकं लैङ्गाः परापरमथापरे ॥ २७ ॥

(२७) अन्वयः— लोकविदः लोकान्, तद्विदः आश्रमाः इति, लैङ्गाः खीपुंनपुंसकं, अथ अपरे परापरं प्राहुः ।

सृष्टिरिति सृष्टिविदो लय इति च तद्विदः ।

स्थितिरिति स्थितिविदः सर्वे चेह तु सर्वदा ॥ २८ ॥

(२८) अन्वयः— सृष्टिः इति सृष्टिविदः, लयः इति च तद्विदः, स्थितिः इति स्थितिविदः—सर्वे च (भेदाः) तु सर्वदा इह (आत्मनि कल्प्यन्ते) ।

(२५) as Mind, the Mind-knowers; and as Intellect, the Knowers of it [Buddhi]; as Thought, the Thought-knowers; and Merit and Demerit, the Knowers of them [Dharma and Adharma];

(२६) Some speak [of Ātman] as constituted of twenty-five; and as constituted of twenty-six, others; [some] as constituted of thirty-one; and as unending, others.

(२७) The Loka-knowers speak of [Ātman] as People [Lokas]; as Āśramas, the Knowers of them [Āśramas, modes of life]; the Laiṅgas [grammarians, or knowers of sex], as Male, Female and Neuter; and others, as higher and lower;

(२८) as Creation, the Knowers of creation; and as Dissolution, the Knowers of dissolution [Laya]; as Subsistence [Sthiti], the Knowers of subsistence, and all these [are imagined] again, always here [in respect of Ātman].

यं भावं दर्शयेद्यस्य तं भावं स तु पश्यति ।

तं चावति स भूत्वासौ तदग्रहः समुपैति तम् ॥ २९ ॥

(२९) अन्वयः— यस्य यं भावं दर्शयेत् सः तु तं भावं पश्यति; असौ भूत्वा सः च तम् अवति, तदग्रहः तं समुपैति ।

एतैरेषोऽपृथग्भावैः पृथग्वेति लक्षितः ।

एवं यो वेद् तत्त्वेन कल्पयेत्सोऽविशङ्कितः ॥ ३० ॥

(३०) अन्वयः— एषः (आत्मा) एतैः अपृथग्भावैः पृथक् एव इति लक्षितः; यः एवं तत्त्वेन वेद् सः अविशङ्कितः (सन्) कल्पयेत् ।

स्वप्नमाये यथा दृष्टे गन्धर्वनगरं यथा ।

तथा विश्वामिदं दृष्टं वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः ॥ ३१ ॥

(३१) अन्वयः— यथा स्वप्नमाये दृष्टे, यथा गन्धर्वनगरं (दृष्टं), तथा वेदान्तेषु विचक्षणैः इदं विश्वं दृष्टम् ।

न निरोधो न चोत्पत्तिर्बद्धो न च साधकः ।

न मुमुक्षुर्न वै मुक्त इत्येषा परमार्थता ॥ ३२ ॥

(३२) अन्वयः— निरोधः न, उत्पत्तिः च न; बद्धः न, साधकः च न; मुमुक्षुः न, मुक्तः वै न; इति परमार्थता एषा ।

(२९) What entity [one] would present to one, he again sees that entity. And that [entity], having assumed his form, protects him; strong attachment to that [entity] encompasses him.

(३०) This [Ātman] is noticed as indeed separate, owing to these entities [though really] non-separate. One who knows thus as the real state of things, may imagine [Ātman to be any thing] without hesitation.

(३१) As are seen dream and Māyā [illusion], as [is seen] the Gandharva-city [castle in the air], so is seen this universe by the well-versed in the Vedāntas.

(३२) Neither destruction, nor again origination; neither one bound down [to this samsāra], nor again aspirant [or, one working] for salvation; neither one desirous of salvation, nor again one emancipated—thus [is] this highest truth,

भावैरसद्विरेवायमद्वयेन च कल्पितः ।

मावा अप्यद्वयेनैव तस्मादद्वयता शिवा ॥ ३३ ॥

(३३) अन्वयः— असद्विः भावैः एव अयं च अद्वयेन कल्पितः; भावाः अपि अद्वयेन एव (कल्पिताः); तस्मात् अद्वयता शिवा ।

नात्मभावेन नानेदं न स्वेनापि कथंचन ।

न पृथङ् नापृथक्किंचिदिति तत्त्वविदो विदुः ॥ ३४ ॥

(३४) अन्वयः— आत्मभावेन इदं नाना न, कथचन स्वेन अपि (नाना न); किंचित् पृथक् न, (किंचित्) अपृथक् न; इति तत्त्वविदः विदुः । वीतरागभयक्रोधैर्मुनिभिर्वेदपारगैः ।

निर्विकल्पो ह्ययं दृष्टः प्रपञ्चोपशमोऽद्वयः ॥ ३५ ॥

(३५) अन्वयः— वीतरागभयक्रोधैः वेदपारगैः मुनिभिः हि अयं निर्विकल्पः प्रपञ्चोपशमः अद्वयः दृष्टः ।

तस्मादेवं विदित्वैनमद्वैते योजयेत्सृतिम् ।

अद्वैतं समनुप्राप्य जडवल्लोकमाचरेत् ॥ ३६ ॥

(३६) अन्वयः— तस्मात् एवं एनं विदित्वा सृतिम् अद्वैते योजयेत् ; अद्वैतं समनुप्राप्य जडवल् लोकम् आचरेत् ।

(३३) This [Ātman] further (*ca*) is imagined to be non-existing entities themselves by the non-dual; the entities also [are imagined] by the non-dual itself; therefore non - duality [is] auspicious.

(३४) This [universe is] manifold neither owing to the nature of Ātman, nor somehow owing to its own [nature] even; nothing whatever [is] separate or non-separate—this the knowers of reality know.

(३५) By the sages void of attachment, fear and anger, who have completely mastered [lit. gone to the other shore of] the Vedas, is seen this cessation of Prapañca, free from imagined attributes [and] non-dual.

(३६) Therefore, having known this [Ātman] thus, one should fix [one's] memory on non-duality; having secured [or, realised] non-duality, one should carry on the worldly activities like an insensate one.

निःस्तुतिर्निर्मस्कारो निःस्वधाकार एव च ।
चलाचलनिकेतश्च यतिर्यादृच्छिको भवेत् ॥ ३७ ॥

(३७) अन्वयः— निःस्तुतिः निर्मस्कारः निःस्वधाकारः एव च,
चलाचलनिकेतः च यतिः यादृच्छिकः भवेत् ।

तत्त्वमाध्यात्मिकं दृष्टा तत्त्वं दृष्टा तु बाह्यतः ।

तत्त्वीभूतस्तदारामस्तत्त्वादप्रच्युतो भवेत् ॥ ३८ ॥

(३८) अन्वयः— आध्यात्मिकं तत्त्वं दृष्टा, बाह्यतः तु तत्त्वं दृष्टा
तत्त्वीभूतः तदारामः तत्त्वार्थं अप्रच्युतः भवेत् ।

इति गौडपादीयकारिकार्थां द्वितीयं प्रकरणम् ।

तृतीयं प्रकरणम् ।

उपासनाश्रितो धर्मो जाते ब्रह्मणि वर्तते ।
प्रागुत्पत्तेरजं सर्वं तेनासौ कृपणः स्मृतः ॥ १ ॥

(१) अन्वयः— ब्रह्मणि जाते उपासनाश्रितः धर्मः वर्तते; सर्वं
उत्पत्तेः प्राक् अजम्; तेन असौ (धर्मः) कृपणः स्मृतः ।

(३७) Disassociated with praise, disassociated with salutation and quite disassociated with the utterance of Svadhā [that is, performance of Śrāddha rites in honour of Pitṛs], and having no fixed residence whatever, one should become an ascetic acting according to [his] will [or, chance].

(३८) Having realised the truth relating to within the body, having realised as well the truth from outside [that is, relating to objects outside], having become the Reality, delighting in it, one should not be slipping away from the reality.

Here ends the Second Chapter in the Gauḍapāda-kārikā

THIRD CHAPTER

(१) Dharma [Jiva] associated with devotion arises when Brahman is [regarded as having been] born. Prior to birth, all [is] unborn; therefore he [Dharma, Jiva is] traditionally known as pitiable.

अतो वक्ष्याम्यकार्पण्यमजाति समतां गतम् ।

यथा न जायते किञ्चिज्जायमानं समन्ततः ॥ २ ॥

(२) अन्वयः— अतः अकार्पण्यम् अजाति समतां गतं वक्ष्यामि यथा समन्ततः जायमानं किञ्चित् न जायते ।

आत्मा ह्याकाशवज्जीवैर्घटाकाशैरिवोदितः ।

घटादिवच्च संधारैर्जातावेतन्निदर्शनम् ॥ ३ ॥

(३) अन्वयः— आत्मा हि आकाशवत् जीवैः घटाकाशैः इव उदितः, घटादिवत् च संन्धातैः (उदितः); जातौ एतद् निदर्शनम् ।

घटादिषु प्रलीनेषु घटाकाशादयो यथा ।

आकाशे संप्रलीयन्ते तद्वज्जीवा इहात्मनि ॥ ४ ॥

(४) अन्वयः— यथा घटादिषु प्रलीनेषु घटाकाशादयः आकाशे संप्रलीयन्ते, तद्वत् जीवाः इह आत्मनि (संप्रलीयन्ते) ।

यथैकस्मिन्धटाकाशे रजोधूमादिभिर्युते ।

न सर्वे संप्रयुज्यन्ते तद्वज्जीवाः सुखादिभिः ॥ ५ ॥

(५) अन्वयः— यथा रजोधूमादिभिः युते एकस्मिन् घटाकाशे सर्वे (घटाकाशाः) न संप्रयुज्यन्ते, तद्वत् जीवाः सुखादिभिः (न संप्रयुज्यन्ते) ।

(२) I shall therefore speak of the non-pitiableness [which is] without birth, maintaining sameness throughout, so that anything [supposed as] being born all around is not [really] born.

(३) Ātman like the Ākāśa rises up indeed in [the form of] Jīvas [individual souls] like Ghaṭakāśas [spaces enclosed by earthen jars], and in [the form of] aggregates [bodies etc.] like earthen jar etc. This [is] the illustration in [the matter of] birth [or, origination].

(४) As the earthen jar etc. being dissolved, Ghaṭakāśa etc. are dissolved in the Ākāśa, so [are dissolved] the individual souls here in Ātman.

(५) As when one Ghaṭakāśa is connected with dust, smoke etc., not all [Ghaṭakāśas] are associated [with them], so [are] the individual souls with happiness etc.

रूपकार्यसमाख्याश्च भिद्यन्ते तत्र तत्र वै ।

आकाशस्य न भेदोऽस्ति तद्वज्रविषु निर्णयः ॥ ६ ॥

(६) अन्वयः— तत्र तत्र वै रूपकार्यसमाख्याः च भिद्यन्ते; आकाशस्य भेदः न अस्ति; तद्वज्र जीविषु निर्णयः ।

नाकाशस्य घटाकाशो विकारावयवौ यथा ।

नैवात्मनः सदा जीवो विकारावयवौ तथा ॥ ७ ॥

(७) अन्वयः— यथा आकाशस्य घटाकाशः विकारावयवौ न, तथा आत्मनः सदा जीवः विकारावयवौ न एव ।

यथा भवति बालानां गगनं मलिनं मलैः ।

तथा भवत्यबुद्धानामात्मापि मलिनो मलैः ॥ ८ ॥

(८) अन्वयः— यथा बालानां गगनं मलैः मलिनं भवति तथा अबुद्धानाम् आत्मा अपि मलैः मलिनो भवति ।

मरणे संभवे चैव गत्यागमनयोरपि ।

स्थितौ सर्वशरीरेषु आकाशेनाविलक्षणः ॥ ९ ॥

(९) अन्वयः— मरणे संभवे च एव, गत्यागमनयोः अपि, स्थितौ, सर्वशरीरेषु आकाशेन अविलक्षणः (आत्मा) ।

(६) In the various cases [lit. there and there] indeed, form, function and name [do] differ, [but] there is no splitting up of the Ākāśa; so the upshot in [respect of] the individual souls.

(7) As the Ghaṭākāśa [is] no transformation or portion of the Ākāśa, similarly [is] the individual soul always no transformation or portion of Ātman.

(8) As the sky becomes to [that is, in the opinion of] the children, soiled owing to impurities, similarly Ātman also becomes to [that is, in the opinion of] the non-wise, soiled owing to impurities.

(9) In death and verily in birth, in going and coming as well, in remaining in position, in all bodies, [Ātman is] not dissimilar to the Ākāśa.

संघाताः स्वमवत्सर्व आत्ममायाविसर्जिताः ।

आधिक्ये सर्वसाम्ये वा नोपपत्तिर्हि विद्यते ॥ १० ॥

(१०) अन्वयः— सर्वे संघाताः स्वमवत् आत्ममायाविसर्जिताः, आधिक्ये सर्वसाम्ये वा उपपत्तिः हि न विद्यते ।

रसादयो हि ये कोशा व्याख्यातास्तैत्तिरीयके ।

तेषाभात्मा परो जीवः खं यथा संप्रकाशितः ॥ ११ ॥

(११) अन्वयः— ये हि रसादयः कोशाः तैत्तिरीयके व्याख्याताः तेषाम् आत्मा परः जीवः यथा खं संप्रकाशितः । .

द्वयोर्द्वयोर्मधुज्ञाने परं ब्रह्म प्रकाशितम् ।

पृथिव्यामुदरे चैव यथाकाशः प्रकाशितः ॥ १२ ॥

(१२) अन्वयः— मधुज्ञाने द्वयोः द्वयोः परं ब्रह्म प्रकाशितम्; यथा पृथिव्याम् उदरे च एव आकाशः प्रकाशितः ।

जीवात्मनोरनन्यत्वमभेदेन प्रशस्यते ।

नानात्वं निन्द्यते यच्च तदेवं हि समञ्जसम् ॥ १३ ॥

(१३) अन्वयः— यत् जीवात्मनोः अनन्यत्वम् अभेदेन प्रशस्यते, नानात्वं च निन्द्यते, तत् हि एवं समञ्जसम् ।

(१०) All aggregates are set forth by the Māyā of Ātman, like dream. In [respect of] [their] superiority or equality everywhere, there does not exist any proper ground [which would enable us to prove that the saṃghātas are real].

(११) The sheaths, essence etc. that are indeed expounded in the Taittiriya [upaniṣad] -- of them, the supreme Jīva is clearly shown up as Ātman, like Ākāśa.

(१२) In the Madhu-jñāna [that is, Madhuvidyā chapter in the Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad], in the various [or, in each of the] pairs [described as Ādhidaiva and Adhyātma] is shown up the Highest Brahman, as Ākāśa is shown up in the earth and in the belly itself.

(१३) That the identity of Jīva and Ātman without any difference, is praised and variety [or, multiplicity] is censured—that is indeed rational only thus [by assuming that Jīva is the creation of Māya].

जीवात्मनोः पृथक्त्वं यत्प्रागुत्पत्तेः प्रकीर्तिंतम् ।

भविष्यद्बृत्या गौणं तन्मुख्यत्वं हि न युज्यते ॥ १४ ॥

(१४) अन्वयः— उत्पत्तेः प्राक् यत् जीवात्मनोः पृथक्त्वं प्रकीर्तिंतम् तत् भविष्यद्बृत्या गौणम् ; मुख्यत्वं हि न युज्यते ।

मृष्णोहविस्फुलिङ्गादैः सृष्टिर्या चोदितान्यथा ।

उपायः सोऽवताराय नास्ति भेदः कथंचन ॥ १५ ॥

(१५) अन्वयः— या मृष्णोहविस्फुलिङ्गादैः अन्यथा सृष्टिः चोदिता, सः अवताराय उपायः; भेदः कथंचन न अस्ति ।

आश्रमाख्विविधा हीनमध्यमोत्कृष्टदृष्ट्यः ।

उपासनोपदिष्टेयं तदर्थमनुकम्पया ॥ १६ ॥

(१६) अन्वयः— हीनमध्यमोत्कृष्टदृष्ट्यः विविधाः आश्रमाः; इथम् उपासना तदर्थम् अनुकम्पया उपदिष्टा ।

स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु द्वैतिनो निश्चिता दृढम् ।

परस्परं विरुद्ध्यन्ते तैरयं न विरुद्ध्यते ॥ १७ ॥

(१७) अन्वयः— द्वैतिनः स्वसिद्धान्तव्यवस्थासु दृढं निश्चिताः; (द्वैतिनः) परस्परं विरुद्ध्यन्ते; तैः अयम् (आत्मैकत्वदर्शनपक्षः) न विरुद्ध्यते ।

(१४) What separateness of Jiva and Ātman prior to creation, has been declared, that [is] figurative, referring [as it does] to the state to come; [to regard it as having] the nature of the primary [sense] indeed does not fit in.

(१५) The creation which has been authoritatively mentioned otherwise by [illustrations of] earth, iron, sparks etc , that [is] a device for the grasping [of the true position] ; no difference whatsoever [between Jiva and Ātman] exists.

(१६) [There are] three-fold stages of life, having low, middle and excellent vision; this [mode of] worship is prescribed for them, out of compassion [by the śruti].

(१७) The dualists are firmly fixed in [their] laying out of their conclusions; they contradict one another; this [Ajātivāda] does not conflict with them.

अद्वैतं परमार्थो हि द्वैतं तद्वेद उच्यते ।

तेषामुभयथा द्वैतं तेनायं न विरुद्ध्यते ॥ १८ ॥

(१८) अन्वयः— अद्वैतं हि परमार्थः, द्वैतं तद्वेदः उच्यते; तेषां (द्वैतिनाम्) उभयथा द्वैतम्; तेन अयं न विरुद्ध्यते ।

मायया भिद्यते ह्येतन्नान्यथाजं कथंचन ।

तत्त्वतो भिद्यमाने हि मर्त्यताममृतं ब्रजेत् ॥ १९ ॥

(१९) अन्वयः— एतत् हि अजम् (अद्वैतं) मायया भिद्यते, अन्यथा कथंचन न; तत्त्वतः हि भिद्यमाने अमृतं मर्त्यतां ब्रजेत् ।

अजातस्यैव भावस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः ।

अजातो ह्यमृतो भावो मर्त्यतां कथमेष्यति ॥ २० ॥

(२०) अन्वयः— वादिनः अजातस्य एव भावस्य जातिम् इच्छन्ति; अजातः अमृतः भावः हि कथं मर्त्यताम् एष्यति ।

न भवत्यमृतं मर्त्यं न मर्त्यममृतं तथा ।

प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिद्गविष्यति ॥ २१ ॥

(२१) अन्वयः— अमृतं मर्त्यं न भवति, तथा मर्त्यम् अमृतं (न भवति); प्रकृते: अन्यथाभावः कथंचित् न भविष्यति ।

(१८) Non-duality [is] indeed the highest reality; duality is spoken of as its outcome [or, modification]. For them [the dualists, exists] duality in both ways; therefore [or, with that dvaita] this [advaita] does not conflict.

(१९) This unborn [advaita] indeed becomes modified [or, different] through Māyā, not otherwise under any circumstances. If indeed it were to be modified in reality, the immortal would go the way of mortality !

(२०) The disputants [dvaitins] wish [to prove] the origination of the entity [which is] verily unoriginated. How indeed can an unborn [and therefore] immortal entity, pass on to mortality ?

(२१) The immortal does not become mortal, nor likewise the mortal immortal. There would not be under any circumstances, a change otherwise of [one's] nature.

स्वभावेनामृतो यस्य भावो गच्छति मर्त्यताम् ।
कृतकेनामृतस्तस्य कथं स्थास्यति निश्चलः ॥ २२ ॥

(२२) अन्वयः— यस्य स्वभावेन अमृतः भावः मर्त्यतां गच्छति तस्य कृतकेन अमृतः कथं निश्चलः स्थास्यति ।

भूततोऽभूततो वापि सृज्यमाने समा श्रुतिः ।
निश्चितं युक्तियुक्तं च यत्तद्वति नेतरत् ॥ २३ ॥

(२३) अन्वयः— भूततः वा अभूततः अपि सृज्यमाने श्रुतिः समा; यत् युक्तियुक्तं निश्चितं च तत् भवति इतरत् न (भवति) ।

नेह नानेति चाम्नायादिन्द्रो मायाभिरित्यपि ।
अजायमानो बहुधा मायया जायते तु सः ॥ २४ ॥

(२४) अन्वयः— न इह नाना इति च, इन्द्रः मायाभिः इति अपि, अजायमानः सः तु मायया बहुधा जायते इति आम्नायात् ।

संभूतेरपवादाच्च संभवः प्रतिषिध्यते ।
को न्वेनं जनयेदिति कारणं प्रतिषिध्यते ॥ २५ ॥

(२५) अन्वयः— संभूतेः अपवादात् च संभवः प्रतिषिध्यते, कः नु एनं जनयेत् इति कारणं प्रतिषिध्यते ।

(२२) [He] for whom [that is, in whose opinion] an entity immortal in [its] own nature, goes to mortality,—how will the immortal of his [that is, admitted by him] artificially made [subject to artificial effort], remain changeless [or, unmoving] ?

(२३) In [the matter of] being created, whether from the [already] existent, or from the non-existent also, the Śruti [is] equal [that is, supporting both the views]. What is associated [or, fortified] with logical reasoning and ascertained, holds, not the other.

(२४) And from the Śruti text ‘No multiple here,’ [from the Śruti text] ‘Indra by means of Māyā powers’ as well, [from the Śruti text] ‘He being unborn is however born in various ways through Māyā’,

(२५) and from the denial of origination [in the Īśavāsyopaniṣad], origination is barred out. By [the Śruti] ‘Who possibly (nu) would produce this [Ātman]?’ the cause [of origination] is barred out.

स एष नेति नेतीति व्याख्यातं निहुते यतः ।
सर्वमग्राह्यभावेन हेतुनाजं प्रकाशते ॥ २६ ॥

(२६) अन्वयः— यतः सः एषः न इति न इति व्याख्यातम् अग्राह्यभावेन हेतुना सर्वं निहुते, अजं प्रकाशते ।

सतो हि मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वतः ।

तत्त्वतो जायते यस्य जातं तस्य हि जायते ॥ २७ ॥

(२७) अन्वयः— सतः जन्म मायया हि युज्यते, न तु तत्त्वतः; यस्य तत्त्वतः जायते तस्य हि जातं जायते ।

असतो मायया जन्म तत्त्वतो नैव युज्यते ।

वन्ध्यापुत्रो न तत्त्वेन मायया वापि जायते ॥ २८ ॥

(२८) अन्वयः— असतः मायया, तत्त्वतः जन्म न एव युज्यते; वन्ध्यापुत्रः तत्त्वेन मायया वा अपि न जायते ।

यथा स्वप्ने द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः ।

तथा जाग्रद्वयाभासं स्पन्दते मायया मनः ॥ २९ ॥

(२९) अन्वयः— यथा मायया मनः स्वप्ने द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते तथा मायया मनः जाग्रत् द्वयाभासं स्पन्दते ।

(२६) As the explanation viz. ‘ This one, he [is] not, [is] not ’ denies [or, conceals] all by the reason of the incomprehensibility [of Ātman], the unborn [Ātman]: shines forth.

(२७) The birth of the existent is indeed reasonable through Māyā, but not in reality. For whom [that is, in whose opinion] is born [the existent] in reality, for him [that is, he would have to admit] indeed the [already] born is born !

(२८) The birth of the non-existent [either] through Māyā [or] in reality is assuredly not reasonable; the son of a barren woman is not born either in reality or through Māyā even.

(२९) As through Māyā the mind in dream vibrates into the appearance of two [grāhya and grāhaka], so through Māyā the mind in the waking state vibrates into the appearance of two [grāhya and grāhaka].

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं मनः स्वप्ने न संशयः ।

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं तथा जाग्रत्त्वं संशयः ॥ ३० ॥

(३०) अन्वयः— स्वप्ने च अद्वयं मनः द्वयाभासं, न संशयः; तथा जाग्रत् च अद्वयं (मनः) द्वयाभासं, न संशयः ।

मनोद्वयमिदं द्वैतं यत्किञ्चित्सच्चराचरम् ।

मनसो ह्यमनीभावे द्वैतं नैवोपलभ्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

(३१) अन्वयः— इदं यत्किञ्चित् सच्चराचरं द्वैतं मनोद्वयम्; मनसः अमनीभावे हि द्वैतं न एष उपलभ्यते ।

आत्मसत्यानुबोधेन न संकल्पयते यदा ।

अमनस्तां तदा याति ग्राह्याभावे तदग्रहम् ॥ ३२ ॥

(३२) अन्वयः— यदा आत्मसत्यानुबोधेन (मनः) न संकल्पयते तदा अमनस्तां याति, ग्राह्याभावे तत् अग्रहम् ।

अकल्पकमजं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाभिन्नं प्रचक्षते ।

ब्रह्म ज्ञेयमजं नित्यमजेनाजं विबुध्यते ॥ ३३ ॥

(३३) अन्वयः— अकल्पकम् अजं ज्ञानं ज्ञेयाभिन्नं प्रचक्षते; अजं नित्यं ब्रह्म ज्ञेयम्; अजम् अजेन विबुध्यते ।

(३०) In dream again, the non-dual mind [is] appearing as dual, no doubt [about it]; and similarly in the waking state, the non-dual mind [is] appearing as dual, no doubt.

(३१) [All] this duality whatsoever, comprising the movable and the immovable, [is] perceivable by the mind; when the mind has indeed become non-mind, duality is assuredly not experienced.

(३२) When [the mind] does not imagine owing to the comprehension of the truth about [or, namely] Ātman, [it] goes to the state of non-mind; it [is] without cognition in the absence of the cognisable.

(३३) They assert the jñāna free from imagination [and] unborn as [being] not different from the knowable. Brahman [is] the knowable, unborn [and] eternal. [Thus] is made known the unborn by the unborn.

निगृहीतस्य मनसो निर्विकल्पस्य धीमतः ।

प्रचारः स तु विज्ञेयः सुषुप्तेऽन्यो न तत्समः ॥ ३४ ॥

(३४) अन्वयः— निगृहीतस्य निर्विकल्पस्य धीमतः मनसः सः प्रचारः तु विज्ञेयः; सुषुप्ते अन्यः (प्रचारः), तत्समः न ।

लीयते हि सुषुप्ते तन्निगृहीतं न लीयते ।

तदेव निर्भयं ब्रह्म ज्ञानालोकं समन्ततः ॥ ३५ ॥

(३५) अन्वयः— सुषुप्ते हि तत् (मनः) लीयते, निगृहीतं (तत्) न लीयते, तत् एव निर्भयं समन्ततः ज्ञानालोकं ब्रह्म ।

अजमनिद्रमस्वप्नमनामकमरूपकम् ।

सकृद्धिभातं सर्वज्ञं नोपचारः कथंचन ॥ ३६ ॥

(३६) अन्वयः— (ब्रह्म) अजम्, अनिद्रम्, अस्वप्नम्, अनामकम्, अरूपकं, सकृद्धिभातं, सर्वज्ञम्; कथंचन न उपचारः ।

सर्वाभिलापविगतः सर्वचिन्तासभूतिथः ।

सुप्रशान्तः सकृज्ज्योतिः समाधिरचलोऽभयः ॥ ३७ ॥

(३७) अन्वयः— सर्वाभिलापविगतः सर्वचिन्तासमुत्थितः सुप्रशान्तः सकृज्ज्योतिः अचलः अभयः समाधिः ।

(34) But that procedure [of the mind] completely controlled [and] free from imagination, endowed with discernment [or, of the discerning person] has to be known properly ; [the procedure of the mind] in deep sleep [is] different, not like that [of the Nighrita mind, described above].

(35) In deep sleep indeed, it [the mind] is laid low ; completely controlled [it] is not laid low. That itself [is] the Brahman void of fear, with the illumination of jñāna all around,

(36) unborn, without sleep, without dream, without name, without form, flashing up once for all, [and] omniscient. [There is in this description of Brahman] no figurative use in any way whatever.

(37) [That is] the intense concentration, gone beyond all statement in words, risen above all thought, completely calm, illumination once for all, unmoving [and] free from fear.

ग्रहो न तत्र नोत्सर्गाश्चेन्ता यत्र न विद्यते ।

आत्मसंस्थं तदा ज्ञानमजाति समतां गतम् ॥ ३८ ॥

(३८) अन्वयः— यत्र चिन्ता न विद्यते तत्र ग्रहः न, उत्सर्गः न; तदा आत्मसंस्थं ज्ञानं अजाति समतां गतम् ।

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम दुर्दर्शः सर्वयोगिभिः ।

योगिनो विभ्यति ह्यस्मादभये भयदर्शिनः ॥ ३९ ॥

(३९) अन्वयः— सर्वयोगिभिः दुर्दर्शः अस्पर्शयोगः वै नाम; अभये भयदर्शिनः योगिनः हि अस्मात् विभ्यति ।

मनसो निग्रहायत्तमभयं सर्वयोगिनाम् ।

दुःखक्षयः प्रबोधश्चाप्यक्षया शान्तिरेव च ॥ ४० ॥

(४०) अन्वयः— सर्वयोगिनां मनसः निग्रहायत्तम् अभयम्, दुःख-क्षयः प्रबोधः अपि च, अक्षया शान्तिः एव च ।

उत्सेक उदधेयद्रकुशाग्रेणैकविन्दुना ।

मनसो निग्रहस्तद्भवेदपरिखेदतः ॥ ४१ ॥

(४१) अन्वयः— यद्वत् कुशाग्रेण एकविन्दुना उदधेः उत्सेकः तद्वत् अपरिखेदतः मनसः निग्रहः भवेत् ।

(38) Where there does not exist thought, there [is] no taking up [that is, apprehension], no giving up [either]. At that time the jñāna well set in itself [or, in the Ātman], [is] non-originated [and] remaining the same [lit. going to sameness].

(39) [This is] verily, the ‘non-touch-Yoga’ by name, difficult to be realised by all [ordinary] Yogins; the Yogins are indeed afraid of it, seeing fear in something free from fear.

(40) For all Yogins, depending upon the control of the mind, [are] absence of fear, destruction of misery, and complete awakening and eternal peace itself.

(41) As [there would be] the draining out of the sea by one drop [of water at a time] by means of the point of [a blade of] Kuśa grass, so would be the control of the mind without all out toiling.

उपायेन निगृहीयाद्विक्षिसं कामभोगयोः ।

सुप्रसन्नं लये चैव यथा कामो लयस्तथा ॥ ४२ ॥

(४२) अन्वयः— कामभोगयोः विक्षिसं लये च एव सुप्रसन्नं (मनः) उपायेन निगृहीयात्; यथा कामः तथा लयः (अनर्थहेतुः) ।

दुःखं सर्वमनुस्मृत्य कामभोगान्विवर्तयेत् ।

अजं सर्वमनुस्मृत्य जातं नैव तु पश्यति ॥ ४३ ॥

(४३) अन्वयः— सर्वं दुःखम् अनुस्मृत्य कामभोगान् निवर्तयेत्; सर्वं अजम् अनुस्मृत्य जातं तु न एव पश्यति ।

लये संबोधयेच्चित्तं विक्षिसं शमयेत्पुनः ।

सकषायं विजानीयात्समप्राप्तं न चालयेत् ॥ ४४ ॥

(४४) अन्वयः— लये चित्तं संबोधयेत्, विक्षिसं (चित्तं) पुनः शमयेत्, सकषायं (चित्तं) विजानीयात्, समप्राप्तं (चित्तं) न चालयेत् ।

नास्वादयेत्सुखं तत्र निःसंगः प्रज्ञया भवेत् ।

निश्चलं निश्चरचित्तमेकीकुर्यात्प्रयत्नतः ॥ ४५ ॥

(४५) अन्वयः— तत्र सुखं न आस्वादयेत्, प्रज्ञया निःसंगः भवेत्, प्रयत्नतः निश्चलं निश्चरत् चित्तम् एकीकुर्यात् ।

(42) By [the prescribed] means, one should control [the mind] tossed about in desire and enjoyment and also quite at ease in the lying low [state]; as desire, so the lying low [both states are equally undesirable and harmful].

(43) Having continually (*anu*) remembered all [to be] misery, one should turn back [the mind from] desires and enjoyments; having continually remembered all [to be] unborn, one assuredly does not see the born for the matter of that (*tu*).

(44) One should fully awaken the mind [when] in the lying low [state], should pacify [it] again [when] tossed about; should know [it] particularly [to be] with passion, [and] should not shake [it] up [when] attained to equilibrium.

(45) One should not relish pleasure there [in Samādhi]; one should be free from attachment through discernment; one should unify, by effort, the steadied mind [if it be] moving out [towards objects of enjoyment].

यदा न लीयते चित्तं न च विक्षिप्यते पुनः ।

अनिङ्ग्नमनाभासं निष्पन्नं ब्रह्म तत्तदा ॥ ४६ ॥

(४६) अन्वयः— यदा चित्तं न लीयते, पुनः च न विक्षिप्यते तदा तत् अनिङ्ग्नम् अनाभासं (सद्) ब्रह्म निष्पन्नम् ।

स्वस्थं शान्तं सनिर्वाणमकथ्यं सुखमुत्तमम् ।

अजमजेन ज्ञेयेन सर्वज्ञं परिचक्षते ॥ ४७ ॥

(४७) अन्वयः— स्वस्थं शान्तं सनिर्वाणम् अकथ्यम् उत्तमं सुखम् ज्ञेयेन अजेन अजं परिचक्षते ।

न कश्चिज्ञायते जीवः संभवोऽस्य न विद्यते ।

एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किंचित् जायते ॥ ४८ ॥

(४८) अन्वयः— कश्चित् जीवः न जायते, अस्य संभवः न विद्यते; एतत् तत् उत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किंचित् न जायते ।

इति गौडपादीयकारिकायां तृतीयं प्रकरणम् ।

चतुर्थं प्रकरणम् ।

ज्ञानेनाकाशकल्पेन धर्मान्यो गग्नोपमान् ।

ज्ञेयाभिन्नेन संबुद्धस्तं वन्दे द्विपदां वरम् ॥ १ ॥

(१) अन्वयः— यः आकाशकल्पेन ज्ञेयाभिन्नेन ज्ञानेन गग्नोपमान् धर्मान् संबुद्धः तं द्विपदां वरं वन्दे ।

(46) When the mind does not lie low, and is not again tossed about, then that [being] without movement, and not presenting any appearance, culminates into Brahman.

(47) Resting in itself, calm, with Nirvāṇa, indescribable, highest happiness, unborn [and one] with the unborn knowable, omniscient—[thus of it] they say.

(48) No creature whatever is born; no origination of it exists [or, takes place]. This [is] that highest truth where nothing whatever is born.

Here ends the Third Chapter in the Gaudapāda-kārikā.

FOURTH CHAPTER

(१) I salute that best of the bipeds, who by jñāna almost like the sky [and] not different from the knowable, fully realised the entities [or, jīvas, individual souls] comparable to the sky.

अस्पर्शयोगो वै नाम सर्वसत्त्वसुखो हितः ॥

अविवादोऽविरुद्धश्च देशितस्तं नमास्यहम् ॥ २ ॥

(२) अन्वयः— (येन) सर्वसत्त्वसुखः हितः अविवादः अविरुद्धः च अस्पर्शयोगः वै नाम देशितः तम् अहं नमामि ।

भूतस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिनः केचिदेव हि ।

अभूतस्यापरे धीरा विवदन्तः परस्परम् ॥ ३ ॥

(३) अन्वयः— केचित् एव वादिनः हि भूतस्य जातिम् इच्छन्ति, अपरे धीराः अभूतस्य (जातिम् इच्छन्ति), परस्परं विवदन्तः (एवम् एते) ।

भूतं न जायते किंचिदभूतं नैव जायते ।

विवदन्तो द्वया ह्येवमजातिं ख्यापयन्ति ते ॥ ४ ॥

(४) अन्वयः— भूतं किंचित् न जायते, अभूतं (किंचित्) न एव जायते; एवं विवदन्तः ते द्वयाः हि अजातिं ख्यापयन्ति ।

ख्याप्यमानामजातिं तैरनुमोदामहे वयम् ।

विवदामो न तैः सार्थमविवादं निबोधत ॥ ५ ॥

(५) अन्वयः— वयं तैः ख्याप्यमानाम् अजातिम् अनुमोदामहे; तैः सार्थं न विवदामः; (अजातिम्) अविवादं निबोधत ।

(२) I bow down to him [by whom] was preached the non-touch-Yoga verily so called, [which is for] the pleasure of all beings, beneficial, without any dispute and unopposed.

(३) Some disputants indeed fancy the origination of the existent; other intelligent [disputants], of the non-existent; [thus they are seen] disputing with one another.

(४) No existent whatever is originated; a non-existent is assuredly not originated; those dualists [disputants] indeed disputing thus proclaim non-origination.

(५) We endorse the non-origination proclaimed by them; we dispute not with them. Know [how the ajātivāda is] free from dispute.

अजातस्यैव धर्मस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति वादिमः ।
अजातो श्वमृतो धर्मो मर्त्यतां कथमेष्यति ॥ ६ ॥

(६) अन्वयः— वादिनः अजातस्य एव धर्मस्य जातिम् इच्छन्ति;
अजातः हि अमृतः धर्मः, (सः) कथं मर्त्यताम् एष्यति ?

न भवत्यमृतं मर्त्यं न मर्त्यममृतं तथा ।
प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिद्विष्यति ॥ ७ ॥

(७) अन्वयः— अमृतं मर्त्यं न भवति, तथा मर्त्यम् अमृतं न
(भवति); प्रकृते: अन्यथाभावः कथंचित् न भविष्यति ।

स्वभावेनामृतो यस्य धर्मो गच्छति मर्त्यताम् ।
कृतकेनामृतस्तस्य कथं स्थास्यति निश्चलः ॥ ८ ॥

(८) अन्वयः— यस्य स्वभावेन अमृतः धर्मः मर्त्यतां गच्छति तस्य
कृतकेन अमृतः कथं निश्चलः स्थास्यति ?

सांसिद्धिकी स्वाभाविकी सहजा अकृता च या ।
प्रकृतिः सेति विज्ञेया स्वभावं न जहाति या ॥ ९ ॥

(९) अन्वयः— या सांसिद्धिकी स्वाभाविकी सहजा अकृता च, या
स्वभावं न जहाति, सा प्रकृतिः इति विज्ञेया ।

(६) The disputants [dvaitins] wish [to prove] the origination of the entity [which is] verily unoriginated. How indeed can an unborn [and therefore] immortal entity, pass on to mortality ?

(७) The immortal does not become mortal, nor likewise the mortal immortal. There would not be under any circumstances, a change otherwise of [one's] nature.

(८) [He] for whom [that is, in whose opinion] an entity immortal in [its] own nature, goes to mortality—how will the immortal of his [that is, admitted by him] artificially made [or, subject to artificial effort], remain changeless [or, unmoving] ?

(९) That should be well known as nature which [is] fully established, natural, inborn and not made [artificially], [and] which does not abandon [its] own nature.

जरामरणनिर्मुक्ताः सर्वे धर्माः स्वभावतः ।

जरामरणमिच्छन्तश्च्यवन्ते तन्मनीषया ॥ १० ॥

(१०) अन्वयः— सर्वे धर्माः स्वभावतः जरामरणनिर्मुक्ताः ; जरामरणम् इच्छन्तः (ते) तन्मनीषया च्यवन्ते ।

कारणं यस्य वै कार्यं कारणं तस्य जायते ।

जायमानं कथमजं भिन्नं नित्यं कथं च तत् ॥ ११ ॥

(११) अन्वयः— यस्य वै कारणं कार्यं तस्य कारणं जायते; जायमानं कथम् अजम् ? भिन्नं च तत् कथं निलम् ?

कारणाद्यद्यनन्यत्वमतः कार्यमजं यदि ।

जायमानाद्वै कार्यात्कारणं ते कथं ध्रुवम् ॥ १२ ॥

(१२) अन्वयः— यदि कारणात् अनन्यत्वम्, अतः यदि कार्यम् अजम्, (तर्हि) ते जायमानात् वै कार्यात् हि (अनन्यं) कारणं कथं ध्रुवम् ?

अजाद्वै जायते यस्य दृष्टान्तस्तस्य नास्ति वै ।

जाताच्च जायमानस्य नव्यवस्था प्रसज्यते ॥ १३ ॥

(१३) अन्वयः— यस्य वै अजात् जायते तस्य वै दृष्टान्तः न अस्ति; जातात् च जायमानस्य नव्यवस्था प्रसज्यते ।

(१०) All entities [are] by nature freed from old age and death. Wishing for old age and death, they deviate [from their nature] by the thought of them.

(११) For whom indeed [that is, who holds that] the cause [is] the effect, for him [that is, he would have to admit that] the cause is originated; [if the cause is] being originated, how [can it be] unborn and how again [can] that [if] modified [be] eternal ?

(१२) If [it is argued by you that there is] non-difference [of the effect] from the cause, and therefore if the effect [is regarded as] unoriginated, how [can] your cause indeed [which is non-different] from the effect being originated [be spoken of by you as] unchanging ?

(१३) For whom [that is, in whose opinion] [the effect] is originated from the unoriginated [cause], for him there is assuredly no illustration [to corroborate his theory]; and [in the case] of [the effect] being originated from the originated, there would be the undesirable contingency of the *regressus ad infinitum*.

हेतोरादिः फलं येषामादिर्हेतुः फलस्य च ।
हेतोः फलस्य चानादिः कर्थं तैरुपवर्ण्यते ॥ १४ ॥

(१४) अन्वयः— येषां हेतोः आदिः फलम्, हेतुः च फलस्य आदिः, तैः कर्थं हेतोः फलस्य च अनादिः उपवर्ण्यते ?

हेतोरादिः फलं येषामादिर्हेतुः फलस्य च ।
तथा जन्म भवेत्तेषां पुत्राजन्म पितुर्यथा ॥ १५ ॥

(१५) अन्वयः— येषां हेतोः आदिः फलम्, हेतुः च फलस्य आदिः, यथा पुत्रात् पितुः जन्म तथा तेषां जन्म भवेत् ।

संभवे हेतुफलयोरेषितव्यः क्रमस्त्वया ।
युगपत्संभवे यस्माद्संबन्धो विषाणवत् ॥ १६ ॥

(१६) अन्वयः— हेतुफलयोः संभवे त्वया क्रमः एषितव्यः, यस्मात् युगपत्संभवे विषाणवत् असंबन्धः ।

(१४) For whom [that is, in whose opinion] the effect [is] the producer [or, beginning] of the cause and the cause [is] the producer [or, beginning] of the effect—how can be [nonchalantly] described by them, the beginningless of the cause as well as the effect ?

(१५) For whom [that is, is whose opinion] the effect [is] the producer [or, beginning] of the cause and the cause [is] the producer [or, beginning] of the effect, for them, there would be the birth in the same manner as the birth of the father from the son !

(१६) In the [case of] origination of the cause and effect [if admitted], the order [in which this takes place] has got to be searched after by you, in as much as (*yasmāt*) in the [case of] simultaneous origination [of cause and effect], [there would be] the absence of [mutual] connection, like the [left and right] horns [of a bull].

फलादुत्पदमानः सन् ते हेतुः प्रसिध्यति ।

अप्रसिद्धः कथं हेतुः फलमुत्पादयिष्यति ॥ १७ ॥

(१७) अन्वयः— फलात् उत्पदमानः सन् ते हेतुः न प्रसिध्यति; कथम् अप्रसिद्धः हेतुः फलम् उत्पादयिष्यति ?

यदि हेतोः फलात्सिद्धिः फलसिद्धिश्च हेतुतः ।

कतरत्पूर्वनिष्पन्नं यस्य सिद्धिरपेक्षया ॥ १८ ॥

(१८) अन्वयः— यदि फलात् हेतोः सिद्धिः, हेतुतः च फलसिद्धिः, (तर्हि) यस्य अपेक्षया सिद्धिः (तत्) कतरत् पूर्वनिष्पन्नम् ?

अशक्तिरपरिज्ञानं क्रमकोपोऽथ वा पुनः ।

एवं हि सर्वथा बुद्धैरजातिः परिदीपिता ॥ १९ ॥

(१९) अन्वयः— अशक्तिः, अपरिज्ञानम्, अथ वा पुनः क्रमकोपः; एवं हि बुद्धैः सर्वथा अजातिः परिदीपिता ।

बीजाङ्गुराख्यो दृष्टान्तः सदा साध्यसमो हि सः ।

न हि साध्यसमो हेतुः सिद्धौ साध्यस्य युज्यते ॥ २० ॥

(२०) अन्वयः— सः बीजाङ्गुराख्यः दृष्टान्तः हि सदा साध्यसमः; साध्यसमः हेतुः हि साध्यस्य सिद्धौ न युज्यते ।

(१७) Your cause being brought into being from the effect, would not be substantiated; how will the unsubstantiated cause produce the effect ?

(१८) If [there is] the substantiation of the cause from the effect and the substantiation of the effect from the cause, which one [of the two is] produced first, whose substantiation [is] dependent [upon the other] ?

(१९) Incapability [of the hetu to prove the sadhya], the absence of full knowledge [about what is prior and what is posterior], the violation again of [the reasonable] order—in view of this [or, thus] indeed, non-origination in every way has been blazoned forth by the wise.

(२०) That [well-known] illustration called ‘seed and sprout’ [is] indeed always in the category of (*sama*) ‘to be proven’. Surely no reason in the category of ‘to be proven’ is employed for the establishment of a thing to be proved,

पूर्वापरिज्ञानमजातेः परिदीपकम् ।

जायमानाद्वि वै धर्मात्कथं पूर्वं न गृह्णते ॥ २१ ॥

(२१) अन्वयः— पूर्वापरिज्ञानम् अजातेः परिदीपकम्; कथं हि जायमानात् धर्मात् पूर्वं न गृह्णते ?

स्वतो वा परतो चापि न किंचिद्द्रिस्तु जायते ।

सदसत्सदसद्वापि न किंचिद्द्रिस्तु जायते ॥ २२ ॥

(२२) अन्वयः— किंचित् वस्तु स्वतः वा परतः वा अपि न जायते; सत्, असत्, सदसत् वा अपि किंचित् वस्तु न जायते ।

हेतुर्न जायतेऽनादेः फलं चापि स्वभावतः ।

आदिर्न विद्यते यस्य तस्य ह्यादिर्न विद्यते ॥ २३ ॥

(२३) अन्वयः— स्वभावतः अनादेः हेतुः न जायते, फलं च अपि (न जायते); यस्य आदिः न विद्यते तस्य हि आदिः न विद्यते ।

प्रज्ञसेः सनिमित्तत्वमन्यथा द्रूयनाशतः ।

संक्षेशस्योपलब्धेश्च परतन्त्रास्तिता मता ॥ २४ ॥

(२४) अन्वयः— प्रज्ञसेः सनिमित्तत्वम्; अन्यथा द्रूयनाशतः संक्षेशस्य उपलब्धेः च परतन्त्रास्तिता मता ।

(२१) The absence of full knowledge about the priority and posteriority [of cause and effect] [is] the full illuminator of non-origination. How indeed can not be comprehended the [thing] prior to an entity that is being originated for the matter of that ?

(२२) Nothing whatever is originated either from itself or from something else also; nothing whatever, [whether] existent, non-existent or existent-nonexistent as well, is originated.

(२३) By [its] own nature the cause is not originated from the beginningless, and the effect too. For which there is no beginning, there is no cause indeed for it.

(२४) Cognition is [or, has the state of being] with [that is, due to some] cause ; otherwise [there would be no prajñpti and no cognition of the dravya; so] on account of the destruction of the dual and on account of the experience of afflictions, the existence [of external objects] in the philosophy of others [is indicated as] favoured [by some].

प्रज्ञसेः सनिमित्तत्वमिष्यते युक्तिदर्शनात् ।

निमित्सस्यानिमित्तत्वमिष्यते भूतदर्शनात् ॥ २५ ॥

(२५) अन्वयः— युक्तिदर्शनात् प्रज्ञसेः सनिमित्तत्वम् इष्यते; भूत-
दर्शनात् निमित्सस्य अनिमित्तत्वम् इष्यते ।

चित्तं न संस्पृशत्यर्थं नार्थाभासं तथैव च ।

अभूतो हि यतश्चार्थो नार्थाभासस्ततः पृथक् ॥ २६ ॥

(२६) अन्वयः— चित्तम् अर्थं न संस्पृशति, तथा एव च न अर्था-
भासं (संस्पृशति); यतः च अर्थः हि अभूतः, अर्थाभासः ततः पृथक् न ।

निमित्तं न सदा चित्तं संस्पृशत्यधर्वसु त्रिषु ।

अनिमित्तो विषयासः कर्थं तस्य भविष्यति ॥ २७ ॥

(२७) अन्वयः— सदा त्रिषु अव्यसु चित्तं निमित्तं न संस्पृशति; कर्थं
तस्य अनिमित्तः विषयासः भविष्यति ?

तस्मान्न जायते चित्तं चित्तदृश्यं न जायते ।

तस्य पश्यन्ति ये जातिं खे वै पश्यन्ति ते पदम् ॥ २८ ॥

(२८) अन्वयः— तस्मात् चित्तं न जायते, चित्तदृश्यं न जायते; ये
तस्य जातिं पश्यन्ति ते वै खे पदं पश्यन्ति ।

(२५) That the cognition is [or, has the state of being] with
[that is, due to some] cause, is fancied on seeing [that is, on the
strength of the presentation of the above] logical reasoning; [but]
that the cause has the state of being without a cause is fancied on
seeing [that is, on the strength of] the actual state of things [or,
the reality].

(२६) The mind does not contact the object, and similarly
indeed not the object-appearance. And because the object again [is]
non-existent, the object-appearance [is] not different from it.

(२७) Ever in the three paths [of time], the mind for all time
does not contact the cause; how would there be its causeless false
impression [or, modification] ?

(२८) Therefore, the mind is not originated, the mind-per-
ceivable is not originated [either]; those who perceive its origina-
tion, they verily perceive the foot [- prints of birds] in the sky !

अजातं जायते यस्माद्जातिः प्रकृतिस्ततः ।

प्रकृतेरन्यथाभावो न कथंचिद्भविष्यति ॥ २९ ॥

(२९) अन्वयः— यस्मात् अजातं जायते ततः प्रकृतिः अजातिः; प्रकृते: अन्यथाभावः कथंचित् न भविष्यति ।

अनादेरन्तवत्त्वं च संसारस्य न सेत्स्यति ।

अनन्तता चादिमतो मोक्षस्य न भविष्यति ॥ ३० ॥

(३०) अन्वयः— अनादेः संसारस्य अन्तवत्त्वं च न सेत्स्यति, आदिमतः मोक्षस्य अनन्तता च न भविष्यति ।

आदावन्ते च यत्कास्ति वर्तमानेऽपि तत्तथा ।

वितर्थैः सदृशाः सन्तोऽवितथा इव लक्षिताः ॥ ३१ ॥

(३१) अन्वयः— यत् आदौ अन्ते च न अस्ति, वर्तमाने अपि तत् तथा (न अस्ति); वितर्थैः सदृशाः सन्तः (भेदाः) अवितथाः इव लक्षिताः ।

सप्रयोजनता तेषां स्वमेविप्रतिपद्यते ।

तस्मादाद्यन्तवत्त्वेन मिथ्यैव खलु ते स्मृताः ॥ ३२ ॥

(३२) अन्वयः— तेषां (भेदानां) सप्रयोजनता स्वमेविप्रतिपद्यते, तस्मात् खलु ते आद्यन्तवत्त्वेन मिथ्याः एव स्मृताः ।

(२९) Inasmuch as the unoriginated is [said to be] originated, therefore non-origination [is] [its] nature. There would not be under any circumstances, a change otherwise of [one's] nature.

(३०) There would not again be resulting [or, be established] the coming to an end of the beginningless mundane creation; and there would not be the endlessness of salvation having a beginning.

(३१) What is not at the beginning and at the end [is] so also in the present; existing [things] [though] similar to illusions, are noted as though real.

(३२) Being possessed of a purpose in [the case of] the entities [in the waking state] is contradicted in the dream; therefore they indeed are traditionally known as unreal and nothing else (*eva*) on account of [their] having a beginning and an end.

सर्वे धर्मा मृषा स्वमेकायस्यान्तर्निर्दर्शनात् ।

संवृतेऽस्मिन्नदेशे वै भूतानां दर्शनं कुतः ॥ ३३ ॥

(३३) अन्वयः— सर्वे धर्माः स्वमेकायस्य अन्तः निर्दर्शनात् मृषा; कुतः अस्मिन् संवृते ग्रदेशे भूतानां दर्शनं वै ?

न युक्तं दर्शनं गत्वा कालस्यानियमाद्वतौ ।

प्रतिबुद्धश्च वै सर्वस्तस्मिन्देशे न विद्यते ॥ ३४ ॥

(३४) अन्वयः— गतौ कालस्य अनियमात् गत्वा दर्शनं न युक्तम्; सर्वः वै प्रतिबुद्धः च तस्मिन् देशे न विद्यते ।

मित्रादैः सह संमन्त्र्य संबुद्धो न प्रपद्यते ।

गृहीतं चापि यत्क्षचित्प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥ ३५ ॥

(३५) अन्वयः— मित्रादैः सह संमन्त्र्य संबुद्धः न प्रपद्यते; प्रतिबुद्धः गृहीतं च अपि यत् किञ्चित् न पश्यति ।

स्वमेचावस्तुकः कायः पृथगन्यस्य दर्शनात् ।

यथा कायस्तथा सर्वं चित्तदृश्यमवस्तुकम् ॥ ३६ ॥

(३६) अन्वयः— स्वमेच अन्यस्य (कायस्य) पृथक् दर्शनात् कायः अवस्तुकः; यथा कायः तथा चित्तदृश्यं सर्वम् अवस्तुकम् ।

(३३) All entities in dream are false on account of their perception within the body. Whence [can there be] the perception of existing things within this enclosed region ?

(३४) On account of the non-fixation of time [required] for the movement, the perception [of things] by [actually] going [there] [is] unwarranted ; and further, [when] awakened every one is not in that region [which he had travelled over to in the dream].

(३५) Having conversed together with [his] friends etc., one [when] re-awakened does not attain [to all that] ; and further whatever had been taken [by one in the dream], one [when] re-awakened does not perceive.

(३६) The body in the dream [is] again unsubstantial owing to the perception of another [body as] distinct [from it] ; as the body, so all mind-perceivable [is] unsubstantial.

ग्रहणाजागरितवत् तद्वेतुः स्वप्न इष्यते ।

तद्वेतुत्वात् तस्यैव सज्जागरितमिष्यते ॥ ३७ ॥

(३७) अन्वयः— जागरितवत् ग्रहणात् स्वप्नः तद्वेतुः इष्यते; तद्वेतुत्वात् तु तस्य (स्वप्नदशः) एव जागरितं सत् इष्यते ।

उत्पादस्याप्रसिद्धत्वादजं सर्वमुदाहृतम् ।

न च भूतादभूतस्य संभवोऽस्ति कथंचन ॥ ३८ ॥

(३८) अन्वयः— उत्पादस्य अप्रसिद्धत्वात् सर्वम् अजम् उदाहृतम्; भूतात् च अभूतस्य संभवः कथंचन न अस्ति ।

असज्जागरिते दृष्ट्वा स्वप्ने पश्यति तन्मयः ।

असत्स्वप्नेऽपि दृष्ट्वा च प्रतिबुद्धो न पश्यति ॥ ३९ ॥

(३९) अन्वयः— जागरिते असत् दृष्ट्वा तन्मयः स्वप्ने पश्यति, स्वप्ने अपि च असत् दृष्ट्वा प्रतिबुद्धः न पश्यति ।

नास्त्यसद्वेतुकमसत्सदसद्वेतुकं तथा ।

सच्च सद्वेतुकं नास्ति सद्वेतुकमसत्कुतः ॥ ४० ॥

(४०) अन्वयः— असत् असद्वेतुकं न अस्ति, तथा सत् असद्वेतुकं (न अस्ति), सत् च सद्वेतुकं न अस्ति, असत् सद्वेतुकं कुतः ?

(37) Owing to the apprehension [of objects in dream, being] similar to [that in] the waking state, dream is fancied to have that [waking state] as [its] cause. And owing to [dream] having that [waking state] as the cause, the waking state is fancied to be real for him [that is, the dreamer] alone.

(38) Owing to the production not being quite established, all is laid down as unoriginated. And there is no origination in any way of the non-existent from the existent.

(39) Having seen the unreal in the waking state, one being deeply absorbed in it, sees [the same] in the dream; and having seen the unreal in the dream also, one [when] reawakened sees [it] not.

(40) The unreal has not the unreal as [its] cause, likewise the real the unreal as [its] cause. The real as well has not the real as [its] cause; whence [can] the unreal [have] the real as [its] cause ?

विपर्यासाद्यथा जाग्रदचिन्त्यान्भूतवत्सपृशेत् ।

तथा स्वप्ने विपर्यासाद्वर्मास्तत्रैव पश्यति ॥ ४१ ॥

(४१) अन्वयः— यथा जाग्रत् विपर्यासात् अचिन्त्यान् भूतवत् स्पृशेत्, तथा स्वप्ने विपर्यासात् तत्र एव धर्मान् पश्यति ।

उपलभ्मात्समाचारादस्तिवस्तुत्ववादिनाम् ।

जातिस्तु देशिता बुद्धैरजातेख्ससतां सदा ॥ ४२ ॥

(४२) अन्वयः— बुद्धैः तु उपलभ्मात्, समाचारात्, अजातेः सदा त्रसताम् अस्तिवस्तुत्ववादिनाम् जातिः देशिता ।

अजातेख्ससतां तेषामुपलभ्माद्विष्यन्ति ये ।

जातिदोषा न सेत्स्यन्ति दोषोऽप्यल्पो भविष्यति ॥ ४३ ॥

(४३) अन्वयः— ये उपलभ्मात् विष्यन्ति, अजातेः त्रसतां तेषां जातिदोषाः न सेत्स्यन्ति, दोषः अपि अल्पः भविष्यति ।

उपलभ्मात्समाचारान्मायाहस्ती यथोच्यते ।

उपलभ्मात्समाचारादस्तिवस्तु तथोच्यते ॥ ४४ ॥

(४४) अन्वयः— यथा उपलभ्मात् समाचारात् मायाहस्ती उच्यते, तथा उपलभ्मात् समाचारात् अस्तिवस्तु उच्यते ।

(४१) As in the waking state, one through misinterpretation may come upon [or, touch] unthinkable [objects] as though real, similarly in dream, one perceives through misinterpretation, objects there itself.

(४२) By the wise [lit. the awakened] has been preached [the doctrine of] ‘origination’ for those who contend that ‘things exist [in reality]’ because of the perception [of those things] [and,] of the prevailing etiquette, [and who are] ever frightened of [the doctrine of] non-origination.

(४३) Who, on account of the perception [of things, as though they are real] go astray,—[in the case] of those frightened of [the doctrine of] non-origination, evils due to [belief in] origination would not be forthcoming ; [there] the evil again [if at all] would be negligible [lit. small].

(४४) As an illusion-elephant is spoken of [as real] because of perception [and] of the prevailing etiquette, similarly ‘things exist’ is spoken of [as depicting a real state of things] because of perception [and] of the prevailing etiquette.

जात्याभासं चलाभासं वस्त्वाभासं तथैव च ।

अजाचलवस्तुत्वं विज्ञानं शान्तभद्रयम् ॥ ४५ ॥

(४५) अन्वयः— जात्याभासं चलाभासं तथा एव च वस्त्वाभासं विज्ञानम्, अजाचलम् अवस्तुत्वं शान्तम्, अद्रयम् ।

एवं न जायते चित्तमेवं धर्मा अजाः स्मृताः ।

एवमेव विज्ञानन्तो न पतन्ति विपर्यये ॥ ४६ ॥

(४६) अन्वयः— एवं चित्तं न जायते, एवं धर्माः अजाः स्मृताः, एवम् एव विज्ञानन्तः विपर्यये न पतन्ति ।

ऋग्गुवक्रादिकाभासमलातस्पन्दितं यथा ।

ग्रहणग्राहकाभासं विज्ञानस्पन्दितं तथा ॥ ४७ ॥

(४७) अन्वयः— यथा अलातस्पन्दितम्, ऋग्गुवक्रादिकाभासं तथा विज्ञानस्पन्दितं ग्रहणग्राहकाभासम् ।

अस्पन्दमानमलातमनाभासमर्जं यथा ।

अस्पन्दमानं विज्ञानमनाभासमर्जं तथा ॥ ४८ ॥

(४८) अन्वयः— यथा अस्पन्दमानम्, अलातम्, अजम्, अनाभासम्, तथा अस्पन्दमानं विज्ञानम्, अजम्, अनाभासम् ।

(45) Origination-appearance, moving-appearance, and thing-appearance exactly in the same way [are nothing but] vijnāna, unoriginated and unmoving, unsubstantiality, calm [and] without any dual.

(46) Thus is not originated the mind; thus are the entities traditionally known as unoriginated; those fully knowing [the reality] thus alone do not fall into error.

(47) As the shaking of the fire-brand [is with] the appearance of straight, crooked etc., so the vibration of vijnāna [is with] the appearance of perception and perceiver.

(48) As the fire-brand not shaking, presenting no appearance [is] unoriginated, so [is] the vijnāna not shaking, presenting no appearance, unoriginated.

अलाते स्पन्दमाने वै नाभासा अन्यतोभुवः ।

न ततोऽन्यत्र निस्पन्दान्नालातं प्रविशन्ति ते ॥ ४९ ॥

(४९) अन्वयः— स्पन्दमाने अलाते वै आभासाः अन्यतोभुवः न, निस्पन्दात् ततः अन्यत्र न; ते अलातं न प्रविशन्ति ।

न निर्गता अलातात्चे द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः ।

विज्ञानेऽपि तथैव स्युराभासस्याविशेषतः ॥ ५० ॥

(५०) अन्वयः— द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः ते अलातात् न निर्गताः; आभासस्य अविशेषतः विज्ञाने अपि तथा एव स्युः ।

विज्ञाने स्पन्दमाने वै नाभासा अन्यतोभुवः ।

न ततोऽन्यत्र निस्पन्दान्न विज्ञानं विशन्ति ते ॥ ५१ ॥

(५१) अन्वयः— स्पन्दमाने विज्ञाने वै आभासाः अन्यतोभुवः न, निस्पन्दात् ततः अन्यत्र न; ते विज्ञानं न विशन्ति ।

न निर्गतास्ते विज्ञानाद्द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः ।

कार्यकारणताभावाद्यतोऽचिन्त्याः सदैव ते ॥ ५२ ॥

(५२) अन्वयः— द्रव्यत्वाभावयोगतः ते विज्ञानात् न निर्गताः; यतः कार्यकारणताऽभावात् ते सदा एव अचिन्त्याः ।

(४९) When the fire-brand is verily shaking up, the appearances do not arise from anything else ; as a result of non-shaking up, [the appearances are] not elsewhere other than there, nor do they enter the fire-brand.

(५०) They do not get out from the fire-brand, owing to [their] connection with the absence of the nature of a substance [that is, owing to their not being a substance]; they would be just like that [in respect of] the vijnâna also, on account of the non-difference in appearance [that is, appearances as such are the same by nature].

(५१) When the vijnâna is verily vibrating, the appearances do not arise from anything else ; as a result of non-vibration, they [the appearances are] not elsewhere other than there, nor do they enter the vijnâna.

(५२) They do not get out from the vijnâna, owing to [their] connection with the absence of the nature of a substance [that is, owing to their not being a substance]; because of the absence of the relation of cause and effect, they are ever and anon incomprehensible.

द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य हेतुः स्यादन्यदन्यस्य चैव हि ।
द्रव्यत्वमन्यभावो वा धर्माणां नोपपद्यते ॥ ५३ ॥

(५३) अन्वयः— द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य, अन्यत् अन्यस्य च एव हि हेतुः स्यात्; धर्माणां द्रव्यत्वम् अन्यभावः वा न उपपद्यते ।

एवं न चित्तजा धर्माश्रितं वापि न धर्मजम् ।

एवं हेतुफलाजातिं प्रविशन्ति मनीषिणः ॥ ५४ ॥

(५४) अन्वयः— एवं धर्माः चित्तजाः न, चित्तं वा अपि धर्मजं न; एवं मनीषिणः हेतुफलाजातिं प्रविशन्ति ।

यावद्वेतुफलावेशस्तावद्वेतुफलोद्भवः ।

क्षीणे हेतुफलावेशे नास्ति हेतुफलोद्भवः ॥ ५५ ॥

(५५) अन्वयः— यावत् हेतुफलावेशः तावत् हेतुफलोद्भवः; हेतुफलावेशे क्षीणे (सति) हेतुफलोद्भवः न अस्ति ।

यावद्वेतुफलावेशः संसारस्तावदायतः ।

क्षीणे हेतुफलावेशे संसारं न प्रपद्यते ॥ ५६ ॥

(५६) अन्वयः— यावत् हेतुफलावेशः तावत् संसारः आयतः; हेतुफलावेशे क्षीणे (सति) (पुरुषः) संसारं न प्रपद्यते ।

(५३) Substance may be the cause of substance; and [a category] other [than substance] of [a category] other [than substance] assuredly. The nature of a substance or the nature of [some] other [category] is not reasonable in the case of entities.

(५४) Thus, entities [are] not originated from the mind ; the mind also for the matter of that [is] not originated from entities. Thus the wise enter into [that is, have to fall back upon] [the doctrine of] non-origination of cause and effect.

(५५) As long as [there is] the obsession of cause and effect, so long [is] the uprising of cause and effect ; when the obsession of cause and effect ceases to exist, there is no uprising of cause and effect.

(५६) As long as [there is] the obsession of cause and effect, so long the worldly existence [is] prolonged; when the obsession of cause and effect ceases to exist, one does not attain to worldly existence.

संवृत्या जायते सर्वं शाश्वतं नास्ति तेन वै ।

सद्ग्रावेन ह्यं सर्वमुच्छेदस्तेन नास्ति वै ॥ ५७ ॥

(५७) अन्वयः— सर्वं संवृत्या जायते, तेन वै शाश्वतं न अस्ति; सर्वं हि सद्ग्रावेन अजम्, तेन वै उच्छेदः न अस्ति ।

धर्मा य इति जायन्ते जायन्ते ते न तत्त्वतः ।

जन्म मायोपमं तेषां सा च माया न विद्यते ॥ ५८ ॥

(५८) अन्वयः— ये धर्माः जायन्ते इति ते तत्त्वतः न जायन्ते; तेषां जन्म मायोपमम्, सा माया च न विद्यते ।

यथा मायामयाद्वीजाज्जायते तन्मयोऽङ्गुरः ।

नासौ नित्यो न चोच्छेदी तद्वद्भर्मेषु योजना ॥ ५९ ॥

(५९) अन्वयः— यथा मायामयात् बीजात् तन्मयः अङ्गुरः जायते; असौ नित्यः न उच्छेदी च न, तद्वद् धर्मेषु योजना ।

नाजेषु सर्वधर्मेषु शाश्वताशाश्वताभिधा ।

यत्र वर्णा न वर्तन्ते विवेकस्तत्र नोच्यते ॥ ६० ॥

(६०) अन्वयः— सर्वधर्मेषु अजेषु (सत्य) शाश्वताशाश्वताभिधा न; यत्र वर्णाः न वर्तन्ते तत्र विवेकः न उच्यते ।

(५७) Everything is originated on account of empirical experience, therefore indeed [what is so originated] is not eternal [or, permanent]. Everything characterised by the nature of existent [is] unoriginated, and therefore there is no annihilation.

(५८) The entities which are spoken of (*iti*) as originated, they are not originated in reality. Their origination is comparable to illusion; that illusion too does not exist.

(५९) As from a seed made up by illusion, is originated a sprout constituted of it [illusion], that [sprout] is not eternal, nor again liable to annihilation; so likewise, the scheme in respect of entities.

(६०) The designation of eternal and non-eternal is not [significant] when all entities [are] unoriginated; where words [lit. alphabet, letters] do not function [lit. exist], discrimination is not spoken of there [that is, cannot be said to have any scope].

यथा स्वमे द्वयाभासं चित्तं चलति मायया ।

तथा जाग्रद्वयाभासं चित्तं चलति मायया ॥ ६१ ॥

(६१) अन्वयः— यथा स्वमे चित्तं मायया द्वयाभासं चलति, तथा जाग्रत् चित्तं मायया द्वयाभासं चलति ।

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं चित्तं स्वमे न संशयः ।

अद्वयं च द्वयाभासं तथा जाग्रत् संशयः ॥ ६२ ॥

(६२) अन्वयः— स्वमे अद्वयं च चित्तं द्वयाभासम्, न संशयः; तथा जाग्रत् अद्वयं च द्वयाभासम्, न संशयः ।

स्वमद्वक्त्रप्रचरन्स्वमे दिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान् ।

अण्डजान्स्वेदजान्वापि जीवान्पश्यति यान्सदा ॥ ६३ ॥

(६३) अन्वयः— स्वमे प्रचरन् स्वमद्वक् वै दशसु दिक्षु स्थितान् यान् अण्डजान् स्वेदजान् वा अपि जीवान् सदा पश्यति,

स्वमद्वक्त्रिचत्तद्वश्यास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक् ।

तथा तद्वश्यमेवेदं स्वमद्वक्त्रिचत्तमिष्यते ॥ ६४ ॥

(६४) अन्वयः— ते स्वमद्वक्त्रिचत्तद्वश्याः, ततः पृथक् न विद्यन्ते; तथा तद्वश्यम् एव इदं स्वमद्वक्त्रिचत्तम् इष्यते ।

(६१) As in dream, the mind through māyā moves, having [or, presenting] the appearance of the dual [grāhya and grāhaka], so in the waking state, the mind through māyā moves, having [or, presenting] the appearance of the dual.

(६२) In dream, the non-dual mind again has the appearance of the dual, no doubt [about it]; similarly in the waking state, the non-dual mind again has the appearance of the dual, no doubt [about it].

(६३) The creatures—oviparous or born of perspiration, as well—which the dream-beholder moving about in dream, always beholds, [as being] located verily in the ten quarters—

(६४) they are [all] capable of being seen [only] by the mind of the dream-beholder; [they] do not exist apart from it [the mind]; so likewise, this capable of being seen only by it [the mind] is fancied [to be] the mind of the dream-beholder.

चरञ्जागरिते जाग्रदिक्षु वै दशसु स्थितान् ।

अण्डजान्स्वेदजान्वापि जीवान्पश्यति यान्सदा ॥ ६५ ॥

(६५) अन्वयः— जागरिते चरन् जाग्रत् वै दशसु दिक्षु स्थितान् यान् अण्डजान् स्वेदजान् वा अपि जीवान् सदा पश्यति,

जाग्रचित्तेक्षणीयास्ते न विद्यन्ते ततः पृथक् ।

तथा तद्दृश्यमेवेदं जाग्रत्तचित्तमिष्यते ॥ ६६ ॥

(६६) अन्वयः— ते जाग्रचित्तेक्षणीयाः, ततः पृथक् न विद्यन्ते; तथा तद्दृश्यम् इदं जाग्रतः चित्तम् इष्यते ।

उभे ह्यन्योन्यदृश्ये ते किं तदस्तीति नोच्यते ।

लक्षणाशून्यमयं तन्मतेनैव गृह्णते ॥ ६७ ॥

(६७) अन्वयः— ते उभे हि अन्योन्यदृश्ये, तत् किम् अस्ति ? न इति उच्यते; उभयं लक्षणाशून्यम् तन्मतेन एव गृह्णते ।

यथा स्वप्नमयो जीवो जायते प्रियतेऽपि च ।

तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥ ६८ ॥

(६८) अन्वयः— यथा स्वप्नमयः जीवः जायते अपि च प्रियते, तथा अमी सर्वे जीवाः भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ।

(६५) The creatures—oviparous or born of perspiration as well—which the waking one moving in the waking state, always beholds, [as being] located verily in the ten quarters—

(६६) they are [all] capable of being beheld [only] by the mind of the waking one ; [they] do not exist apart from it [the mind] ; so likewise, this capable of being seen only by it [the mind] is fancied [to be] the mind of the waking one.

(६७) They both [are] capable of being perceived by each other; then what is it [that is real] ? Nothing is the answer (*ucyate*). Both, void of characteristics, are perceived by their thought itself.

(६८) As a dream-made creature is born and also dies, so likewise, all these creatures are and also are not.

यथा मायामयो जीवो जायते ग्रियतेऽपि च ।

तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥ ६९ ॥

(६९) अन्वयः— यथा मायामयः जीवः जायते अपि च ग्रियते, तथा अमी सर्वे जीवाः भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ।

यथा निर्मितको जीवो जायते ग्रियतेऽपि वा ।

तथा जीवा अमी सर्वे भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ॥ ७० ॥

(७०) अन्वयः— यथा निर्मितकः जीवः जायते अपि वा ग्रियते, तथा अमी सर्वे जीवाः भवन्ति न भवन्ति च ।

न कश्चिज्ञायते जीवः संभवोऽस्य न विद्यते ।

एतत्तदुत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किंचित्त्र जायते ॥ ७१ ॥

(७१) अन्वयः— कश्चित् जीवः न जायते, अस्य संभवः न विद्यते; एतत् तत् उत्तमं सत्यं यत्र किंचित् न जायते ।

चित्तस्पन्दितमेवेदं ग्राह्यग्राहकवद्द्रयम् ।

चित्तं निर्विषयं नित्यमसंगं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥ ७२ ॥

(७२) अन्वयः— इदं ग्राह्यग्राहकवत् द्रयं चित्तस्पन्दितम् एव; चित्तं निर्विषयं तेन नित्यम् असंगं कीर्तितम् ।

(69) As a māyā-made creature is born and also dies, so likewise, all those creatures are and also are not.

(70) As a creature created by supernatural power is born and also dies, so likewise, all those creatures are and also are not.

(71) No creature whatever is born; no origination of it exists [or, takes place]. This [is] that highest truth where nothing whatever is born.

(72) This dual, associated with [or, involving] the perceptible and perceiver [is] the mind-vibration itself; the mind [is] unrelated to the object; therefore [it is] glorified as eternal [and] without attachment.

योऽस्ति कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नास्त्यसौ ।

परतन्त्राभिसंवृत्या स्यान्वास्ति परमार्थतः ॥ ७३ ॥

(७३) अन्वयः— यः कल्पितसंवृत्या अस्ति असौ परमार्थेन न अस्ति; परतन्त्राभिसंवृत्या स्यात्, परमार्थतः न अस्ति ।

अजः कल्पितसंवृत्या परमार्थेन नाप्यजः ।

परतन्त्राभिनिष्पत्या संवृत्या जायते तु सः ॥ ७४ ॥

(७४) अन्वयः— कल्पितसंवृत्या अजः आपि परमार्थेन न अजः; सः तु परतन्त्राभिनिष्पत्या संवृत्या जायते ।

अभूताभिनिवेशोऽस्ति द्वयं तत्र न विद्यते ।

द्वयाभावं स बुद्ध्यैव निर्निमित्तो न जायते ॥ ७५ ॥

(७५) अन्वयः— (यत्र) अभूताभिनिवेशः अस्ति, तत्र द्वयं न विद्यते; द्वयाभावं बुद्ध्या एव सः निर्निमित्तः न जायते ।

यदा न लभते हेतुनुच्चमाधममध्यमान् ।

तदा न जायते चित्तं हेत्वभावे फलं कुतः ॥ ७६ ॥

(७६) अन्वयः— यदा उत्तमाधममध्यमान् हेतुन् न लभते तदा चित्तं न जायते; हेत्वभावे कुतः फलम् ?

(७३) What is on account of the imagined phenomenal experience, that exists not in reality. It may exist in accordance with the phenomenal experience accepted in other schools [of philosophy], [but it] exists not in reality.

(७४) What [is] even unoriginated on account of the imagined phenomenal experience [is] not unoriginated in reality. But that [same] is [held to be] originated by the phenomenal experience established in other schools [of philosophy] !

(७५) [Where] is persistent adherence to the unoriginated, [or, [in the other schools of philosophy] there is persistent adherence to the non-existent;] there the dual exists not; having just understood the absence of the dual, he is not born, being without a cause [for being born].

(७६) When one does not get [that is, become associated with] causes, superior, inferior or middling, then the mind is not originated. In the absence of the cause, whence the effect ?

अजातस्यैव सर्वस्य चित्तदृशं हि तथतः ।

अनिमित्तस्य चित्तस्य यानुत्पत्तिः समाद्वया ॥ ७७ ॥

(७७) अन्वयः— यतः हि तत् (चित्तं) चित्तदृशं (ततः)

अनिमित्तस्य चित्तस्य—अजातस्य सर्वस्य एव—या अनुत्पत्तिः (सा) समा, अद्वया (च) ।

बुद्ध्वानिमित्ततां सत्यां हेतुं पृथग्नामुवन् ।

वीतशोकं तथाकाममभयं पदमश्चुते ॥ ७८ ॥

(७८) अन्वयः— सत्याम् अनिमित्ततां बुद्ध्वा हेतुं पृथक् अनापुवन्

वीतशोकं तथा अकामम् अभयं पदम् अश्चुते ।

अभूताभिनिवेशाद्वि सद्वशे तत्प्रवर्तते ।

वस्त्वभावं स बुद्ध्वैव निःसंगं विनिवर्तते ॥ ७९ ॥

(७९) अन्वयः— अभूताभिनिवेशात् हि तत् सद्वशे प्रवर्तते; सः

वस्त्वभावं बुद्ध्वा एव निःसंगं विनिवर्तते ।

निवृत्तस्याप्रवृत्तस्य निश्चला हि तदा स्थितिः ।

विषयः स हि बुद्धानां तत्साम्यमजमद्वयम् ॥ ८० ॥

(८०) अन्वयः— तदा निवृत्तस्य अप्रवृत्तस्य हि स्थितिः निश्चला;

सः हि बुद्धानां विषयः, तत् साम्यम् अजम् अद्वयम् ।

(७७) Inasmuch as that [mind is] verily the mind-perceptible, what non-origination, of the mind free from causal relation [or for the matter of that], of everything unoriginated as well, [there is, it is the] same, free from the dual.

(७८) Having [thus] understood the true causelessness, not finding out [another] separate cause, one secures the state [which is] void of grief, free from desire [and] free from fear.

(७९) That [mind], owing to [its] persistent adherence to the non-existent proceeds to a similar [entity]; having verily realised the absence of a [real] object, he turns back, without any attachment.

(८०) Then the state of [him, or the mind] turned away and not active, [is] verily unmoving. That [is] indeed the province (*visayah*) of the Enlightened. It [is] same, unoriginated, free from the dual.

अजमनिद्रमस्वर्गं प्रभातं भवति स्वयम् ।

सकृदिभातो ह्यैष धर्मो धातुस्वभावतः ॥ ८१ ॥

(८१) अन्वयः— अजम् अनिद्रम् अस्वर्गं स्वयं प्रभातं भवति; एषः हि धर्मः धातुस्वभावतः एव सकृदिभातः ।

सुखमात्रियते नित्यं दुःखं वित्रियते सदा ।

यस्य कस्य च धर्मस्य ग्रहण भगवानसौ ॥ ८२ ॥

(८२) अन्वयः— यस्य कस्य च धर्मस्य ग्रहण असौ भगवान् नित्यं सुखम् आत्रियते, सदा दुःखं वित्रियते ।

अस्ति नास्त्यस्ति नास्तीति नास्तीति वा पुनः ।

चलस्थिरोभयाभावैरावृणोत्येव बालिशः ॥ ८३ ॥

(८३) अन्वयः— अस्ति, न अस्ति, अस्ति न अस्ति इति, न अस्ति न अस्ति इति वा पुनः बालिशः चलस्थिरोभयाभावैः (भगवन्तम्) आवृणोति एव ।

कोट्यश्चतस्म एतास्तु ग्रहैर्यासां सदावृतः ।

भगवानाभिरस्पृष्टो येन दृष्टः स सर्वदृक् ॥ ८४ ॥

(८४) अन्वयः— एताः चतस्रः कोट्यः, यासां ग्रहैः तु सदा आवृतः भगवान् आभिः अस्पृष्टः येन दृष्टः सः सर्वदृक् ।

(८१) Unoriginated, free from sleep, free from dream, it [the highest] blazes forth itself. This entity indeed is illuminated once for all owing to [its] fundamental nature.

(८२) By the apprehension of some object or other again, is continuously covered over [or, concealed] that Lord easily [and] is always uncovered with difficulty.

(८३) Is, is not, is [and] is not, is not—is not—thus again the untrained one (*baliśa*) does encompass [the Bhagavat] with [notions of him as] moving, steady, both [moving and steady] and free from both.

(८४) These [are the] four points [alternative theories], by apprehensions of which, the Lord again is always encompassed,—he is omniscient by whom [the Lord] is seen as being uncontaminated by these.

प्राप्य सर्वज्ञतां कृत्स्नां ब्राह्मणं पदमद्वयम् ।

अनापनादिमध्यान्तं किमतः परमीहते ॥ ८५ ॥

(८५) अन्वयः— कृत्स्नां सर्वज्ञतां अनापनादिमध्यान्तम् अद्वयं ब्राह्मणं पदं प्राप्य अतः परं किम् ईहते ?

विग्राणां विनयो ह्येष शमः प्राकृत उच्यते ।

दमः प्रकृतिदान्तत्वादेवं विद्वाऽशमं ब्रजेत् ॥ ८६ ॥

(८६) अन्वयः— एषः विग्राणां विनयः हि प्राकृतः शमः, प्रकृतिदान्तत्वात् दमः उच्यते; एवं विद्वान् शमं ब्रजेत् ।

सवस्तु सोपलम्भं च द्वयं लौकिकमिष्यते ।

अवस्तु सोपलम्भं च शुद्धं लौकिकमिष्यते ॥ ८७ ॥

(८७) अन्वयः— सवस्तु सोपलम्भं च द्वयं लौकिकम् इष्यते, अवस्तु सोपलम्भं च शुद्धं लौकिकम् इष्यते ।

अवस्त्वनुपलम्भं च लोकोत्तरमिति स्मृतम् ।

ज्ञानं हेयं च विज्ञेयं सदा बुद्धैः प्रकीर्तितम् ॥ ८८ ॥

(८८) अन्वयः— अवस्तु अनुपलम्भं च लोकोत्तरम् इति स्मृतम्; बुद्धैः सदा ज्ञानं हेयं विज्ञेयं च प्रकीर्तितम् ।

(85) Having attained to complete omniscience, the state beneficial to a Brāhmaṇa, non-dual, not amenable to any beginning, middle and end, what more than this does one yearn for ?

(86) This discipline of the Brāhmaṇas indeed is spoken of as the natural calm and control owing to the nature [itself] being controlled. Knowing thus, one should attain to calm.

(87) The dual, with the object and with [its] perception, is fancied [or, looked upon] as ‘practical’; [the dual] without the object and with [its] perception is looked upon as ‘pure practical’.

(88) [The dual] without the object and without [its] perception is traditionally known as ‘super-practical’. Knowledge, the object of knowledge and particularly the knowable [these three] are always proclaimed by the enlightened.

ज्ञाने च त्रिविधे ज्ञेये क्रमेण विदिते स्वयम् ।

सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र भवतीह महाधियः ॥ ८९ ॥

(८९) अन्वयः— ज्ञाने त्रिविधे ज्ञेये च क्रमेण विदिते (सति) महाधियः हि स्वयं सर्वत्र सर्वज्ञता भवति ।

हेयज्ञेयाप्यपाक्यानि विज्ञेयान्यग्रयाणतः ।

तेषामन्यत्र विज्ञेयादुपलभ्यत्विषु स्मृतः ॥ ९० ॥

(९०) अन्वयः— अप्रयाणतः हेयज्ञेयाप्यपाक्यानि विज्ञेयानि तेषां विज्ञेयात् अन्यत्र त्रिषु उपलभ्यः स्मृतः ।

प्रकृत्याकाशवज्ञेयाः सर्वे धर्मा अनादयः ।

विद्यते न हि नानात्वं तेषां क्वचन किंचन ॥ ९१ ॥

(९१) अन्वयः— सर्वे धर्माः आकाशवत् प्रकृत्या अनादयः ज्ञेयाः, तेषां हि क्वचन किंचन नानात्वं न विद्यते ।

आदिबुद्धाः प्रकृत्यैव सर्वे धर्माः सुनिश्चिताः ।

यस्यैवं भवति क्षान्तिः सोऽमृतत्वाय कल्पते ॥ ९२ ॥

(९२) अन्वयः— प्रकृत्या एव सर्वे धर्माः आदिबुद्धाः सुनिश्चिताः; यस्य एवं क्षान्तिः भवति, सः अमृतत्वाय कल्पते ।

(८९) Knowledge and the three-fold objects of knowledge being known gradually [or, in order], omniscience, of its own accord, accrues here on all sides to one of high intellect.

(९०) What is fit to be abandoned, what is fit to be known, what is fit to be secured, what is fit to be made perfect are to be known from the *Agrayāna*. Of these, of the three excluding that fit to be particularly known, perception is traditionally known [to take place].

(९१) All entities should be known as naturally beginningless like the sky. In their case, no multiplicity indeed of any kind anywhere exists.

(९२) All entities by nature itself are well ascertained as *Ādi-buddhas* [enlightened from the very beginning]; one who has self-sufficiency in this way, is capable of [securing] immortality.

आदिशान्ता ह्यनुत्पन्नाः प्रकृत्यैव सुनिर्वृताः ।

सर्वे धर्माः समाभिन्ना अजं साम्यं विशारदम् ॥ ९३ ॥

(९३) अन्वयः— सर्वे धर्माः हि आदिशान्ताः अनुत्पन्नाः प्रकृत्या एव सुनिर्वृताः समाभिन्नाः; अजं साम्यं विशारदम् ।

वैशारद्यं तु वै नास्ति भेदे विचरतां सदा ।

भेदनिन्माः पृथग्वादास्तस्मात्ते कृपणाः स्मृताः ॥ ९४ ॥

(९४) अन्वयः— सदा भेदे विचरतां तु वैशारद्यं वै नास्ति; पृथग्वादाः भेदनिन्माः, तस्मात् ते कृपणाः स्मृताः ।

अजे साम्ये तु ये केचिद्गविष्यन्ति सुनिश्चिताः ।

ते हि लोके महाज्ञानास्तत्र लोको न गाहते ॥ ९५ ॥

(९५) अन्वयः— ये केचित् तु अजे साम्ये सुनिश्चिताः भविष्यन्ति ते हि लोके महाज्ञानाः, लोकः तत् च न गाहते ।

अजेष्वजमसंक्रान्तं धर्मेषु ज्ञानभिष्यते ।

यतो न क्रमते ज्ञानमसंगं तेन कीर्तितम् ॥ ९६ ॥

(९६) अन्वयः— अजेषु धर्मेषु अजं ज्ञानम् असंक्रान्तम् इष्यते; यतः ज्ञानं न क्रमते तेन असंगं कीर्तितम् ।

(93) All entities indeed [are] calm from the very beginning, unoriginated, quite happy [in nīrvāṇa] by nature itself, [always the] same and non-different. [The highest is] unoriginated, sameness and self-confident.

(94) But there is indeed no self-confidence in the case of those who move about in [a world of] difference. Those who hold the doctrine of separateness descend down to differences. Therefore they are traditionally known as nervous wrecks [or, pitiable].

(95) On the other hand (*tu*) whosoever those would be well set up in the unoriginated sameness, they [are] indeed those of high knowledge in the world. The world [in general] however (*ca*) does not delve into it.

(96) The unoriginated knowledge is fancied [or, regarded] as not crossing over to the unoriginated [entities]; as the knowledge does not cross over, it is therefore proclaimed [to be] without attachment.

अणुमात्रेऽपि वैधर्म्ये जायमानेऽविपश्चितः ।

असंगता सदा नास्ति किमुतावरणच्युतिः ॥ ९७ ॥

(९७) अन्वयः— अणुमात्रे अपि वैधर्म्ये जायमाने अविपश्चितः सदा असंगता न अस्ति; आवरणच्युतिः किम् उत् ?

अलब्धावरणाः सर्वे धर्माः प्रकृतिनिर्मलाः ।

आदौ बुद्धास्तथा मुक्ता बुध्यन्ते इति नायकाः ॥ ९८ ॥

(९८) अन्वयः— सर्वे धर्माः अलब्धावरणाः प्रकृतिनिर्मलाः आदौ बुद्धाः तथा मुक्ताः इति नायकाः बुध्यन्ते ।

क्रमते न हि बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं धर्मेषु तायिनः ।

सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं नैतद् बुद्धेन भाषितम् ॥ ९९ ॥

(९९) अन्वयः— तायिनः बुद्धस्य ज्ञानं हि धर्मेषु न क्रमते, सर्वे धर्माः तथा ज्ञानं (न क्रमन्ते)—बुद्धेन एतत् न भाषितम् ।

दुर्दर्शमतिगम्भीरमजं साम्यं विशारदम् ।

बुद्ध्वा पदमनानात्वं नमस्कुर्मो यथावलम् ॥ १०० ॥

(१००) अन्वयः— दुर्दर्शम् अतिगम्भीरम् अजं साम्यं विशारदम् अनानात्वं पदं बुद्ध्वा यथाबलं नमस्कुर्मः ।

इति गौडपादीयकारिकायां चतुर्थं प्रकरणम् ।

(97) If there is difference even of the measure of an atom, being produced, for an unwise one, there is not always the state of being without attachment; much more therefore [there is no] slipping away of the veil [covering the Highest].

(98) All entities [are] those who have [never] secured any covering, naturally unsullied; [they are] enlightened as well as liberated from the beginning— so understand the Leaders [the wise].

(99) The knowledge of the eternal enlightened one, does not cross over into the entities; all entities likewise [do not cross over into] the knowledge—this has not been declared by Buddha.

(100) Having realised the state, difficult to see, very profound, unoriginated, sameness, self-confident, without multiplicity, we salute [it] to the best of our power.

Here ends the Fourth Chapter in the Gaudapāda-kārikā.

NOTES

The first Prakaraṇa contains twenty-nine Kārikās or verses. Verses 1-9, 10-18, 19-23, and 24-29 are usually inserted in the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad with the expression अत्रैते शुल्का भवन्ति after paragraphs 1-6, 7, 8-10, and 11 respectively and the whole is taken to be the text of the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad by Kūrānārāyaṇa of the Rāmānuja school and Madhva. Colophons in manuscripts name the first Prakaraṇa variously as आगमप्रश्नण, ओङ्कारनिर्णय etc. (see Introduction for a detailed consideration of all these topics).

Gauḍapāda has obviously planned his first Prakaraṇa on the basis of the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad. He only refers to such points therein as are pertinent to his own thesis, ignores several details given in the Māṇḍūkyā, and introduces some new matter to make his position clear. It is clear from the last verse (29) in the Prakaraṇa that Gauḍapāda intends to advocate the Upāsanā of Omkāra which he identifies with the Turya or the Highest.

(1) The विष्व (All-pervading) is here described as assuming three forms corresponding to the three states जाग्रत् (waking), स्वप्न (dream) and शुष्टुप्ति (deep sleep). विश्व is बहिष्पत्त, because in the waking state, the जीव perceives by means of the sense-organs which are turned outward (परात्मा खानि व्यतुणत् स्वयंसूतस्माद् पराकृ पद्धयति नान्तरामन् । Kaṭha). The outward universe is called विश्व, so the soul is also called विश्व, as he perceives the outward universe in the जाग्रत् state. The Māṇḍūkyā calls the बहिष्पत्त, वैश्वानर. Gauḍapāda changed वैश्वानर into विश्व, probably because वैश्वानर in Brahmasūtra I.2.24 is taken to mean Brahman. वैश्वानर is thus explained by Kūrānārāyaṇa, विश्वते गम्यते सर्वैर्ज्ञायत इति ... । विश्वं सर्वैर्ज्ञेयं स्थूलं वस्तुच्यते । भोक्तुतया तत्सम्बद्धी विश्वः । न रीयते क्षीयत इति नरः । विश्वश्वासौ नरश्चेति । Śaṅkara, on the other hand, explains the term as follows:— विश्वेषां नराणामनेकधा नयनाद्वैश्वानरः । यद्वा विश्वश्वासौ नरश्चेति विश्वानरो, विश्वानर एव वैश्वानरः । Yāskā derives as under:— वैश्वानरः कस्माद्वैश्वानराच्चयति । विश्व एवं नरा नयन्तीति वा । अपि वा विश्वानर एव स्याद् प्रत्यृतः सर्वाणि भूतानि तस्य वैश्वानरः ।

In the dream state, the विश्व is called तैजस, because the perception is there due to the soul's own light, without the intervention of the sense-organs. He is अन्तःप्रज्ञ, because he perceives everything then within the body itself (इच्छियापेक्षयाऽन्तःस्थत्वान्मनस्तद्वासनारूपा च स्वप्ने प्रज्ञा यस्येत्यन्तःप्रज्ञः विषयशून्यायां प्रज्ञायां केवलप्रकाशस्वरूपायां विषयित्वेन भवतीति तैजसः । Śaṅkara)

In the state of deep sleep, the soul is घनप्रज्ञ (same as the प्रज्ञानघन of the Māndūkyā; प्रज्ञानघन इत्यस्य घनप्रज्ञान इति विपरीतसमासो ध्येयः Kūra-nārāyaṇa), because there being no object of knowledge, the soul is just massed consciousness or purely self-conscious. He is called प्राज्ञ, because he is capable of knowing everything, being consciousness and nothing else (भूतभविष्यज्ञात्वं सर्वविषयज्ञात्वमस्यवेति प्राज्ञः ... अथवा प्रज्ञप्रिमित्वासाधारणं रूपमिति प्राज्ञः । Śaṅkara). Kūra-nārāyaṇa explains प्राज्ञ as ' one not throwing light on बाह्य or स्वाप्न things ' (प्रकर्णेण न ज्ञापयतीति प्राज्ञः । जीवस्वरूपकालाज्ञानातिरिक्तं बाह्यं स्वाप्नं वा किमपि न ज्ञापयतीति प्राज्ञनामक इत्यर्थः ।). स्मृतः is explained by Kūra-nārāyaṇa as मन्त्रद्रष्टा ब्रह्मणा भगवद्गुपाणामेतेषामेकत्वं स्मृतमित्यर्थः । He regards the Kārikās as Mantras, and so brings in Brabman to account for the स्मरण !

(2) The location of the three विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ in the body is given here. As the eye is the most important organ of perception, the विश्व is located there (cf. रूपेपलब्धिसाधनमिन्द्रियं चक्षुः कृष्णतारायवर्ति । Tarkabhāṣā). Śaṅkara refers here to the श्रुति, इन्द्रो है नामैष योऽप्यदक्षिणोऽक्षन्तुरुषः (Brhadāraṇyakopaniṣad II. 1. 17). But that passage mentions the name as इन्द्र and इन्द्र apparently means the reflection of a man in the eye of the person sitting opposite to him. This is surely not meant here. Other Upaniṣadic passages referring to the Puruṣa in the eye, likewise are irrelevant here. Gauḍapāda is only interested in giving a local habitation to each of the three, विश्व etc. The तैजस resides in the mind which alone is active in dream. प्राज्ञ resides in the हार्दिकाश or the इहराकाश which is so often referred to in the Upaniṣads. Śaṅkara remarks दक्षिणाक्षिगतो रूपं दृष्ट्वा निमीलिताक्षस्तदेव स्मरन्मनस्यन्तः स्वप्नं इव तदेव वासनारूपाभिव्यक्तं पश्यति । यथाऽत्र तथा स्वप्ने । अतो मनस्यन्तस्तु तैजसोऽपि विश्व एव । Śaṅkara thus says that तैजस is विश्व himself. This also does not appear to be the view of Gauḍapāda. It is one thing to say that विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ are the three forms of विश्व, and another that तैजस and विश्व should be regarded as one, when they are deliberately described as different,

(३) As a corollary to what is stated in the second Kārikā, the objects of enjoyment for the three विश्व, तैजस, and प्राज्ञ are respectively, gross, subtle and आनन्द. In the स्वप्न state, the भोग is प्रविविक्त, because the विषय being absent, only the वासना divorced from the विषय is the भोज्य. In the सुषुप्ति state, आनन्द is the भोज्य, because there is हुःखाभाव; हुःख is caused by the contact with विषय and वासना (cf. ये हि संस्पर्शजा भोगा हुःखयोत्य एव ते : B. G. II. 22); both विषय and वासना being absent in सुषुप्ति, the प्राज्ञ enjoys only हुःखाभाव or आनन्द.

(४) विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ are satisfied with their lot in being able to enjoy सूक्ष्म, प्रविविक्त and आनन्द respectively, and so तुम्हि is also of three kinds. Kūrānārāyaṇa reads विजानथ (for निर्बोधत) and remarks विजानथ विजानीथ विकरणव्यत्ययात्, आनन्दमानन्दो लिङ्गाध्यत्ययात्.

The Māṇḍūkya mentions two more characteristics सप्ताङ्ग and एकोनविश्वातिसुख for both विश्व (वैश्वानर) and तैजस, and एकीभूत and आनन्दमय for प्राज्ञ. Gaudapāda ignores them, because they are unnecessary for his main purpose which is ultimately to establish the अज्ञातिवाद. Read the following from the Bhāṣya by Śaṅkara for the terms सप्ताङ्ग and एकोनविश्वातिसुख—तथा सप्ताङ्गान्यस्य तस्य ह वा एतस्यात्मनो वैश्वानरस्य सूर्येव सुतेजाश्वभूर्विश्वरूप प्राणः पृथग्वर्त्मत्मा संदेहो बहुलो बस्तिरेव रयिः पृथिव्येव पादो इत्यग्निहोत्रकृत्यनाशो च वेनाहृषीयोऽग्निरस्य सुखत्वेनोक्त इत्येवं सप्ताङ्गानि यस्य स सप्ताङ्गः। तथैकोनविश्वातिसुखान्यस्य वृद्धीनिर्याणि कर्मनिर्याणि च दश वायवश्च प्राणाद्यः पञ्च मनो बुद्धिरहंकारश्चित्तमिति सुखानीव सुखानि तान्युपलादिवद्वाराणीत्यर्थः। Kūrānārāyaṇa gives the following fantastic explanation, चत्वारो हस्ता द्वौ पादो गजसुखत्वाद्गृहस्त इति सप्ताङ्गः। एकोनविश्वातिसुखः। मध्यमसुखं गजसुखाकारं पार्श्वद्वये तु न व न च सुखानि पुरुषसुखाकाराणीति विवेकः।

(५) One who knows that विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ are really just the forms of one and the same विश्व, and the three-fold भोज्य is likewise concerned only with the three forms, knows that the भोक्तृ is really the one Ātman and hence he is not contaminated in any way by the empirical experience. यो वैदैतदुभयं भोज्यमोक्तुतयानेकधा भिन्नं स भुजानो न लिप्यते। भोज्यस्य सर्वस्यैकस्य भोक्तुभौज्यत्वात्। न हि यस्य यो विषयः स तेन हीपते धर्यते वा। न ह्याख्यिः स्वविषये दग्धवा काषादि तद्वद्। (Śaṅkara); Kūrānārāyaṇa says, तत्तत्थानेषु तत्त्वकलभोजयिता स्वस्य स्वेतरस्य च जीवस्य कर्मफलप्रदः सर्वेभ्वर एव न ममात्र भोग इतरजीवानां वा स्वातन्त्र्यमिति मत्वा न विकरोतीति भावः।

The same idea is contained in सर्वभूतात्मभूतात्मा कुर्वन्नपि न लिप्यते॥ Gītā V. 7, नैव किञ्चिद् करोमीति युक्तो मन्येत तत्त्वविद्। ... इन्द्रियाणीनिर्यार्थेषु वर्तमान इति धारयन्। ... लिप्यते न स पापेन। ibid V. 8-10.

(6) Prof. Vidhuśekhara takes सतां to mean ' of sages '. This is impossible, when we remember that Gauḍapāda holds the अज्ञातिवाद. There is no doubt that verses 6-9 describe the views of Gauḍapāda's opponents. All of them take it as axiomatic truth that ' Whatever exists must have a source ', and base their various theories on it. Kārikās 6-10 seem to have for their basis in the Māṇḍūkya the sixth paragraph, where the प्राज्ञ is described as सर्वेश्वर, सर्वज्ञ, अन्तर्यामिन्, सर्वस्य योनि, and भूतानां प्रभवात्प्रयौ. The theories about creation referred to by Gauḍapāda in Kārikās 6-9, appear to us to be of the nature of उपदेशाद्यं वादः, to quote Gauḍapāda's own words. Gauḍapāda's own view, is न कञ्चित्ज्ञायते जीवः संभवोऽप्य न विद्यते । एतत्तद्वृत्तम् सर्वं यत्र किंचिद्ग जायते (III. 48 ; IV. 71). Gauḍapāda points out how his opponents, not realising the highest truth—the non-origination theory—indulge in starting different theories about creation, seemingly supported by śruti texts which they misinterpret to suit their own views. The very foundation on which they base their theories, viz. there must be a प्रभव for all that is existent, is shaky ; no wonder therefore that the super-structure based on it topples down under the onslaught of अज्ञातिवाद. As we interpret Kārikās 6-9, there are nine different theories of creation referred to by Gauḍapāda.

[1] The first theory is that of प्राणवादिनः ; their view is सर्वे जनयति प्राणः . This is also the popular view. A thing without प्राण is dead ; with प्राण, it is full of life. So प्राण can be regarded as putting life into objects. Passages like अथ खलु प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मेदं शरीरं परियुक्तोऽप्यति, स एष प्राण एव प्रज्ञात्मानन्दोऽजरोऽमृतः (Kauśītaki Upaniṣad) may be cited in support of this theory (Śāṅkara in his Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra I. 1. 28, shows that प्राण means Brahman).

[2] The पुरुषवादिनः believe in a personal God and describe पुरुष as creating जीव as different bits of चैतन्य, as portions of himself. They take their stand upon passages like पुरुष एवेदं सर्वे यद्वृत्तं यत्र भव्यत्वम्, (Puruṣasūkta, R. X. 90), ममैवांशो जीवलोके जीवभूतः सनातनः । (Gitā XV. 7), यथा सुदीप्तात्पावकाद्विस्फुलिष्ठः सहस्रशः प्रभवन्ते सरूपाः । तथाक्षराद्विविधाः सोम्य प्रजायन्ते तत्र चैवापि यन्ति ॥ (Muṇḍaka II. 1). चेतोशूल- rays or bits of चैतन्य. The पुरुष is a store-house of चैतन्य, from which जीव can be said to have taken the necessary portion for themselves. Vidhuśekhara thinks that the चेतोशूल refers to the

चित्तस्पन्दित mentioned in IV. 72. This is very unlikely. Kūrana-rāyaṇa says सर्वस्य प्रणेतुव्वेतुना प्राणनामा सर्वे जनयतीत्युक्त्वा न विवर्तस्तप्तुपादानत्वं सर्वप्रभवत्वमित्युक्तं भवति । पुरुषः पूर्णषद्युपादानिना पुरुषनामा प्राणुक्तनामा चतूरूपात्मा हरिः । चेतोऽशूलज्ञानात्पराक्रिमयुक्ताजीवानिति यावत् । पृथग्देवदानव-मानवादिभेदेन जनयति । He thus takes both प्राण and पुरुष to refer to हरि.

(7) [3] The विश्वृतिवादिन्‌s, apparently taking their stand upon the विश्वृतिस of the Lord described in the Gitā and Purāṇas, explain the process of creation, by attributing the expansion or manifestation of the universe to the supernatural power of the Lord which makes him perceivable in the created objects. सृष्टिचिन्तक—One who is absorbed in reasoning out *how* the creation proceeded. The सृष्टिचिन्तकs take it for granted that there *is* a सृष्टि; their worry is only about how it came to be there. The परिणामवादिन्‌s (सांख्यs and others) may also come under this category.

[4] The स्वप्नमायावादिन्‌s are undoubtedly the Mahāyāna Buddhists who deny the existence of ब्रह्मार्थं. They are referred to in Brahmasūtra (II. 2. 29, वैधर्म्यव्व न स्वप्नादिवत्) where Śaṅkara refutes their view. Prof. Vidhuśekhara strangely enough remarks ‘This view is held by some of the Vedāntists including our teacher’ (that is, Gauḍapāda). Could Gauḍapāda have referred to himself as अन्यैः सृष्टिविकल्पिताः? We think that Gauḍapāda has in his mind here passages from the Laṅkāvatārasūtra, like मायास्वप्नोपमं हृच्यं विज्ञप्या न विकल्पेत् ॥१३॥ मायोपमाः सर्वधर्माश्रित्विज्ञानवर्जिताः ॥१४॥ मायोपमं समाधिं च दशसूनिविनिर्गतम् ॥१५॥ स्वप्नविभ्रममायाख्यं शून्यं वै कल्पितं जगत् ॥१६॥ अनुत्पद्मा द्वामी धर्मा न चैवैते न सन्ति च । गन्धर्वनगरस्वप्नमायानिर्मण-सट्टशः ॥१४॥ गन्धर्वस्वप्नमाया या स्वगत्तजा द्वामौतिका ॥२९१॥ मायास्वप्नो-पमं लोकं हेतुप्रत्ययवर्जितम् ॥५६१॥ गन्धर्वस्वप्नमायाख्या भावा विद्यन्त्यहेतुकाः ॥५८२॥ मायास्वप्ननिभा भावा ... ॥८७५॥ where माया and स्वप्न are used together in one and the same passage. Those who believe सृष्टि to be like स्वप्न or माया, do believe in the reality of the creation-process, while Rāmānuja goes to the extent of saying that the creation in dream is real enough. Kūrana-rāyaṇa remarks, सृष्टिचिन्तका इत्यनेन यथावद्ब्रह्म-स्वरूपानभिन्ना इति सृचितम् ।

(8) [5] इच्छावादिन्‌s; they believe in a real creation by a personal creator who does not stand in need of any उपादानकारण etc. to create, but is able to bring about creation merely by his will.

This view is referred to in the Upaniṣadic passages like सोऽकामयत् बहु स्थां प्रजायेय. Kūranārāyaṇa takes this as the opinion of the औपनिषद्स (those who advocate the philosophy of the Upaniṣads) and hence the Siddhānta view. According to Kūranārāyaṇa, the second half of the Kārikā again refers to मतान्तरस. He seems to have been misled by the expression विनिश्चिताः which does not necessarily refer to the Siddhānta view. It is unnatural to expect the Siddhānta view to be sandwiched between the मतान्तरस. Kūra-nārāyaṇa sees the above difficulty, but tries to meet it, lamey enough, by remarking कालचिन्तकाः ... उपलक्षणमेतत् । यदृच्छानियति-स्वभावादीनां तेषां निरासः पुरुषप्रभुपदाभ्यामेव ज्ञेयः । अत एवेच्छामात्रस्य पक्षस्य मध्ये निवेशः ।

[6] कालवादिन्^s advocate that काल or Time is the great dispenser. The श्वेताश्वतरोपनिषद् refers to काल (कालः स्वभावो नियतिर्यट्च्छा भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चिन्त्यम् । I.1). Atharvaveda and the Mahā-bhārata also refer to these philosophers. It is wrong to call them astronomers.

(9) Those who believe in a real creation by a personal creator, differ as to the cause or purpose of the creation all the same.

[7] भोगवादिन्^s say that the creation is intended for the enjoyment by the जीव (cf. रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृथाद् । पुरुषस्य तथात्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ सांख्यकारिका, 59).

[8] क्रीडावादिन्^s say that the creation is just for the sport of the Lord.

[9] स्वभाववादिन्^s argue that the Lord being आत्माम cannot possibly have any desire or purpose in creation which is just his लीला (cf. लोकवनु लीलाकैवल्यम्, Brahmasūtra II. 1. 33). The proper explanation is, therefore, that it is the स्वभाव of the Lord to create. Kūranārāyaṇa thinks देवस्यै स्वभावः etc. is the सिद्धान्त view (स्वमतसाह श्रुतिः देवस्येति । देवस्य क्रीडाशौलस्यै लीलारूपोऽयं सुट्टादिविषयः स्वभाव एव तान्यत्प्रयोजनमिति भावः ।). He seems also to combine क्रीडा and स्वभाव into one प्रयोजन. Śaṅkara says भोगार्थं क्रीडार्थमिति चान्ये सृष्टि मन्यन्ते । अनयोः पक्षयोर्द्दृश्यं देवस्यै स्वभावोऽपमिति । According to Śaṅkara, स्वभाव means here अविद्या. We have already stated above that the अज्ञातिवाद has no scope for a creation even by means of अविद्या.

(10) Having mentioned the various theories about creation, Gaudapāda now says that there is only non-duality, the Turya (' the fourth ', apart from Viśva, Taijasa and Prājña) that is real, capable of ending all misery, eternal and विशु. The question of creation does not therefore arise. निदृत्तेः goes with ईशानः. Kūra-nārāyaṇa says, सर्वद्वयानां निदृत्तेः कारणमिति शेषः. The reading निदृत्तिः would mean that the तुर्यं is the negation of all misery.

(11) In the जाग्रत् and स्वप्न states, the द्वैतबुद्धि in the form of विषयविषयभाव, ग्राहाग्राहकभाव, ज्ञातज्ञेयभाव, कार्यकारणभाव etc. persists. In the सुषुप्ति state, there is no विषय, no ग्राहा, no ज्ञेय etc., but the प्राज्ञ is still in the clutchेः of अविद्याकारण and अहंभाव ; the तुर्यं on the other hand is pure consciousness and light, free from all द्वैत. कार्यं ... फलभावः कारणं ... बीजभावः, तत्त्वाग्रहणान्यथाग्रहणाभ्यां बीजफलाभावाभ्यां तौ यथोक्ते विश्वतैजसौ बद्धो ... प्राज्ञस्तु बीजभावेनैव बद्धः। तत्त्वाप्रतिबोधमात्रमेव हि बीजं प्राज्ञत्वे निमित्तम् । (Śaṅkara) ; अज्ञानकार्यस्तोऽहंममतादिभ्रमस्तद्वृपकार्यवन्धः । तत्कारणाविद्यावन्धः कारणवन्धः । (Kūranārāyaṇa).

(12) In the सुषुप्ति state, the ज्ञान of the प्राज्ञ takes the form of न किञ्चिद्देविषयम्, as there is no विषय to be cognised. तुरीय on the other hand is all light and consciousness, hence सर्वद्वृक्ष though there too no द्वैत exists. सर्वं च तत् द्वृक्षच् is the explanation of सर्वद्वृक्ष according to Śaṅkara who remarks अथवा जाग्रत्स्वप्नयोः सर्वसुतावस्थः सर्वस्तद्वृग्भासात्तुरीय एवेति सर्वद्वृक्षसदा । (सर्वं दर्शयतीति Kūranārāyaṇa).

(13) Both प्राज्ञ and तुर्यं do not cognise द्वैत, but they are as poles asunder. प्राज्ञ still remains wedded to the मूलाविद्या which can only vanish when the highest truth is realised. निद्रा is explained as तत्त्वाग्रहण in Kārikā 15 below.

* (14) विश्व and तैजस are always encumbered with स्वप्न (अन्यथा ग्रहणम्) and निद्रा (तत्त्वाप्रतिबोधः); प्राज्ञ with तत्त्वाप्रतिबोध only, there being no अन्यथाग्रहण in सुषुप्ति. तुर्यं is completely unencumbered, there being neither अन्यथाग्रहण nor तत्त्वाप्रतिबोध. अस्वप्ननिद्रया is explained by Śaṅkara as स्वप्नवर्जितकेवलयव निद्रया, by Kūranārāyaṇa as द्विविधभ्रमं विनाशक्तकेवलाविद्या. It will be seen that निद्रा is common to all the three, विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ. जाग्रत् is not specifically mentioned, for Gaudapāda regards जाग्रत् and स्वप्न states to be identical for all practical purposes, as is made clear in the second Prakarana. Both जाग्रत् and स्वप्न states are वित्तम्.

(15) A person in dream (and in ज्ञात्र state, as well) sees things as they are not. Hence अन्यथाग्रहण is the sine qua non of स्वप्न (as well as ज्ञात्र); in sleep a person knows nothing, here the विषयास is अज्ञानरूप. When अन्यथाग्रहण and तत्त्वज्ञान vanish, one secures the ज्ञान of हृष्ट and becomes हृष्ट.

(16) अनादिमायया is taken by Kūrānārāyaṇa with both सुः (अनादेविष्णोरनादिमायया कर्मस्पाविद्यया) and प्रबुध्यते (भगवदिच्छुया भगवत्प्रसादेन). अनिद्रमस्वप्नम् — In अद्वैत there cannot be any अन्यथाग्रहण or तत्त्वाप्रतिबोध. This Kārikā is quoted by Śaṅkara in Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya II. 1. 9. with the remark मायामात्रं ह्येतद्यत्परम्यत्वमनोऽवस्थाव्यात्मनाचभासनं रज्जवा इव सर्पादिभावेनेति ।

(17) An objection is raised to the statement अद्वैतं बुध्यते तदा in the last Kārikā. If अद्वैत is realised, what happens to the प्रपञ्च which we all experience ? The answer is : प्रपञ्च is just मायामात्र, mere illusion which disappears immediately अद्वैतज्ञान is secured. The question raised by the opponent could be taken seriously if प्रपञ्च were real ; even in that case प्रपञ्च would have to go in the face of अद्वैत ; but we would have been required to search for some effective means to get rid of it. But the problem does not arise, as प्रपञ्च is just illusion. Or, we might take अद्वैत as the subject of निवर्त्तेत ; if प्रपञ्च did exist, then अद्वैत would have to retire from the field, for both अद्वैत and प्रपञ्च could not stay together. But the question does not arise, as अद्वैत is the only reality and द्वैत is but मायामात्र like the creation in स्वप्न (the expression मायामात्र is found in Brahmasūtra III. 2-3, मायामात्रं तु कास्तन्येनातभिव्यक्तस्वपन्वाद). This, however, does not seem to be intended. Gaudapāda perhaps uses निवर्त्तेत in the sense ‘would definitely continue to exist’ (निवर्त्तेत = नितरां वर्तेत as opposed to विनिवर्तेत ‘would turn away’ in the next Kārikā). If प्रपञ्च is real, it could not cease to exist on any account. For a thing cannot ever change its nature.

(18) If various ideas about creation and प्रपञ्च are put forth by people through some reason or other, those would have necessarily to be given up ultimately. They are sometimes useful to beginners who cannot grasp the अद्वैत all at once. Kūrānārāyaṇa reads न निवर्त्तेत (for विनिवर्त्तेत), and explains it as उपदेशान्महतासुपदेशबलात् निवर्त्तेतापि तु निवर्त्तेतैव ! With the reading न निवर्त्तेत, the idea would be as follows :— If the प्रपञ्च were to exist in reality, it

would never disappear, for a thing can never change its nature as is stated in III. 21 below. But if विश्व is merely कल्पित, surely it must disappear; for a कल्पना is unreal. ज्ञाते, supply अद्वैते. The second line is found in Yogavāsiṣṭha (III. 84. 27) विवदन्ते ह्यसंबुद्धाः स्वविकल्पविजूम्भितैः । उपदेशादयं वादो etc. and in III. 84. 25, as अविवोधादयं वादो ज्ञाने द्वैतं न विद्यते । ज्ञाने संशान्तकलनं मौनमेवावशिष्यते ॥

(19) Verses 19-23 describe how the three states are to be equated with the three Mātrās of Omkāra, and the त्रुट्य to the Mātrā-less.

ओम् has three portions, अ, उ and म्; the totality of these portions (or the नाम) can be said to be the अमात्र. विश्व resides in the first of the states, अ is the first of the Mātrās; so when we want to say विश्व has the nature of अ (This would be the निर्दर्शना figure of speech, अभवन्वस्तुसंबन्ध उपमापरिकल्पकः, resulting in उपमा) or विश्व is like अ, the साधारणधर्म is 'the being at the head of the series'; when for purposes of उपासना and the like, विश्व is to be identified with अ (that is, when the idea of रूपक is involved, where the साधारणधर्म is more intimately connected than in उपमा), the common ground is आत्मि (pervading nature). विश्व pervades the whole outside creation; अकार is also all-pervading, as अक्षराणामकारोऽस्मि (Gitā X. 32) shows अ to be the विश्वति of the Lord. This kind of identification is frequently met with in Brāhmaṇa literature. The फल of this एकत्वोपासना is आप्नोति ह वै सर्वान् कामानादिः प्रथमश्व भवति महताम् । (Śaṅkara on Māṇḍūkyā 9).

(20) तैजस (in the second state) is like उ, because तैजस is more exalted than विश्व, being more subtle, and उ has greater उत्कर्ष, because it follows अ like a king coming after the servant! Or, we might take उत्कर्ष to mean just 'coming after'. उ follows अ, तैजस can be identified with उ, because तैजस is midway between (and so connected with both) विश्व and प्राज्ञ, and उ is midway between (and so connected with both) अ and म् ! The फल of this एकत्वोपासना is उत्कर्षति ह वै ज्ञानसंततिम् । विज्ञानसंततिं वर्धयतीयत्यः । समानस्तुल्यश्वमित्रपक्षस्येव शञ्चुपक्षाणामप्यद्वेष्टो भवति । अब्रह्मविदस्य कुले न भवति । (Śaṅkara on Māṇḍūkyā 10).

(21) प्राज्ञ is like म्, because प्राज्ञ acts as a limit (मानम्), being the last, and म् also acts as a limit, being the last syllable of ओम्.

प्राज्ञ can be identified with मृ, because विश्व and तैजस merge into प्राज्ञ in the सुषुप्ति state, and अ and उ merge into मृ (like वर्णs in the रक्षोट शब्द) after being uttered. मित्रेभितीर्मानं सीयते इव हि विश्वतैजसौ प्राज्ञेन प्रलयोत्पत्योः प्रवेशनिर्गमाभ्यां प्रस्थेनेव यदाः । तथोऽकारसमाप्तौ तुनः प्रयोगे च प्रविद्य निर्गच्छत् इवाकारोऽकारौ मकारे । (Śaṅkara). The फल of this एकत्वोपासना is मिनोति ह चा इदं सर्वे जगद्यात्म्यं जानातीत्यर्थः । अपीतिश्व जगत्कारणात्मा भवतीत्यर्थः । (Śaṅkara on Māṇḍūkyā 11).

(22) तुल्यं सामान्यम्, the common ground between each of the three pairs. महामुनिः = ब्रह्मविद् (Śaṅkara).

(23) The उपासक of विश्व (as identified with अकार) secures his goal viz. विश्व ; that of तैजस (as identified with उकार) तैजस ; that of प्राज्ञ (as identified with मकार) the प्राज्ञ, in accordance with the doctrine, यो यच्छ्रुद्धः स एव सः (Gītā XVII. 3). But the worshipper of Mātrāless portion of ओङ्कार has not to go anywhere to secure his goal. He realises himself as Brahman. The उपासक of विश्व, तैजस and प्राज्ञ secures only the lower फल, and as such is inferior to the उपासक of the अमात्र. But Kārikā 22 calls him a महामुनि, while in Kārikā 29, one who knows the ओङ्कार as अमात्र etc. is called only a मुनि. This is strange. Kārikā 22 appears to be a suspicious one.

(24) Kārikās 24-29 glorify the उपासना and the उपासक of ओङ्कार as a whole, and especially its अमात्र aspect. One who knows ओङ्कार as अमात्र, अनन्तमात्र, द्वैतस्योपशमः etc. is the real Muni. ओङ्कार is also known as प्रणव.

To know ओङ्कार as a whole, one must know its parts or Mātrās equated with the आत्मपादाः. There is no necessity of meditating upon anything else.

(25) प्रणव or ओङ्कार is ब्रह्मविद् which is described in the Upaniṣads as absolutely free from fear. प्रणव is ओम्, lit. which is praised (प्रणूयते इति) or uttered first. A Vedic passage is expected to begin and end with ओम्. Read the following from Manusmṛti, ब्रह्मणः प्रणवं कुर्यादादावन्ते च सर्वदा । स्वत्यनोद्दृक्षतं पूर्वे पुरस्ताच्च विनश्यति ॥ ... अकारं चायुकारं च मकारं च प्रजापतिः । वेदत्रयाक्षिरद्वद्वद् चूर्णवः स्वरितीति च ॥ एतदक्षरमेतां च जपन्वयाहृतिपूर्विकाश । संध्यायोर्वेदविद् विश्रो वेदपुण्येन युज्यते ॥ II. 74, 76, 78. The Aitareyabrahmaṇa says तेभ्योऽभित्तेभ्यष्ठयो वर्णा अजायन्ताकार उकारो मकार इति ताननेकधा समभरत्तदेतदोऽस्मिति । तस्मादो-

मिति प्रणौत्येमिति वै स्वर्गो लोक ओमित्यसौ योऽसौ तपति । In later literature ओम् is said to refer to the Trinity, Brahmadeva, Viṣṇu and Maheśa, अकारो विष्णुरुहिष्ट उकारस्तु महेश्वरः । मकारेणोच्यते ब्रह्मा प्रणवस्तु ब्रयो मताः । The Gitā (XVII. 23-24) also says, ॐ तत्सदिति निर्दिशो ब्रह्मणस्त्रिविधः स्मृतः । ब्राह्मणास्तेन वेदाश्च यज्ञाश्च विहिताः पुरा ॥ तस्मादेमित्युदाहृत्य यज्ञदानतपःक्रियाः । प्रवर्तन्ते विधानोक्ताः सततं ब्रह्मवादिनाम् ॥

(26) Vidhuśekhara reads परं स्मृतम् for परः स्मृतः । There is no doubt that परः स्मृतः is the original reading which was emended so as to refer to परं ब्रह्म which is generally spoken of along with अपरं ब्रह्म. परः is the परः आत्मा or परः पुरुषः referred to in the Kāṭhopaniṣad (महतः परमव्यक्तमव्यक्तात्पुरुषः परः । पुरुषात्त परं किंचित्सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः ॥ III. 11). अपरं ब्रह्म—the lower Brahman associated with उपाधिः. There is no point in describing प्रणव as अपरं ब्रह्म, when प्रणव is to be immediately shown as परः आत्मा. Kūrānārāyaṇa boldly explains अपरं as अपरः पूर्वतनो चूलस्तपपूर्वावतारात्मा प्रणवो हरिः ..., and परः as पश्वात्तनो विश्वायवतारस्पः प्रणवो हरिः ... पूर्वावतारे पश्विमावतारे च पूर्णतैव न क्वचिदपि न्यूनतेति भावः । Could it be that the original reading was प्रणवो हि परं ब्रह्म, so that प्रणव is described as परं ब्रह्म and परः आत्मा, thus equating ब्रह्मन् and आत्मन् at the same time ? On the other hand, in Praśna V. 2, we read एतद्वै सत्यकाम परं चापरं च ब्रह्म यदौकारस्तस्माद्विद्वैनैतैवायतनैकतरमन्वेति । अतन्तरोऽब्रह्मः— This expression is found in Bṛhadāraṇyaka IV. 5. 12. अपूर्वः, न विद्यते पूर्वं कारणं यस्य सोऽपूर्वः प्रणवः कारणहीनः । (Kūrānārāyaṇa).

(27) तद्वन्नतरम्-प्रारब्धभोगानन्तरं (Kūrānārāyaṇa), तदात्मभावं (Śaṅkara). तद् apparently refers to Brahman in Kārikā 26.

(28) Compare for the first line, ईश्वरः सर्वभूतानां हृदेशेऽङ्गैति । (Gitā XVIII. 61), also ज्ञानं ज्ञेयं ज्ञानगम्यं हृदि सर्वस्य विषितम् । (XIII. 17), अङ्गुष्ठमात्रः पुरुषोऽन्तरात्मा सदा जनानां हृदये संनिविष्टः । (Kāṭhopaniṣad (II. 217). न शोचति, तरति शोकमात्मविद् इत्यादिशृतिभ्यः । (Śaṅkara).

(29) इतस्योपज्ञमः— There being only अद्वैत, all duality ceases. इतरो जनः, शास्त्रविदपि (Śaṅkara). People well-versed only in the Sāstras cannot be called सुनिः, if they do not know the Omkāra.

Of the older Upaniṣads, besides the Māṇḍūkyā, Kāṭha, Praśna, Muṇḍaka, Taittirīya, Chāndogya and Maitri refer to Omkāra. Praṇava, describe its identification with Brahman, glorify the various

uses for meditation and fruit of ओंकारोपासना. The following extracts will be found interesting in this connection.

Kaṭhopaniṣad :—

सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमासनन्ति तपांसि सर्वाणि च यद्वदन्ति ।
यदिच्छन्तो ब्रह्मचर्ये चरन्ति तत्ते पदं संग्रहेण ब्रवीमि ॥

ओमित्येतत् ॥ I.21.5

एतद्वेदाक्षरं ब्रह्म ह्येतद्वेदाक्षरं परम् ।

एतद्वेदाक्षरं ज्ञात्वा यो यदिच्छति तस्य तत् ॥ I.12.16

एतदालम्बनं श्रेष्ठमेतदालम्बनं परम् ।

एतदालम्बनं ज्ञात्वा ब्रह्मलोके महीयते ॥ I.12.17

Praśnopaniṣad :—

एतद्वै सत्यकाम परं चापरं च ब्रह्म यदोङ्कारस्तस्माद्विद्वानेतैवायतनेतैकतर-
मन्वेति ॥ V. 2

स यदेकमात्रमभिध्यायीत स तेनैव संबेदितम्भूर्णमेव जगत्यामाभिसंपद्यते । तस्मैचो
लोकमुपनयन्ते स तत्र तपसा ब्रह्मचर्येण अद्यथा संपद्यो महिमानमनुभवति ॥ V. 3

अथ यदि द्विमात्रेण मनसि संपद्यते सोऽन्तरिक्षे यज्ञार्भिरुच्चीयते स सोमलोकं स
सोमलोके विश्वतिमलुभ्यु पुनरावर्तते ॥ V. 4

यः पुनरेतत्त्विमात्रेणोमित्येतैवाक्षरेण परं उरुषमभिध्यायीत स तेजसि सूर्ये संपद्याः ।
यथा पादोदरस्तवचा विनिर्दृच्येत एवं है स पापमना विनिर्दृक्ःः स सामभिरुच्चीयते
ब्रह्मलोकं स एतस्माज्जीवधनापरात्परं पुरिशायं पुरुषमीक्षते ॥ तदेतौ श्लोको भवतः । V.5

तिस्रो मात्रा स्मृत्युमयः प्रयुक्ता अन्योन्यसक्ता अनुविग्रहयुक्ताः ।

क्रियाणु बाह्याभ्यन्तरमध्यमाणु सम्यकप्रयुक्ताणु न कम्पते ज्ञः ॥ V.6

कर्मिभरेतं यज्ञार्भिरुच्चारिक्षं ससामभिर्यत्तकवयो वेद्यन्ते ।

तमोङ्कारेणैवायतनेनान्वेति विद्वान्यन्तच्छान्तमजरमसृतमभयं परं चेति ॥ V.7

Muṇḍaka :—

प्रणवो धनुः शरो ह्यात्मा ब्रह्म तत्त्वश्चयुच्यते ।

अप्रमत्तेन वेदवृद्धयं शरवत्तन्मयो भवेत् ॥ II.2.4

Taittiriya :—

ओमिति ब्रह्म ॥ ओमितीद॑सर्वम् । ओमित्येतदनुकृतिर्ह स्म वा अन्यो आवयेत्या-
आवयन्ति । ओमिति सामानि गायन्ति । ओऽशामिति शाश्वाणि शऽसन्ति ॥ ओमि-
त्यधर्म्युः प्रतिगृहणाति । ओमिति ब्रह्म प्रस्तौति । ओमित्यश्विहोत्रमनुजानाति ।
ओमिति ब्राह्मणः प्रवक्ष्यन्नाह ब्रह्मोपाप्रवानीति ॥ ब्रह्मैवोपाप्नोति । I.8

Chāndogya :—

ओमित्येतदक्षरभुद्वीथसुपासीतोमिति हृद्वायति तस्योपव्याख्यातम् । I.1.1

वागेवर्कं प्राणः सामोमित्येतदक्षरभुद्वीथस्तदा एतनिमथुनं यद्वार्कं च प्राणश्वर्कं च ।
साम च । तदेतनिमथुनमेमित्यस्मिन्द्वक्षरे सङ्ख्यज्यते ... I.1.5.6

तेनेयं व्रयी विद्या वर्तते ओमित्याश्रावयत्योमिति शङ्सत्योमित्यहृद्वायत्येतस्यैवाक्षरस्या-
पचित्यै महिन्ना रसेन । I.1.8

यदा वा कृचमाङ्गोमित्येवातिस्वरत्येवङ्सामैव यजुरेष उ स्वरो यदेतदक्षरमेतद्वृत्त-
मध्यं तत्प्रविद्य देवा असूता अभवन् । I.4.4

अथ सलु य उद्वीथः स प्रणवो यः प्रणवः स उद्वीथ इत्यसौ वा आदित्य उद्वीथ एव
प्रणव ओमिति ह्येष स्वरच्चेति । I.5.1

प्रजापतिलोकावभ्यतपत्तेभ्योऽभित्तेभ्यस्त्रीयी विद्या संप्राप्तवत्तामभ्यतपत्तस्या अभि-
तताया एतान्यक्षराणि संप्राप्तवत्त भूर्ष्ववःस्वरीति । II.13.2

तान्यभ्यतपत्तेभ्योऽभित्तेभ्य ॐ्कारः संप्राप्तवत्तयथा । ऋड्कुना सर्वाणि पर्णाणि
संतुष्णान्येवमोङ्करेण सर्वा वाक्संतुष्णानोङ्कार एवेदङ्सर्वमोङ्कार एवेदङ्सर्वम् ॥ II.13.3

अर्वाणिवचरत एतौ प्राणादित्या एता उपासीतोमित्यक्षरेण व्याहृतिभिः साधित्या
चेति ॥ VI.2

Maitri :—

द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे भूर्ते चाभूर्ते चाथ यन्मूर्ते तदमत्यं यदभूर्ते तस्यत्यं तद्ब्रह्म
तज्जयेतिर्यज्जयेतिः स आदित्यः स वा एष ओमित्येतदात्मामवत्स देवात्मानं व्यकुरुतौ-
मिति तिस्रो मात्रा एताभिः सर्वमिदमोत्तं प्रोतं चैवास्मीत्येवं द्वाहृतद्वा आदित्य ओमित्यं
ध्यायतात्मानं गुञ्जतेति । VI.3

अथ सलु य उद्वीथः स प्रणवो यः प्रणवः स उद्वीथः । इत्यसौ वा आदित्य उद्वीथ
एष प्रणव इत्येवं ह्याहोऽद्वीथं प्रणवाख्यं प्रणेतारं भास्त्रं विगतनिद्रं विजरं विसृन्युं विपदं
इत्यक्षरं एुनः पश्चात् ज्ञेयं निहितं यहायामित्येवं ह्याह । ... ओमित्येतदक्षरस्य चैतत् तस्मादो-
मित्यनेनैतद्वासीताजन्ममिति । ... एतदेवाक्षरं उण्यमेतदेवाक्षरं परम् । एतदेवाक्षरं ज्ञात्वा
यो यदिच्छति तस्य तत् । VI.4

अथान्यत्राप्युक्तं स्वनवत्येषास्य तत् ।

ओमिति ऋचुपुनेषुकेति लिङ्गवत्येषा

अथ अश्विर्वायुरादित्य इति भास्वत्येषा

अथ ब्रह्म रुद्रो विष्णुरिति अधिपतिवत्येषा

अथ कृक्यज्ञःसामेति विज्ञानवत्येषा

अथ भुर्भूवः स्वरिति लोकवत्येषा
 अथ सूर्तं भव्यं भविष्यदिति कालवत्येषा
 अथ प्राणोऽग्निः सूर्य इति प्रतापवत्येषा
 अथ अन्नमापव्यन्द्रमा इति अप्यायनवत्येषा
 अथ बुद्धिर्मनोऽहंकार इति चेतनवत्येषा
 अथ प्राणोऽपानो व्यान इति प्राणवत्येषा

इत्यत ओभित्युक्तेनैताः प्रस्तुता अर्चिता अर्पिता भवतीत्येवं ह्याहैतदै संयकाम परं
चापरं च ब्रह्म यदोभित्येतदक्षरमिति । VI.5

अन्तं वा अस्य सर्वस्य योनिः कालश्चाक्षस्य सूर्यो योनिः कालश्य ... यावत्यो वै
कालस्य कलास्तावतीषु चरत्यसौ यः कालं ब्रह्मत्युपासीत कालस्तस्यातिदूरमपसरतीत्येवं
ह्याह ।

कालात्मवन्ति भूतानि कालाद्विद्धि प्रथान्ति च ।
काले चास्तं नियच्छन्ति कालो मूर्तिरमूर्तिमान् ॥ VI.14

अथ यथोर्णनाभिस्तन्तुनोर्ध्वमूलकान्तोऽवकाशं लभतीत्येवं वाव सत्वसावभिध्यातोभि-
त्यनेनोर्ध्वमूलकान्तः स्वातन्त्र्यं लभते । ... VI.22

धनुःशरीरमोभित्येतच्छरः शिखास्य मनस्तमोलक्षणं भित्वा तमोऽत्माविष्टमागच्छ-
त्यथाविष्टं भित्वा अलातचक्रमित्व रुक्मिनीस्तमादित्यवर्णमूर्जस्वन्तं ब्रह्मतमसः पर्य-
मन्त्यत । VI.24

निद्रोवान्त्तहितेन्द्रियः शुद्धितमया धिया स्वप्न इव यः पश्यतीन्द्रियबिलेऽविवशः
प्रणवाख्यं प्रणेतारं भास्तुं प्रिणतिर्विगतनिद्रं विजरं विस्तुतुं विशोकं च सोऽपि प्रणवाख्यः प्रणेता
भास्तुपो विगतनिद्रो विजरो विस्तुतुर्विशोको भवति । VI.25

Kūrānārāyaṇa tries his best to show that Hari with his four forms is the object of Upāsanā described in the first Prakaraṇa. Madhva also follows the same line. It is unnecessary to take the interpretations of Kūrānārāyaṇa and Madhva seriously. In the eyes of both of them, Gauḍapādiyakārikās in the first Prakaraṇa form a part of the Māṇḍūkyopaniṣad. They do not seem to be aware of the other three Prakaraṇas of the Gauḍapādiyakārikas. The colophons in the Manuscripts at the end of this Prakaraṇa vary considerably, such as इति माण्डूक्योपनिषद् समाप्ता, पथम् प्रकरणम् (without any specific name) ... ओङ्कारनिर्णयः प्रथमं प्रकरणम्, ओङ्काराख्यं प्रथमं प्रकरणम्, ... आगमशास्त्रविवरणे प्रथमप्रकरणे माण्डूकव्याख्यानं समाप्तम्. There does not appear to be any good authority for calling this प्रकरण, आगम, as is done by Prof. Vidhuśekhara. ओङ्कारोपासना perhaps is the most fitting title for this Prakaraṇa, if any is to be given.

CHAPTER II

This Prakaraṇa contains 38 Kārikās and is usually called वैतश्य, presumably because the first word of the first Kārikā in this Prakaraṇa is वैतश्य. Gauḍapāda tries to prove here that there is no difference between the जाग्रत् and स्वप्न states, and परमार्थता consists in the belief that there is neither निर्गोष nor उत्पत्ति, neither बद्ध nor साधक etc.

(1) Things seen in a dream are admitted to be false, because they are seen within the body in a very limited space. Mountains, chariots etc. seen in a dream cannot possibly be accommodated in the small limited space occupied by the body of the dreamer. So they must be false or imaginary.

(2) The objector might argue as follows :— The mountains etc. are not within the body ; the dreamer may be actually travelling to those regions, in which case the things seen in a dream may be regarded as real. To this we answer :— It is impossible for the dreamer to actually travel to the regions within the short period of time he is dreaming; the dream hardly lasts, say an hour or so; how could he be travelling thousands of miles during that period ? Secondly, many a time the dreamer awakes suddenly, but he does not find himself, when awake, in the regions which he had visited in his dream. All this shows that the objects seen in a dream are within the body itself; the dreamer does not go out to see them.

(3) The following passage from the Brhadāraṇyaka shows how the objects in a dream are created by the soul out of the material of this all-containing world, but they really do not exist. स यत्र प्रस्तुपिति अस्य लोकस्य सर्वावतो मात्रास्तुपादाय स्वयं विहृत्य स्वयं निर्माय स्वेन भासा स्वेन ज्योतिषा पित्यव्यायं एुरुः स्वयंज्योतिर्भवति । न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानो भवन्त्यथ रथान् रथयोगान्पथः सृजते न तत्रानन्दात् सुदः प्रसुदो भवन्त्यथानन्दात् सुदः प्रसुदः सृजते न तत्र वेशान्ताः एुक्तरिणः ऋवन्त्यो भवन्त्यथ वेशान्तात् एुक्तरिणीः ऋवन्तीः सृजते स हि कर्ता (IV. 3. 10). The expression न्यायपूर्वकम् is usually understood to mean, ‘with the logical reasoning therefore’. सुकृतिः (Śaṅkara). But there is no सुकृति as such in the above passages from the Brhadāraṇyaka, which are undoubtedly what Gauḍapāda is referring to here. वैतश्यं श्रुत्या स्वप्ने स्वयंज्योतिष्ठूपतिपादनपरया प्रकाशितमाहुर्बद्धविदः says Śaṅkara ; but स्वयंज्योतिः would simply

emphasise that the soul does not require the help of other means to perceive things, not that they are unreal. Their unreality or अभाव etc. is just dogmatically asserted in the above passage, न रथा न रथ्योगा etc. Some sort of reasoning is to be found in Yogavāsiṣṭha III. 19, याद्गर्थं जगदूपं तत्रै बोदेति तत्क्षणाद् । न देशकालदीर्घत्वं न वैचित्र्यं पदार्थजम् ॥ १९ ॥ बाह्यमाभ्यन्तरं भाति स्वप्नार्थोऽत्र निदर्शनम् । यदन्तः स्वप्नसंकल्पपुरं च कंचनं चितेः ॥ २० ॥ तदेतद्वाह्यनामैव स्वाभ्यासात्सर्स्फुटं रिथतम् । ... ॥ २१ ॥ सद्गुपा एव चैतस्य स्वप्नसंकल्पसैन्यवत् । अविसर्वादि सर्वार्थस्त्रूपं यदुभ्यते ॥ २३ ॥ तत्य तावद्वद कर्थं कीदृशी वापि सत्यता । अथवोत्तरकाले तु भङ्गरत्वादवस्तु तद् ॥ २४ ॥ ईर्वद्वच सर्वमेवेदं तत्र का नास्तिताधिका । स्वप्ने जाग्रदसद्गुपा स्वप्नो जाग्रत्यसन्मयः ॥ २५ ॥

We however think that न्यायपूर्वकम् does not refer to logical reasoning at all. It might be argued that the soul in the dream might be different from the soul in संप्रसाद or जाग्रत् state or that स्वप्न is but जागरितदेश, as in dream one sees just what one had seen in the जाग्रत् state (अथो स्वल्बाहुर्जागरितदेश एवास्यैष इति यानि ह्येव जाग्रप्रद्यते तानि छुत इति IV.3.14) and therefore the mere statement about the absence of रथ etc. in dream, without the corresponding statement about the same soul persisting in the three states is futile. The Brhadāraṇyaka to meet this argument says in IV.3.15-17, that the soul enters from one state into another and returns the same way (यथान्यायं means the same way by which one had gone, न्याय—the way of going, entering); and it is this न्याय in यथान्याय used in the following passages, that is referred to by Gaudapāda: —

स वा एष एतस्मिंसंप्रसादे रत्वा चरित्वा हृष्टैव उष्णं च पापं च एनः प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति स्वप्नायैव स यत्तत्र किञ्चित्पद्यत्यन्वागतस्त्वेन मध्यत्यसङ्गेऽप्युरुषं इति ... IV. 3.14, स वा एष एतस्मिन्स्वप्ने रत्वा... प्रतिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति छुद्धान्तायैव स... उरुषं इति IV.3.15, स वा एष एतस्मिन्बुद्धान्ते रत्वा ... प्रातिन्यायं प्रतियोन्याद्रवति स्वप्नान्तायैव IV.3.17, तथाथा महामत्य उभे हृलेऽनुसंचरति पूर्वे चापरं चैवमेवायं उरुषं एताद्वभावन्तावत्तुसंचरति स्वप्नान्तं च छुद्धान्तं च ॥ IV.3.18.

(4) भेद and भाव are synonymous terms, meaning 'thing' 'object'. There is वैतश्य in स्वप्न, because the objects experienced there, are seen within the body; there is वैतश्य in जाग्रत् also, because the so-called बाह्य objects cannot be perceived unless the perceiver's बुद्धि (which is within the body) becomes तत्तद्वाह्यवस्त्वाकारा (The विज्ञानवादिनः therefore argue that बाह्यवस्तु does not exist at all, because for perception only the अन्तःस्थबुद्धि helps). So that what obtains in

the जाग्रत् state, obtains in the स्वप्न as well. But this must not lead us to conclude that there is only one state and not two. There is some difference; जाग्रत् state is different from स्वप्न on the score of संदृश्यत्व (being enclosed) which is a characteristic of स्वप्न only where all objects are enclosed within the body of the dreamer. But this is not a material difference. Devadatta sitting in the open cannot surely be regarded as different from Devadatta sitting in a closed room on a rainy day ! Prof. Vidhuśekhara unnecessarily wants to emend संदृश्यत्वेन भिद्यते into संदृश्यत्वं न भिद्यते which he explains to mean that the state of being enclosed does not differ in waking and dream. There is no manuscript authority for such an emendation. Again, as we have shown above, the reading संदृश्यत्वेन भिद्यते does give a satisfactory meaning. To take संदृश्यत्वेन भिद्यते as संदृश्यत्वे न (वैतर्थ्यं) भिद्यते is equally unnecessary. Śaṅkara tries to evolve a regular syllogism out of this Kārikā,

जायदृश्यानां भावानां वैतर्थ्यम् (प्रतिक्रिया)

दृश्यत्वात् (हेतुः)

यत् दृश्यं तत् वितर्थम्, स्वप्नदृश्यभाववत्.

All this is cumbrous and confusing.

(5) For all practical purposes, स्वप्न and जागरित् स्थानं are therefore understood by the wise to be one and the same, because both are वितर्थ and अन्तःस्थान. स्वप्न is also called सन्धर्यं तृतीयं स्थानं (तस्य वा एतस्य पुरुषस्य द्वे एव स्थाने भवति इदं च परलोकस्थानं च सन्धर्यं तृतीयं स्वप्नस्थानं... Brha. IV. 39): प्रसिद्धेनैव भेदानां शाश्वताहक्त्वेन हेतुना समत्वेन (Śaṅkara).

(6) This Kārikā is repeated in the fourth Prakarana (IV.31). Things in स्वप्न and जागरित् states are वितर्थ also on the general principle that whatever is not there from the very beginning (that is, whatever is produced or born) and is going to have an end (that is, can be destroyed) must also have the same characteristic, viz. being unreal, even in the present. The mirage (सूर्यग्रन्थिका) is not there before, is not going to be after, so it is unreal when it appears. Things in स्वप्न and जागरित् are really possessed of the same characteristics (सहशा) as those of वितर्थ entities, but they are taken to be आवेतर्थ by the ignorant.

(7) One may readily grant the वितर्थत्वं of objects in dream, but some may not be so sure about the जागरितमाव being वितर्थः. Gauda-

pāda therefore explains the point further. Why do we regard the objects in dream as वित्त ? Because, their सप्तयोजनता (the capacity of serving some purpose) is contradicted in another state. A real object can never change its characteristics or प्रकृति. The hearty meal that a person takes in the dream, is of no avail in the जाग्रत् state where he has to satisfy his hunger by having another meal. Now exactly the same is the situation about the objects in the जाग्रत् state. The सप्तयोजनता of a meal in the जाग्रत् state is contradicted in the स्वप्न state (the dreamer goes on eating in a dream as though he had never tasted any meal in the जाग्रत् state). So, जाग्रत् objects stand on the same level as the स्वप्न objects in that each is contradicted in the other state. So जाग्रत् objects also, being of a changeful nature, with their प्रकृति securing अन्यथाभाव in a different state, must be regarded as मिथ्या like the स्वप्न objects. Prof. Vidhuśekhara reads स्वप्ने विप्रत्यतेऽपि प्रतिपद्यते for स्वप्ने सप्तयोजनता, and translates the first line as 'that the things have some purpose also in dream is known'. We fail to see what the स्वप्न सप्तयोजनता of objects has to do with the matter in question. Gaudapāda wants to prove that objects in the जाग्रत् state are मिथ्या and he gives the reason that their सप्तयोजनता is contradicted in dreams. Whether objects in a dream have a प्रयोजन or not is beside the point.

(8) Prof. Vidhuśekhara wants to emend अद्युत्ते स्थानिधर्मः into अपुत्तीः स्थानिधर्मः, and confesses that the Kārikā is not quite clear to him. There is no doubt that अद्युत्ते स्थानिधर्मः is the genuine reading, if not for any other reason, merely on account of the fact that no one is likely to change अपुत्तीः स्थानिधर्मः into अद्युत्ते स्थानिधर्मः. Gaudapāda's style is sometimes very terse and we have to fill in gaps to make the meaning clear, but that hardly justifies us in changing his words at will. Prof Vidhuśekhara is unable to understand the Kārikā, presumably because he has failed to grasp the meaning of the last Kārikā.

The idea in the Kārikā is as follows:—

The objector says that it may be granted that the सप्तयोजनता of objects in the जाग्रत् state (referred to as तेषां in the last Kārikā) is contradicted in the dream-state if the same are seen there. But many a time the dreamer sees in a dream quite abnormal, fantastic and unprecedented objects which he has never seen in the जाग्रत्

state. The सप्रयोजनता argument therefore has no scope here. Are we not therefore justified in saying that the dream is an entirely unique state having no correspondence to the जाग्रत् state, and that the dreamer is also a different soul who creates those abnormal things in such an easy manner? No conclusion can therefore be drawn about the वैतर्णश of objects in the waking state from what we see in the dream.

The Siddhāntin's answer is as follows: — We agree that स्वप्नदृश्य is an अपूर्व thing. But that does not mean that the dreamer is a different soul; it is just a case of स्थानमाहात्म्य. The अपूर्वता is but a characteristic of the dream-state. Is not the देवलोक associated with all kinds of unbelievable objects? An ordinary person when anointed as king, does become possessed of extraordinary powers. Similarly the dream is a privileged place. To us in the waking state the things seen or done in a dream may appear impossible or abnormal, but the dreamer considers them as just ordinary routine and they are real to the dreamer only. Even in the waking state an untrained man would think it abnormal or impossible that one could fly in the air in a big Constellation aeroplane at the rate of 300 miles an hour, but a trained air-pilot does that with the greatest ease. So the वैतर्णश of things does not depend upon whether the things are normal or abnormal, but upon whether they are capable of being belied in another state. The अपूर्व in the dream is the धर्म of the dreamer, that is all. यथा स्थानिधर्माणां रजनुसर्पस्त्रूचिकादीनामसत्त्वे तथा स्वप्नदृश्यानामपूर्वाणां स्थानिधर्मत्वमेवेत्यसत्त्वम् । (Saṅkara).

(9 and 10) Things, both in the जाग्रत् and स्वप्न states, are चेतः-कल्पित and so मिथ्या.

जाग्रत् state

(1) Whatever is imagined by the mind is popularly regarded as असत्

(2) Whatever is cognised by the sense-organs outside, is regarded as सत्

स्वप्न state

(1) Even in the स्वप्न, the dreamer imagines certain things in the mind and considers them as असत्

(2) Even in the स्वप्न, the dreamer considers things cognised outside as सत्

This shows that the so-called सदसद्विभाग in the जाग्रत् state obtains in the स्वप्न state as well. जाग्रत् state is therefore on par with the स्वप्न

state, and is वित्तथ like the स्वप्न, on account of the अन्तःस्थानत्व of things as has been explained below.

(11) If both the जाग्रत् and स्वप्न objects are वित्तथ and चेतःकलिपत्, ' What is real ? Who imagines these भेदः—' these questions require to be answered. स्वतिज्ञानयोः कः आलम्बनमित्यभिप्रायः (Śankara).

(12) ' Ātman ' is the answer to the questions raised in the last Kārikā. Ātman is all light (देव), अज, अद्वैत etc, hence he imagines all this within himself by his Māyā (which also is not different from him). Here Gaudapāda parts company with the Bauddhas (Vijnānavādins). Śankara aptly remarks, नैच निराशदे एव ज्ञानसूती वैताक्षिकानामिवेऽभिप्रायः । According to the Bauddhas विज्ञान is also ' क्षणिक ' . It cannot be आलम्बन for any thing.

(13) This Kārikā shows how the powerful (प्रभुः) Ātman effects the creation. He first thinks of the objects to be created in his mind and then becomes out-ward-minded and fixes them up outside, just as a speaker first thinks about what he is going to speak and then speaks out. Prof. Vidhuśekhara wants to read अव्यवस्थितान् for व्यवस्थितान्, because the objects in a dream are not fixed, and नियतान् in the second line is intended to be contrasted with अव्यवस्थितान्. He also wants to read बहिष्वित्ते so as to correspond with अन्तःवित्ते. We differ from Prof. Vidhuśekhara. Things within are अव्यक्त according to Gaudapāda (Kārikā 15), अव्यक्त is not अव्यवस्थित. As dreams go; they are as good as नियत. The author seems to emphasise here that objects are first thought out and then projected for practical purposes. The expression बहिष्वित्ते would mean ' outside in the mind ' which is a contradiction in terms. That is why बहिष्वित्तः ' minded out-ward ' seems to have been preferred by Gaudapāda.

(14) Objects within are चित्तकाल (staying as long as the thought lasts), objects without are चित्त द्वाल and इन्द्रियकाल. चित्तकालः are cognised by the mind; द्वयकालः, in addition by इन्द्रियः, as they are व्यवहारदशापक्षः. द्वय is referred to by Gaudapāda himself in IV. 72 as ग्राहय/हक्कवत्; but the द्वय in द्वयकाल here does not mean ग्राहय/ग्राहकवत्, for that characteristic belongs surely to चित्तकाल as well (for चित्त would be the ग्राहक and the things imagined would be ग्राहा). Read the following from Śankara's Bhyāṣya, चित्तकालाः ... चित्तपरिच्छेदाः । ... कल्पनाकाल एवोपलभ्यन्त इत्यर्थः । द्वयकालात् भेदकाला अन्योन्यपरिच्छेदाः । (यथा

आगोदोहनमास्ते यावदास्ते तावद्वां दोग्निध यावद्वां दोग्निध तावदास्त इति) परस्परपरिच्छेदपरिच्छेदकत्वं बाह्यानां भेदानां ते द्वयकालाः । बाह्य objects thus are चित्तकाल and also dependent upon or correlated to other objects for their existence. Hence they are द्वयकाल. Whatever that be, all objects, whether within or without, are but imagined objects. The विशेष pointed out, viz. some are चित्तकाल and others are द्वयकाल, is due, not to any other cause, but कल्पितत्व itself.

(15) It is true that objects within are not distinctly experienced while those without are स्फुट, but this distinction between the two is caused merely by the difference in the means for their cognition. It is not that objects within are कल्पित while those without are real. All are कल्पित, but objects within are cognised by the mind, while objects without require in addition the help of इन्द्रियः or sense-organs for their cognition; आत्मा मनसा संयुज्यते मन इन्द्रियेण, इन्द्रियस्य अर्थेन— according to this theory of the Naiyāyikas, there is इन्द्रिय in between मनस् and objects. इन्द्रियान्तर may mean other इन्द्रियः (बाह्य as opposed to मनस् which is an अन्तरिन्द्रिय) or the difference or distance due to the intervention of इन्द्रियः between मनस् and the objects of perception.

(16) This Kārikā indicates the process by which बाह्य and आध्यात्मिक objects come into existence. The Advaita Ātman first imagines (by his Māyā) the individual soul and then the different objects चित्तकाल and द्वयकाल. It appears that the individual souls thus imagined, imagine for themselves different objects according to their experiences also imagined. Gauḍapāda does not dilate upon this topic any further, as he is mainly interested in the अज्ञातिवाद. The Yogavāsiṣṭha carries this theory to its logical conclusion and speaks of countless myriads of worlds within worlds created by imagination by the individual souls. यथाविद्यः तथासृतिः is unexceptional enough. But whence does the first विद्या or विज्ञान come? Why should there be the difference in the powers of imagination of individual souls to start with? — to this and similar queries, Gauḍapāda has only one answer, they are all unreal and only the Advaita Ātman is the परमार्थता ! Śaṅkara says, योऽसौ स्त्रयं काङ्गतो जीवः सर्वकल्पनायामधिकृतः स यथाविद्यो यादशी विद्या विज्ञानमस्येति यथाविद्यस्तथाविद्यैव सृतिस्तस्येति तथासृतिर्भवति स इति ! अतो हेतुकल्पनाविज्ञानात्फलविज्ञानं ततो हेतुफलसृतिस्तस्येति त्विज्ञानं तदर्थे क्रियाकारकत्फलभेदविज्ञानानि तेभ्यस्तस्मृतस्तस्मृतेश्व उनस्तद्विज्ञानानीत्येवं बाह्यानाध्यात्मिकांश्वेतरनिमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेनानेकधा कल्पयते ।

(१७) सर्पधारादिभिः— The rope in darkness is mistaken for a stream of water (उदकधारा), serpent (सर्प), stick etc. Similarly Ātman is mistaken for all sorts of things by different people according to their powers of imagination.

(१८) When the रज्जु is realised in its true nature, the विकल्पs vanish away; similarly when आत्मन् is realised as अद्वैत, the different विकल्पs about आत्मन् disappear.

(१९) It is due to the Māyā of Ātman that so many विकल्पs, प्राण etc. are superimposed on him. It is strange, but true that Ātman himself stands deluded by this Māyā of his and gives rise to such विकल्पs ! Śāṅkara hastens to explain, स्वयमपि मोहित इव मोहितो भवति !

(२०) Verses 20-28 describe the various विकल्पs (३५ of them) fathered upon Ātman. They represent the ideas about the Highest or the goal to be achieved, entertained by philosophers and lay men. It is possible to point out some *prima facie* bases for these विकल्पs in the Upaniṣads and older works. Ātman is imagined to be

[१] प्राण by some प्राणवादिन्स, Vedantins who take their stand upon passages like प्राणे सर्वे प्रतिष्ठतम् (Chāndogya I.11.4-5) and others quoted in notes on I.6 above. Ānandagiri says that Vaiśeśikas and worshippers of Hiranyagarbha are meant (प्राणो हिरण्यगर्भस्तटस्थेश्वरो वा स जगतो हेतुरिति प्राणविदो हैरण्यगर्भाया वशेषिकादयश्च कल्पयन्ति).

[२] भूतानि by भूतविद् who take their stand upon passages that support the ब्रित्वकरण (Chāndogya VI.2.3-4) or the पञ्चिकरण process for the creation of the world. पृथग्, आप्, तेजस् are the three भूतs, or five, with वायु and आकाश added to the list. The popular or the Cārvāka view that the body is पाञ्चभौतिक is also well-known. The Gītā also refers to these philosophers in भूतानि यान्ति भूतेज्याः (IX. 25). पृथिव्यसेजोवायवस्तत्त्वानि तानि च चत्वारि भूतानि जगत्कारणानीति लोकायतिकाः (Ānandagiri, according to whom only four elements are meant here).

[३] गुणs by some of the Sāṅkhyas who postulate सत्, रज्जु and तमस् as the three constituents out of which every thing is constituted. The Gītā (XVI and XVII Adhyāyas) elaborates this aspect in various detail. सत्त्वं जप्तमोसि वयो गुणः स्त्राव्यनावृत्यता जगतो महदादिलक्षणस्य कारणमिति सोख्याः (Ānandagiri).

[4] तत्त्वानि by the Śaivas (according to Ānandagiri) who say that आत्मन्, अविद्या and शिव are the three तत्त्वs which create the world. One would naturally expect the सांख्यतत्त्वs to follow the सांख्यगुणs in the last Kārikā, but as the सांख्यतत्त्वs are obviously referred to in Kārikā 26 below, Ānandagiri's interpretation is reasonable.

(21) [5] पादs by some Vedantins who take their stand upon Chāndogya (III.5.5-8) where सत्यकाम is instructed by the कृष्ण in the पादs of Brahman, called प्रकाशवान्, अनन्तवान्, ज्योतिषमात् and आयतनवान् constituted of four कलाः each, as follows—प्राची दिक्षला प्रतीची दिक्षला दक्षिणा दिक्षलादीची दिक्षलेष वै सोम्य चतुष्कलः पादो ब्रह्मणः प्रकाशवान्नाम ... पृथिवी कला अन्तरिक्षं कला थौः कला समुद्रः कर्लेष वै सोम्य चतुष्कलः पादो ब्रह्मणोऽनन्तवान्नाम ... अश्वः कला सूर्यः कला चन्द्रः कला विशुद् कर्लेष वै सोम्य चतुष्कलः पादो ब्रह्मणो ज्योतिषमान्नाम ... प्राणः कला चक्षुः कला शोत्रं कला मनः कर्लेष वै सोम्य चतुष्कलः पादो ब्रह्मण आयतनवान्नाम ! Ānandagiri thinks that the four पादs are विश्व, तैजस, प्राज्ञ and हुर्य (the Māṇḍūkya says सर्वं द्वैतद्वृद्धायमात्मा ब्रह्म सोऽयमात्मा चतुर्भाव). This is not likely as Gauḍapāda himself has dilated upon them in Prakaraṇa I (though with the ultimate object of establishing अद्वैत) and would not of his own accord include himself among the पादविद्.

[6] विषयs by the विषयविद् who consider enjoyment of the objects of sense as the highest goal, sensualists like वात्स्यायन the author of Kāmasūtra (वात्स्यायनप्रभृतीनां कल्पनां कथयति-शब्दादयो विषयः द्वयो भूयो भुज्यमानास्त्रयमिति विभ्रममात्रम् । विषय विषयाणां च दूरमत्यन्तमन्तरम् । उपभूक्त विषयं हन्ति विषयाः स्मरणादपि ॥ इति विषयानुसंधानस्य निन्दितत्वात् ... Ānandagiri) and चार्वाकs whose motto is यावज्जीविं सुखं जीवेत् ।

[7] लोकs by the लोकविद् who think highly of देवलोक, वरुणलोक, प्रजापतिलोक etc. and aspire to secure residence in them; भूर्भुवः स्वरिति भयो लोका वस्तुभूताः सन्तीति पौराणिकाः (Ānandagiri). It is better to understand by लोकs, the various abodes on the देवयान path, rather than द्युः, द्युवः and द्यः as stated by Ānandagiri. Very few would choose द्यः and द्युवः for their goal.

[8] देवs by देवविद् or देवदत्तs who are enamoured of the hierarchy of the gods and worship their favourite gods to secure their worlds; यान्ति देवदत्त देवता (Gītā IX. 25). अग्नीन्द्रादयो देवास्तस्तकल-शतारो नेत्वरस्तयेति देवताकाण्डीयाः (worshippers of the देवताः mentioned in the देवताकाण्ड in Yāska's Nirukta), says Ānandagiri.

(22) [9] वेद्स by वेदविद्स who swear by the वेद्स which they regard as अपौरुषेय and निःश्वसित or directly revealed word of the Highest. ऋग्वेदाद्यो वेदाश्वत्वारस्तत्त्वानीति पाठका वदन्ति (Ānandagiri).

[10] यज्ञs by the यज्ञविद्स or याज्ञिकs who take their stand upon passages from the Gitā, यज्ञाणिष्टाधिनः सन्तो मुच्यन्ते सर्वकिल्बैषः । (Gitā III. 13), यज्ञाणिष्टासुतभुजो यान्ति ब्रह्म सनातनम् (IV.31), यज्ञायाचरतः कर्म समयं प्रविलीयते (IV. 23), ब्रह्मार्पणं ब्रह्म हविंब्रह्माश्च ब्रह्मणा हुतम् । ब्रह्मैव तेन गन्तव्यं ब्रह्मकर्मसामाधिना ॥ (IV. 24). Ānandagiri remarks, ज्योतिष्टोमाद्यो यज्ञा वस्तुभूता भवन्तीति वौधायनप्रस्तुतयो याज्ञिका मन्त्रन्ते ।

[11] भोक्तु by the भोक्तुविद्स who believe in the Highest being the भोक्तु (अहं हि सर्वयज्ञानां भोक्ता च प्रसुतेव च । Gitā IX.24, उपद्रष्टासुमन्ता च भर्ता भोक्ता महेश्वरः । परत्मामेति चाप्युन्हो देहेऽस्मिन् उरुषः परः ॥ XIII.22), भोक्तैवात्मा न कर्तेति सांख्याः । (Ānandagiri).

[12] भोज्यम् by the भोज्यविद्स who take their stand on passages like प्राणो वा अन्नम् ॥ शरीरमन्नादम् ॥ प्राणे शरीरं प्रतिष्ठितम् शरीरे प्राणः प्रतिष्ठितः । तदेतदन्नमन्ने प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥ ... भावो वा अन्नम् ॥ ज्योतिरन्नादम् । अप्यु ज्योतिः प्रतिष्ठितम् । ज्योतिष्वापः प्रतिष्ठिताः ॥ तदेतदन्नमन्ने प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥ पृथिवी वा अन्नम् ॥ आकाशोऽन्नादः ॥ पृथिव्यामाकाशः प्रतिष्ठितः ॥ आकाशे पृथिवी प्रतिष्ठिता ॥ तदेतदन्नमन्ने प्रतिष्ठितम् ॥ (Taittiriya III.7-9) अन्नं ब्रह्मति व्यजानात् (II.1) अन्नाद्वै प्रजाःप्रजायन्ते (II.1.2) अन्नं हीदं सर्वञ्चित्यतम् (Chāndogya I. 3. 6). Ānandagiri displays a sense of humour rare in a Sanskrit commentary in saying सूपकाराः (cooks) भोज्यं वस्तिवति प्रतिजानते. We do not think Gaudapāda wishes to include cooks in the category of philosophers, in spite of the fact that the problem of food is universally admitted to be the most important one and the validity of the Napoleonic dictum that an army marches on its stomach, is self-evident.

(23) [13] सूक्ष्म by the सूक्ष्मविद्स. They are the atomists, Vaiśeṣikas who regard अण्स as the जगत्कारण. Ānandagiri says, आत्मा सूक्ष्मोऽस्यपरिमाणः स्थाविति केचिद् । Vidhuśekhara says 'they would refer to all the Vaiśṇava teachers, such as Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhvā and Vallabha'. This is quite improbable, for these Vaiśṇava teachers regard the individual as atomic, not the परमात्मन्. Here the question is about the ideas about the Highest or the जगत्कारण and not about the individual soul.

[१४] स्थूल by the स्थूलविद्स ; they are the चार्वाक्स according to whom the gross body is the Highest, or the Jainas who regard the Ätman as शरीरपरिणामः. स्थूलो देहोऽहपत्ययादासेति लोकायतभेदः (Änandagiri).

[१५] मूर्ते by the मूर्तविद्स; they are the आगमिक्स, followers of the Pāñcarātra or Śaiva आगमस. They believe that God descends down to the earth in various forms. They take their stand upon passages like प्रकृतिं स्वामधिष्ठाय संभवं भ्याम्नमायथा ... संभवामि सुगे सुगे (Gitā IV.6,8). मूर्तविद्स शूलादिधारी महेश्वरश्वकादिधारी वा परमार्थो भवतीत्यागमिकाः । (Änandagiri). मूर्ते is explained as तदेतन्मूर्ते यदन्यद्वायोश्वान्तरिक्षाच्च ... इदमेव मूर्ते यदन्यत्प्राणाच्च यश्वायमन्तरात्मन्नाकाशः in Br̥hadāranyaka II. 3. 2-3.

[१६] अमूर्ते by the अमूर्तविद्स. The Br̥h. passage quoted above explains अमूर्ते as अथामूर्ते वायुश्वान्तरिक्षं च ... प्राणश्च यश्वायमन्तरात्मन्नाकाशः etc. अमूर्ते: सर्वाकारशूल्यो निःस्वभावः परमार्थं इति मूर्त्यवादिनः (Änandagiri). It is more likely that the अमूर्तविद्स are some theorists who deny the existence of a personal god in a concrete form. अमूर्ते cannot mean शून्य.

(२४) [१७] काल by the कालविद्स ; these take their stand upon passages like कालोऽस्मि लोकक्षयकृत् प्रदृच्छो (Gitā XI.32), सृत्युः सर्वहरश्वाहम् (X. 34) and Atharvaveda XIX. 53, 54, etc. कालः परमार्थं इति ज्योतिर्विद्ः (astronomers) says Änandagiri. The वैशेषिक्स also regard काल as नित्य.

[१८] दिशः by the दिशिविद्स ; these are probably the वैशेषिक्स who regard space as eternal; everything that exists exists in space; so space is the स्फुलकारण. Änandagiri says स्वरोदयविदस्तु दिशः परमार्थं इत्याहुः. The expression स्वरोदयविदः is usually explained as 'those who know how to foretell events by reading the voices of birds etc.' Perhaps it means 'Yogins who can hear the music of the spheres.'

[१९] वादा: by the वादविद्स; these are, according to Änandagiri, those who are conversant with alchemy, mantras or charms etc. (धातुवादो मन्त्रवादश्चेत्यादयो वादा वस्तुभूता भवन्तीति केचिद् ।). Perhaps the तार्किक्स who believe in the dictum वादे वादे जायते तत्त्वज्ञोऽहः are meant here. They think that right knowledge could be had by discussion and argumentation. वाद is defined as तत्त्वबुझत्सोः कथा वादः ।

[२०] भूवनानि by the भूवनविद्स ; these are the geographers who claim to know the whole universe consisting of fourteen भूवनः (seven

higher, भूः, भुवः, स्वः, महः, जनः, तमः and सत्यम्, and seven lower, अतल, वितल, सुतल, रसातल, तलातल, महातल and पातल). भुवनानि चतुर्दश वस्तुनीति भुवनकोशविदः । (Ānandagiri).

[25] [21] मनस् by the मनोविद्वः; these take their stand on passages like मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीन, मन एव मदुष्याणां कारणं बन्धमोक्षयोः । मन एवात्मेति लोकायतभेदः । (Ānandagiri).

[22] बुद्धिः by the बुद्धिविद्वः; these are evidently the Bauddhas (बुद्धिरेवात्मेति बौद्धः, Ānandagiri).

[23] चित्तम् by the चित्तविद्वः; these are evidently the Vijnānavādins, Bauddhas (चित्तमेव बाद्याकारशून्ये विज्ञानम् । तदेवात्मेत्यपरे । Ānandagiri).

The Bauddhas use मनस्, बुद्धि and चित्त as synonymous terms very often. It is quite clear that Gaudapāda, who condemns all these theorists, could not have been himself a Buddhist. It is significant that Prof. Vidhuśekhara has no remarks to offer on this point.

[24] धर्माधर्मैः by the धर्माधर्मविद्वः; these are the Mimānsakas; they do not admit any ईश्वर, but say that धर्म and अधर्म (पाप and पुण्य) of the individual soul determine his future and hence they are the जगत्कारण (धर्माधर्मैः विधिनिरेष्वचोदनागम्यौ परमार्थाविति मीमांसकाः । Ānandagiri).

(26) [25] पञ्चविंशक (constituted of twenty-five principles or elements) by the Sāṅkhya (मूलप्रकृतिविकृतिः महादायाः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त । ओङ्कारश्च विकारः न प्रकृतिर्वै विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥). Thus—

मूलप्रकृतिः —	I
प्रकृतिविकृतयः — महत् (बुद्धिः), अहंकार, पञ्च तन्मात्राणि—	7
प्रकृतिविकारः — पञ्च तु द्वीन्द्रियाणि (ब्राह्मणं, रसनं, चक्षुः, त्वक् and ओक्तम्)	
पञ्च कर्मन्दियाणि (वाक्याणिपादपाशृपस्थाः)	
मनः	
पञ्च महाभूतानि (पृथिव्यवेजोवायुराकाशाः)	16
पुरुषः—	I
	<hr/> 25

[26] षड्विंश (constituted of twenty-six principles) by the Patañjalas, followers of the system of Yoga propounded by Patañjali,

They accept the twenty-five तत्त्वs of the Sāṅkhya system, and add only one more तत्त्व, viz. ईश्वर (hence, they are also called सेश्वर सांख्यs).

[27] एकत्रिंशक (constituted of thirty-one principles) by some. They, according to Ānandagiri, are Pāśupatas (worshippers of Paśupati, Śiva). They accept the twenty-five तत्त्वs of the सांख्यs, and add six more, (1) रागः (2) अविद्या (3) नियतिः (4) कालः (5) कला and (6) माया. Others add to this list five more, शिवः, शक्तिः, सदाशिवः, ईश्वरः and विद्या, making the total 36. Prof. Vidhuśekhara says that out of these thirty-six, रागः, अविद्या, नियतिः, कालः, and कला are regarded as मायाविभूतिः, so the thirty-six तत्त्वs can be reduced to thirty-one. We think that all the above views are wrong and that Gauḍapāda is here merely referring to the passage in the Gītā (XLII. 5-6) महाभूतान्यहकारो बुद्धिरव्यक्तमेव च । इन्द्रियाणि दशैकं च पञ्च चेन्द्रियगोचराः ॥ इच्छा देषः सुखं दुःखं संघातश्वेतना धृतिः । एतत्क्षेत्रं समासेन सविकारस्तुदाहृतम् ॥ The total 31 is thus made up,

महाभूतs—	5
अहंकार, बुद्धि and अव्यक्त—	3
इन्द्रियs (5 कर्मेन्द्रियs, 5 ज्ञानेन्द्रियs and मनस्)—	11
इन्द्रियगोचरs (रूप, रस, गन्ध, स्पर्श and शब्द)—	5
इच्छा, देष, सुख, दुःख, संघात, चेतना and धृतिः—	7
	<hr/>
	31

[28] अजन्त by some who hold that it is futile to limit the number of तत्त्वs. They presumably take their stand upon passages like नान्तोऽस्ति मम दिव्यानां विभूतीनां परंतप । ... यद्याद्विभूतिमत् सत्त्वं श्रीमद्भूर्जितमेव वा । तत्तदेवावगच्छ त्वं मम तेजोशासंभवम् ॥ (Gītā X. 40-41).

(27) [29] लोकाः by the लोकविद्वs; these are the democrats who look at the world from a practical point of view, and are not interested in metaphysics. 'The greatest good of the greatest number' is their motto, and लोकसंग्रह their forte. These लोकविद्वs are different from the लोकविद्वs in II. 21 above.

[30] आश्रमाः by the आश्रमविद्वs; these want to follow the directions given in the Smṛti works about the different modes of life (ब्रह्मचर्य, युहस्थ, वानप्रस्थ and संन्यास); the proper observance of the Smṛti rules in this behalf conduces to the well-being of society.

as a whole, and ensures salvation for the individual as well (दक्षप्रभृतयस्त्वाश्रमाः परमर्थो इति समर्थयन्ते । Ānandagiri. दक्ष was the first great patriarch to introduce the system of आश्रमs in society according to some Purāṇas). The आश्रमs mentioned in III. 16 below are not to be confused with the आश्रमs referred to here.

[३१] स्त्रीयुंडुंसकम् by the लैङ्गs ; these are the grammarians, according to Ānandagiri, who say that everything in this world can be classified into one of the three classes, male, female and neuter (वैयाकरणास्तु स्त्रीयुंडुंसकं शब्दज्ञातं तत्त्वमिति वर्णयन्ति), followers of पाणिनिदर्शन. Perhaps the remote ancestors of modern Freudists are meant here ; those who regard the highest तत्त्व as nothing but sexurge which animates the world. These can take their stand upon passages like असत्यमप्रतिष्ठं ते जगदाहुरनीश्वरम् । अपरस्परसंभूतं किमन्यत्काम-हैतुकम् ॥ Gitā XVI.8, by interpreting the same to suit their own views:

[३२] परापरम् by some ; द्वे ब्रह्मणि वेदितव्ये परं चापरं चेति केचित् (Ānandagiri). Perhaps, we should read परावरम् here, and the reference might be to the passage, मिथ्यते हृदयश्चन्थिश्छियन्ते सर्वसंशयाः । क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन्द्वै परावरे ॥ Mundaka II. 2-8. परं and अपरं ब्रह्म are mentioned in the Praśnopaniṣad V. 2, एतद्वै सत्यकाम परं चापरं च ब्रह्म ...

(२८) [३३] सृष्टिः by the सृष्टिविद्दs in whose eyes the problem of creation looms large ; these are presumably the worshippers of Brahmadeva, the creator.

[३४] लघः by the लघविद्दs, the worshippers of महेश, the destroyer of the world.

[३५] स्थितिः by the स्थितिविद्दs, the worshippers of Viṣṇu who looks to the maintenance of the world.

सृष्टिर्वा लघो वा स्थितिर्वा तत्त्वमिति पौराणिकाः (Ānandagiri).

These thirty-five विकल्पs and similar others are always being continuously associated with the Highest by ignorant and semi-ignorant thinkers.

(२९) Gaudapāda here points out that in accordance with the dictum यो यच्छूद्धः स एव सः (Gitā XVI. 3), persons entertaining any विकल्प about the Ātman, secure that विकल्प as their goal, and fail to reach the highest reality. The Kārikā (especially the second half)

is very confusing, with the promiscuous use of सं, तं, यं, असौ etc. making it very difficult to understand its import.

The idea is as follows:— Let us suppose that Devadatta is a simple-minded seeker after truth. Yajñadatta, his friend in whom he has implicit faith, is a votary of Viṣṇu and advises Devadatta to regard Viṣṇu as the Highest reality. Devadatta whole-heartedly and jealously sticks to Viṣṇu at all costs, and this obsession for Viṣṇu, having taken root, ultimately becomes united with Viṣṇu यं (विष्णुरूपं) भावं (यज्ञदत्तः) दर्शयेद् यस्य (देवदत्तस्य) तं (विष्णुरूपं) भावं सः (देवदत्तः) तु पश्यति । तं (विष्णुरूपं भावं) च अवति सः (देवदत्तः), असौ (देवदत्तः) तद्यग्नहः (तस्मिन् विष्णुरूपे भावे ग्रहः यस्य सः) भूत्वा सम्पैति तं (विष्णुरूपं भावम्). Śaṅkara explains differently, तं च (द्रष्टारं) स (भावः) अवति (यो दर्शितो भावः) असौ भूत्वा (रक्षति) स्वेनात्मना सर्वतः निहणद्धि (that is, the Ātman, assuming the form of the विकल्प, protects the ब्रह्म) तस्मिन् ग्रहस्तद्वाहस्तद्वभिनिवेशः । इदमेव च तत्त्वमिति स तं ग्रहीतारम्भपैति तस्यात्मभावं निगच्छतीत्यर्थः । (that is, the obsession, viz. that विकल्प is the आत्मन्, takes hold of him). Thus—

first तं means द्रष्टारं (according to भावं (according to our Śaṅkara), interpretation)

सः „ आत्मा („) साधकः („)

असौ „ दर्शितो भावः („) (same as
सः in the
first half)

साधकः („)

तद्यग्नहः, तत्पुरुष compound („) बहुब्रीहि („)

second तं means ग्रहीतारम् („) भावं („)

Looking to the wording in the Kārikā तं भावं स तु पश्यति तं चावति सः, where the use of च shows that the subject of अवति and पश्यति is the same, we think that सः should refer to the साधक, and as a corollary, तं should refer to भाव. According to Śaṅkara the Ātman protects the साधक, and तद्यग्न takes possession of him; according to our interpretation the साधक guards the adopted भाव, and obsessed by it reaches it. The meaning is ultimately the same (it is just a case of Mahomed going to the mountain or the mountain going to Mahomed), but our way of construing the Kārikā is more in conformity with the grammatical requirements.

(30) Those who indulge in the various विकल्पs about Ātman, regard Ātman as different; these विकल्पs actually are not different from Ātman. No wonder that they fail to know the real truth about Ātman. On the other hand, those who have realised that Ātman is the only reality, do not take these विकल्पs at their face value and are not contaminated by the कर्मफल which might have otherwise accrued to them. न ह्यनध्यात्मविद्वेदाऽन्वारुं शक्नोति तत्त्वतः । न ह्यनध्यात्म-विकल्पित क्रियाफलमुपाश्रुत इति हि मानवं बचनम् ॥ (Anandagiri).

(31) स्वप्न, माया, गन्धर्वनगर etc. are known to be असदूप; the universe is likewise असदूप. वेदान्तेषु—नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन, इच्छो मायाभिः, आत्मवेदमग्र आसीत्, ... यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मेवासृद—इत्यादिषु (Anandagiri).

(32) Having shown thus far how the views of other thinkers cannot stand, Gaudapāda enunciates his view about परमार्थता. निरोध, उत्पत्ति, बद्ध, साधक, सुषक्षु, भुक्त—these terms can have any meaning only if there is द्वैत. Only अद्वैत आत्मन् is the reality. An अद्वैत can not have any उत्पत्ति, प्रलय etc. It is futile also to talk of निरोध etc. in connection with imagined things. Cf. ... वस्तुतस्तु न बन्धोऽस्ति न मोक्षोऽस्ति महामते ॥ (Yogavāsiṣṭha III. 101). नात्र कञ्चित्नमहामते बध्यते न च मृच्यते । (Laṅkāvatārasūtra 79).

(33) The अद्वय आत्मन् is responsible for imagining himself to be all sorts of things that are really non-existent, and likewise for the imagined things themselves. Ātman is always the same, unchangeable and serves as the अधिष्ठान for all कल्पनाः (न हि निरास्पदा काचित्कल्पनोपलभ्यते Anandagiri). All कल्पनाः are अशिवः; the अद्वय alone is शिव.

(34) The objector says that he admits that the जगत् is just विकल्प foisted on the Ātman; would not that mean that जगत् is नाना from the point of view of आत्मभाव ? The answer is no. Can one say that the imagined serpent is नाना from the point of view of रज्जु ? The imagined serpent simply does not exist; no question of नानात्व can therefore arise. In the same way there cannot be any स्व-भाव, पृथक्त्व or अपृथक्त्व for an imagined or असत् thing. Prof. Vidhuśekhara wants to read नान्यभावेन for आत्मभावेन so as to have a contrast between अन्यभाव and स्व-भाव; he thinks that आत्मभाव and स्वभाव mean one and the same thing. We have shown above that आत्मभाव means 'not the nature of जगत्', but 'the nature of जगत् as conceived as a विकल्प on आत्मन्'. Again,

it is absurd to talk about a thing having the nature of another (except in Alarīkārāśāstra). The suggestion that नात्मभावेन should be read for नात्मभावेन, against all manuscript authority does not merit consideration.

(35) The expression वीतरागभयक्रोध is used twice in the Bhagavadgitā (II.५६, IV.१०). प्रपञ्चोपशमः — प्रपञ्चो द्वैतभेदविभूतारस्तस्योपशमोऽभावो यज्ञिन्स आत्मा (Śaṅkara). निर्विकल्पकः— Void of कल्पनाः. The Yogavāsiṣṭha has the fifth Prakaraṇa called उपशमः of which the author apparently thinks very highly as he calls it निर्विकारै, and उत्तमसिद्धान्तसुन्दरम्.. .

(36) जडवत्—अप्रख्यापयज्ञात्मानमहमेवंविद्य इत्यमिदायः । (Śaṅkara). It is only bogus मुनिः who advertise themselves and their so-called miraculous powers, cf. तस्माद्ब्राह्मणः पाणिङ्गतं निर्विद्य वाल्येन तिष्ठासेत् (Brha. III. ५.१). Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya on अनाविकुर्वन्वन्यात् (Brahmasūtra III. ४.५०) says तथा चोक्तं स्मृतिकारैः, यं न सन्तं न चासन्तं नाश्रुतं न बहुश्रुतम् । न सुदृतं न दुर्वृतं वेद कश्चित्स ब्राह्मणः ॥ गृहधर्माश्रितो विद्वानज्ञानचरितं चरेत् । अन्यवज्जडवज्ञापि भूकवच मर्ही चरेत् ॥ अव्यक्तलिङ्गोऽव्यक्ताचारः, इति चैवमादि ।

(37) The परमहंससंन्धासिन् is beyond all obligations. He has no use for praise or salutation for deities; he need not perform the Srāddha rites for the Pitṛs (स्वधा, all oblations to the pitṛs are offered with इति (पितृभ्यः) स्वधा). As he has secured the right knowledge, there is no possibility of his doing any unmoral or irreligious acts as such, even though he may be technically above all विधिः or निषेधः. चलाचल— Constantly changing. A यति should have no fixed abode, he should be constantly changing his place of residence, lest he might fall a prey to तृणा, लोभ etc. चलं चाचलं च चलाचले ते निकेतो यस्याश्रयः स तथेति यावत् । (Anandagiri). Śaṅkara curiously enough says, चलं शरीरं प्रतिक्षणमन्यथाभावात् । अचलमात्मतत्त्वम् । यदा कदाचिद्द्वौजनादिव्यवहारनिमित्तमाकाशवदचलं स्वरूपमात्मतत्त्वमात्मनो निकेतयाश्रयमात्मस्थितिं विस्मृत्याहमिति मन्यते यदा तदा चलो देहो निकेतो यस्य सोऽयमेवं चलाचलनिकेतो विद्वान्न पुनर्बाह्यविषयाश्रयः । All this is unsatisfactory. Prof. Vidhuśekhara rightly explains चलाचल as 'absolutely not fixed'. यादृच्छिकः— यदृच्छाप्राप्तकौपीनच्छादनग्रासमात्रेऽहस्थितिरित्यर्थः । (Śaṅkara). A Yati must make use of only what comes to him unsolicited; he must not hanker after anything. Only the bare minimum required to keep body and soul together, should be taken by him.

(३८) बाह्यतः— Referring to the external world, the five Mahābhūtas, आधारात्मिकं— Connected with the body. The तत्त्व is, आत्मा च सबाह्याभ्यन्तरे हाजोऽप्यौऽनन्तरे ऽवाह्यः कृत्व आकाशवत्सर्वगतः सूक्ष्मोऽचलो निर्णयो निष्कलो निष्क्रियः (Saṅkara). Having known this तत्त्व, the यति should ever be on his guard not to deviate from it.

CHAPTER III

This Prakaraṇa usually called अद्वैतप्रकरण contains 48 Kārikās. The first Prakaraṇa mainly dealt with औकारोपासना and the second with the वैतर्थ्य of the विश्व. The problem of the individual soul however was not discussed. If there exists only अद्वैत आत्मन्, what are we to understand by the various Śruti passages dealing with the उत्पत्ति of Jivas and the world? How does the उपास्योपासकभाव come into existence? What is exactly meant by birth or जाति? All such topics are discussed here, and the last Kārikā gives the considered opinion of the author as follows:— न कश्चिज्जायते जीवः संभवोऽस्य न विद्यते । एततद्गुतमं सर्वं यत्र किञ्चिच्च जायते ॥ This is the famous अजातिवाद or non-origination doctrine which was first systematically propounded by Gaudapāda.

(१) Śaṅkara thus introduces the third Prakaraṇa—ओङ्कारनिर्णय उक्तः प्रपञ्चोपशमः शिवोऽद्वैत आत्मेतिप्रतिज्ञामात्रेण । ज्ञाते द्वैतं न विद्यत इति च । तत्र द्वैताभावस्तु वैतर्थ्यप्रकरणेन स्वप्नमायागन्धर्वनगरादिदृष्टान्तैर्दृष्ट्यत्वाद्यन्तवृच्चादिहेतुभिस्तर्केण च प्रतिपादितः । अद्वैतं किमागममात्रेण प्रतिपञ्चयमाहोस्मिन्तकेणापीत्यत आह शक्यते तर्केणापि ज्ञातुम् । तत्कथमित्यद्वैतप्रकरणमारभ्यते ।

धर्मः— साधकः (जीवः), Śaṅkara. Prof. Vidhuśekhara takes धर्मः to mean 'duty'. As the last Kārikā (III. 48) uses the expression जीव, the meaning given by Śaṅkara is a better one. Brahman is अज and अद्वैत; the existence of जीव and the उपास्योपासकभाव are possible only when द्वैत is produced. So first, Brahman has to be born (what exactly is meant by the जाति of Brahman is made clear in the text itself later), and then Jīva's उपासकत्व can function. The existence of जीव thus depends upon something else. जीव is therefore called a दृष्ण, one who is unable to stand on one's own legs, a parasite. The जीव who believes in उपासना as a means of reaching Brahman (even though he is really Brahman) has surely an intelligence only

to be pitied. He is a भुद्वलविद् as Śaṅkara says. The Kenopaniṣad in a memorable passage repeats five times the refrain तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिद्वसुपासते (I. 3-8), which shows clearly how the जीव hankering after उपासना is rightly called कृपण.

(2) Jīva is कृपण, who is अकृपण then ? — this natural query is answered in this Kārikā. Brahman is called अकार्पण्यं (not अकृपण, because that expression implies the possibility of Brahman being possessed of some धर्म). तद्विद्धि कार्पण्यास्पदम् 'यत्रान्योऽन्यत्पद्यत्यन्यच्छुष्णो-अन्यद्विज्ञानाति तदल्पं मर्त्यमसत्' ... तद्विषयीतं सत्त्वाद्याभ्यन्तरमजमकार्पण्यं भूमास्त्वं ब्रह्म (Śaṅkara). समर्तां गतम् (same as साम्य in IV. 80, 93, 100 etc.), being ever the same, unchangeable. Only a thing with parts can be विषम. जायमानं which is popularly regarded as being produced. समन्ततः all around; सर्वतो देशतः कालतो वस्तुतश्च (Ānandagiri).

(3) Gauḍapāda shows by using the famous घटाकाश illustration what is the real meaning of जाति or origination. The relation between ब्रह्मन् (or आत्मन्) in respect of जीवs and their bodies is like that of आकाश with घटाकाश etc. and घट etc. Thus—

[1] Both आत्मन् (or Brahman) and आकाश are really अंज, सूक्ष्म, निरवयव etc.

[2] आकाश seems to give rise to घटाकाश, पटाकाश etc.

Similarly आत्मन् जीवs

[3] घट, पट, etc. seem to give rise to घटाकाश, पटाकाश etc. (or आकाश seems to produce घट, पट etc.); similarly आत्मन् seems to produce जीवशारीरs or संघातs. But in no case is there any trace of real production. The so-called जाति is due to the उपाधिः. Śaṅkara understands उदितः to mean (1) डकः or (2) उत्पन्नः (आत्मा परो हि यस्मादाकाशवत्सूक्ष्मो निरवयवः सर्वगत आकाशबदुको जीवैः क्षेत्रज्ञैर्घटाकाशैरिव घटाकाशतुर्लय उदित उक्तः । स एवाकाशसमः पर आत्मा । अथ वा घटाकाशैर्यथाकाश उदित उत्पन्नस्तथा परो जीवात्मभिरुपद्वो जीवात्मनां परस्मादात्मन उत्पत्तिर्यशूयते वेदान्तेषु सा महाकाशाद् घटाकाशोत्पत्तिसमा न परमार्थत इत्यभिप्रायः । तस्मादेवाकाशाद् घटाकाशः संघाता यथोत्पद्यन्त एवमाकाशस्थानीयात्परमात्मनः पृथिव्यादिभूतसंघाता आध्यात्मिकाश्रव्य कार्यकारणलक्षणा रज्जुसर्पवद्विकलिपता जायन्ते ।)

(4) उत्पत्ति and प्रलय affect the उपाधिः only. The so-called उत्पत्ति of आकाश is really the उत्पत्ति of घट, पट, etc.; when घट, पट, etc. disappear, घटाकाश, पटाकाश etc. disappear. जीवोऽपत्ति similarly is due to the

उत्पत्ति of देहसंघात; when the देहसंघात disappears, जीव also disappears, being merged in the Ātman.

(5) The objector says:— If there is only one Ātman, how is it that Devadatta and Yajñadatta do not suffer alike? If Devadatta dies, Yajñadatta also ought to die at the same time! There must be therefore many Jivas, all different from one another. The Siddhāntin's answer is:— When there is one घटाकाश full of smoke, we do not find all घटs or घटाकाशs covered with smoke (because the smoke is concerned with one particular उपाखि), similarly the सुख, हृङ्ख etc. of one जीव do not affect other जीवs. यथा त्वाकाशस्याधिकारोपितरजोधूममलत्वादिवेषवच्चं तथात्मनोऽविद्याध्यारोपितब्रह्मध्याच्युपाधिकृतसुख-दुःखादिवेषवच्चै बन्धमोक्षादयो व्यावहारिका न विरुद्ध्यन्ते । ... तस्मादात्मभेदपरिकल्पना वृथैव तार्किकैः क्रियत इति । (Saṅkara).

(6) Even though आकाश is one, we talk of घटाकाश, पटाकाश, करकाकाश etc. The रूप (form), कार्य (purpose served), समाख्या (name) of the आकाश as covered by घट, पट, करक etc. are different no doubt, but these do not affect the आकाश at all. The आकाशभेद is due to the उपाखिभेद. Similarly the सुख, हृङ्ख etc. of the जीवs become different on account of the देहोपाखिः.


(7) The भेदs, घटाकाश, पटाकाश etc. cannot be real. A real भेद is either a विकार (or परिणाम, the रुचक ornament is a विकार of gold; घट is a विकार of मृत्तिका; फेन, ब्रह्मदुर्द etc. are विकार of water) or. an अवयव (कपाल is an अवयव of घट, a शाखा is an अवयव of a tree). But घटाकाश, पटाकाश have no independent existence as apart from आकाश, and do not affect in any way the आकाश. वाचारम्भण विकारः, says the Chāndogya (VI. 3-5). विकार is explained as सतत्त्वतोऽन्यथा प्रथा विकार इत्युदीरितः । (Vedāntasāra).

(8) बाल—Child, an ignorant person. Saṅkara in his Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra I. 1-1 says अप्रत्यक्षेऽपि ह्याकाशे बालास्तलमलिनताद्यध्यस्यन्ति, which appears to be an echo of the first half of this Kārikā. अबुद्धानां is equal to बालानाम्. बुद्धानां at any rate here, cannot refer to the Buddhas as they do not believe in आत्मन्. The मलिनत्व etc. is really superimposed on the गग्न by the ignorant who do not realise its real nature; similarly all विकारs associated with Ātman by the ignorant are merely अध्यसित and have no real existence. देहोपाखिजीवभेदकृतो जन्ममरणादिव्यवहारः ... न ह्यपरदेशस्त्रूद्वयाण्यध्यारोपितोदक्फेनतरङ्गादिमांसंथा नात्माद्वधारोपितक्षेत्रशादिमलैर्मलिनो भवतीत्यर्थः (Saṅkara),

(9) The various विकारः usually spoken of in connection with Ātman owing to his association with bodies, such as birth, death, going and coming, remaining steady etc., do not in the least affect Ātman who is अविलक्षण (undergoing no change, remaining the same always) like आकाश. For स्थितौ, Prof. Vidhuśekhara would like to read स्थितः. स्थितौ however fulfils the आकाशं raised by गत्यागमन, as स्थिति is usually found mentioned along with गति and आगति.

(10) संघाताः—देहादिः, these are just like objects in a dream. People talk about the difference in the case of bodies of birds, men, gods etc.; some philosophers might argue that the bodies being made of the same constituent elements, can be regarded in essence as being सम्. Both these views cannot be justified; it is futile to discuss details about a non-existent or illusory object. And the illusion can be satisfactorily explained only on the ground that it is माया-विसर्जित. उपपत्तिः, reasonable explanation. Śaṅkara takes the expression to mean संभवः (and also adds) सञ्चाब्रपतिपादको हेतुः.

(11) In Kārikā II. 9, Gauḍapāda declared that आत्मन् was आकाशेनाविलक्षण. In this Kārikā and the next he refers to passages from the Taittiriyaka (by name) and the Brhadāraṇyaka which corroborate his statement. In the Taittiriyopaniṣad (Adhyāya II, ब्रह्मानन्दवल्ली) the five sheaths are described, and Brahman सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं is spoken of as the ultimate प्रतिष्ठा.



All these five कोशः are stated to be पुरुषविद्य; and ब्रह्मन्, the ultimate प्रतिष्ठा, is by implication अपुरुषविद्य and so like आकाश। Śaṅkara comments at length on the Taittiriya passage referred to in the आनन्दमयाधिकरण (Brahmasūtra I. 1-6) and shows in the second interpretation that आनन्दमय cannot be Brahman, but is just a mere कोशः, which seems to be Gaudapāda's view. For here, ब्रह्मन् or आत्मन् is said to be परः जीवः (सर्वेषां जीवननिमित्तत्वजीवः) of all the कोशः (तेषां); not merely of the first four. रसादयः— (रस stands for अन्न) अन्नमय; प्राणमय, मनोमय, विज्ञानमय and आनन्दमय. According to Gauḍapāda, these कोशः are आत्ममायाविसर्जित्. Prof. Vidhuśekhara wants to read सं यथा (for सं यथा) संप्रकाशितः which he explains as 'as it is made clear there.' The expression स यथा as used in passages like स यथा इन्द्रभेर्व न्य-मानस्य ..., स यथा शङ्खस्य ..., स यथा वीणायै ... (Brhadāraṇyaka IV. 5) in a similar case, is always followed by a specific दृष्टान्त. Here there is no such दृष्टान्त; besides सं यथा corresponds to यथाकाशः in the next Kārikā. Prof. Vidhuśekhara's preference for स यथा is hardly reasonable.

(12) This Kārikā refers to Brhadāraṇyaka II. 5 which contains the famous मधुविद्या (or मधुज्ञान).

(1)	पृथिवी	सर्वेषां	भूतानां	मधुः	अस्यै	पृथिव्यै	सर्वाणि	भूतानि	मधु
(2)	आपः	“	“	“	“	आसामपां	“	“	“
(3)	अग्निः	“	“	“	“	अस्य अग्नेः	“	“	“
(4)	वायुः	“	“	“	“	अस्य वायोः	“	“	“
(5)	आदित्यः	“	“	“	“	अस्य आदित्यस्य	“	“	“
(6)	दिशः	“	“	“	“	आसां दिशां	“	“	“
(7)	चन्द्रः	“	“	“	“	अस्य चन्द्रस्य	“	“	“
(8)	विशुद्ध	“	“	“	“	अस्यै विशुद्धतः	“	“	“
(9)	स्तनयित्तुः	“	“	“	“	अस्य स्तनयित्तुः	“	“	“
(10)	आकाशः	“	“	“	“	अस्य आकाशस्य	“	“	“
(11)	धर्मः	“	“	“	“	अस्य धर्मस्य	“	“	“
(12)	सत्यं	“	“	“	“	अस्य सत्यस्य	“	“	“
(13)	मातुर्ष	“	“	“	“	अस्य मातुर्षस्य	“	“	“
(14)	आत्मा	“	“	“	“	अस्य आत्मनः	“	“	“

In the case of each of the above fourteen pairs, occurs the following passage *mutatis mutandis*. यज्ञायम् (अस्यां पृथिव्यां) तेजोमयोऽसृत-

मयः पुरुषो यश्वायमध्यात्मं (शारीरः) तेजोमयोऽसृतमयः पुरुषोऽयमेव स योऽय-
मात्मेदमसृतमिदं ब्रह्मेदं सर्वम् । The pairs referred to by द्वयोः are the अधिदैव
(पृथिवी, आपः etc.) and the अध्यात्म (शारीर, रेतम्, वाङ् etc.) and not पृथिवी
and सर्वाणि भूतानि as Prof. Vidhuśekhara seems to understand. Just
as the ultimate purpose of the Taittiriyaka passage describing the
कोशः was shown to be the identity of जीव and परब्रह्मन्, so here also
ब्रह्मात्मैक्य is declared in the refrain. Brahman is everywhere both
outside and inside, just as there is the same आकाश, outside on
the earth etc., and inside in the belly etc. The section describing
every thing as मधु is called मधुब्राह्मण (ब्रह्मविद्याख्यं मधुमसृतमसृतत्वं मोदन-
हेतुत्वाद्विज्ञायते पस्मिन्निति मधुज्ञानं मधुब्राह्मणं तस्मिन्नित्यर्थः (Śāṅkara). प्रकाशितः—
अनुमानेन लोके (Śāṅkara).

(13) The identity of ब्रह्मन् and आत्मन् is praised and emphasised by the Śruti and any idea of difference between the two is deprecated strongly. Thus both positively and negatively ब्रह्मात्मैक्य is rightly brought home to the साधक. The identity passages are (as quoted by Śāṅkara in his Bhāṣya on Brahmasūtra II. 1-14) ऐतदात्म्य-
मिदं सर्वं तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमस्ति (Chāndogya VI. 8-7), आत्मैवेदं सर्वम् (VII. 25-2), इदं सर्वं यदयमात्मा (Brha II. 4-6), नेह नानास्ति किंचन (IV. 4-19); ब्रह्मैवेदं सर्वम् (Muṇḍaka II. 2-11) and the censure passages (as quoted in the Bhāṣya on Gaudapādakārikā) are न तु तद्वितीयमस्ति, द्वितीयादृ भयं भवति, ... उद्दरमन्तरं कुरुते । अथ तस्य भयं भवति, सृत्योः स चन्त्युमाप्नोति य इह नानेव पद्यति । (Śāṅkara). प्रशस्यते-स्तुप्यते शाकेण व्यासाद्विभिन्न (Śāṅkara). Ānandagiri quotes in this connection, वासुदेवः सर्वमिति; स महात्मा सुदुर्लभः । (Gītā) अहं हरिः सर्वमिदं जनार्दनो नान्यततः कारणकार्यजातम्, अविद्यामोहितात्मानः पुरुषा भिन्नदर्शिनः ।, किं तेन न कृतं पापं चौरेणात्मापद्याहरिणा ॥

(14) The objector says:— You tell us that there is Brahman only, one without a second, and the जीवस् and संचातस् are just created by Māyā. But this goes against some Śruti passages which say that before creation, जीव was there along with Ātman (we can understand the presence of जीव after creation, as being due to Māyā). How are such passages to be explained ?

The Śiddhāntin's reply is as follows:— The passage relied upon is सेयं देवतैक्षत इन्ताइमिमास्तिन्नो देवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनाऽपविद्य नामस्ये व्याकरणीति । ... अनेनैव जीवेनात्मनाऽल्पपविद्य नामस्ये व्याकरोतु । (Chāndogya VI. 3-2-3), which shows that the जीव आत्मन् was already in existence

along with the देवता (Brahman) before creation (Śaṅkara in his Bhāṣya on Brahmaśūtra II. 1-36 remarks श्रुतौ तावत् अनेन जीवेनात्मना इति सर्गप्रसुखे शारीरमात्मानं जीवशब्देन प्राणधारणनिमित्तेनाभिलपन्ननादिः संसार इति दर्शयति । आदिमत्त्वे तु प्रागनवधारितप्राणः सत् कथं प्राणधारणनिमित्तेन जीव-शब्देन सर्गप्रसुखे अभिलप्यते । न च धारयिष्यतीत्यतोऽभिलप्यते । अनागताद्वि संबन्धादतीतः संबन्धो बलवान्भवति । अभिनिष्पत्त्वाद् ।). The passage must not be interpreted literally, for we have seen that its literal interpretation is impossible in the face of आत्मैकत्व. So here the पृथक्त्व of जीव and आत्मत्व should be understood figuratively as referring to a future state of things obtaining when the creation by Māyā comes into existence. It is an illustration of the use of the Bhāvika figure of speech (प्रत्यक्षा इव यज्ञावा क्रियन्ते भूतभाविनः । तज्जाविकम् Kāvyaprakāśa). The popular expressions ओदनं पचति (one really cooks the rice-grain, not the cooked rice which is really the meaning of ओदन), सहस्री भार्यासुपेयात् (the lady is entitled to be called a भार्या only after marriage) refer to the भविष्यद्वृत्ति or future state, the primary sense of ओदन and भार्या not being appropriate.

There is no doubt that the above is the correct interpretation of the Kārikā, the passage referred to in the first half, being the Chāndogya अनेन जीवेनात्मना etc. But the Śaṅkarabhāṣya on the Kārikā (entirely in opposition to what the Śaṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmaśūtra II. 1-36 says) takes प्राणत्वेः पूर्वम् to mean कर्मकाण्डे, refers to मन्त्रवर्ण, स दाधार पृथिवी धाम्, RV. X. 121-1, sees here विरोध between कर्मकाण्ड and ज्ञानकाण्ड, and remarks यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते ... इत्याङ्गुत्पत्यस्थर्थोपनिषद्वाक्येभ्यः प्राङ्गुपृथक्त्वं कर्मकाण्डे प्रकीर्तिं तत्र परमार्थम् । किं तर्हि गौणम् । महाकाशघटाकाशादिभेदवत् । यथौदनं पचतीति भविष्यद्वृत्त्या तद्वत् । ... उपनिषत्वेकत्वं श्रुत्या प्रतिपिदादियितिं भविष्यतीति भाविनीसेकदृतिमाश्रित्य लोके भद्रद्वच्छुद्धादो गौण एवेत्यभिग्रायः । This means that the Kārikābhāṣya takes भविष्यद्वृत्ति to refer to the आत्मैकत्व to be ultimately established. An alternative interpretation is offered by the same, अथ वा तदैक्षत, तत्त्वेजोऽसृजत इत्याङ्गुत्पत्तेः प्राङ् एकमेवाद्वितीयम् इत्येकत्वं प्रकीर्तितम् । तदेव च तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि इत्येकत्वं भविष्यतीति तां भविष्यद्वृत्तित्वमपेक्ष्य यज्जीवात्मनोः पृथक्त्वं यत्र कविद्वाक्ये गम्यमानं तद्वौणम् । This makes matters still worse; the subject of प्रकीर्तितम् is not पृथक्त्व but एकत्व understood ! and the पृथक्त्व is to be referred to some unspecified passage. It is clear that the Kārikābhāṣya has completely gone wrong in not taking into account the Chāndogya passage which is most pertinent here. In view of the fact that Śaṅkara rightly refers to it in his Vedānta-

sūtrabhāṣya (II. 1-36), it is possible to argue that the Bhāṣya on the Kārikās attributed to Śaṅkara, could not have been a work of Ādiśaṅkara.

It would be seen that Gauḍapāda boldly distinguishes between मूर्खशृतिः and गौणशृतिः, and Śaṅkara does not lag behind him in this respect.

The expression प्रायुत्पत्तेः occurs in Kārikā 1 in this Prakarana, where the Kārikābhāṣya understands it in its natural sense. The meaning कर्मकाण्डे given here is not therefore acceptable.

(15) The objector says:— The पृथक्सत्र of जीव and आत्मन् before creation may be admitted as गौण, but after creation it is मूर्ख, and Śruti passages also are found, describing the creation in various ways. How are we to account for this state of things, in face of your insistence upon आत्मैकत्व as the highest reality ?

The Siddhāntin's answer to the above is given in this Kārikā. The different views about creation in the Śruti are not to be taken literally. They are intended to enable especially the मन्दमति साधकs to grasp the profound truth viz. आत्मैकत्व, in accordance with the अरुच्छतीदर्शनन्याय.

The मूर्ख and लोह दृष्टान्तs are found in Chāndogya VI. 3.4-5, यथा सोऽस्यैकेन मृत्पिण्डेन सर्वे सुन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं सृतिकेत्येव सत्यम् । यथा सोऽस्यैकेन लोहमणिना सर्वे लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्याद् ... लोहमित्येव सत्यम् । (The world is the विकार of आत्मन्; in other words, the शृति can be taken to have preached that the world proceeds from आत्मन्).

The विस्फुलिङ्ग दृष्टान्त is found in Brhadāraṇyaka II. 1. 20, यथा अग्नेः क्षुद्रा विस्फुलिङ्ग व्युच्चरन्त्येवमेवास्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणाः सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे देवाः सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति । also in Kausītaki III. 3, यथा अग्नेज्वलतो विस्फुलिङ्गा विप्रतिष्ठेवत्त्वैवैतस्मादात्मनः प्राणा यथायतनं विप्रतिष्ठन्ते प्राणेभ्यो देवैभ्यो लोकाः ।

The आदि refers to passages like स यथाद्वैधाद्येरभ्याहितस्य पृथग्भूमा विनिश्चरन्त्येवं वा अदेष्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद् ... सर्वाणि च भूतान्यस्यैवैतानि सर्वाणि निःश्वसितानि (Brha. IV. 5. 11) and to ऊर्जनाभि in II. 1. 20 etc.

अवतार—lit. coming down; reaching the level of the dull-witted. जीवपरमात्मैकत्वबुद्ध्यवताराय (K. bhāṣya). Read also the following from K. bhāṣya, कल्पसर्गमेवासंवादशृतीनामृत्पत्तिशृतीनां च प्रतिसर्गमन्यथात्वमिति चेत्त । निष्प्रयोजनत्वादथोक्तबुद्ध्यवतारप्रयोजनव्यतिरेकेण । न हन्यप्रयोजनवत्त्व-

संवादोपतिश्चूतीनां शक्यं कल्पयितुम् । तथात्वप्रतिपत्तये ध्यानार्थमिति चेद्वा । कलहात्पीत-
प्रलयानां प्रतिपत्तेरनिष्टव्वात् । तस्माद्बुद्ध्यादिसत्य आत्मैकत्वबुद्ध्यवतारयैव नान्यार्थाः
कल्पयितुं युक्ताः ।

(16) आश्रमाः— आश्रमिणोऽधिकृताः, वर्णिनश्च मार्गगाः । (K.bhāṣya), used here in the sense of ‘ types of men ’; the usual sense of the four आश्रम (ब्रह्मचर्य etc.) would not do, as the आश्रम are said to be विविध here. Ānandagiri remarks, आश्रमिणो वर्णिनश्च कार्यब्रह्मोपासका हीनहृष्टयः । कारणब्रह्मोपासका मध्यमहृष्टयः । अद्वितीयब्रह्मदर्शनशीलास्त्रूतमहृष्टयः । We think that the reference here is to ऊर्ध्वं गच्छन्ति सत्त्वस्था मध्ये तिष्ठन्ति राजसाः । जघन्ययुणदृत्तस्था अधो गच्छन्ति तामसाः ॥ (Gitā XIV.18), विविधा भवति अद्वा देहिनां सा स्वभावजा । सात्त्विकी राजसी चैव तामसी चेति तां पृष्ठु ॥ (Gitā XVII. 2) so that सत्त्वस्थ, राजस and तामस types of people are alluded to. Śaṅkara in his Sūtrabhāṣya (कांश्चिदत्यन्तसुखभाजः करोति देवादीन् कांश्चिदत्यन्तद्वुःखभाजः पश्चादीन् कांश्चिन्मध्यमभोगभाजो मनुष्यादीन् II.1-34) refers to देव, मनुष्य and पशु to represent three-fold creation in another context. Śaṅkara also refers to Buddha adjusting his preaching to suit the intellect of his pupils (केषांचिक्लिं विनेयानां बाह्ये वस्तुत्यभिनिवेश-मालय तद्दुरोधेन बाह्यार्थवादप्रक्रियेण विरचिता । नासौ सुगताभिग्रायः । तस्य हु विज्ञानैकस्त्वचाद् एवाभिप्रेतः । Sūtrabhāṣya II. 2-28), and enunciating three different doctrines (बाह्यार्थविज्ञानशून्यवाददत्यमितरेतरविरुद्धसुपदिशता सुगतेन स्पष्टीकृतमात्मनोऽसंबद्धप्रलापितं, प्रदेषो चा प्रजास्तु विरुद्धार्थप्रतिपत्त्या विष्णुयु-रिमाः प्रजा इति । II.2-32). This Kārikā explains the expression अवताराय used in the last one.

(17) द्वैतिनः— Followers of सांख्य, वैशेषिक, मीमांसा etc. अद्वैत, being one, does not admit of any differences; while द्वैत is capable of infinite varieties. Thus the Dvaitins, each sticking to his own fancied view, are always quarreling amongst themselves; the Advaitin, like a star, standing apart, looks on amusedly, without malice. He has no quarrel with Dvaitins who are concerned with phantoms ! यथा स्वकीयकरचरणादिभिराघाते कदाचिदाचरितेऽपि द्वेषो न जायते । परबुद्ध्यमावात्तथा द्वैताभिमानिभिरुपद्रवे क्षुद्रे क्षुद्रेऽपि नाद्वैतदर्शिनस्तेषु द्वेषो जायते । सर्वानन्यत्वापरबुद्ध्यमावादित्यर्थः । says Ānandagiri. Advaita is all pervading and so includes द्वैत (may be, due to माया) as well. How can one quarrel with something belonging to or included in oneself ?

(18) The only परमार्थ or reality is अद्वैत; Dvaita can at best, be a variety or effect of it (what is the exact cause of this भेद is made clear in the next Kārikā), hence there cannot be any विरोध

between अद्वैत and द्वैत. The Advaitins admit द्वैत, but as merely having existence in appearance only; while the द्वैतिन् being आनन्द, regard द्वैत as real both परमार्थतः and अपरमार्थतः. The ब्रह्मवित् is the आत्मन् of the द्वैतिन्, so he pities them for being आनन्द (यथा मन्तगजास्तु उन्मत्तं भूमिष्ठं प्रति गजास्तुऽहं वाहय मां प्रतीति ब्रुवाणमपि तं प्रति न वाहयत्यविरोध-कुदृश्या तद्वत् (K. bhāṣya). A person gone mad standing on the ground says to another mounted on a big elephant 'I am mounted on an elephant, lead on to me.' Knowing that the person talking like that is आनन्द, the other man takes pity upon him and leaves him alone. Similarly the Advaitin refuses to quarrel with a Dvaitin).

(19) An अज object can have भेद associated with it only through माया. If the भेद is real, the अज object will lose its nature and become सत्यं ! भेद and अजत्व are incompatible with each other.

यत्परमार्थसद्वैतं मायया भिद्यते ह्येतत् ... न परमार्थतः निरवयवत्वादात्मनः । सात्रयत्वं द्वावयवान्यथात्मेन भिद्यते । यथा सृष्टघटादिभेदैः । तत्त्वतो भिद्यमाने द्व्यभृतमन्त-मद्ययं स्वभावतः सन्मर्यतां ब्रजेत् । यथाग्निः शीतताम् । तत्त्वानिष्टं स्वभावैपरीत्यगमनम् । (K. bhāṣya).

(20) Some ब्राह्मिन् are very illogical in their statements. They regard their Highest as immortal and at the same time say that he is born as well ! Now every one must admit that a thing that is born, must be mortal (जातस्य हि ध्रुवो चृत्युः Gītā II. 27); only an unproduced (or unborn) object can be immortal. How possibly can an object having an immortal nature become mortal ? These ब्राह्मिन्, according to K. bhāṣya are केचिद्दुपनिषद्वृत्याख्यातारो ब्रह्मवादिनो वावद्वृक्षाः, perhaps the Kṛṣṇa-worshippers, Rāma-worshippers etc. are referred to ; for these while regarding Rāma, Kṛṣṇa etc. as the Highest, immortal etc., celebrate his birth-day with great pomp etc., believing in his real birth. It is doubtful if the K. bhāṣya was written by Śāṅkara who hardly ever refers to commentators on उपनिषद्सः.

(21) If a thing is immortal by nature, it must *always* remain so; if it is mortal, it must *always* be mortal. No one can ever change his nature. A leopard can never change his spots. Cf. अस्थैर्य व्यवसायस्ते प्रकृतिस्त्वां नियोक्षयति । (Gītā XVIII. 59).

(22) These द्वैतिन् do not see the absurdity in their reasoning. They say

- [१] that their Highest is naturally असृत,
- [२] that he is born and so becomes मर्त्य;
- [३] though become a मर्त्य in this way, he still can be made असृत and निश्चल.

It is wrong to say that a naturally असृत thing can become मर्त्य (for no one can change one's nature); assuming that it does become मर्त्य, why should it again change its nature ? If it again becomes असृत, what guarantee is there that it would not change its nature again ? Who would care for a मोक्ष that is always changing and not permanent ? Read the following acute observations of Śaṅkara, यस्य तृतीयो मोक्षस्तस्य मानसं वाचिकं कायिकं वा कार्यमपेक्षत इति युक्तम् । तथा विकार्यत्वे च तयोः पक्षयोर्मोक्षस्य धूद्रमनित्यत्वम् । न हि दध्यादि विकार्यम् उत्पाद्य वा घटादि नित्यं दृष्टं लोके । न चाप्यत्वेनापि कार्यापेक्षा स्वात्मस्वरूपत्वे सत्यनाप्यत्वात् । स्वरूपत्वतिरिक्तव्येऽपि ब्रह्मणो नाप्यत्वं सर्वगतत्वेन नित्याप्तस्वरूपत्वात्सर्वेण ब्रह्मणः आकाशस्येव । नापि संस्कार्यो मोक्षः येन व्यापारमपेक्षेत । संस्कारो हि नाम संस्कार्यस्य खुणाधानेन वा स्थाहोवापनयनेन वा । न तावद्गुणाधानेन संभवति, अनाधेयातिशयब्रह्म-स्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य । नापि दोषापनयनेन नित्यशुद्धब्रह्मस्वरूपत्वान्मोक्षस्य । स्वात्मधर्म एव संस्तिरोभूतो मोक्षः क्रिययात्मनि संस्कियमाणोऽभिव्यज्यते यथादर्शे निघर्णणक्रियया संस्कियमाणे भास्वरत्वं धर्म इति चेत्वा । क्रियाशंघत्वात्पत्तेरात्मनः । यदाश्रया तम-विकृबंती नैवात्मानं लभते । यद्यात्मा क्रियया विक्रियेतानित्यत्वमात्मनः प्रसञ्जेत ।

Sūtrabhbāṣya I. १-४).

(२३) There are Śruti passages which speak of a real (भूततः, भूत=सत्य, आर्ये कथयामि ते भूतार्थम् । Śāk. I) creation; there are others which speak of the creation being unreal. The भूतिचल is claimed for both views. But we must not take Śruti passages at their face value; we must find out what the real purport of the Śruti is, and by logical reasoning weed out certain passages as being गौण. भूततः means परमार्थतः. Passages like एतस्माद्वा आत्मनः आकाशः संभूतः etc , speak of a real creation; passages mentioned in the next Kārikā speak of मायासृष्टि. To bring about a समन्वय of these two types of passages, we have no alternative but to regard the परमार्थसृष्टि passages as गौण; if they are regarded as सूख्य, the मायासृष्टि passages would have no scope. Prof. Vidhuśekhara takes भूततः to mean 'from the existent' (referring to सदेव सोऽप्येदमग्न आसीत्--Chāndogya VI. 2-1) and अभूततः 'from the non-existent' (असद्वा इदमग्न आसीत् ततो वै सदजायत Taittiriya II. 7-1), and remarks 'according to Śaṅkara भूततः is परमार्थतः and अभूततः मायया. But in IV. 3 he explains the same words saying

भूतस्य विद्यमानस्य, अभूतस्य अविद्यमानस्य.' It seems that Prof. Vidhuśekhara has not understood the real purport of the present Kārikā. Gauḍapāda is concerned here with pointing out the real nature of the *process of creation*, and not the *creation of any thing*. In IV. 3, the expression used is भूतस्य जातिम्, which is entirely different from भूततः सूज्यमाने here. The Kārikābhāṣya is perfectly justified in interpreting भूतस्य as विद्यमानस्य in the particular context in IV. 3.

(24) Gauḍapāda says that the passage नेह नानास्ति किञ्चन (Bṛha. IV. 4-99, also Kaṭha IV. 11) indirectly and इन्द्रो मायाभिः पुरुरूप ईयते (R̥gveda VI. 47-18, and Bṛha. II. 5-19) directly point out to the creation being due to माया. मायाभिः is explained as इन्द्रियप्रज्ञाभिरविद्यारूपाभिः in K. bhāṣya. Even if माया is taken to mean 'wonderful power,' the meaning of the passage is not affected, 'Indra by his wonderful powers assumes different forms which are illusory or unreal.' K. bhāṣya apparently takes the second line also as a श्रुति passage, probably referring to प्रजापतिश्वरति गर्भेऽन्तरजायमानो बहुधा विजायते । तस्य योनिं परिपश्यन्ति धीरास्तस्मिन् ह तस्थुर्षुवनानि विश्वा ॥ (Taittirīyāraṇyaka, III. 13-1). As there are only two इतिः in the Kārikā, only two passages are intended; in that case, the second line may be explained as the conclusion drawn from the first line, 'the Puruṣa or Ātman is born in various ways due to Māyā, although really not being born.'

(25) Gauḍapāda further fortifies his contention by referring to the passage, अन्यं तमः प्राचिशन्ति येऽसंभूतिस्तुपासते । ततो भूय इव ते तमो य उ संभूत्यां रताः ॥ (Īsopaniṣad 12). Those who believe in the संभवाद, the doctrine of a real creation, enter into deep pitchy darkness. This shows that the Īsopaniṣad condemns the creation as futile or unreal. Ānandagiri says सम्यक्षुतिरैश्वर्ये यस्याः सा संभूतिर्देवता हिरण्यगर्भारूप्या । तस्य श्व कार्यमध्ये अष्टावा निनिदत्तब्बाद प्रधानमल्लिनिर्बहुण्ण्यायेन संभवशब्दितं कार्यमेव निषिद्धते । तथा च सिद्धं तस्यावस्तुत्वमित्यर्थः । K. bhāṣya also says संभूतेरपास्यत्वापवादात्संभवः प्रतिषिद्धते । ... संभूतेरपवादात्संभूतेरापेक्षिकमेव सद्गमिति । परमार्थ-सद्गमैकत्वमपेक्ष्यासूतारूपः संभवः प्रतिषिद्धते । All this seems to be quite far-fetched. Gauḍapāda apparently understands संभूति and संभव to be just synonyms in the sense of 'creation', 'origination'. को न्वेन जनयेत् refers to the Bṛha. passage जात एव न जायते को न्वेन जनयेत्वनः (III. 28). In the first line, संभव was condemned, but that leaves room for believing in the संभवकारण lying in a dormant condition, and suspending

its activities of संभव for the time being. The second line says that no संभवकारण also exists. There is only आत्मन् and nothing else, no संभव, no संभवकारण either.

(26) The passages from the Brhadāraṇyaka अथात आदेशो नेति नेति । (II. 3-6), स एष नेति नेत्यात्मागृहो न हि गृहते । (III. 9-26, IV. 2-4, 22 etc.) make it clear that whatever other Upaniṣadic passages state about creation, is to be regarded as secondary and over-powered by the main statement about आत्मैकत्व, which is necessarily not in any way concerned with ग्राह्यग्राहकसाव. And on account of this very reason the reality can only be अज or unoriginated; only the originated द्वैत can be ग्राह्य and have a ग्राहक.

(27) Having shown that the Śruti passages favour अभूततः शृज्यमानत्व, Gaudapāda now turns to pointing out that युक्ति also favours the same view (in Kārikā 23, it was declared that what is युक्तियुक्त can alone be निश्चित). A thing which is सत्, and has सत्ता for its लक्षण, cannot have any जन्म or origination in reality (for this जन्म would change its nature ; no one can change his nature under any circumstances), it can only be illusory or due to Māyā. To say that a thing which is सत् can have जन्म is as absurd as to say that a thing *already* originated or existent is being originated ! How can a सिद्ध thing be regarded as सत्त्व in reality ? जाति implies that the जन्मक्रिया is completed ; जायते implies that the जन्मक्रिया is in process. How can one be compatible with the other ? सतः may be taken as abl. sing. also. A thing can come into existence from the सत् only through माया. सतो मायाविनः मायया जन्मकार्यम् ... सतो हि विद्यमानात्कारणान्मायानिर्मितस्य हस्त्यादिकार्यस्येव जगज्जन्म युज्यते नासतः कारणात् । ... अथवा सतो विद्यमानस्य वस्तुनो रज्जवादेः सर्पदिवन्मायया जन्म युज्यते न तु तत्त्वतो यथा तथा ग्राह्यस्यापि सत् एवात्मनो रज्जुसर्पवज्जगद्वेण मायया जन्म युज्यते । न तु तत्त्वत एवाजस्यात्मनो जन्म । (K. bhāṣya). Once you admit that a जाति thing can be originated, there would be no finality for this process and अनवरथादीप् would be the result.

(28) The last Kārikā had in mind opponents who were ready to admit that the highest is सत्, this one refers to those who rely on the Śruti passage असदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्, and say that the जगत् comes out of असद्. The असद्वादिन् are really beneath contempt. There can be no question of any जन्म whether real or illusory with reference to a non-existent thing. What is the use of inquiring

whether the वृद्धपात्र was married in accordance with Vedic rites or under the Civil Marriages Act?

(29) It has been proved so far that जन्म can only be due to Māyā. This Kārikā tells us how that happens. Gauḍapāda turns to his favourite view that the जाग्रत् state and स्वप्न state are identical in their working. In dream, the mind creates different objects with the आहाराहकभाव ; the same thing happens in the जाग्रत् state also. The जगत् is मतोदृश्य in the जाग्रत् state as in the स्वप्न state.

(30) The मनस् is really अद्वय, being आत्मस्वप्न, but appears as द्वय. In the dream state, the इन्द्रिय that perceive (आहार) and the objects that are perceived (आहा) are not apart from the विज्ञान or मनस् ; the same state of things obtains in the जाग्रत् state as well.

(31) All द्वैत is just the creation of the mind. When मनस् which is the real culprit in staging this huge illusory show, ceases to play its pranks, being curbed by विवेक and वैराग्य, द्वैत vanishes, as the cause which produces it has disappeared. When a person enjoys deep or dreamless sleep, he experiences the absence of द्वैत; but शुषुप्ति is not the same as आत्मज्ञान (see Kārikās, 34, 35 below).

(32) When the अमनीभाव is caused by the knowledge that Ātman is the only reality, मनस् ceases to have any विकल्प. There being no आहा, मनस् has no work to do. The अमनीभाव referred to here is named केवलीभाव in Yogavāsiṣṭha, यद्वद्वृत्तरस्याद्रूपत्वं दृश्याभावे भवद्वृलाद ! तद्विद्धि केवलीभावं तत एवासतः सतः ॥ तत्त्वामुपगते भावे रागद्वेषादिवासनाः ॥ शाम्यन्यस्पन्दिते वाते स्वन्दनक्षुब्धधायथा ॥ असंभवति सर्वस्मिन्दिग्भूम्याकाशरूपिणि ॥ प्रकाशये यादृशां रूपं प्रकाशस्थामलं भवेत् ॥ त्रिजगत्वमहं चेति दृश्येऽसत्त्वामुपागते । द्रष्टुः स्थात्केवलीभावस्तादशो विमलात्मनः ॥ (III. 4.53-56).

(33) The मनस् which has ceased to be मनस् (and so has caused the absence of all द्वैत) is thus merely ज्ञान, unoriginated and void of all illusory contacts and so is not different from the ज्ञेय which is Brahman. The मनस् (which is Brahman) thus realises itself as Brahman, unoriginated and eternal. K. bhāṣya takes ब्रह्म ज्ञेयं to mean ब्रह्म ज्ञेयं यस्य स्वरूपं तदिदं ब्रह्मज्ञेयम्. This is unnecessarily clumsy. The first line says ज्ञान is ज्ञेयाभिन्न, naturally the आकाङ्क्षा is what is this ज्ञेय ? This आकाङ्क्षा is satisfied by the statement ज्ञेयं is ब्रह्म, अजं नित्यम्. विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्म, सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म etc. show that ज्ञान is Brahman.

(34) Gauḍapāda in this and the following Kārikās points out that the अमनीभाव due to आत्मभाव is entirely different from the daily merging into the सत्, which occurs when a man is in deep sleep. The Chāndogya passage (VI. 8-1) says, यदैतत्पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम सता सोम्य तदा संज्ञो भवति स्वपीतो भवति तस्मादेन स्वपितीत्याचक्षते स्वं शूष्णितो भवति । But this merging is merely temporary ; in fact, the mind is in a state of coma or दृढ़ in deep sleep, with its mischief-making powers intact, but lying dormant. The mind does not know that it had been merged into the सत्. The result is that when the deep sleep is over, the mind goes on its travels again, and is again enveloped by the illusory विकल्प (says the Chāndogya ... एवमेव खलु सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रज्ञाः सति संपद्य न विद्युः सति संपद्यामह इति । ... सत आगच्छ न विद्युः सत आगच्छामह इति त इह व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा दृको वा वराहो वा कटिं वा पतङ्गे वा दंशो वा मशको वा यद्यद्वन्ति तदा भवन्ति । VI. 9-10-2). In both शुष्णिति and आत्मबोध, the mind ceases to act, and merges into Ātman ; but in शुष्णिति the mind is still possessed of the वासनाबीजः, and hence this merging is temporary. In आत्मबोध, on the other hand, the वासनाबीजः are completely destroyed and the mind is आत्मन् himself, having realised its true nature. In short, the अमनीभाव in शुष्णिति is pseudo-अमनीभाव and should be carefully distinguished from that caused by आत्मबोध which makes the mind free from विकल्प, steady and properly regulated. धीमतः, विवेकवतः : (K. bhāṣya), of the wise man (Prof. Vidhuśekhara). The context seems to show that धीमतः is an adjectival expression going with mind, cf. शैः शैनैरुपरमेद्बुद्धया चृतिगृहीतया । Gītā VI. 25. प्रचारः—movements, working. यस्मात्शुष्णेऽन्यः प्रचारोऽविद्यामोहतमोऽस्तस्यान्तर्लिनानेकानर्थप्रदृतिवीजवासनावतो मनस आत्मसत्यानुबोधहृताशविष्टुष्टाविद्यानर्थप्रदृतिवीजस्य निरुद्धस्यान्य एव प्रशान्तसर्वक्षेशरजसः स्वतन्त्रः प्रचारः । अतो न तत्समः । (K. bhāṣya).

(35) In शुष्णिति, the मनस् is benumbed; in आत्मबोध on the other hand, it being thoroughly controlled and kept away from all भ्राद्य, is विज्ञानघन itself. It is, in fact, Brahman, fearless, with the light of ज्ञान beaming in all its splendour all around. अभय—cf. अभय वै जनक प्राप्तोऽसि (Brha. IV. 2-4), विद्वान्व विभेति कदाचन. Brahman is अभय, because all भय arises from द्वैत and द्वैत does not exist in Brahman. ज्ञानमालोकः प्रकाशो यस्य तद्वद्वा ज्ञानालोकं विज्ञानैकरसघनमित्यर्थः । समन्ततः समन्तात्सर्वतो व्योमवैरन्तर्येण व्यापकमित्यर्थः । (K. bhāṣya).

(36) As मनस् thus is Brahman, it can be rightly spoken of in terms associated with it, अजन्म, अनिद्रम्, अस्वप्नम्, etc. There being no

अविद्या or माया influencing such मनस्, it is without birth, sleep, dream etc. It has no name and form, being intangible, यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते says the Śruti. It is सकृद्गम्भात shining all the time, or once for all. Other things shine occasionally, because they depend upon the light of something else. Here, the light is always there inherently, retaining its splendour for ever. नोपचारः कथंचन — Gauḍapāda says that in describing मनस् with the अमनीभाव, as अजस्र, अनिद्रम् etc. he is not using figurative language. The expressions अजस्र etc. fit in with the मनस्, in their literal meaning. Prof. Vidhuśekhara takes उपचार to mean ‘access-concentration’ (one of the two kinds or stages of Samādhi, उपचार समाधि and अप्यन्त, mentioned in Buddhistic philosophy). The mind in this Samādhi moves near the object just like a bee sitting gently inside a lotus in search of honey. It is doubtful whether Gauḍapāda has this meaning in mind, in using the expression उपचार. K. bhāṣya takes उपचारः to mean उपचरणम् (नेह ब्रह्मण्येवंविष उपचरणमुपचारः कर्तव्यः । यथान्येषामात्मस्वस्पद्यतिरेकेण समाधानायुपचारः ।). Ānandagiri also remarks उपचारः समाध्यादिः । निरुक्ताधिके ब्रह्मणि विदुषो न कर्तव्यशेषः ।

(37) The मनस् with the अमनीभाव is समाधि itself, not something to be achieved by समाधि. Prof. Vidhuśekhara points out that अचल is a particular Samādhi in Buddhism, which is hardly intended by Gauḍapāda. समाधिः समाधिनिमित्तप्रज्ञावगम्यत्वात् । समाधीयतेऽस्मिन्स्थितिं वा समाधिः । (K. bhāṣya). The Yogasūtras call this the निर्विकल्प समाधि.

(38) ग्रह and उत्सर्ग are out of question, when there is only one thing which is निरवयत्र and अविक्रिय; as the मनस् ceases to function, there can be no चिन्ता or विकल्प. The ज्ञान is thus resting in itself, unborn and remaining always the same. This is the अकारण्य which Gauḍapāda had promised to explain in Kārikā 2. Cf. आत्मसंस्थं मनः छत्वा न किञ्चिदपि चिन्तयेत् ॥ Gītā VI. 25, यदा पञ्चावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ञानानि मनसा सह । बुद्धिश्व न विचेष्टति तामाहुः परमां गतिम् ॥ तां योगसिति मन्यन्ते स्थिराभिनिद्र्यधारणाम् । ... Kaṭha I. 6-10-11.

(39) The समाधि in Kārikā 37 or the mind with the अमनीभाव is known as अस्पर्शयोग—concentration where there is no contact with another object. Yogins in general are loath to go in for this अस्पर्शयोग, for they think that this is akin to आत्मनाश, and are content with minor successes which are secured by following a less rigorous

course of Yogic exercises. They are, to be sure, quite wrong for they see fear where there is really total absence of fear. सर्वयोगिन् seems to be used not in the sense of ' all Yogins ', but ' Yogins in general ', ' ordinary types of Yogiin. ' It is only the select few that are able to reach the highest level of अस्पर्शयोग. It appears that the Gītā (VI. 6-23) calls this same अस्पर्शयोग as merely योग, तं विदाद्वृत्तःख-संयोगविद्योगं योगसंज्ञितम् । which is necessarily void of मात्रास्पर्शः that are the main obstacle to the realisation of the highest bliss (मात्रास्पर्शास्तु कौन्तेय शीतोष्णं लुभद्वःखद्वाः । आगमापायिनोऽनित्यास्तांस्तितिक्षस्व भारत ॥ II. 14). Gauḍapāda appears to be indebted to the Gītā for the detailed description of the अस्पर्शयोग given in Kārikās, 40-47.

(40) अभय, दुःखशय, प्रबोध and eternal शान्ति, all depend upon the निग्रह of the mind. K. bhāṣya says that those who have realised the real nature of मनस् (viz. that it is कल्पित), secure this अभय etc. naturally, without any further effort (येषां तु न ब्रह्मस्वरूप-व्यतिरेकेण रज्जुसर्पवत् कल्पितमेव मन इन्द्रियादि च न परमार्थतो विद्यते तेषां ब्रह्मस्वरूपाणामभयं मोक्षाख्या चाक्षया शान्तिः स्वभावत एव सिद्धा नान्यायता नोपचारः कथं च नेतृत्वोचाम । ये त्वतोऽन्ये योगिनो मार्गं गाहीनमध्यमट्टयो मनोऽन्यदात्मव्यतिरिक्तमात्म-संबन्धं पद्यन्ति तेषामात्मसत्यात्मुद्भोधरहितानां मनसो निग्रहायत्तमभयं सर्वेषां योगिनाम् ।). This does not appear to be warranted by the text. The साधक however must not be down-hearted, but must continue his efforts, may be for several lives till he achieves his goal.

(41) It requires persistent long-standing effort to secure मनोनिग्रह. It is not at all an easy job (it is like trying to empty the ocean by taking out a drop of water by the end of the small Kuśa grass) for a person who allows his mind to be associated with distracting experiences. This Kārikā is quoted in Pañcadasī. Cf. स निश्चयेन योक्तव्यो योगोऽनिर्विणन्चेतसा (Gītā VI. 23). Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in his comment on the above Gītā passage says अनिर्विणन्चेतसा, एतावतापि कालेन योगो न सिद्धः किमतः परं कष्टमित्यनुतापो निर्वेदस्तद्रहितेन चेतसा, इह जन्मनि जन्मान्तरे वा सेत्पति किं त्वयेवेव धैर्ययुक्तेन मनसेत्पर्थः । तदेतद्वौडपादा उदाजहुः । ' उत्सेक उदधे ... परिसेदतः । ' Madhusūdana then refers to टिड्डुभोपाख्यान in the Hitopadeśa to illustrate his point, अत्र संप्रदायविद आख्यायिकामाचक्षते । कस्यचित्किल पक्षिणोऽण्डानि तीरस्थानि तरङ्गवेगेन समुद्रोऽपञ्चार । स च समुद्रं शोषयिष्यामयेति प्रवृत्तः स्वमृगवधेनैकैकं जलविन्दुसुपरि प्रचिक्षेप । तदा च बहुभिः पक्षिभिर्बन्धुवर्गैर्यमाणोऽपि नैवोपरराम । यदुच्छया च तत्रागतेन नारदेन निवारितोऽप्यस्मिन् जन्मनि जन्मान्तरे वा येन केनाप्युपायेन समुद्रं शोषयाम्येवेति प्रति-

नज्ञे । ततश्च दैवानुकूलयात् कृपालुर्नारदो गरुडं तत्साहाय्याय प्रेषयामास समुद्रस्त्वज्ञाति-
द्वौहेण त्वामवमन्यत इति बचनेन । ततो गरुडपक्षवातेन शुष्पृन्समुद्रो भीतस्तान्यण्डानि
तस्मै पक्षिणे पददाविति । एवमखेदेन मनोनिरोधे परमधर्मे प्रवर्तमानं योगिनमीश्वरोऽनु-
युद्धाति ततश्च पक्षिण इव तस्याभिमतं सिध्यतीति भावः । अपरिखेदतः in the text
corresponds to अनिर्विणचेतसा in the Gītā passage. The Gītā (VI.34)
compares मनोनिग्रह to वायुनिग्रह, both are सुदुष्कर.

(42) Gauḍapāda says that मनोनिग्रह is very difficult no doubt (cf. चत्वारं हि मनः कृष्ण प्रमाणि बलवद्वद्वम् । तस्याहं निग्रहं मन्ये वायोरिव
सुदुष्करम् ॥ श्रीभगवानुवाच । असंशयं महावाहो मनो दुर्निग्रहं चलम् । अभ्यासेन तु
कौन्तेय वैराग्येण च यद्यन्ते ॥ असंयतात्मना योगो दुष्प्राप इति मे मतिः । बद्धयात्मना तु
यतता शक्योऽवाप्तुमुपायतः ॥ Gītā VI. 34-36), but there are उपाय, a
resort to which enables the साधक to achieve his goal. These उपाय are described in Kārikās 42-45. First, the साधक should be on
constant vigil against काम and भोग which are continually distracting
the mind (The Gītā is particularly harsh against काम, अथ केन
प्रयुक्तोऽयं पापं चरति पूरुषः । अनिच्छन्नपि वार्ष्णेय बलादिव नियोजितः ॥ श्रीभगवानुवाच ।
काम एष क्रोध एष रजोयुणसमुद्धवः । महाशनो महापापमा विद्युत्येनमिह वैरिणश ॥ ...
आत्मतं ज्ञानमेतेन ज्ञानिनो नित्यवैरिणा । कामरूपेण कौन्तेय दुष्प्रोणानलेन च ॥
(III. 36, 38-39). Then he should always beware of the pseudo-
pleasurable sensations in सुखस्ति, and control his mind against
harbouring them. काम and भोग can easily be recognised as one's
enemies, but लय might be regarded by the unwary as an innocent
friend. Such is not the case. लय can do as much damage as काम
can (यथा कामोऽनर्थेहेतुस्तथा लयोऽपि । अतः कामविषयस्य मनसो निग्रहवद्यादपि
निरोद्धव्यमित्यर्थः ॥ K. bhāṣya). Both are impediments in the attain-
ment of समाधि (उपायेन बृक्ष्यमाणेन वैराग्याभ्यासेन, विक्षितं प्रमाणविपर्ययविकल्प-
समृतीनामन्यतमया वापि दृच्या परिणतं ... कामभोगयोरिति चिन्त्यमानावस्था भुज्यमाना-
वस्थाभेदेन द्विवचनम् । ... सुप्रसन्नम् आयासवर्जितं ... यथा कामो विषयगोचरप्रमाणादि-
दृच्युत्पादनेन समाधिविरोधी तथा लयोऽपि निद्राख्यदृच्युत्पादनेन समाधिविरोधी ।
Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on Gītā VI. 26, where the next four
Gauḍapāda Kārikas are also commented upon by him).

(43) To keep off काम and भोग, one should never forget that they would but lead to दुःख; by always remembering the teaching of Vedānta that all is अज or Brahman, one would get out of the clutches of द्वैत. सर्वे दुःखम् is the most important basic tenet of Buddhism.
Gauḍapāda however adds that अजं (ब्रह्म) सर्वे also must not be lost sight of at the same time. The remembrance of अजं सर्वे nips in the

bud all द्वैत idea (सर्वे द्वैतमविद्याविज्ञुभितमल्पं हुःखमेवेत्यतुसुध्य “यो वै सूक्ष्मा तत्सुखं नाल्पे सुखमस्ति अथ यदल्पं तत्समर्थं तद् हुःखम् ” इति श्रुत्यर्थं यस्तपेदशाददृष्टं पश्चात् पर्यालोच्य कामान् चित्तस्यमानावस्थाद् विषयान्मोगान् भुज्यमानावस्थांश्च विषयान् निर्वर्तयेत् मनसः स काशादित्यर्थः । कामश्च भोगश्च कामभोगं तस्मान्मनो निर्वर्तयेदिति एव । Madhusūdana), कामभोगान् accusative plural or कामभोगाद् ablative singular. There should be thus first वैराग्यमावता when there is द्वैतस्मरणः; this should be followed by द्वैतविस्मरणे.

(44) There are four impediments in the way of सम्प्राप्ति or समाधि (लय, विक्षेप, कषाय and मुख). लय is the daily oblivion experienced in sleep, there is no विक्षेप in that state; there is silence but that is the silence of the grave, not enlightened silence. So the साधक should hasten to put the mind in the state of awakening from this daily oblivion, and not allow it to be distracted while in the state of awakening. He should also realise that the स्तब्धीभाव of the mind (where there is no विक्षेप or लय) is also not the goal to be reached, for the mind is still under the influence of दोष. Once the mind has become averse to विषय and steadied, care should be taken to see that it is not again attracted by the विषय. Cf. संकल्पप्रभवान् कामांस्थ्यकस्त्वा सर्वांशेषतः । मनसैवेन्द्रियशामं विनियम्य समन्ततः ॥ श्वेतश्वेतरसेद्वृ-
भुद्धया धृतिगृहीतया । ... ॥ यतो यतो निश्चरति मनश्चञ्चलमस्थिरम् ॥ ततस्ततो नियम्य-
तदात्मन्येव वशं नयेत् ॥ (Gītā VI. 24-26). सकषायं सरागं बीजसंयुक्तं (K. bhāṣya), स्तब्धीभूतं सकषायं रागद्वेषादिप्रबलशासनावशेन स्तब्धीभावाख्येन
कषायेण द्वेषेण युक्तम् (Madhusūdana). कषाय is the same as the कलमण्ड in the Gītā (VI. 27-28) or the क्लेश (राग, द्वेष and मोह) of the Yogasūtras. सम्प्राप्तं (साम्यापन्नं K. bhāṣya), समं जडा (Madhusūdana). Prof. Vidhuśekhara reads शम्प्राप्तं for सम्प्राप्तम्. This Kārikā is quoted in the Vedāntasāra. On लये संबोधयेत्, Madhusūdana comments as follows, निद्राशेषाजीर्णबहुशनश्रमाणां लयकारणानां निरोधेन चित्तं सम्यक् प्रबोधयेद्वृत्यानप्रथलेन. He appears to take लय to refer not to the state of deep sleep or शुष्टुपि, but to pseudo-sleep caused by indigestion, over-eating, fatigue etc.

(45) The साधक should beware of the pleasurable sensation in the practice of समाधि as well, for that smacks of स्पर्शसुख which has no place in अस्पर्शयोग. प्रज्ञया निःसङ्कृतः भवेत् is explained by Madhusūdana in two ways:— (i) प्रज्ञया यद्वप्लभ्यते सुखं तदप्यविद्यापरिकल्पितं सृष्टेवेत्यब्दावनया निःसङ्कृतः निःस्पृहः सर्वसुखेषु भवेत् । (ii) अथवा प्रज्ञया सविकल्प-सुखाकारदृतिस्त्रया सह सङ्कृतं परित्यजेत् न तु स्वरूपसुखमपि निर्वृतिकेन विचेन नामुपेत्

स्वभावप्राप्तस्य तस्य वारयितुमशक्यत्वात् एकीकृत्यांतं प्रयत्नतः— आत्मन्येवैकीकृत्यांतं ... चित्स्वरूपसत्तामात्रमेवापादयेदित्यर्थः (K. bhāṣya), निरोधप्रयत्नेन समे ब्रह्मण्यैकतां नयेत् (Madhusūdana).

(46) In the first half of the Kārikā, only लय and विक्षेप are mentioned. Madhusūdana says that लय includes स्तवीभाव, and विक्षेप, सुखास्वाद as well; so that all the four दोष could be taken to have been referred to. अनिङ्गनं—इङ्गनं चलनं तद्रहितं निवातप्रदीपकल्पम् (Madhusūdana), अचलं (K. bhāṣya); cf. यथा दीपो निवातस्थो नेङ्गते सोपमा स्फुता । योगिनो यतचित्तस्य युज्ज्ञते योगमात्मनः ॥ Gitā VI. 19. अनाभासं—न केनचिद्विषयाकारेणाभासत इत्येतत् कथायसुखास्वादयोरुभयान्तर्भावं उक्तं एव । (Madhusūdana), न केनचित्कालिपत्तेन विषयमावेनावभासत इति । (K. bhāṣya). Cf. तदा योगी शानाभासं प्रज्ञया पद्धयते जगत् । Laṅkāvatāra X. 94. The expression निराभास also is used to express the same thing by the Laṅkāvatāra.

(47) निर्बाणं— कैवल्यं ; अक्षयं, न शक्यते कथयितुम् । अत्यन्तासाधारणविषयत्वात् (K. bhāṣya), क्षीरसुखादिमाधुर्यभेदस्येव स्वाक्षुमवमावाविगम्यत्वादवाच्यत्वम् (Ānandagiri). Cf. योऽन्तःसुखोऽन्तरारामस्तथान्तर्जयोतिरेव यः । स योगी ब्रह्मनिर्बाणं ब्रह्मभूतोऽविगच्छति ॥ ... लभन्ते ब्रह्मनिर्बाणसुखयः क्षीणकलमषाः । छिक्षद्वैधा यतात्मानः सर्वभूतहिते रताः ॥ कामक्रोधवियुक्तानां यतीनां यतचेतसाम् । अभितो ब्रह्मनिर्बाणं वर्तते विदितात्मनाम् ॥ (Gitā V. 24-26), also प्रशान्तमनसं ह्वेन योगिनं सुखभूतमम् । उपैति शान्तरजसं ब्रह्मभूतमकल्पम् ॥ युज्ज्ञेवं सदात्मानं योगी विगतकलमणः । सुखेन ब्रह्मसंपर्शामत्यन्तं सुखमश्चुते ॥ (VI. 27-28), विहाय कामान्यः सर्वानुमांश्वरति निःस्पृहः । निर्ममो निरहंकारः स शान्तिमधिगच्छति ॥ एषा ब्राह्मी स्थितिः पार्थं नैनां प्राप्य विसुद्धाति ॥ स्थित्वास्यामन्तकालेऽपि ब्रह्मनिर्बाणशृच्छति ॥ (II. 71-72). The अत्यन्तसुख is not different from the सर्वज्ञ ब्रह्मन् ।

(48) Brahman or the highest bliss is nothing but मनस् with the अमनीभाव. The whole द्वैत is the विकल्प of the mind. It follows therefore that the अज्ञ आत्मन् can have no संभव in reality. The best सत्य is that nothing can ever be born, and that अज्ञातिवाद is the only true doctrine.

CHAPTER IV

This is called अळातशान्ति, presumably after the simile of the अळात (fire-brand) used in the text (47-50). It contains one hundred Kārikās, and may be said to give the quintessence of Gauḍapāda's teachings. It also contains a मङ्गलाचरण containing a salutation to द्विपदां वर (which expression is generally taken to refer to Nārāyaṇa by some, and to Gautama Buddha by others), many a Buddhistic philosophic term and a reasoned exposition of Ajātivāda (see Introduction for a detailed exposition of these topics).

K. bhāṣya thus introduces this Prakarana:- ओङ्कारनिर्णयद्वारेणागमतः प्रतिज्ञातस्याहैतस्य बाह्यविषयमेदबैतश्याच्च सिद्धस्य उनरहैते शास्त्रयुक्तिभ्यां निर्धारितस्यै-तहुतमं सत्यमित्युपसंहारः कृतः । अन्ते तस्यैतस्यागमार्थस्यद्वैतदर्शनस्य प्रतिपक्षभूता द्वैतिनो वैनाशिकाश्च तेषां चान्योन्यविरोधाद्वाग्द्वेषाद्वेषास्यदं दर्शनमिति मित्यादर्शनत्वं स्मृचितम् । द्वेषानास्पदत्वात्सम्यग्दर्शनमित्यद्वैतदर्शनं स्तूयते । तदिदै विस्तरेणान्योन्य-विरुद्धतयाऽप्यग्दर्शनत्वं प्रददीर्घं तत्प्रतिषेधेन द्वैतदर्शनसिद्धिरूपसंहर्तव्याऽवीतत्याये-नैत्यलातशान्तिरारभ्यते । धर्मान्-आत्मनः (K. bhāṣya,) ; objects, elements of existence (Prof. Vidhuśekhara). It does not matter what meaning is assigned to धर्म, for धर्म and धर्मित्व are one and the same, according to Advaita view. Both ज्ञान and धर्म are like आकाश, the common property being ज्ञानरणनिर्दृक्तत्व referred to in Kārikā 10 below), अमलितत्व (implied in III. 8 above), अभिज्ञात्व (referred to in III. 6 above), अनादित्व (referred to in Kārikā 91 below). ज्ञेयां-मित्तेन is usually taken as going with ज्ञानेन; we think that it should be taken as उपलक्षणे तृतीया, used as a kind of adverbial clause, ' who realised the धर्मs as being not different from the ज्ञेय, that is, Brahman '. In III. 33, ज्ञेय is already declared to be ब्रह्मच. Gauḍapāda salutes in this Kārikā the द्विपदां वर (best amongst men or bipeds) who realised by his आकाश-like ज्ञान, the आकाश-like धर्मs as being not different from ब्रह्मच. Whatever the exact reference to द्विपदां वर, it could not be Gautama Buddha who is meant, for Brahman could not be said to have been realised by Buddha. द्विपदां वर—It is true that this expression is usually associated with Buddha in Buddhistic literature, but so are the epithets, विनायक, गणेश, नारायण, etc. The MBh. uses द्विपदां वर to refer to नैषध, धूतराष्ट्र and नारायण. द्विपदां वर can not claim exclusive association with द्विपदा in any case. Anandagiri says that नारायण is meant here (आचार्यो हि पुरा बदरिकाश्चमे नरनारायणाधिष्ठिते नारायणं भगवन्तमभिप्रेत्य तपो महदत्प्यत । ततो भगवान्तिप्रसन्नस्तस्मै विष्णों

प्रादादिति प्रसिद्धं परमथुरुत्वं परमेश्वरस्येति भावः ।) A question has been raised as to why Gauḍapāda has no मङ्गलश्लोक at the beginning of the First Prakarana. Are we to conclude that the Fourth Prakarana alone is the work of Gauḍapāda ? (See Introduction) ... अयमेषेष्वरो योऽनाशयणास्यस्तं बन्देऽभिवादये द्विपदां वरं द्विपदोपलक्षितानां उरुवाणां वरं प्रधानं उरुषोत्तमित्यभिप्रायः । उपदेष्टूनमस्कारमुखेन ज्ञानज्ञेयज्ञातुभेदरहितं परमार्थतत्त्वदर्शन-मिह प्रकरणे प्रतिपिपादयिषितं प्रतिपक्षप्रतिषेधद्वारेण प्रतिज्ञातं भवति (K. bhāṣya).

(2) तं—अस्पर्शयोगस् or येन देशितस्तत्त्वम्. Prof. Vidhuśekhara in a long note on अस्पर्शयोग, says that the expression अस्पर्शयोग ‘refers to the ninth or the last of the nine dhyānas or meditations called अनुपूर्वविहार or the successive states of dhyāna which the Buddha taught and are found frequently in Buddhist texts’. He also tries to show that अस्पर्शयोग is nothing but असुखयोग meaning thereby ‘a yoga which is not one that can be attained with ease’, on the ground that स्पर्शविहार (Pali कामविहार) is सुखस्थिति and अस्पर्शविहार is its opposite ! All this is sheer special pleading (see Introduction). Gauḍapāda need not have gone to any non-Vedic work for the term अस्पर्शयोग which is certainly not directly traceable to Buddhist literature, nor is there any definite statement about Buddha having taught any yoga as such. अविवादः— It has been already stated in III. 18 above that अद्वैत is परमार्थ and द्वैत is an off-shoot (due to माया) thereof. Hence there can be no विरोध between द्वैत and अद्वैत. The द्वैतिन् certainly accepts द्वैत, but only as having an empirical reality. The द्वैतिन् have every reason to quarrel with one another but not with the सर्वसंग्राहक अद्वैत. अविरुद्ध—not containing contradictory statements. Prof. Vidhuśekhara on the strength of the expression अविवाद and अविरुद्ध, comes to the amazing and unwarranted conclusion ‘that the *asparśayoga* was not originally taught in the Brahmanic system of yoga ... in acceptance of the *asparśayoga* by the Vedantists, among whom the author himself is included, there cannot be raised any dispute or opposition, for there is nothing to be opposed even from their own point of view.’ How such a conclusion can be drawn from the expressions अविवाद and अविरुद्ध, only Prof. Vidhuśekhara knows (see Introduction).

(3) In order to establish his अजातिवाद, Gauḍapāda shows first how कार्बलकारणवाद held by the सांख्य, वैशेषिक etc. cannot possibly exist. Those who believe in real origination have naturally to

believe in the relation of cause and effect. In Kārikā III. 23 above, भूततोऽभूततो वा पि सूक्ष्ममाने, the point under discussion was whether the creation was real or unreal (hence भूततः was taken there to mean परमार्थतः), here भूतस्य means ' of the existent ', because here the point is how the origination (which is taken to be self-evident) comes into effect.

(1) भूतस्य जातिमिच्छन्ति— These are the सांख्यs, सत्कार्यवादिन्हs or परिणामवादिन्हs, वैशेषिकs among the Buddhists). Their view is that the कार्य is सत् (in the कारण) prior to origination. Thus घट is not something new produced from the मृत्तिका, घट already exists (सत्) in the मृत्तिका; when we say घट is produced, what happens is मृत्तिका घटस्पेण परिणमते (घट however is not a वाचारम्भणं विकारः, but a real transformation).

अभूतस्यापरे जातिमिच्छन्ति— These are the वैशेषिकs, सौत्रान्तिकs (among the Buddhists); असत्कार्यवादिन्हs. Their view is that घट is a new (असत्) object produced from मृत्तिका, but there is समवाय संबन्ध (intimate relation) between them (as there is no समवाय between तनुः and घट, the असत् घट does not come from तनुः); कार्य is असत् before its origination.

Thus the सत्कार्यवादिन्हs deny production of an असत् object, and the असत्कार्यवादिन्हs „ „ „ „ a सत् object.

As there can be only two sets of objects सत् and असत्, it follows that like बुद्ध and उपबुद्ध, the सत्कार्यवादिन्हs and the असत्कार्यवादिन्हs destroy each other's जातिवाद and enable the अजातिवाद to hold up its head triumphantly.

(4) If a thing is सत्, it cannot be originated, for it is already originated. You cannot surely die twice. Similarly if a thing is असत्, असत् will it remain for ever, for instance the बन्धयुत. No one can change his स्वभाव under any circumstances. विवदन्तो द्वयाः— The वैतिकs, सांख्यs and वैशेषिकs contradicting each other, simply help the establishment of the doctrine of non-origination. Prof. Vidhusekhara says that in Kārikā 4, "the Ācārya now proceeds to mention the doctrine of the Buddhists who subscribe to neither of these two views asserting absolute non-becoming (ajati) of things ". He also takes विवदन्तो द्वयाः as विवदन्तः अद्वयाः and explains अद्वय as अद्वयवादिन् (Buddhists who do not subscribe to any extreme views, but take a

middle path. The Buddha does not hold that any thing exists, nor does he hold that it does not exist). According to Prof. Vidhuśekhara, the teachers alluded to in the present Kārikā are different from those in Kārikā 3, as they do not discuss as to whether the origination is of the existent or of the "non-existent, but assert that there is no origination (*ajatim khyāpayanti te*).

We have stated Prof. Vidhuśekhara's views as given on pp. 102-104, in his edition of Gauḍapādakārikās in his own words. We have no hesitation in saying that Prof. Vidhuśekhara has completely gone astray in his exposition of Kārikā 4. The expression विवदन्तः (which is also found in Kārikā 3) clearly shows that Gauḍapāda regards बादिनः, अपेरे (in Kārikā 3) and द्रव्याः (or अद्रव्याः according to Prof. Vidhuśekhara) as philosophers belonging to the opposite school, whose views he does not share, but whose arguments are useful to him in establishing the अज्ञातिवाद. विवदन्तः means ' disputing '. Surely Prof. Vidhuśekhara does not desire the अद्रव्याः also disputing about something amongst themselves. The correct reading is द्रव्याः and it undoubtedly refers to the सांख्यs and वैशेषिकs in the last Kārikā. विवदन्तोऽद्रव्याः may also mean ' the disputants thus actually come to be अद्वैतिन् supporting the अज्ञातिवाद '. Again, the अद्रव्याः propounding the middle path cannot be regarded as holding any definite view like the अज्ञातिवाद. The first half of the Kārikā shows how the सांख्यs and वैशेषिकs turn the tables on each other and nullify each other's views. Thus—

- { The सांख्यs say that there is चूतस्य जातिः,
The वैशेषिकs reply अचूतं न जायते किञ्चित् (a thing to be produced is necessarily an अचूत one).
- { The वैशेषिकs say that there is अचूतस्य जातिः,
The सांख्यs reply अचूतं नैव जायते (for, origination is but a transformation of a चूत thing).

(5) Gauḍapāda displays his sense of humour by asserting that he whole-heartedly backs up his opponents in their arguments against each other. It is not often that your opponents support you, but here the सांख्यs and वैशेषिकs together help in proving that no जाति or origination is at all possible. Under these circumstances, Gauḍapāda declares that there is no ground for quarrel with his

opponents who have made his work easier, and proceeds to further expound how the अज्ञातिवाद transcends all विवाद.

(6-8) These three Kārikās are the same as III. 20-22 excepting that धर्मस्य and धर्मो (in 6 and 6-8) are substituted for भावस्य and भावो (in 20 and 20-22). K. bhāṣya says सदृशद्वादिनः सर्वेऽपीति । पुरस्तात्कृतमात्रः श्रुतेः (Kārikā 6) and उक्तार्थानां श्रुतेकानामिहोपन्थासः परवादिपक्षाणामन्योन्यविरोधख्यापितात्मोददर्शनार्थः । Gauḍapāda before subjecting the views of the सांख्यs and वैशेषिकs to detailed criticism, quotes these Kārikās which contain a general idea about what origination really connotes. As the word धर्म is used in Kārikā 1, धर्म seems to have been substituted for भाव occurring in the Kārikās in the third Prakaraṇa. It is difficult to say whether Gauḍapāda himself is responsible for this change or some copyist did it. Actually, no hiatus would be felt even if these Kārikās are dropped here.

(9) As origination necessarily involves some change in the nature of the object concerned, Gauḍapāda first explains what is meant by प्रकृति (or nature). प्रकृति never gives up its own characteristics (स्वभाव). प्रकृति is of four kinds:—

[1] सांसिद्धिकी— which has become part and parcel of the object due to the acquisition of supernatural power etc. Gauḍapāda presumably was possessed of Yogic powers and we have to take this variety of प्रकृति on trust. (सम्यक् सिद्धिः संसिद्धिः तत्र भवा सांसिद्धिकी यथा योगिनां सिद्धानामणिमायैश्वर्यप्राप्तिः प्रकृतिः सा भूतभविष्यत्कालयोरपि योगिनां न विपर्येति । K. bhāṣya)

[2] स्वाभाविकी— द्रव्यस्वभावत एव यथाग्न्यादीनामृष्णप्रकाशादिलक्षणा सापि न कालान्तरे व्यभिचरति देशान्तरे च । (K. bhāṣya)

[3] सहजा— आत्मना सहैव जाता यथा पक्षादीनामाकाशगमनादिलक्षणा । (K. bhāṣya)

[4] अकृता— अन्यापि या काचिदकृता केनचिन्न कृता यथापां निष्पदेशादेगमनलक्षणा । (K. bhāṣya).

K. bhāṣya also adds मिथ्याकलिपते हु लौकिकेष्वपि वस्तुषु प्रकृतिर्नान्यथा भवति किमुत्ताजस्वभावेषु परमार्थवस्तुष्वसृष्टत्वलक्षणा प्रकृतिर्नान्यथा भवतीत्यभिप्राप्तः ।

सांसिद्धिक is the same as नैसर्गिक according to वैशेषिकs, here it is used in the sense ' acquired, but become second nature '.

(10) Here perhaps धर्मः should mean जीवः (or आत्मानः as the K. bhāṣya says). The जीवः imagine (इच्छन्त इच्छन्तो रज्ज्वाभिष सर्पभासनि कल्पयन्तः K. bhāṣya) that they are subject to old age and death, and experience accordingly (cf. यं च वापि स्मरन्भावं त्यजन्त्यन्ते कलेवरम् । तं तमैवैति कौन्तेयं सदा तज्ज्वावभावितः ॥ Gitā VIII. 6).

(11) Gauḍapāda now shows how the कार्यकारणभाव admitted by the सांख्यs and वैशेषिकs cannot be valid. According to the सांख्यs who are सत्कार्यवादिनs, प्रकृति (or प्रधान) is the मूलकारण and is also अज. The creation of the world means that प्रधान is transformed into महत्, etc. Let us analyse this view of the सांख्यs, that प्रधान (कारण) itself becomes महत् (कार्य).

In other words, महत् is originated (but महत् and प्रधान are one and the same).

∴ We ought to say that प्रधान is originated (but प्रधान is also said to be अज).

But how can an अज (unoriginated and so immutable) thing undergo origination or change ? If it undergoes a change, how can it be नित्य ? (प्रधानं भिन्नं विदीर्णं स्फुटितमेकदेशेन सत्कर्थं नित्यं भवेदित्यर्थः । न हि सावयवं घटादि, एकदेशस्फुटनधर्मिनि नित्यं दृष्टं लोक इत्यर्थः । विदीर्णं च स्थादेकदेशेनाजं चेति, एतद्विप्रतिपिद्धं तैरभिधीयत इत्यभिप्रायः । (K. bhāṣya).

(12) The सांख्य might say:— ‘We believe that कारण and कार्य are one, कार्य is अनन्य from कारण. So if कारण is अज, then कार्य is also अज.’ To this our answer would be ‘But this is also विप्रतिपिद्ध, for your कार्य is जायमान and therefore अनित्य; कार्य is अनन्य from कारण as you say, so the अनित्य कार्य should mean an अनित्य कारण, then what becomes of your theory that the कारण (मूलप्रकृति) is अज ? Your कार्य (which is अनन्य from कारण) cannot be अनित्य only in parts, like the curate’s egg bad in parts ! ’ (न हि कुक्कुट्या एकदेशः पच्यते एकदेशः प्रसवाय कल्प्यते । K. bhāṣya). The proposed emendation यदनन्यत्वम् for यदनन्यत्वम् makes the construction simpler and for that very reason, is not likely to be genuine.

(13) If it is argued that an अज thing can produce a कार्य, we ask : is there any दृष्टान्त to corroborate this statement ? Our experiences in this world are concerned only with उत्पन्न things producing any कार्य.

If it is argued that we might accept the proposition that only an उत्पन्न thing produces a कार्य, then there would be the fault of endlessness (न व्यवस्था =अनवस्था) thus:— B is produced by A (which must itself be उत्पन्न according to the above supposition), A in turn owes its origination to, say, A¹, A¹ to A², A² to A³ and so on ad infinitum. If the series comes to an end at some point, all the preceding links break down and the main proposition falls to the ground.

(14) The objector says:— We can produce a हृषान्त which shows that an अनादि can originate, and which also does not contain the अनवस्थादोष. This संसार is admitted by all to be अनादि, so also are धर्माधर्म and देहादिसंघात. Now

धर्माधर्म (कारण) produces the फल or कार्य (देहादिसंघात) and
देहादिसंघात (कारण), „ „ „ „ (धर्माधर्म)

Here the कारण and कार्य are interdependent and अनादि.

So this हृषान्त should meet all your objections.

The Siddhāntin's answer is:— It is a contradiction in terms to speak of अनादित्व and हेतुफलभाववस्त्व. How can an अनादि thing have any कारण ? How can an अनादि thing have any फल which is necessarily associated with change in the कारण ? (न हि नियम्य कूटस्थस्थात्मनो हेतु-फलात्मता संभवति । K. bhāṣya).

(15) Again, your argument that फल or कार्य produces the कारण is simply astounding ! Can any one in his senses argue that a son begets the father ?

(16) Again, it is no use saying that कारण and कार्य mutually produce each other. You must be able to state the order in which the things are produced. It cannot be argued that कारण and कार्य may both be produced simultaneously, for, in that case, the left and the right horns of a cow, that spring up simultaneously could be regarded as having कार्यकारणभाव between them ! Śāṅkara uses the विष्ण �simile in his Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya on II. 2-17, अथापुथक्कालमयुतसिद्धत्व-मुच्येत सव्यदक्षिणयोरपि गोविष्णाणयोरयुतसिद्धत्वं प्रसज्जेत ।

(17) Further, the कारण which depends for its production upon its फल (which is जन्य), cannot possibly be proved to exist ! And a non-existent कारण, it is needless to add, like शाशविष्ण, can

not produce any thing ! (न हीतरेतरापेक्षसिद्धयोः शशबिषाणकलपयोः कार्यकारणभावेन संबन्धः कविदृष्टः, अन्यथा बेत्यभिप्रायः ! (K. bhāṣya).

(18) Further, even if we admit, just to please you, that कार्यकारणभाव can exist mutually between हेतु and फल, and फल and हेतु, it is incumbent upon you to say which comes first, and which second that has to depend upon the establishment of the first. But this you cannot do.

(19) कार्यकारणभाव can have the following alternative theories:-

[1] The cause produces the effect.

[2] The effect produces the cause.

This is denounced as absurd in Kārikās 15 and 17.

[3] Cause and effect mutually produce each other.

This also can be ruled out on the ground that it is impossible to state what comes first, the cause or the effect. In a कार्यकारणभाव, the knowledge of कौरोपर्य is essential and implicit (Kārikās 16 and 18).

[4] Cause and effect are produced simultaneously. This is obviously absurd. There cannot be कार्यकारणभाव between things which have a simultaneous origin.

{ [5] There is no origination at all.

{ [6] कार्य and कारण are one; कार्य is a mere विवर्तं.

Gauḍapāda emphasises No. 5 and is mainly concerned with establishing the अज्ञातिवाद. Saṅkarācārya, on the other hand, emphasises No. 6 and resorts to the मायावाद and व्यावहारिक सत्य to expound his thesis. It would be seen that Numbers 5 and 6 are but different aspects of one and the same proposition.

No. 1 of the above alternatives has not been discussed so far. Prof. Vidhuśekhara says ' it appears that a Kārikā dealing with the first preposition is now lost between Kārikās 16 and 17. For, as the second and third propositions are discussed (IV. 17-18), one may naturally expect to have the discussion also of the first proposition, but it is not to be found. Can we think that the author himself has omitted it ? ' Prof. Vidhuśekhara's fears are groundless,

Gaudapāda does not ignore proposition No. 1, but discusses it, being fully aware of its importance, in the first half of Kārikā 19.

Those who believe that कारण produces the कार्य, tacitly admit

[1] कारण and कार्य are two entirely different things. There is कार्यभाव first before कार्य is produced.

[2] कारण and कार्य are however intimately connected with each other by the समवाय relation.

[3] This समवाय relation ensures that only a particular कारण (सृजिका) produces a particular कार्य (घट), otherwise we might get even घट from सृजिका.

[4] कारण has thus a particular शक्ति to produce the कार्य in question.

[5] If कारण and कार्य are अनन्य, उत्पत्तिः would be निरर्थिका etc.

Gaudapāda now attacks these tenets of the असत्कार्यवादि वैशेषिकs.

[1] Gaudapāda points out that the existence of शक्ति in the कारण to produce a particular कार्य cannot be proved. Thus—

(a) Is this शक्ति different from कारण ? Or

[2] Is this शक्ति, like कार्यभाव, of a non-existent nature ?

In either case, the शक्ति would not help the कारण to produce the कार्य ; if the शक्ति is existent and not different from कारण, it is कारण itself (Read the following from Śāṅkarabhaṣya on II. 1-13, युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च, प्रागुत्पत्तेः कार्यस्य सत्त्वमनन्यत्वं च कारणाद्वगम्यते ... दधिघटहृचकाय-थिभिः प्रतिनियतानि क्षीरसृजिकासुवर्णादीन्युपादीयमानानि लोके दृश्यन्ते । न हि दधर्थिभिर्मिर्बुद्धिकोपादीयते न घटार्थिभिः क्षीररम् । तदसत्कार्ये नोपपथते । अविशिष्टे हि प्रागुत्पत्तेः सर्वस्य सर्वब्राह्मणे कस्मात् क्षीरादेव दधुत्पत्तयते न सृजिकायाः, सृजिकाया एव च घट उत्पत्तयते न क्षीरात् । अथाविशिष्टेऽपि प्रागसञ्चे क्षीर एव दध्नः कम्बिदतिशयो न सृजिकायामिस्युच्छेत्, तर्ह्यतिक्षयवस्थात् प्रागवस्थाया असत्कार्यवादहानिः सत्कार्यवादसिद्धिभ्यः । शक्तिश्च कारणस्य कार्यनियमार्थां कल्प्यमाना नान्यासती वा कार्यं नियष्टेत् । असर्वाविशेषादन्यव्याविशेषाच्च । तस्मात् कारणस्यात्मभूता शक्तिः शक्तेभ्यात्मभूतं कार्यम् ।).

अशक्तिः thus means 'the absence of any power in the कारण to produce the particular कार्य'. K. bhāṣya seems to connect अशक्तिः with कतरपूर्वनिष्पक्षं यस्य सिद्धिरपेक्षया in the last Kārikā, saying अथैतक्षयस्मै वक्तुमिति मन्यसे सेयमशक्तिः, so that अशक्तिः is taken to mean 'the

inability to answer the query.' Prof. Vidhuśekhara thinks that अशक्ति refers to IV. 3 where two classes of teachers are mentioned, one holding *satkāryavāda* and the other *asatkāryavāda*.

[2] Another objection to the असम्कार्यवाद् is that there is no knowledge of the inter-relation between कार्य and कारण; no intimate relation between two entirely different things can be proved. It can not be known how कार्य can reside in the कारण. There can be no relation between कारण which already exists and कार्य which is going to come into existence later. A संबन्ध is possible only between two existing things (अपि च कार्यद्वारारणयोर्द्रव्यगुणादीनां चाश्वमहिषवद्भृद्ध्यभावात् तादात्म्यमध्युपगमन्तव्यम् । समवायकल्पनायामपि समवायस्य समवायिभिः संबन्धेऽभ्युपगम्यमाने तस्य तस्यान्योन्यः संबन्धः कल्पयितव्य इत्यनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । अनभ्युपगम्यमाने च विच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । ... तादात्म्यपतीतेश्व इत्यगुणादीनां समवायकल्पनानर्थक्यम् । कथं च कार्यमध्यविक्रियं कारणेष्ववयवद्वयेषु वर्तमानं वर्तते— किं समस्तेष्ववयवेषु वर्तेत उत प्रत्ययवयम् । यदि तावत् समस्तेषु वर्तेत ततोऽवयवद्यनुपलिङ्गः प्रसज्येत समस्तावयवसंनिकर्षस्याशक्यत्वात् । ... अथावयवशः समस्तेषु वर्तेत तदाव्याप्तम्भकावयवद्यतिरेकेणावयविनोऽवयवाः कल्पयेत् यैरारम्भकेष्ववयवेष्ववयवशोऽवयवी वर्तते । ... अनवस्था चैव प्रसज्येत तेषु तेष्ववयवेषु वर्तयितुमन्येषामवयवानां कल्पनीयत्वात् । अथ प्रयवयवेषु वर्तेत तदैकत्र द्वायापरेऽन्यवाक्यापारः स्यात् । न हि देवदत्तः स्तुत्ते संनिधीयमानस्तदहरेव पाटलिहुत्रेऽपि संनिधीयेत् । युगपदनेकत्र दृतावनेकत्वप्रसङ्गः स्यात् ... गोत्वादिवत् प्रत्येकं परिसमाप्तेन कोष इति चेत् न तथा प्रतीत्यभावात् । ... प्रत्येकपरिसमाप्तौ चावयविनः कार्येणाधिकारात् तस्य चैकत्वात् शृङ्गेणापि स्तनकार्यं कुर्यादुरुसा च पृष्ठकार्यम् । न चैव दृश्यते । ... यस्य एनः प्राणुपत्तेरसत् कार्यं तस्य निर्विवद्यः कारकव्यापारः स्यात्, अभावस्य विषयत्वाद्युपत्तेराकाशाहननप्रयोजनसङ्गाद्यनेकायुधप्रयुक्तिवत् । ... समवायिकारणविषयः कारकव्यापारः स्यादिति चेत्, न । अन्यविषयेण कारकव्यापारेणान्यनिष्पत्तेरतिप्रसङ्गात् । ... तस्मात् क्षीरादीन्येव इत्याणि दध्याद्यभावेनावतिष्ठमानानि कार्याद्यां लभन्त इति न कारणादन्यत् कार्यं वर्षशतेनापि शक्यं निश्चेतुम् । तथा मूलकारणमेवान्त्यात् कार्यात् तेन तेन कार्याकारणं न दृश्वत् सर्वद्वयवहारास्पदत्वं प्रतिपद्यते । Saṅkarabhāṣya on Brahmasūtra II. 1-18).

अपरिज्ञान is explained by K. bhāṣya as तच्चाविवेको भृहतेत्यर्थः । It may mean पूर्वापरिज्ञानम् in Kārikā 21 below, in which case, the expression refers to No. 3 of the alternatives mentioned above. Prof. Vidhuśekhara suggests that अपरिज्ञान is the पूर्वापरकोटि—अपरिज्ञान which is described in पूर्वापरकोटिपरीक्षा (Chapter XI) of the Mula-madhyamakārikā of Nāgārjuna.

क्रमकोपः— No 4 alternative, viz. कार्य and कारण arising simultaneously, is objected to, on the ground of the ‘violation of the order’.

The accepted order between कार्य and कारण comes first and कार्य afterwards. Kārikā 16 above also refers to this.

Gauḍapāda says that the wise philosophers having considered carefully all the points involved in कार्यकारणभाव, and the various alternative theories adumbrated, have come to the conclusion that

No. 1 is to be rejected on the ground of अजाति of the कारण, and the अपरिज्ञान of any संबन्ध between कार्य and कारण.

No. 2 is frivolous and beneath consideration.

No. 3 is to be rejected, because there is no ground to ascertain which comes first, of the two कार्य and कारण (and no दृष्टान्त to corroborate it).

No. 4 goes against अतुभव.

Thus No. 5 which says that there is अजाति, is alone the correct theory.

Prof. Vidhuśekhara says that by बुद्धैः, we should understand 'the Buddhists'. The expression seems to have been used in the sense of तत्त्वदाशीमिः (see Introduction). In IV. 42, we have जातिस्तु देशिता बुद्धैः and in IV. 54, एवं हेतुफलाजाति प्रविशान्ति मनीषिणः। so that by मनीषिणः, बुद्धैः, Gauḍapāda probably refers to 'wise philosophers' in general.

(20) The objector says that it was not fair on the part of Gauḍapāda to brush aside his theory of mutual कार्यकारणभाव (कार्य producing कारण and कारण producing कार्य) as frivolous by asking how a son can beget the father (Kārikā 15); the matter should not be treated in that light-hearted manner. The बीजाङ्करन्याय correctly represents his position (बीज produces अङ्कुर and अङ्कुर produces बीज). Why should mutual कार्यकारणभाव be objected to ? Every body accepts the बीजाङ्करन्याय as authoritative.

Gauḍapāda says in reply:— We अजातिवादिनः can not accept the बीजाङ्कर दृष्टान्त. You have yet to prove to us how the कार्यकारणभाव exists between बीज and अङ्कुर. The दृष्टान्त is not सिद्ध, it is still साध्य. Again, strictly speaking, it is wrong to regard बीजाङ्कर proving अनादित्व as well. It is generally held that

बीज — अङ्कुर — बीज — अङ्कुर and so on—this series shows mutual
(१) (१)

कार्यकारणभाव, but surely the बीज १ produced from अङ्कुर is *different* from बीज; and अङ्कुर १ produced from बीज १, is different from अङ्कुर. Here are therefore different कार्यकारणभाव between different sets of objects ! साध्यसम is a हेत्वाभास mentioned by Gautama; it is the same as असिद्ध of other तार्किकs. On हेतुः, K. bhāṣya remarks, हेतुरिति दृष्टान्तोऽत्रामिप्रेतो गमकत्वात्। प्रकृतो हि दृष्टान्तो न हेतुरिति। But Gauḍapāda may be taken here to enunciate a general proposition, not referring to the particular point under reference.

(२१) The objector says:— You are making too much of our inability to mention which of the two कार्य and कारण comes first. What does it matter if we do not know this particular ? The relationship between the two is clear to the meanest intelligence and that should suffice for our purpose.

Gauḍapāda's reply would be:—

If a thing is really being produced, surely a child ought to be able to tell which is the कारण (that is already there) prior to the thing to be produced. The fact that you are not able to point out the कारण and its relation with the कार्य, shows that your basic principle viz. that there is जाति, is unfounded. If the कार्य can be apprehended, its जनक must be capable of being apprehended too (जायमानो हि च धर्मो यद्यते कथं तस्मात्पूर्वं कारणं न यद्यते । अवश्यं हि जायमानस्य ग्रहीत्रा तज्जनकं ग्रहीतव्यम् । जन्यजनकयोः संबन्धस्यावर्णतत्वाद् । K. bhāṣya).

(२२) The upshot of all this discussion is that the view of the (सकार्यवादिन्स) सांख्य that वस्तु स्वतः जायते is untenable (घट cannot be produced from itself); that of the (असत्कार्यवादिन्स) वैशेषिकs that वस्तु परतः जायते (घट cannot be produced from an entirely different thing, say पट) is equally untenable. A thing obviously cannot be produced स्वतः and परतः. When we say 'a thing is produced', we are using mere words (शब्दप्रश्ययविषयं वस्तु घटएवादिलक्षणं शब्दमात्रमेव तद् । बाचारम्भणम् इति श्रुतेः K. bhāṣya). Similarly, a सत् or असत् thing can not be produced (otherwise there would be अन्यथाभाव of their प्रकृति), सदसद् cannot likewise be produced (विश्वस्यैकस्यासंभवात् K. bhāṣya which adds येषां पुनर्जनिरेव जायते इति क्रियाकारकफलैकत्वमभ्युपगम्यते क्षणिकत्वं च वस्तुनः, ते (बौद्धाः) दूरतः एव न्यायापेताः । इदमित्यमित्यवधारणक्षणान्तरानवः स्थानादननुभूतस्य स्मृत्यनुपपत्तश्च ।)

(23) Those who speak of जाति, basing their arguments on the अनादि धर्मार्थम् and देहादिसंघात mutually giving rise to अनादि संसार, are contradicting themselves. अनादे: फलात् हेतुर्न जायते — For, if the फल is अनादि and does produce something, there would be ceaseless production, and an अनादिकारण must produce अनादि कार्य (for कारण and कार्य must be like in nature) which is ridiculous (how can an अनादि कार्य have a beginning ?) Similarly फल cannot be produced from अनादिहेतु. Prof. Vidhuśekhara against all manuscript authority wishes to read अनादिः for अनादे: (this would make the sense more clear) and जातिः for हादिः (this is quite unnecessary). It is quite clear that आदिः is used twice deliberately (in two different senses) to give an enigmatical touch to the line. आदिः means (1) cause (2) beginning. A thing for which no cause can be found, cannot have any beginning, that is, cannot be produced (कारणवत् एव शादिरभ्युपगम्यते नाकारणवतः K. bhāṣya).

(24) Having disposed of the सांख्यs, वैशेषिकs etc. (whom Gaudapāda could have called अस्मदीयः), Gaudapāda now turns to the Buddhas. परतन्त्र means ' another शास्त्र, another school of philosophy ' (परेण तन्त्रं परतन्त्रमित्यन्यज्ञात्रं K. bhāṣya; cf. समानतन्त्रासिद्धः परतन्त्रासिद्धः प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तः Nyāyasūtra I. 1-29). The बाह्यार्थवादि वौद्धs are referred to here. The बाह्यार्थवादिनs maintain that बाह्यार्थ apart from विज्ञान or बुद्धि must be taken to exist (and therefore there must be जाति for it) to account for the प्रत्ययवैचित्र्य and the experience of pain etc. प्रज्ञाप्ति—Objective experience. In order to perceive घट, it is essential that one's बुद्धि must be घटाकारा; if there is no घट, how can the बुद्धि be घटाकारा) and how can घटप्रज्ञाप्ति arise ? So प्रज्ञाप्ति must have a निमित्त; in the absence of this निमित्त, there would be no ब्राह्मब्राहकभाव (द्रष्ट); secondly, we actually experience pain etc., this cannot be denied. This संक्लेशोपलक्ष्य also must be attributed to some cause. This cause could only be the बाह्यार्थ which is subject to जाति. Prof. Vidhuśekhara explains परतन्त्रासितता मता as '(their) existence is regarded as dependent,' which hardly makes things clear. There is no question here about existence being dependent or independent, but about existence of the बाह्यार्थ itself. संक्लेशः—संक्लेशनं दुःखमित्यर्थः (K. bhāṣya). संक्लेशs according to the Buddhists arise from इकन्धs (रूप, वेदना, संज्ञा, संस्कार and विज्ञान), आयतन (५ क्षेत्रनिक्षयs and mind, and their objects, in all 12), and भावु (६ organs of sense, six objects and six kinds of consciousness).

(25) This Karikā refutes the बाह्यार्थवादिन्'s view. The बाह्यार्थवादिन् takes his stand upon युक्ति (inference, as implied in the last Karikā), but युक्ति is inferior and must give way to सूतदर्शन, the real state of things (परमार्थदर्शनादित्येतद् । न हि घटो यथासूतसूतपदर्शने सति तद्वयतिरेकेणास्ति । यथाश्वानमहिपः पटो वा तन्त्रव्यतिरेकेण-त्येवसूतरोत्तरसूतदर्शन आशब्दप्रत्ययनिरोधाद्यैव निमित्तसूतपलभामह इत्यर्थः । अथवा सूतदर्शनाद्वार्थस्यानिमित्तत्वमित्यते । रज्जवादाविव सर्पदैरित्यर्थः । आनितदर्शनविषयत्वाच्च निमित्तस्यानिमित्तत्वं भवेत् । तदभावेऽभावात् । न हि उद्गतसमाहितसूतकानां आनितदर्शनाभाव आत्मव्यतिरिक्तो वाहोऽर्थं उपलभ्यते । न ह्युन्मतापगतं वस्त्वसूतन्मतैरपि तथा सूतं गम्यते K. bhāṣya). सूतदर्शन tells us that nothing is ever produced, all so-called production is शब्दमात्र.

(26) प्रज्ञसि has no निमित्त, as no बाह्यार्थ can exist. The चित्त (or विज्ञान) alone exists and appears as बाह्यार्थ. Thus चित्त has no contact with अर्थ (because it does not exist) or अर्थभास (without अर्थ, अर्थभास cannot exist). असूतः— Not existent. (जागरितेऽपि स्वप्नार्थवदेव K. bhāṣya).

(27) चित्तव्यवस्थ—In the three paths or periods of time, अतीतानागतवर्तमानाध्यत्तु. चित्त never gets into contact with any external object. The objector points out that if the चित्त can have घटाधारासत्ता in the absence of घट etc., there is the chance of चित्त presenting a wrong picture of घट etc. The answer is that if घट were to exist, we would be in a position to say if the presentation by चित्त conforms to the घट or not. But with घट not in existence, घटविषयात् is out of question (अपेक्ष हि स्वभाववित्तस्य यद्गतासति निमित्ते घटाद्वौ तद्वयभासनम् । K. bhāṣya).

(28) K. bhāṣya says:— प्रज्ञस्तः सनिमित्तत्व (Kārikā 25)भित्यादेतदन्तं (Kārikā 27) विज्ञानवादिनो औद्यस्य वचनं बाह्यार्थवादिपक्षप्रतिषेधपरमाचार्योऽनुसोदितम् । तदेव हेतुं क्वचा तत्पक्षप्रतिषेधाय तदिदमस्यते तस्मादित्यादि । Just as Gauḍapāda used the arguments of the वैशेषिकs against the सांख्यs, and vice versa, he uses the arguments advanced by the विज्ञानवादिनs against the existence of बाह्यार्थ admitted by the बाह्यार्थवादिनs. In this Karikā he turns the tables on the विज्ञानवादिनs. According to the विज्ञानवाद, विज्ञान is associated with क्षणिकत्व, दृश्य, सून्यत्व etc., that is, these are विज्ञानज धर्मs. Gauḍapāda says that neither चित्त nor चित्तव्य can be originated (the origination of चित्त means its association with धर्मs). The विज्ञानवादिनs holding the view that चित्त or चित्तव्य is originated, see the foot-prints (of birds) in the sky. It is as absurd to say that चित्तं जायते as to say that one can mark the passage of birds in

the sky (Śaṅkara uses the simile in his Br̥hadāraṇyakabhb̄ṣya V. 4-6, त उत्सहन्ते खेऽपि शाकुनं पदं द्रष्टुम्). दृश्य implies the presence of a द्रष्टु ; when there is no दृश्य, द्रष्टु also does not exist. So the विज्ञानवादिन्‌s who admit that both चित्त (which is क्षणिक) and चित्तदृश्य (which is produced by चित्त) undergo production are wrong (तस्य चित्तस्य ये जातिं पश्यन्ति विज्ञानवादिनः क्षणिकत्वद्वःसित्वशूल्यत्वानामत्वादि च तेनैव चित्तेन चित्तस्वरूपं द्रष्टुमशक्यं पश्यन्तः खे वै पश्यन्ति ते पदं पश्यादीनाम् । अत इतरेभ्योऽपि दैतिभ्योऽध्यन्तसाहस्रिकाः । K. bhāṣya). The शूल्यवादिन्‌s deserve only to be treated with contempt, says the K. bhāṣya (येऽपि शूल्यवादिनः पश्यन्त एव सर्वशूल्यतां खदर्शनस्यापि शूल्यतां प्रतिज्ञानते ते ततोऽपि साहस्रिकतराः स्वं मुटिनापि जिघृक्षन्ति ।).

(29) The विज्ञानवादिन् argues that चित्त or विज्ञान is also अज, according to him (for the चित्तसंतति is continuous even if चित्त is क्षणिक) and why should not an अज thing give rise to विकारः etc.? The answer is, when you say a thing is born, you imply that *the thing was unborn before*, that is, अजातत्व was its प्रकृति. If so, the अजात �thing would never get rid of its प्रकृति viz. अजातत्व. Hence अजातस्य जातिः is impossible.

(30) The जातिवादिन्‌s who believe that संसार is अनादि (in accordance with the बीजाङ्गरन्याय) and मोक्ष is a thing to be secured by उपासना etc. are criticised in this Kārikā. If संसार is अनादि, it would ever remain अनादि ; if मोक्ष is a product and so has a beginning, it would also have an end (whatever has a beginning must also have an end, is a thesis accepted by all). Who would care for such a temporary मोक्ष ? मोक्ष surely must be eternal. The जातिवादिन्‌s have therefore no case.

(31) It may be argued that if nothing is born, how is it that we perceive so many things, and are affected by them? It is impossible to deny that they exist. The answer is, they are really illusory and only appear as real. For, no one can question the truth of the thesis that whatever was not existing before (that is, which has a beginning), and does not necessarily exist in the end (because whatever is born must have an end), must also not be existing in the present. Its प्रकृति is ‘not to exist’ and प्रकृति cannot change. So all the things that we perceive must not be really in existence, they are false.

(32) The things in the waking state are contradicted in the dream-state (A dreamer sleeping in a house dreams that he is out in

the open, getting all wet in the rain ; the सप्रयोजनता of the house is thus set at naught in the dream). Kārikās 31 and 32 are the same as II. 6-7 which were introduced in Prakarana II, to prove that जागरितदृश्य is as अस्त् as स्वप्नदृश्य. Here they are quoted in connection with the eternity of संसार and negation of मोक्ष, if अजातिबाद is not accepted.

(33) Only the अज ब्रह्मन् (or विज्ञान) is real. The जाग्रदृश्य is as false as the स्वप्नदृश्य. This is elaborated in this Kārikā and the next four. The dreamer sees within the body all sorts of things, mountains, rivers etc. which are obviously unreal ; for, how can such real things be seen in a small enclosed space ? भूत means here ' existing thing '.

(34) This Kārikā is the same as II. 2, except that the first line is read as न युक्तं दर्शनं गत्वा कालस्पानियमाहूतौ (there is no change in the meaning. Why the Kārikā should appear in this changed form is not clear). No one can dispute the fact that the dreamer has no time enough at his disposal to actually go to the places he sees in dream, neither does he find himself in those places when he awakes. This shows that स्वप्नदृश्य is false.

(35) The dreamer may have conversed with his friends, but remembers not what it was all about, when he is awake ; he may have been given some gifts in the dream, which he fails to find with him when awake. All this points out that स्वप्नदृश्य is मिथ्या.

(36) Actually, the dreamer goes on with his work in the dream, assuming an entirely different and unreal body (his real body is lying on his bed all the time) ! So, as his body assumed in the dream is false, so also is the स्वप्नदृश्य.

Now in the waking state also, everything is चित्तदृश्य as in the dream-state (unless the चित्त becomes घटाकार, you cannot cognise the घट). The चित्तदृश्य in the dream is false ; the चित्तदृश्य in the waking state must also be false.

(37) तद (जागरितं) हेतुः अस्य सः तद्देतुः. As a rule, one sees in dreams things exactly as in the waking state. The waking state is the cause of the dream-state and for this reason, the जागरित state is real only to the particular dreamer and not to others. यथा स्वप्नः स्वप्नदृश एव सन्साधारणविद्यमानवस्तुवद्वभासते तथा तत्कारणवात्साधारणविद्यमानवस्तुवद्वभासमानं न तु साधारणं विद्यमानवस्तु स्वप्नवदेवेत्यभिप्रायः । K. bhāṣya.

(38) Actually it is wrong to say that जागरित produces स्वप्न. There can not be संभव of an असूत (स्वप्न) from the भूत (जागरित). An असूत, the शशब्दिष्ण for instance, can never be produced. There is no उत्पाद, hence the Vedāntas have proclaimed that all is Brahman which is अज. We may take असूत to mean अज and take the second half as corroborating अजं सर्वमुदाहृतम् in the first line.

(39) The dreamer sees in dream things which he has seen in the waking state as unreal; having seen the unreal things in the dream, he fails to see them in the waking state. So both in the waking state and in the dream-state, one sees things seen in the other state as unreal. जागरित is the cause of स्वप्न only from the point of view of व्यवहार, but the जागरित is also equally unreal. The propriety of च is given by K. bhāṣya as च शब्दान्तश्च जागरितेऽपि हृष्टा स्वप्ने न पश्यति कदाचिदित्यर्थः । तस्माज्जागरितं स्वप्नेऽतुरुच्यते न तु परमार्थसदिति कृत्वा. The स्वप्नहृष्ट्य is unreal and has जागरितहृष्ट्य for its cause; this shows that जागरितहृष्ट्य must be unreal. A person thus sees unreal things both in the waking and dream states, but does not realise this in the waking state.

(40) From the point of view of the highest reality no कार्यकारणभाव is possible. Thus

- [1] असद् स्वकुसुम cannot have असद् शशब्दिष्ण for its cause.
- [2] सद् (घट) cannot have असद् (शशब्दिष्ण) for its cause.
- [3] सद् (घट) cannot have सद् (घट, पट) for its cause.
(for, in that case सद् would lose its प्रकृति, सत्त्व)
- [4] असद् cannot have सद् for its cause.
(for, they are as two poles asunder).

(41) The objector says that if both जाग्रत् and स्वप्न experiences are unreal, how can there be any कार्यकारणभाव between them ? The answer is that it is not our statement the स्वप्नधर्मs are produced by the जाग्रत्धर्मs. Just as in the waking state, a person can have false knowledge of a rope as though it were a real serpent, the same thing happens in the dream-state as well. भूतवत्—As a fact, as real. In both states, there is विपर्यास, that is all.

(42) If the अजातिबाद is the highest philosophical truth, why have Śāstras taught different kinds of Upāsanās, वर्णधर्मधर्मs etc.

which presuppose that creation is real and duality exists? The answer is that the wise (*buddha*) people realise that अजातिवाद is extremely difficult to be grasped by ordinary people who see nothing but आत्मनाश in the अजातिवाद. So, taking compassion on these weak-kneed but well-intentioned people, the wise have preached for them the उत्पत्तिवाद, in the belief that in course of time they would be in a position to understand the higher truth of अजातिवाद (this is what is meant by उपायः सोऽवताराय in III. 15). Prof. Vidyashekharā understands by बुद्धैः here also, the Buddhists. But surely, the Buddha never preached the उत्पत्तिवाद or अजातिवाद either!

(43) विषयं— विरुद्धं वन्ति, द्वैतं प्रतिपथन्त इत्यर्थः (K. bhāṣya). The objector says: The श्रुति (... उदरमन्तरं कुरुते ! अथ तस्य भयं भवति । Taittiriyopaniṣad II. 7-1) warns the साधक against the danger of believing in द्वैत. Would not those people who follow the Śāstrik injunctions based upon जातिवाद, because they are terribly afraid of अजातिवाद, come to grief in the end? Have they ever no hope for salvation? The answer is that these people are after all not bad, but just weak and certainly सम्प्रव्यवसित (साधुरेव स मन्तव्यः सम्प्रव्यवसितो हि सः । Gītā IX. 30). They are not नास्तिकs like the Cārvākas or Buddhists, and with luck, they can ultimately see their way to believing in the अजातिवाद (न हि कल्पणकात्क्षिदद्गीर्णते तात गच्छति । Gītā XI. 40).

(44) Gauḍapāda says howsoever he might sympathise with the अस्तिवस्तुवादिन् referred to in Kārikās 42, 43, he has to point out that their argument viz. there is वस्तुभाव on account of उपलभ्य and समाचार is entirely wrong. Because an object is perceived and can be put to practical use, it does not mean that it is real. For instance, the magic elephant shown up by a juggler is actually perceived; people see its movements and so on, but every one knows that the elephant is unreal.

(45) The only real thing is thus विज्ञान (also called वित्तं, मनस्) that is, ज्ञानस्त्रप ब्रह्मात्, which is अज (but appears to be born), अचल (but appears to have motion), अवस्तु (but appears to be a वस्तु) and is completely unruffled (having no विकार) and not within the province of the द्वय (ग्राह्यग्राहकभाव). This description of विज्ञान by Gauḍapāda shows that he does not hold the विज्ञानवाद of the Buddhists. The विज्ञान of the Buddhists is neither अज, nor अचल,

nor अवस्था. Gaudapāda accepts the arguments of the विज्ञानवादिन्‌s against the बाह्यार्थवादिन्‌s, but then he parts company with them.

(46) विज्ञान or चित्त or ब्रह्मन् is अज, and all so-called धर्मs not being different from ब्रह्मन् are also अज. When this truth is realised there is no संसार trouble. एवमेव यथोक्तं विज्ञानं जात्यादिरहितमद्वयमात्मतत्त्वं विज्ञानन्तस्त्पक्त्वाद्यैषणाः उन्नर्न पतन्त्यविद्याद्वान्तसागरे विपर्यये । 'तत्र को मोहः कः शोक एकत्वमनुपश्यतः' इत्यादि मन्त्रवर्णात् । (K. bhāṣya). It is unusual to speak of an Upanisadic passage as a मन्त्रवर्ण as is done here by the K. bhāṣya.

(47-52) Kārikās 47-52 introduce the famous अलात simile after which the present Prakaraṇa is named. If the विज्ञान is one and अज, how do we experience the various धर्मs? Whence do they come and whither do they go? What is their connection with विज्ञान? Do they arise out of विज्ञान? The answer is that जात्याद्याभासs are all असत् and जात्यादित्तुद्विषयस् is सूषा.

अलातस्

(1) When the fire-brand is whirled about, there is the appearance of straight and crooked lines.

(2) When the अलात is at rest, there arises no appearance, there is no change in the अलात; it is अज.

(3) When the अलात is whirled about, the कर्तुषक्रादि appearances do not come in from a place outside it.

(4) When the अलात is at rest, the appearances do not go out elsewhere, nor do they enter the अलात.

(5) The appearances can not be going out, as they are not द्रव्यs; only a द्रव्य is capable of movement.

विज्ञानस्

When the विज्ञान vibrates, there is the appearance of ग्राह and ग्राहक (the vibration of the विज्ञान is of course due to अविद्या, it is not real).

When the विज्ञान does not vibrate, it is without any ग्राहग्राहकभाव and is अज.

When the विज्ञान vibrates, the ग्राहग्राहकभाव appearances do not come in from a place outside it.

When the विज्ञान is at rest, the appearances do not go out elsewhere, nor do they enter the विज्ञान.

The appearances involving ग्राहग्राहकभाव cannot be going out as they are not द्रव्यs. Only a द्रव्य is capable of movement.

Whether it is the कर्तुवक्रादि or ग्राह्यग्राहकभाव आभास, the आभासत्व is the same and their behaviour is exactly alike. There is no कार्यकारणभाव between the आभास and अलात् or विज्ञान. Hence they must be pronounced to be not capable of being considered or in plain language सूषा, यथासत्स्वज्ञायाभासेतु, कर्तुवदिष्टुद्विष्टुलातमात्रे तथासत्स्वेव जात्पादिष्टु विज्ञानभावे जात्यादिष्टुद्विष्टुवेति समुदायार्थः। K. bhāṣya which also hastens to add अलातेन समानं सर्वे विज्ञानस्य विशेषः।

(53) In the last Kārikā, it was stated that in the case of विज्ञान which is one, अज्ञ etc., no कार्यकारणभाव was possible. This Kārikā explains why it is so. कार्यकारणभाव implies that there must be two द्रव्यas, so that one द्रव्य can be the cause of another द्रव्य. विज्ञान is one, immutable, there is nothing else, so it cannot have any अवयवas (कपाल and घट have कार्यकारणभाव, because there is अवयावयवि relation between the two) or युग्मas (घट and घटरूप can have a कार्यकारणभाव). Though there is the कार्यकारणभाव between पटरूप and तन्तुरूप (which are अद्रव्य, being युग्म) it is obvious that रूप depends upon a द्रव्य (पट + तन्तु) here also, so that does not vitiate the general statement द्रव्यं द्रव्यस्य कारणम् or अन्यद् अन्यस्य कारणम् (कारण and कार्य must be two separate things). The धर्मas are not द्रव्यas, nor are they different from विज्ञान, as we have already proved. So no कार्यकारणभाव is possible.

(54) So, we have to fall back upon अज्ञातिशाद् as the only unassailable doctrine. The विज्ञानवादिन् seem to hold that धर्मas are चित्तज ; but this is not possible. चित्त is आत्मविज्ञानस्वरूप and धर्मas are विज्ञानस्वरूपाभासमात्र ; there cannot be हेतुफलभाव between them. Here Gaudapāda uses the expression मनीषणः। It is more probable therefore, that the expression बुद्धेः in IV. 19 and IV. 42 does not refer to the Buddhists, especially because the विज्ञान of Gaudapāda is different from the विज्ञान of the Buddhists, and the Buddhists who are really अद्रव्यवादिन् could not have preached the अज्ञातिशाद्. प्रशिशन्ति—अध्यवस्थन्ति (K. bhāṣya).

(55) आवेशः, usually used in connection with the seizure by ghosts or spirits ; hence, strong attachment or adherence. As long as there is the superimposition of धर्मas upon the आत्मक् or विज्ञान, there exists the कार्यकारणभाव based on हैत. But when the adherence to causality disappears, the हैत also disappears. यदा पुनर्मन्त्रौषधिवीर्येणष्व

ग्रहावेशो यथोक्तद्वैतदर्थनेनाविद्योद्भूतहेतुफलावेशोऽपनीतो भवति तदा तस्मिन्क्षणे नात्ति हेतुफलोऽप्यवः । (K. bhāṣya).

(५६) With the disappearance of हेतुफलावेश, and consequently that of द्वैत, there can be no Saṁsāra.

(५७) संदृति is explained by K. bhāṣya as संबस्तम् अविद्याविषयो लौकिकव्यवहारः ; the Buddhists admit of two kinds of सत्य, संदृतिसत्य empirical truth (व्याख्यातिक सत्य of Śaṅkara) and परमार्थसत्य. It appears to us that Gaudapāda uses the expression in the sense of माया (the instrumental संदृत्य does not fit in well with the meaning 'empirical truth'). Prof. Vidhuśekhara thinks that in this Kārikā the Śāsvatavāda and the Ucchedavāda are attacked. He also likes to read स्वभावेन for सञ्चावेन. We are of opinion that Gaudapāda here answers the objector who, being told that there is no संसार in the last Kārikā, argues that the संसार is actually experienced, and that it is अनादि (we may not be able to say whether the बीज comes first or the अङ्गुर comes first, but we must admit that the बीजाङ्गुर series is अनादि). In fact, the प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद of the Buddhists admits this kind of causality. Gaudapāda's answer is that the संसार is an illusion due to Māyā, and when the संसार really does not exist, any talk of its coming to an end is futile. Every thing that exists is अज (and Brahman alone exists), on account of the fact that it is सत्. The reading स्वभावेन proposed by Vidhuśekhara (against all MSS authority) appears simpler, but after all the स्वभाव is the same as सञ्चाव in the case of an अज object.

(५८) The धर्मस may refer to the 75 divisions of Reality admitted by the Sarvāstivādi Bauddhas (72 संस्कृतधर्मस— 11 ऋगधर्मस, (5 इन्द्रियायतनस + 5 विषयायतनस + 1 अविज्ञति) + 1 चित्तधर्म + 46 चैततधर्मस + 14 चित्तविषयकधर्मस) and 3 असंस्कृतधर्मस (आकाश, प्रतिसंख्यानिरोध and अप्रतिसंख्यानिरोध). They are popularly said to be born. Gaudapāda says that really they are not born. They can be compared to Māyā which is also really non-existent.

(५९) This Kārikā explains the statement in the last Kārikā viz. the जन्म of the धर्मस is मायोपम. A मायाङ्गुर coming from मायाबीज, cannot be called नित्य or विनाशि, because it really does not exist. Similar is the case with the धर्मस, न तु परमार्थतो धर्माणां जन्म नाशो वा युज्यत इत्यर्थः (K. bhāṣya).

(60) The Buddhists speak of 72 संस्कृतधर्मs and 3 असंस्कृतधर्मs (see note on Kārikā 58 above), the former being अशाश्वत and the latter शाश्वत. Gaudapāda says that in the अज्ञातिवाद which holds that everything is अज्ञ, the nomenclature शाश्वत and अशाश्वत is meaningless. The highest can not be described in words (यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते Taittirīyopaniṣad II. 4-5), as it is not possessed of any describable लक्षणs. विवेक consisting of ideas like 'this is of this nature' 'this is of that nature' has no scope in the case of अज्ञ धर्मs.

(61-62) विवेक has scope only in the illusory origination. All धर्मs, whether in the जाग्रत् state or the स्वप्न state, are due to the चित्तस्पन्दन caused by Māyā ; the चित्त though really void of ग्राहा-ग्राहक-भाव, appears to have that दृश्य in the two states. Kārikā 61 is the same as III. 29, with the difference that चित्तं चलति मायया is substituted for स्वन्दनते मायया मनः; Kārikā 62 is also the same as III. 30, only substituting चित्तं for मनः.

(63-64) Whatever the dreamer sees in the dream, is दृश्य to the चित्त of the dreamer and is not different from the चित्त; this चित्त again is दृश्य only to the dreamer himself. Thus स्वप्नाङ्क, स्वप्न-दृष्टिचित्त, and स्वप्नचित्तदृश्य are one and the same.

अण्डज and स्वेदज (there are four kinds of जीवs, जरायुज and उद्दिज being the remaining two) refer to all the four kinds of जीवs. द्विष्ठु दशमु—the four main quarters, the four by-quarters, the upper and the lower are the ten quarters.

(65-66) The situation in the जाग्रत् state is exactly the same as in the dream state.

(67) चित्त and चैत्य are thus दृश्य only to each other, and depend upon each other for their existence. चित्तदृश्य without the चित्त, and the चित्त without the चित्तदृश्य are unthinkable. Both have no characteristic features peculiar to them. They are cognised only as thought of by the चित्त itself. प्रमाणगून्यमुभयं चित्तं चैत्यं दृश्यं यतस्तन्मतेनैव तच्चित्ततयैव तद्व गृह्णते । न हि घटमतिं प्रत्याख्याय घटो गृह्णते नापि घटं प्रत्याख्याय घटमतिः । न हि तत्र प्रमाणप्रमेयभदः शक्यते कल्पयितुमित्यभिप्रायः । (K. bhāṣya). लक्षणa is used here in the sense of लक्षण characteristic, लक्षयते जनयेति लक्षणा प्रमाणम् (K. bhāṣya). किं तदस्तीति चोच्यते but curiously enough translates the same as 'but you do not say what remains there'. The objector asks:— If

both चित्त and जैत्य have no independent existence, then what exists ? The answer is nothing dependent exists. Gaudapāda holds the view that the चित्त which sees the जैत्य is not the highest reality. The विज्ञानवादिन्‌s as Gaudapāda understands them, seem to regard चित्त as capable of producing the चित्तधर्मेः, endowing them with some sort of reality.

(68-70) The objector remains still unconvinced. He says:— How can the चित्तदृश्य be unreal and दृश्य at the same time ? The answer is:— The object in the dream, the object created by the magician, the object created by a Yогin possessed of supernatural powers—all these are manifestly unreal as the common man understands the expression, but do these not undergo the process of origination and annihilation before our very eyes ? There is therefore nothing surprising if the unreal चित्तदृश्य comes into being and dies. निर्मितकः— मन्त्रौषध्यादिभिर्निष्पादितः, Gaudapāda is a believer in the yogic powers, perhaps being a great Yогin himself.

(71) This Kārikā is the same as III. 48. Gaudapāda repeats his thesis that the अज्ञातिबाद is the only true doctrine enunciating ‘ Nothing is ever produced or born ’ and not चित्तज्ञाः धर्माः and धर्मज्ञचित्तं as held by the Buddhists. उत्तमं सत्यम्—This is a hit against the Buddhists who admit सत्य to be of two kinds (see notes on Kārikā 73 below).

(72) The दृश्य consisting of ग्राहा and ग्राहक, object and subject, is nothing but the vibration of the चित्त which is निर्विशय and therefore rightly called असङ्क (‘ असङ्को ह्ययं पुरुषः ’ इति श्रुते : । सविषयस्य हि विषये सङ्कः । निर्विषयत्वाच्चित्तमसङ्कमित्यर्थः (K. bhāṣya)).

(73) K. bhāṣya says ननु निर्विषयत्वेन चेदसङ्कत्वं चित्तस्य न निःसङ्कता भवति यस्माच्छास्ता शास्त्रं शिष्यश्वेयेवमादेविषयस्य विद्यमानत्वात्, so that according to it the meaning would be ‘ the distinction about the teacher, pupil etc. which is inevitable in studying the Vedāntaśāstra itself would have no scope, if the चित्त is निःसङ्क . The answer is, the distinction is due to Avidyā and is intended only as a step to know the reality. A thing existing by परशास्त्रव्यवहार (K. bhāṣya explains परतत्त्वाभिसङ्कल्प्य as परशास्त्रव्यवहारेण) does not really exist’. Prof. Vidhuśekhara says by way of introduction to this Kārikā ‘ the author says that the existence of the duality consisting of the subject and the object is only in empirical (saṃvṛti) and not in absolute (paramartha)’.

truth. For a thing which is dependent (*paratantra*) for its existence may exist in empirical and not in absolute truth' (Prof. Vidhuśekhara here also, as usual against Manuscript authority, emends परतन्त्राभिसंदृत्या into परतन्त्रोऽभिसंदृत्या on the ground that the sense requires it and it is supported by Buddhist works. He says अभिसंदृत्या is the same as अभिनिष्पत्या संदृत्या which he explains as संदृति which is the cause of existence or appearance of things. Not satisfied with all this, the Professor says that we should read परतन्त्रो हि संदृत्या instead of परतन्त्रोऽभिसंदृत्या first proposed by himself!).

Prof. Vidhuśekhara points out that the Buddhists admit two kinds of सत्य, संदृतिसत्य (corresponding to व्यवहारसत्य of the Jainas, and the व्यावहारिक सत्यानुत of Śaṅkara) and परमार्थसत्य (परमार्थसत्य of the Jainas, पारमार्थिक सत्य of Śaṅkara) (द्वे सत्ये समुपाश्रित्य बुद्धानां धर्मदेशानां लोकसंदृतिसत्यं च सत्यं च परमार्थतः ॥ येऽनयोर्न विजानन्ति विभागं सत्ययोद्वयोः । ते तत्त्वं न विजानन्ति गम्भीरं बुद्धशासने ॥ Madhyamakārikā IV. 8-9). संदृति is the उपाय and परमार्थ is the उपेय. परतन्त्र is one of the three लक्षण of a thing, according to the Buddhists, परिकल्पित or कल्पित, imagined (e. g. योगनिर्मित elephant) परतन्त्र or तन्त्र, dependent (the form of the योगनिर्मित elephant depending for its existence upon the cause योग) and परिनिष्पत्त or निष्पत्त, perfect (the non-existence of the elephant). The परिकल्पित corresponds to the आतिभासिक सत्य of the Vedāntins.

We differ from Prof. Vidhuśekhara regarding the interpretation of this Kārikā. परतन्त्र means here undoubtedly 'other schools of philosophy', the Buddhistic school (cf. समानतन्त्रसिद्धः परतन्त्रासिद्धः प्रतितन्त्रसिद्धान्तः (Nyāyasūtra I. 1-29). The Buddhists regard संदृति or लोकसंदृति as सत्य (which is really a contradiction in terms, for संदृति means आवरण), while Gauḍapāda regards it as असत्य. It is wrong to say that Śaṅkara admits any व्यावहारिक सत्य. In the beginning of the Vedāntasūti abhāṣya, he defines his position quite clearly ... मिथ्याज्ञाननिमित्तः सत्यानुते मिथुनीकृत्य, अहमिदं ममेदमिति नैसर्गिको लोकव्यवहारः. He talks of व्यवहारावस्था, but not of व्यवहारसत्य. Like Gauḍapāda, he understands सत्य to be one, indivisible and without any gradations. संदृति must therefore be always असत्य. Gauḍapāda recognised only कल्पितसंदृति. The objector says:— You said in the last two Kārikās that चित्त was असङ्ग and जीव is not born. But in Kārikā 57, you also said संदृत्या जायते सर्वम्. How can you reconcile this ?

The answer is:— Kārikā 58 makes it quite clear that the अन्म is मायोपम्, so जीव is not born and माया does not exist. So whatever is taken to exist on account of the कलिप्त अविद्या, does not exist in reality (न चायं व्यवहाराभावोऽवस्थाविशेषनिवद्दोऽभिधियते इति युक्तं वक्तुम् 'तत्त्वमासि' इति ब्रह्मान्मध्यानवस्थाविशेषनिवद्धनत्वाद् । तस्करद्वाषान्तेन चानृताभिसंधस्य बन्धनं सत्याभिसंधस्य च मोक्षं दर्शयन्त्रेकाव्यमेवैकं पारमार्थिकं दर्शयति । भिश्याज्ञानविज्ञभित्तं च नानात्वम् । उभयसत्यतायां हि कथं व्यवहारगोचरोऽपि जन्मतुरनृताभिसंधित्युच्येत । Śāṅkarabhaṣya on Vedāntasūtra II. 1-14).

The objector says:— The Buddhists admit संदृति as सत्य; so what is accepted by संदृति should be true.

The answer is:— The Buddhists have their own terminology and may endow their favourite संदृति with any characteristics they like, but in reality the thing admitted in संदृति cannot be real. (cf. Mammata silencing an objector who complains that परमाणु etc. are regarded by the बौद्धेषिक as गुणs, while Mammata would class them as जाति, परमाणवादीनां युणमध्यपाठाद् पारिभाषिकं युणत्वम् । Kāvya-prakāśa II).

अभिसंदृति seems to mean अभिमत्ता or अभिनिष्पत्ता (evolved, perfected) संदृति.

K. bhāṣya's explanation of परतन्त्र ... as मोक्षशास्त्रव्यवहारेण is far-fetched.

(74) The objector says that it is not fair to condemn संदृति outright. If संदृति says जीवः अजः, are we going to discard that teaching simply because संदृति is कलिप्त ?

The answer is:— 'Certainly' (this is made clear in the next Kārikā). We stick to our proposition that the कलिप्तसंदृति cannot be associated with any reality. Again, संदृति which bears the Buddhist brand does admit even an अज thing or the idea about it as being born. परतन्त्राभिनिष्पत्तिः यस्याः तया, that is, how we take the expression परतन्त्राभिनिष्पत्य (K. bhāṣya says, परशस्त्रासिद्धिमपेक्ष्य योऽज इत्युक्तः, that is, आत्मन् is called अज—really we cannot call the आत्मन् or जीव even अज, as he is निर्विक्षेप—only with a view to give validity to the मोक्षशास्त्र etc. prior to आत्मबोध; this is obviously far-fetched). Gaudapāda says that ideas about संदृति differ according to different philosophers. But they involve कार्यकारणभाव which has been declared to be baseless. So, even if the संदृति blunders into the right,

that cannot be accepted as truth, because it is based on wrong premises. To hold that लोकसंवृति is सत्य is pure eye-wash and self-deception.

(75) The reason why संवृति cannot tell us any truth, is that there is अभिनिवेश for an असत् (असूत् = not existing, unreal) viz. the कार्यकारणभाव which means belief in द्वैत. Actually in the case of reality there cannot be any द्वैत. When a person knows that there cannot exist any ग्राहाग्राहकभाव, the असूताभिनिवेश caused by कार्यकारणभाव has no scope. K. bhāṣya takes सः to mean यः इयाभावं बुद्ध्वा निर्निमित्तो निवृत्तमिथ्याद्वाभिनिवेशः, so that it supplies यः to make the construction less involved. We might take असूताभिनिवेशः as the subject of न जायते, but then इयाभावं बुद्ध्वा would go with अभिनिवेश and it might be objected that अभिनिवेश cannot be said to cognise anything. स बुद्ध्वैव has the sense of a nominative absolute, and the subject of न जायते may be different from सः, or सः refers to अजः in Kārikā 74, or जीवः in Kārikā 71.

(76) The उत्तमाधममध्यम हेतु^ss correspond to the three आश्रम mentioned in III. 16 (हीनमध्यमोऽकृष्टवृद्ध्य आश्रमाः). धर्मा देवन्वादिप्राप्ति-हेतव उत्तमाः । ... अधर्मव्यामिश्रा मनुष्यत्वादिप्राप्त्यर्था मध्यमाः । तिर्यगादिप्राप्ति-निमित्ता अधर्मलक्षणाः प्रवृत्तिविशेषाक्षाधमाः (K. bhāṣya). When the चित्त does not concern itself with these हेतु^s, it becomes निर्निमित्त and is not originated.

(77) When the चित्त has become निर्निमित्त, the अनुभवति state of the चित्त remains the same immutable for ever. That अनुभवति is the मोक्ष itself. Prof. Vidhuśekhara admits himself baffled over this Kārikā, leaves the second half of the Kārikā untranslated, and considers the explanation given in the K. bhāṣya (निरस्तधर्माधर्मख्योत्पत्तिनिमित्तस्यानिमित्तस्य चित्तस्येति या मोक्षाद्याकुत्पत्तिः सा सर्वदा सर्वावस्थासु समा निर्विशेषाद्वया च । पूर्वमप्यजातस्यैवाकुत्पत्तस्य चित्तस्य सर्वस्याद्वयस्येत्यर्थः । परमात्मागपि विज्ञानाच्चित्तहृदयं तद्वद्यं जन्म च तस्मादजातस्य सर्वस्य सर्वदा चित्तस्य समाद्वयाकुत्पत्तिः । ... सर्वदैकरूपैत्यर्थः) as unsatisfactory. His objections are : (1) There is nothing corresponding to या in the first line and the sentence is incomplete, and (2) there is no antecedent to तद् in the second line. It must be admitted that the construction is an involved one (but this is not uncommon with Gaudapāda), but we can easily supply सा to correspond with या, and take तद् as referring to चित्त. Because चित्त is nothing but चित्तहृदय, and therefore as explained before, अजात

and अनिमित्त, its real state is just अनुत्पत्ति and it perseveres without any change. K. bhāṣya rightly calls this अनुत्पत्ति state as the मोक्ष, or we might take तत् as referring to फल in हेत्वभावे फलं कृतः in the last Kārikā. The फल also is चिन्तहृदय and cannot really exist.

(78) सत्याद्—परमार्थस्त्वाद्. The अनिमित्तता of the चिन्त is the same as the असनीभाव. Prof. Vidhuśekhara reads अनाप्रवृत् so that it might agree with चिन्त which is regarded by him as the subject of अनुत्ते. The expressions वीतशोकं, पदमभृते however agree better with the person (rather than चिन्त) who secures the right knowledge. As Prof. Vidhuśekhara has pointed out the change over from चिन्त to a person is abrupt. On the other hand, it might be argued that the आकृता of the reader, after being told about the state of मोक्ष, is to know what happens to a person who realises that state, and that is satisfied by the present Kārikā. सः=जीवः.

(79) As long as the अभूताभिनिवेश involving the belief in द्वन्द्व persists, the चिन्त is tossed about from one असत् thing to another. But when it is realised that there cannot be any द्वय or वस्तु, the चिन्त becomes असङ्ग and turns away from the द्वय. The subject of विनिवर्तते may be तत् (चिन्त) in the first half, in which case स बुद्धैवैव is a kind of absolute construction, or सः is the subject of विनिवर्तते, the first half being regarded as a parenthetical cause.

(80) When the चिन्त is thus fully निवृत्त and remains steady in that state, the person can be said to have realised the Reality which is the same always, unborn and free from द्वय; naturally only the enlightened ones are lucky to realise this. बुद्धानाम्—Prof. Vidhuśekhara thinks that this expression refers to the Buddhas. It rather refers to the स्थितप्रज्ञs of the Gītā (cf. श्रुतिविप्रतिपक्षा ते यदा स्थास्यति निश्चला । समाधावच्छला बुद्धिस्तदा योगमवाप्यासि ॥ II. 53, ... वज्ञे हि यस्येन्द्रियाणि तस्य प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठिता ॥ II. 61, प्रसन्नचेतसो ह्याशु बुद्धिः पर्यवतिष्ठते ॥ II. 65, तस्मायस्य महाबाहो निश्चीतानि सर्वशः । इन्द्रियाणीन्द्रियार्थेभ्यस्तस्य प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठिता ॥ II. 68). विषयः—गोचरः, something to be realised by.

(81) धर्मः—आत्माद्वयः, धातुस्वभावतः—वस्तुस्वभावतः (K. bhāṣya). Prof. Vidhuśekhara wishes to take धर्म in the special Buddhistic sense, सर्वबीजक आलयविज्ञान or आश्रयपरावृत्ति. He also reads धर्मो धातुः स्वभावतः, but wishes to emend it into धर्मधातुः स्वभावतः (धर्मधातुः mean-

ing ' the essence of reality. ' The reading as it is gives a satisfactory sense. It is however likely that Gauḍapāda may have deliberately used here the Buddhistic expression धर्मधातुः कल्पितस्य सर्वस्य धारणाद् धर्मो ... धीयते निधीयते सर्वं निक्षिप्यते सुषुप्तादावभिमान्विति धातुरात्मोच्यते । (Ānandagiri). स्वयं प्रभातं भवति (cf. न तद् भासयते सूर्यो न शशाङ्को न पावकः । Gītā XV-6) which is self-illuminating and does not depend upon others for its light. The expression सङ्कल्पिमातः occurs in Chāndogya VII. 4-2, सङ्कल्पिभातो हेवैष ब्रह्मलोकः ।

(82) सुखं and द्वःखं are used adverbially. Prof. Vidhuśekhara translates सुखम् आविष्टे नित्यं and द्वःखं विविष्टते सदा as ' bliss is constantly covered and misery is unfolded '. According to him भगवान्सौ is to be construed with अस्ति, नास्ति etc, in the next Kārikā. We see no reason to split the Kārikā in this way. K. bhāṣya rightly remarks एव मृच्यमानमपि परमार्थतत्त्वं कर्मालौकिकैर्न गृह्णत इत्युच्यते । यस्मादस्य कस्यचिद् द्वयवस्तुनो धर्मस्य ग्रहणे वेशेन मिथ्याभिनिविष्टतया सुखमाविष्टतया सेनाच्छायत इत्यथेः ... द्वःखं च विविष्टते प्रकटीक्रियते । परमार्थज्ञानस्य दुर्लभत्वात् । भगवान्सौ glorifies the निश्वला स्थितिः which is the same as अमनीभाव or आत्मन्. Prof. Vidhuśekhara says that the expression fits in better with धर्मधातु ।

(83) Gauḍapāda points out in this Kārikā how the भगवान् (आत्मन्) is obscured by the ignorant who associate him with different धर्म, by resorting to the four कोटिः (modes) of looking at reality. The four कोटिः are:—

[1] अस्ति— अस्त्यात्मेति वादी कञ्चित्प्रातिपद्यते । (K. bhāṣya)
प्रमाता देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽस्तीत्याद्यो वै शेषिकादिपक्षः ।
(Ānandagiri)

[2] नास्ति— नास्तीत्यपरो वै नाशिकः । (K. bhāṣya)
देहादिव्यतिरिक्तोऽपि नासौ बुद्धेदर्थतिरिच्यते । क्षणिकस्य विज्ञान-
स्यैवाभ्यत्वादिति द्वितीयो विज्ञानवादिपक्षः । (Ānandagiri)

[3] अस्ति नास्ति— अस्ति नास्तीत्यपरोऽर्थवै नाशिकः सदसद्वादी दिग्बासाः ।
(K. bhāṣya), द्वितीयो दिग्बन्धरपक्षः । (Ānandagiri)

[4] नास्ति नास्ति— नास्ति नास्तीत्यत्यन्तशून्यवादी । (K. bhāṣya)
चतुर्थेतु शून्यवादिपक्षे शून्यस्यात्यन्तकत्वयोत्तनार्थी वीक्षा ।
(Anandagiri)

According to the K. bhāṣya and Ānandagiri नास्ति (२) and नास्ति (४) refer to the विज्ञानवादिन्ृs and the ज्ञन्यवादिन्ृs respectively ; while No. ३ अस्ति नास्ति is taken by K. bhāṣya to refer to the वैशेषिकs and Jainas, Ānandagiri refers it only to the Jainas (actually the Jainas admit the सप्तभङ्गीनय). No. १ is not referred to any particular school of philosophy by K. bhāṣya; Ānandagiri refers it to the वैशेषिकs.

Prof. Vidhuśekhara sees here no reference to the विज्ञानवादिन्ृs and माध्यमिकs, but is prepared to refer No. १ to the Vedāntins who believe in the existence of Ātman (अस्तीति ब्रुवते॒अन्यत्र कथं तदूपलभ्यते । अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यस्तत्त्वभावेन चोभयोः । अस्तीत्येवोपलब्धव्यस्तत्त्वभावः प्रसीदति ॥ Katha VI. १२-१३,) and whom Gaudapāda dubs here as वालिश ! It is unthinkable that the Vedāntins could have been referred to here, for being specifically condemned. Prof. Vidhuśekhara to suit his purpose, takes चल, स्थिर, उभय, and अभाव (not as referring respectively to अस्ति, नास्ति, अस्ति नास्ति, and नास्ति नास्ति, but) as referring to नास्ति, अस्ति, etc.), that is, अस्ति refers to स्थिर and चल to नास्ति. Gaudapāda obviously understands by अस्ति, a phase involving production (one of the six भावविकारs, जायते, अस्ति, विपरिणमते, वर्धते, अपचीयते, विनश्यति), so that those only who believe that Ātman undergoes any change are condemned here as वालिश (तत्रास्तिभावश्वलः घटाद्यनित्यविलक्षणत्वात् । नास्तिभावः स्थिरः सदाविशेषत्वात् । K. bhāṣya). The belief in the existence of the wrong type of Ātman is referred to here.

We think that Gaudapāda is not thinking of any particular schools of philosophy here. He seems to be indebted to Buddhistic references like कारणैः प्रत्ययैश्वापि येषां लोकः प्रश्नते । चातुष्कोटिकया युक्ता न ते सञ्चयकोशिदाः ॥ असक्त जायते लोको न सक्त सदसन्कचित् । प्रत्ययैः कारणैश्वापि यथा वालिर्बिकल्पते ॥ Laṅkāvatāra III. 20-21; चालपृथग्जन्ता ... न स्वासिद्धान्तनयं चातुष्कोटिकनपविशुद्धं प्रतिविभावयन्ति । P. 171) चतुष्यविनिर्मुक्ता तथागतानां धर्मदेशना यद्यैकत्वान्यत्वोभयानुभयपक्षवर्जिता नास्यस्तिसमारोपापवादविनिर्मुक्ता etc. P. 96, चातुष्कोटिकं च महामते लोकव्यवहारः । यच्च चातुष्कोटिकबाह्यं तद्वाद्यमात्रं प्रसञ्जयते वन्ध्यापुत्रवत् । P. 188.

(84) When the Ātman is realised as being untouched by the चातुष्कोटिकत्वं, one goes beyond लोकव्यवहार and becomes omniscient.

(85) Being a सर्वज्ञ means securing the ब्राह्मण्य पद. ब्राह्मण्यम्—Befitting a Brāhmaṇa (one who knows Brahman) who deserves the highest पद as mentioned in एष नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य (Brha. IV. 4-23) That Gauḍapāda calls the highest end in life as a ब्राह्मण्य पद is convincing proof that he could not be preaching Buddhism (Prof. Vidyūṣekhara points out that in Buddhist literature a Brāhmaṇa is held in as much respect as a Śramaṇa and a true Brāhmaṇa is sometimes identified with a Buddha. But it would be all the same extremely unusual for a true Buddhist to speak of the highest reality as ब्राह्मण्य पद). आदिमध्यान्ता उत्पत्तिस्थितिलया अनापन्ना अप्राप्ता यस्याद्यस्य पदस्य न विद्यन्ते तदनापन्नादिमध्यान्तं ब्राह्मण्यं पदम् । (K. bhāṣya). किमतः परमीहते । — Cf. ... यस्त्वात्मरतिरेव स्यादात्मतुपसङ्गं मानवः । आत्मन्येव च संतुष्टस्य कार्यं न विद्यते ॥ नैव तस्य कृतेनार्थो नाकृतेनेह कश्चन । न चास्य सर्वभूतेषु कञ्चिदर्थव्यपाश्रयः ॥ Gitā III. 17-18.

(86) The ब्राह्मण्य पद secured by those who know Brahman or the true आत्मस्वरूप is not something to be secured anew, but is the natural state for them. विनयः, education, from e = out, duco = I lead, is the exact English equivalent for विनयः, वि = विशेषेण and नी to carry. प्राकृतः—स्वाभाविकः. A knower of Brahman is naturally possessed of the right विनय, ज्ञान and इम. Cf. योगार्थस्य तस्यैव ज्ञानः कारणमुच्यते । (Gitā VI. 3). It is possible that Gauḍapāda deliberately uses the expression विनय here to hint that the विनय in the Buddhistic work विनयपिटक is not the true विनय.

(87) In the remaining portion of this Prakaraṇa, Gauḍapāda shows his acquaintance with Buddhistic thought and works; he however improves upon some of the ideas and points out where he differs from the Buddhists. In this Kārikā and the next, he describes the three kinds of ज्ञानas (which are dealt with in detail in the Laṅkāvatāra).

[1] लौकिक— This is जागरितज्ञान, where both the object and its perception are experienced.

लौकिकं ज्ञानं सदस्त्पक्षाभिनिविष्टानां सर्वतीर्थकरब्राह्माल-
पृथग्जनानां च (Laṅkāvatāra P. 157).

[2] शुद्धलौकिक— This is स्वप्नज्ञान, where the object is absent, but the perception exists. It is called शुद्ध, because it is free from contact with the वस्तु. According to the Laṅkāvatāra this would be

लोकोत्तर. K. bhāṣya by way of introduction remarks here, एवमन्योन्यविचुद्धत्वात्संसारकारणमि रागदेवदोषास्पदानि प्रावाहुकानां दर्शनानि । अतो मिथ्यादर्शनानि तानीति तयुक्तिभिरेव दर्शयित्वा चतुष्कोटिवर्जितत्वाद्वागादिदोषानास्पदं स्वभावशान्तमदैतदर्शनमेव सम्बन्धदर्शनमित्युपसंहृतम् । अथेदानीं स्वप्रक्रियाप्रदर्शनार्थं आरम्भः— Similarly, Ānandagiri, वरमतानेराकरणमुखेनात्मतत्त्वमवधारितम् । अथुना स्वप्रक्रियावस्थाद्वयमुपस्थ्यति ।

(88) [3] लोकोत्तरम्— This is the सुषुप्तम्, where there is neither वस्तु nor उपलभ्म.

The लङ्कावतार explains as follows:— लोकोत्तरं ज्ञानं सर्वशावकप्रत्येकदुद्धानां च स्वसामान्यलक्षणपतिताशयाभिनिविष्टानाम्, and mentions also लोकोत्तरतमं ज्ञानं, शुद्धलौकिकसत्त्वानां निराभासधर्मप्रविचयादनिरोधात्माददर्शनात् सदसत्पक्षविगतं तथागतभूमिनेरात्म्याधिगमाव्यवर्तते । (P. 157).

The लौकिक, लोकोत्तर, and लोकोत्तरतम of the Laṅkāvatāra, corresponds, as Prof. Vidhuśekhara points out, respectively to लौकिक, शुद्धलौकिक and लोकोत्तर in the text. We however do not agree with Prof. Vidhuśekhara when he says that ‘the difference is only in nomenclature and as such is not important’. Gaudapāda seems to show by his scheme that the लोकोत्तरतमज्ञान of the Buddhas could not be the उत्तमज्ञान which according to him is किञ्चिच्च जायते (III. 48, IV. 71).

Generally only two categories लौकिक and लोकोत्तर (मार्ग 4 + मार्गफल 4 + निर्वाण = 9 लोकोत्तर, and all the other mental states are लौकिक) are referred to in Buddhist works. The Laṅkāvatāra gives three categories which Gaudapāda cleverly equates with the three states जाग्रत्, स्वप्न and सुषुप्त ।

In the second line Gaudapāda refers to what is regarded by the wise philosophers to be fit to be comprehended to secure salvation. Different interpretations are proposed as follows:—

[1] K. bhāṣya:— लौकिकं शुद्धलौकिकं लोकोत्तरं क्रमेण येन ज्ञानेन जायते तज्ज्ञानं ज्ञेयम् एतान्येष श्रीणि, एतदव्यतिरेकेण ज्ञेयातुपपत्तेः ... विज्ञेयं परमार्थसत्यं सुपर्यात्महृयमज्ञानात्मतत्त्वमित्यर्थः । सदा सर्वदैतद्वाँकिकादिविज्ञेयान्तं इच्छैः परमार्थार्थमिर्बहुविद्धिः प्रकीर्तितम् ।

[2] Prof. Vidhuśekhara:— ‘ This is to be understood to be the knowledge and knowable, as is always declared by the Buddhas. We have already (IV. 1) seen that there is no difference between *jñāna* and *jñeyā*. Or it may mean that whatever we may know by the terms *jñāna* and *jñeyā* is only the three things mentioned in the Kārikā ’.

Prof. Vidhuśekhara’s interpretation is hardly convincing. We need not understand that Buddhas are meant by the expression बुद्धैः, again ज्ञेयं (which elsewhere is taken to be Brahman by Gauḍapāda III. 33 ब्रह्म ज्ञेयं) can not refer to the object of the three-fold ज्ञान just described. The next Kārikā tells us that when ज्ञेयं is known, the person becomes सर्वज्ञः, so ज्ञेयं cannot mean a mere object of knowledge in the ordinary sense of the term.

The first query about the second half of the Kārikā would be : How many things are mentioned there—

[1] ज्ञानं, ज्ञेयं and विज्ञेयं, these three, or

[2] ज्ञानं विज्ञेयं and ज्ञेयं विज्ञेयं; ज्ञानं and ज्ञेयं—these two, that is, विज्ञेयं to be taken as a predicative ?

Though Gauḍapāda has said before that ज्ञेयं is Brahman, it appears that K. bhāṣya is right in taking विज्ञेयं to be the तुर्थं, and there is also no इति which would be necessary if only ज्ञानं and ज्ञेयं are intended (Gauḍapāda, however, as has been already remarked, is careless in his constructions).

The second query would be : what is the exact meaning of ज्ञानं and ज्ञेयं ? Does ज्ञानं refer to the three-fold division लौकिक, शुद्धलौकिक and लोकोत्तर ? The expression विविधे ज्ञाने in the next Kārikā strongly favours this interpretation, but the next Kārikā refers only to ज्ञानं and ज्ञेयं and not to विज्ञेयं (unless we hold that सर्वज्ञता हि सर्वत्र refers to विज्ञेयं), or is the second line just intended to give some information in a detached parenthetical way ? Just as the three-fold division of ज्ञानं is given, the well-known triad ज्ञानं, ज्ञेयं and विज्ञेयं is mentioned for the benefit of the student. If the latter interpretation is favoured, Gauḍapāda possibly refers to the Gītā in this connection, ज्ञानं तेऽहं सविज्ञानमिदं वश्यमयशेषतः । यज्ज्ञात्वा नेह श्वयोऽन्यज्ञातवयमवशिष्यते ॥ etc. VII. 2; अमानितवमद्विभित्वमहिंसा क्षान्तिराज्यवध । आचार्योपासनं शौचं श्वैर्यं मात्रमविनियहः ॥ हन्त्रियायेषु वैराग्यमनहंकारं एव च । जन्ममहत्युजराग्याधिष्ठाःसदोषाणु-दर्शनम् ॥ असक्तिरनभिषङ्गः पुत्रदारग्यहादिषु । नित्यं च समचित्तत्वमिष्टानिष्टोपपत्तिषु ॥

मयि ज्ञानन्ययोगेन भक्तिरव्यभिचारिणी । विविक्तदेशसेविवरतिर्जनसंसदि ॥ अध्यात्म-
ज्ञाननित्यत्वं तत्त्वज्ञानार्थदर्शनम् । एतज्ञानाभिति प्रोक्तमज्ञानं यदतोऽन्यथा ॥ XIII.
7-11; ह्येयं यत् तत् प्रवक्ष्यामि यज्ञात्वा सृतमशुते । अनादिमतपरं ब्रह्म न सद्
तत्त्वासदुच्यते ॥ सर्वतः पाणिपादं तत् सर्वतोऽक्षिशिरोमुखम् । सर्वतः श्रुतिमल्लोके
सर्वमादृत्य तिष्ठति ॥ सर्वेन्द्रियगुणाभासं सर्वेन्द्रियविवर्जितम् । असक्तं सर्वभूचैव निर्णीण
गुणमोक्तुं च ॥ बहिरन्तश्च भूतानामचरं चरमेव च । सूक्ष्मत्वाद् तदविज्ञेयं दूरस्थं
ज्ञानितके च तद् ॥ अविभक्तं च भूतेषु विभक्तमिव च स्थितम् । भूतभर्तुं च तज्ज्ञेयं
ग्रसिण्ड प्रभविष्णु च ॥ ज्योतिषामपि तज्ज्ञोतिस्तमसः परसुच्यते । ज्ञानं ह्येयं ज्ञानगम्यं
इदि सर्वस्य धिष्ठितम् ॥ XIII. 12-17 (The expression ज्ञानं ह्येयं ज्ञानगम्यं above seems to be an echo of ज्ञानं ह्येयं ज्ञानगम्यं above).

(89) K. bhāṣya takes ह्येये to mean लौकिकादौ त्रिविधे and ज्ञाने as लौकिकादिविषये । त्रिविधे refers only to ज्ञाने, if ह्येय means अनादिमत परं ब्रह्म as explained in the Gītā (XIII. 12). One who knows Brahman, automatically becomes सर्वज्ञ for all time. K. bhāṣya says, आत्मस्वरूपमेव सर्वज्ञता सर्वश्चासौ ज्ञश्च सर्वज्ञस्तत्त्वावः सर्वज्ञता ... न हि परमार्थविदो ज्ञानोऽन्वाभिभवत्वौ स्तो यथान्वेषां प्राबादुकानाम् । which is far-fetched. The idea of a ब्रह्मवित् being सर्वज्ञ is quite common, cf. यो मामेवमसंसृद्धो ज्ञानाति पुरुषोत्तमम् । स सर्वविद्धजाति मां सर्वभावेन भारत ॥ Gītā XV. 19.

(90) K. bhāṣya says by way of introduction, लौकिकादीनि क्रमेण ह्येयत्वेन निर्देशादस्तित्वाशक्त्वा परमार्थतो मा भूदित्याह and explains अग्रयाणतः as प्रथमतः Prof. Vidhuśekhara takes अग्रयाण as referring to Mahāyāna. There is no doubt that the explanation प्रथमतः is unsatisfactory. According to Prof. Vidhuśekhara, the first line means 'ह्येयज्ञेयाग्यपाक्षयः should be understood from the Mahāyāna'. Even if अग्रहाण means महायान, Gaudapāda's reference to ह्येयज्ञेयाग्यपाक्षयः as विज्ञेयानि (In Kārikā 88, Gaudapāda refers to विज्ञेय as the highest truth, he could not possibly admit more than one विज्ञेय) shows that he does not approve of what the Mahāyāna says (This is further corroborated by the second line which uses the word विज्ञेय in its proper sense and brushes aside the विज्ञेयः in the first line uncaringly). The words in the Kārikā are variously interpreted:-

ह्यानि — लौकिकादीनि त्रीणि जागरितस्वप्नमुक्तान्यात्मन्यसत्त्वेन रज्ज्वां सर्वै-
वद्वात्मानि । (K. bhāṣya).

परतन्त्रस्वभाव (Prof. Vidhuśekhara, in conformity with Asaṅga).

ज्ञेयम् — चतुर्थोटिवर्जितं परमार्थतच्चम् । (K. bhāṣya; while the same authority explained ज्ञेय as लौकिकादीनि श्रीणि, in the comment on Kārikā 88).

परिकल्पितस्वभाव (Vidhuśekhara).

आप्यानि — आप्यानि त्यक्तवाहौषणाङ्गेण भिक्षुणा परिषदस्यबाल्यमौनाख्यानि साधनानि । (K. bhāṣya).

Attainable, धर्मधातु which is परिनिष्पत्त (Vidhuśekhara).

पाक्यानि — रागद्वेषमोहादयो दोषाः कषायाख्यानि पक्षव्यानि । सर्वाण्येतानि हेय-ज्ञेयाप्यपाक्यानि विज्ञेयानि भिक्षुणोपायत्वेनेत्यर्थः । (K. bhāṣya; but how could the चतुर्थोटिवर्जितं परमार्थतच्च be regarded as an उपाय ?).

To be matured, the act of maturing by discipline for the attainment of the absolute, not only for others but also for one's own self (Vidhuśekhara).

तेषां etc.—तेषां हेयादीनामन्यत्र विज्ञेयात्परमार्थसत्यं विज्ञेयं ब्रह्मैकं वर्जयित्वा, उपलभ्मनस्तुपलभ्मोऽविद्याकल्पनामात्रम् (K. bhāṣya so far seems to take तेषां as referring to all the four हेय, ज्ञेय, आप्य, and पाक्य, and calls the four अविद्याकल्पना, and makes a distinction between ज्ञेय in the first line and विज्ञेय in the second line) हेयाप्यपाक्येषु विष्वपि रस्तो ब्रह्मविभूतिने परमार्थसत्यता त्रयाणामित्यर्थः (here only the three हेय, आप्य and पाक्य are said to be असत्य, in contradiction of what was just said before).

Prof. Vidhuśekhara translates the second line as “ It is said that among them there is perception of the three, but not of that which is to be known ” and explains the idea as under:— “ only three, i. e. *heya*, *apya* and *pak'ya* can be perceived but not the *jñeyya* or *vijñeyya*. For it is *parikalpita* ‘ imagined ’ and a thing which is only imagined owing to its very nature cannot be perceived, just like mirage, as it has no existence.” Vidhuśekhara thus, like K. bhāṣya, takes विष्व to refer to हेय, आप्य and पाक्य; and ज्ञेय (in line 1) to be the same as विज्ञेय (in line 2).

We differ from Prof. Vidhuśekhara and K. bhāṣya in the interpretation of this Kārikā. We are of opinion that तेषां refers to

all the four, हेय, ज्ञेय, आत्म्य and पाक्ष्य, and विषु to लौकिक, शुद्धलौकिक and लोकोत्तर. Gaudapāda says that हेय, ज्ञेय, आत्म्य and पाक्ष्य, which are known to be विज्ञेय from अग्रयाण, are really not fit to be known, as their उपलग्नम् is connected with द्वैत and they are apart from Brahman, the real विज्ञेय. They can at best be taken to be concerned with the three-fold ज्ञान which does not make us know Brahman. अग्रयाण, lit. the first or previous path, means here according to us, the पूर्वमीमांसा which concerns itself with pointing out what is हेय, उपादेय etc. (cf. न हि परिनिषितवस्तुप्रतिपादनं संभवति, पत्यक्षादिविषयत्वात्परिनिषितवस्तुनः । तत्प्रतिपादने च हेयोपादेयरहिते कुरुषार्थभावात्, ... न च परिनिषिते वस्तुस्वरूपे विधिः संभवति, क्रियाविषयत्वात् विधेः । Śāṅkarārbhaśya on Vedāntasūtra I. 1-4). According to the पूर्वमीमांसा, हेय is to be known from the निषेधबाक्यः; ज्ञेय, what should be known, can be learnt from the विधिबाक्यः (ज्ञेय seems to be used in the sense of उपादेय) from which one knows what sacrifices should be performed and the routine of the sacrificial procedure etc.; आत्म्य is the goal, स्वर्गलोक, प्रजापतिलोक etc. which can be secured by the performance of various sacrifices, and पाक्ष्यस् are the various sacrifices. The कर्मकाण्ड thus preaches what is dependent upon द्वैत, while in the case of the true विज्ञेय (Brahman) there is no scope for द्वैत. The knowledge gained from पूर्वमीमांसा is thus wrong knowledge and we should be on our guard against being influenced by that. अग्रयाण is undoubtedly a strange expression, but that it should refer to महायाण is not likely.

(91) Anandagiri thus introduces the Kārikā, यदुक्तं ज्ञेयं चतुष्कोटिर्विनितं परमार्थतस्वमिति तदिदार्नीं स्फुटयति । Gaudapāda says that the popular view about the three-fold ज्ञान and the पूर्वमीमांसा view about ज्ञेय etc. are wrong and द्वैत or नानात्म् is to be attributed to अध्यास. All धर्मस् are really unoriginated and incapable of being contaminated, like आकाश. The expression धर्मः does not mean that there is real नानात्म. कलिप्तभेदनिबन्धनं चहुच्चन्मित्यर्थः— कत्वनेति देशकालावस्थाग्रहणम्, (किंचन किंचिदण्मात्रमपि K. bhāṣya) अण्मात्रमपीति कार्यकारणभावस्थांशांशिभावस्थ ओपादानम् । Anandagiri.

(92) The expression धर्मः ज्ञेयः in the last Kārikā may be misunderstood by some to mean that the ज्ञेयत्व of the धर्मस् is something to be acquired anew. Gaudapāda says that all धर्मस् (which are really Brahman) are already शुद्ध. आदिशुद्धाः— नित्यबोधस्वरूपाः.. Prof. Vidhuśekhara takes शुद्ध to mean बोध or तथागत. It appears to us that Gaudapāda is here objecting to the Buddhistic view that there

are some who are आदिबुद्धs (or आदिजान्तs, who are born बुद्धs), some who acquire बुद्धhood (बोधिसच्चs) etc. क्षान्तिः— Persistent or enduring belief, बोधकर्तव्यतातिरेक्षता (K. bhāṣya).

(93) Gauḍapāda points out that शान्ति, निर्वाण etc. which are but different names for मोक्ष or salvation is not something to be acquired. All are मुक्त or निर्वृत by nature, only they do not know it. If मोक्ष were to be कृतक (artificially made), it would be अनित्य (संसारदुःखोपशमनं स्वयं जन्म वा यदि क्रियेत तदा कृतकस्यानित्यत्वमवश्यंभावीत्यर्थः । (Ānandagiri). समात्र अभिज्ञाश्च समाभिज्ञाः, always the same, without any change or variety. The highest is thus अज, साम्य (always the same) and विशारद (opposite of कृपण). The धर्मs are all अध्यस्त्. सुनिर्वृताः— सुषूपरतस्वभावाः (K. bhāṣya) or grounded in निर्वाण.

(94) वैशारद्यस् is the opposite of कार्पण्यम्. K. bhāṣya takes it to mean विशुद्धि. विशारद generally means ‘proficient’ ‘clever’. According to Gauḍapāda, a कृपण is one who believes in duality ; a विशारद is one who has the right knowledge that the highest is अज and सम्. Prof. Vidhuśekhara points out that in Buddhism वैशारद्य is four-fold, in respect of (१) the highest knowledge of all things, (२) the knowledge of destroying all the human passions, (३) the knowledge about destroying impediments, (४) the knowledge of the rightness of the way leading to salvation. Gauḍapāda may be referring to this Buddhistic idea in this Kārikā, but the reference to the कृपणs (as contrasted with विशारदs) as भेदनिःस्त and पृथग्वाद्य shows that वैशारद्य mainly points out to the bold belief in अद्वैत. The Bhagavadgītā uses the expression कार्पण्यदोषोपहतस्वभावः (II. 7) with reference to Arjuna who had become धर्मसंमूढचेताः. Gauḍapāda is indebted perhaps to the Gītā for the expression कृपण.

(95) The द्वैतिन् are कृपण; those who are firmly grounded in अद्वैत alone can be called महाज्ञानs. In the Lankāvatāra, one महामति is described as propounding Buddhistic views. One is tempted to think that Gauḍapāda hints in this Kārikā, that the महामति of the Lankāvatāra is really no महामति at all ! तत्र लोको न गाहते— तत् ... परमार्थतत्त्वं सामान्यबुद्धिरन्यो लोको न गाहते नावतरति न विषयीकरोत्यर्थः । ‘सर्वं भूतात्मभूतस्य सर्वभूतहितस्य च । देवा अपि मार्गे लुद्यन्यपदस्य पदैषिणः । शकुनीनाभिवाकाशे गतिर्नेवोपलभ्यते ॥ इत्यादि स्मरणात् । (K. bhāṣya).

(96) When it is said that a महाज्ञान is one who has the knowledge of the अद्वैत Brahman, it should not be understood that

the ज्ञान is different from Brahman. The अज ज्ञान is there in the अज धर्म, as heat and light are in the sun. ज्ञान is the very nature of, and not different from, the अज धर्म. Only the हैतिन् speak of ज्ञान being related to the objects (the Buddhists also in a sense regard ज्ञान to be related to the वासना). ज्ञान is really असङ्ग and आकाशकल्प and नित्यविज्ञप्तिरूप. Read the following comment of Ānandagiri, अजं साम्यमित्युकं प्रमेयस् । तद्विषयनिश्चयवान्प्रभाता । प्रभातं तथाविद्यनिश्चयज्ञानमिति । वस्तुपरिच्छेदे कथं महाज्ञानत्वमित्याशङ्क्याह अजेविति । अजा धर्माश्रितप्रतिक्रिया जीवा विवक्ष्यन्ते । तेष्वजं ज्ञानं कृटस्थद्विस्तरं विभक्तं ब्रह्माचलमात्मभूतमध्युपगम्यते । तथा च मानमेयादिभावस्य कलित्यत्वेऽपि वस्तुतो वस्तुपरिच्छेदाभावादुपर्यन्तं तज्ज्ञानवतां महाज्ञानत्वमित्यर्थः । किं चास्मन्मते ज्ञानस्य यदसङ्क्षेपमङ्गीकृतं तदपि विषयाभावादेव सिद्धयति । ततश्च सुकृत्य निर्विषयं मन इति यद्युच्यते तदप्यविरुद्धमित्याह यतो नेति । The Laṅkāvātāra also describes ज्ञान to be असङ्ग and contrasts it with विज्ञान, तत्रोत्पन्नप्रधर्वंसि विज्ञानम् अनुत्पन्नप्रधर्वंसि ज्ञानम् । ... निमित्तानिमित्तप्रतितं विज्ञानं नास्त्यस्तिवैचित्र्यलक्षणेहतुकं च, निमित्तानिमित्तव्यतिक्रान्तलक्षणं ज्ञानम् । ... उपचयलक्षणं विज्ञानम्, आचयलक्षणं ज्ञानम् । ... असङ्गलक्षणं ज्ञानं विषयवैचित्र्यसङ्गलक्षणं च विज्ञानम् । ... त्रिसङ्गतिक्षयोन्यादयोगलक्षणं विज्ञानम्, असङ्गस्वभावलक्षणं ज्ञानम् ... अप्राप्तिलक्षणं ज्ञानं स्वप्रत्यायज्ञानगतिगोचरभ्रवेशानिर्गमत्वादुकचन्द्रवज्जले । (Pp. 157-158). The ज्ञान is असङ्ग, for there is no विषय, as Ānandagiri says.

(97) Ānandagiri thus comments upon this Kārikā:-कृटस्थं ब्रह्मैव तत्त्वमिति स्वमते ज्ञानमसङ्गं सिद्धतीत्युक्तम् । मतान्तरे उनः सविषयत्वाज्ञानस्यासङ्क्षेपमसंगतं असज्येतेत्याह अणुमात्रेऽपीति । अविद्वद्वृष्ट्यज्ञा कस्यचिदपि पदार्थस्य अन्माङ्गीकारे ज्ञानस्य तददुषङ्गित्वेनासङ्गत्वायोगे बन्धधर्वंसलक्षणं प्रयोजनं कूर्शपास्तं भवतीत्याह किञ्चुतेति । If once we admit that Brahman is capable of even the slightest change, ज्ञान would cease to be असङ्ग and आवरण-असुति would become a कार्य and so अनित्य. It has been already stated that मोक्ष can never be a कार्य in any sense. आवरण is the concealment of the true nature of Brahman, due to माया, अविद्या, मिथ्या-ज्ञान etc.

(98) All धर्मs are always without any आवरण in their natural state. It is we who wrongly superimpose upon them all sorts of qualities and forms. They are always बुद्ध and छुक्त. It is wrong to say that they become बुद्ध or छुक्त after undergoing penance etc. K. bhāṣya takes नायकाः to mean स्वामिनः समर्थ बोद्धुं बोधशक्तिमत्समावाह, and adds यथा नित्यप्रकाशस्वरूपोऽपि सविता प्रकाशत इत्युच्यते यथा वा नित्य-निवृत्तमप्योऽपि नित्यमेव शैलाशितष्टन्तीत्युच्यते तद्वत् बुद्ध्यन्त इत्युच्यते । Though the धर्मs are always बुद्ध, they are metaphorically said to be 'knowers',

which expression implies knowing to be something different from the knower. We have to regard इति to be misplaced according to this interpretation. The natural way would be to take इति with नायकाः. Prof. Vidhuśekhara rightly explains नायकाः to mean Buddhas. K. bhāṣya seems to understand the Kārikā to mean that all धर्मस are प्रकृतिनिर्मल, आदिबुद्ध and नायक and they are spoken of as बुध्यन्ते only metaphorically. After इति we have to supply apparently लक्षणयोच्यते. This is obviously an unnatural interpretation. The proper way surely is to take इति नायकाः to mean 'so the नायकs say' and what they say is to be found in the rest of the Kārikā (and not इति नायकाः बुध्यन्ते as Prof. Vidhuśekhara takes it). We think that the first half of the Kārikā is not to be connected with the second half. After having stated his thesis that all धर्मस are अलंकारण and प्रकृतिनिर्मल, Gauḍapāda in the second half of this Kārikā and the next one, points out how the Bauddha view differs from his. Buddhas (नायकाः) say that the आदिबुद्धs and the आदिसुक्तs have knowledge of the धर्मस (and the बोधिसंवादs try to secure that knowledge. Some Bauddhas at any rate admit that some are बुद्ध or बुक्त from the very beginning and some attain to Buddhahood by penance etc.). Gauḍapāda argues that this view of the Bauddhas is wrong. For this involves वैधर्म्य which is a great obstacle in the way of आवरणच्युति. When all धर्मस are प्रकृतिनिर्मल, the distinction that some धर्मस are आदिबुद्ध or आदिसुक्त or अ.दिशान्त is meaningless.

(99) Gauḍapāda shows here how it is not possible for a बुद्ध to have the knowledge of the धर्मस. In order that there may be ज्ञान of the धर्मस, ज्ञान must relate itself to the objects; but according to the अज्ञातिवाद there is no उत्पाद of the धर्मs themselves. ज्ञान cannot therefore be said to be going over to the धर्मs. The धर्मs too, being प्रकृतिनिर्मल like आकाश, cannot relate themselves to ज्ञान either, for ज्ञान is also आकाशकल्प; thus—

ज्ञानं धर्मेण न क्रमते, and

सर्वे धर्माः ज्ञानं न क्रमन्ते (one would have expected here ज्ञाने to keep the symmetry); or सर्वे धर्मास्तथा ज्ञानं (तायिनः or तापिनः is explained in K. bhāṣya, as संतानवतो निरन्तरस्याकाशकल्पस्येत्यर्थः । पूजावतो वा प्रज्ञावतो वा । तायिन् is variously explained in Buddhist literature as 'permanent' 'instructed') might be taken to mean as the K. bhāṣya does, सर्वे धर्माः क्वचिदप्यर्थान्तरे न क्रमन्ते तथा ज्ञानं क्वचिदप्यर्थान्तरे न क्रमते. In any case,

धर्माः ज्ञानं न क्रमन्ते, and ज्ञानं धर्मेषु न क्रमते are respectively used to mean न चित्तजा धर्माः and चित्तं न धर्मजस् (Kārikā 54, above). What Gaudapāda means to say is that Gautama Buddha told many things (The Laṅkāvatāra contains the expression भाषिष्यद्देहं तत् repeated many times and put in the mouth of Buddha who is made to discourse on various topics there), but he could not grasp the Ajātivāda which is the only proper solution of the problem about Sarīsāra. Buddha no doubt denied the existence of बाह्यार्थ, and admitted the विज्ञानवाक्, but he somehow or other could not get out of the idea of causal relation and origination. To that extent Buddha's philosophy is defective—this seems to be the meaning of this Kārikā. Prof. Vidhuśekhara on the other hand sees in the expression नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम्, a reference to अवचानं बुद्धवचनम् which is taken to mean that the transcendental truth cannot be attained through instruction from another, and is therefore silence for the noble. All this seems to us to be entirely far-fetched (see the article ' Dvipadām Varā ' in the Annals of the B. O. R. I., Vol. XXXII, pp. 166-173 for a detailed discussion about this Kārikā). K. bhāṣya remarks on नैतद्बुद्धेन भाषितम्, इदं तु परमार्थतत्त्वमद्वैतं वेदान्तेष्वेव विज्ञेयमित्यर्थः । All agree that the expression बुद्धेन refers to Gautama Buddha.

(100) Gaudapāda had saluted द्विपदां वर in Kārikā 1, and अस्फौ-योग in Kārikā 2; he concludes this Prakarana and the whole work by saluting the पद or highest state. Prof. Vidhuśekhara takes पद to mean निर्बाण and thinks that the epithets द्वृदर्श (in Pali उद्वृदर्श means निर्बाण) and अतिगम्भीर support the meaning निर्बाण. It is quite unnecessary to take पद to mean निर्बाण. The expression, usually परम पद, is used often in philosophical literature to mean मोक्ष. K. bhāṣya remarks, हुःसेन दर्शनमस्येति द्वृदर्शम् । आस्ति नास्तीति चतुष्कोटिवर्जितत्वाद्वृद्विज्ञेयमित्यर्थः । यथाबलम्— Prof. Vidhuśekhara says अज्ञा, वीर्य, स्वृति, समाधि and प्रज्ञा which constitute बल in Buddhism are meant here.



APPENDIX I

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ERRATA

[The list is not exhaustive. In counting the lines, the heading or top line is ignored]

Page	For	Read
59	II. 22 (line 7)	V. 22
"	V. 8-10 (last line)	V. 7-10
61	१३ (line 24)	३
63	बीजफलाभावाभ्यां (line 13)	बीजफलभावाभ्यां
65	X. 32 (line 20)	X. 33
67	II. 217 (line 29)	II. 3. 17
73	IV. 39 (line 24)	IV. 3. 9
95	VI. 3. 4-5 (line 20)	VI. 1. 4-6
98	यदाश्रया तम- (line 19)	यदाश्रया क्रिया तम-
113	त्यजन्त्यन्ते (line 4)	त्यजत्यन्ते
116	तदस्तकार्ये (line 24)	तदस्तकार्यवादे
121	nor (line 14)	not
131	नैसर्गिको (line 31)	नैसर्गिकोऽथं

